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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Hervaeus Natalis: An Early "Thomist" on the Notion of Being . . . . . . ELLIOTT B. ALLEN 1

Widukind of Corvey and the "Non-Roman" Imperial Idea . . . . . . JAMES A. BRUNDAGE 15

Divine Infinity in Albert the Great's Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard . FRANCIS J. CATANIA 27

Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders, and the Security of Constantinople, 1097-1204: The Precarious Survival of an Ideal . . WILLIAM M. DALY 43

The *Preconium Augustini* of Godfrey of St. Victor PHILLIP DAMON 92

The *De contemptu mundi* of Bernardus Morvalensis, Part One: A Study in Common place . GEORGE J. ENGELHARDT 108

Caxton's *Eneydos* and the Redactions of Vergil . LOUIS BREWER HALL 136

Gilbert of Poitiers, Author of the *De Discretione animae, spiritus et mentis* commonly attributed to Achard of Saint Victor . . NICHOLAS M. HARING 148

The Fifteen Signs before the Judgement: Further Remarks . . . . WILLIAM W. HEIST 192

On the Tradition of Troilus's Vision of the Little Earth . . . . ALFRED L. KELLOGG 204

L'authenticité bernardine du sermon *In celebratione adventus* . . . . J. LECLERCQ 214

Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls . . . . MICHAEL E. MARMURA 232

Coluccio Salutati on the Poet-Teacher J. REGINALD O'DONNELL C.S.B. 240

Diversity and Community of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas . . . . J. OWENS, C.SS.R. 257

The *Problemata Determinata XLIII* ascribed to Albertus Magnus (1271) . . JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, O.P. 303

MEDIAEVALIA

Dies Dominica: Two Hiberno-Latin Texts ROBERT E. MCNALLY S.J. 355

The Relation of Books I and III of Malory's *Morte Darthur* . . . . . . CHARLES MOORMAN 361

Significance of a Day in *Troilus and Criseyde* CHARLES A. OWEN Jr. 366

The Rhymes in *Guillaume d'Angleterre* . . WILLIAM S. WOODS 370

Hervaeus Natalis: An Early "Thomist" on the Notion of Being

ELLIOTT B. ALLEN C.S.B.

AMONG the names of those whom historians have consistently regarded as early disciples and defenders of St. Thomas Aquinas, that of Hervaeus Natalis, Master of Theology at Paris and Master General of the Dominicans, has long been prominent. Hervaeus was a figure to be reckoned with in the ecclesiastical and theological life of the early 14th century. Born in Brittany in 1260, or slightly later, he entered the Dominicans in 1276, read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1302-1303. In 1307 he became Master of Theology, and was *Magister regens* until 1309 when he was elected Provincial of France. He played an increasingly active role in the affairs of his Order and in 1318 he was elected Master General of the Dominicans. He died at Narbonne on August 7, 1323, only a few weeks after the canonization of St. Thomas Aquinas, *pro qua diu laboravit.*[1]

Apart from his long career as Provincial and General, Hervaeus seems to have been an almost indefatigable controversialist and polemicist. He was especially prominent by reason of his writings and actions as Provincial against Durand of St. Porçain,[2] but he had time for others as well. A glance at his writings reveals a long series of treatises directed against the *Quodlibets* of Henry of Ghent, while there are also criticisms directed against James of Metz, Peter Auriol, and perhaps even Duns Scotus.[3] No doubt as our knowledge of this period becomes more precise the list of Hervaeus' adversaries will increase.

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[1] *Chronicle* of Orvieto (c. 1348). Cf. A. M. Viel-Girardin, *Chronique du couvent des Prêcheurs d'Orvieto*, p. 23, quoted by A. de Guimarães, "Hervé Noël († 1323): Étude Biographique," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, 8 (1938), 5-81. This study is by far the most ambitious attempt to present an exhaustive critical biography of Hervaeus. For Hervaeus' works, cf. B. Geyer, *Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie*, 11th ed. (Berlin 1928), pp. 536-537; E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York 1955), p. 747; P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, vol. 1 (Kain 1925), pp. 200-208; *Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII*^{e} *siècle*, vol. 1 (Paris 1933), pp. 199-206; B. Hauréau, "Hervé Nédélec, Général des Frères Prêcheurs," *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, vol. 34 (Paris 1915), pp. 314-351; J. Koch, "Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P.," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 26 (Münster i. W. 1927), pp. 211-216.

[2] Cf. J. Koch, *op. cit.*

[3] Cf. the works of Koch and de Guimarães already mentioned. See also R. M. Martin, *La Controverse sur le péché originel au début du XIV*^{e} *siècle: Textes inédits* (Louvain 1930). On the subject of James of Metz, see J. Koch, "Jacob von Metz, O. P., Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano," *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, 4 (1929-30), 169-232.

Generally speaking, later historians of Hervaeus Natalis follow tradition in listing him as a member of the early Thomist 'school,' but at the same time they often note that there are certain difficulties in so categorizing him. Writing in the last century, the noted Hauréau seems slightly puzzled as to how to classify Hervaeus. He writes, somewhat naively, that Natalis was, of course, a Thomist, for was he not a Dominican? But he goes on to indicate that Hervaeus' Thomism did not prevent him making rather broad concessions to nominalism.[4] In an early work, Msgr. Grabmann speaks of Hervaeus in rather enthusiastic terms: "The philosophic writings of Hervaeus Natalis defend the philosophy of Aquinas with certainty and moderation against Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Durandus, Auriol and Godfrey of Fontaines." [5] M. de Wulf, for his part, speaks of the Breton master as a Thomist more concerned with protecting than developing the doctrine of the master. He notes, however, that more than one "doctrinal peculiarity" separates Hervaeus from St. Thomas.[6] Professor Gilson has admirably collected for us an impressive list of Hervaeus' "peculiarities" :

> Among the 'doctrinal peculiarities' by which Harvey differs from Thomas, M. de Wulf (*Histoire*, III, 59), counts his rejection of the 'real distinction of essence and existence'. Another one is his insistence on the distinction between the 'subjective being' of the act of knowing (as a psychological fact) and the 'objective being' of the thing as an object of cognition. Harvey situated the reality that answers universals (general concepts) in a 'real conformity' species; this invited him to attribute a certain numerical unity to the species. Individuation is not accounted for by quantified matter (Thomas), nor by 'hecceity' (Scotus); the external cause for the distinction of individuals is their efficient cause; the internal cause for it is essence itself, which individualizes its own accidents. All these positions are typical of the early fourteenth century.[7]

Follower and defender of St. Thomas though he claimed to be (and, indeed, often was), the quality of Hervaeus' Thomism does seem to have been "strained" in his solution to many rather crucial philosophical problems. The very possibility of classifying Natalis in any school has, as a matter of fact, been questioned.[8] But the awareness of Hervaeus' divergencies from St. Thomas remains rather general, for very little detailed work has been done on the

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[4] *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, vol. 2, part 2 (Paris 1880), p. 238.

[5] *Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin von der Kirche als Gotteswerk* (Regensburg 1903), p. 34. Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 747-748.

[6] *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 6th ed., vol. 3 (Louvain 1947), p. 59.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 747.

[8] *Ibid.*

Hervaean texts themselves. Hervaeus in this respect is in the same position as many another fourteenth century writer. His importance has been proclaimed often enough, but relatively little is known at first hand of what he has to say.

Among the areas inviting investigation is that of the metaphysics of being, especially the problem of the structure of finite being in terms of the interrelationship between essence and *esse.* Such an investigation would seem fitted to yield at least two fruitful results: 1) an understanding of a key metaphysical position in the thought of a man intimitely engaged in the doctrinal developments and controversies of the early years of the fourteenth century; 2) a possible clue to the fate of the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas at the hands of his early disciples.

A reading of the *Quaestiones in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*[9] reveals that while Hervaeus does make explicit reference to St. Thomas, there is little or no evidence of any firm grasp of the latter's doctrine of being. On the crucial problem of the interrelationship between essence and *esse* in created being, Hervaeus is peculiarly elusive. The witness of the Hervaean *Sentences* on this problem may be conveniently summarized in the following statements: 1) Hervaeus declines on numerous occasions to make any definitive decision as to the distinction or identity of essence and *esse*, preferring to avoid commitment as he handles problems wherein the point naturally arises;[10] 2) at the end of a presentation of various solutions to this problem, Natalis refers the reader to another, unnamed work, very likely the *De esse et essentia*, in which he has treated the issue at length, nor does he at all indicate that whatever was said therein is not still his own opinion at the time of the writing (or rather, revising), of the *Quaestiones;*[11] 3) Hervaeus, in the course of his commentary on the *Sentences*, handles metaphysical problems from a distinctly essentialist point of view, that is, in a perspective in which essence quite definitely holds the primacy within being.

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[9] This is the manuscript title. See B. Hauréau, *op. cit.*, p. 315. In this article, references will be made to the 1505 Venice edition of Hervaeus' Commentary on the Sentences.

[10] E.g. 1)... transeo, tum quia non est multum certum quod in creaturis differunt re esse et essentia, tum quia si ita esset non videtur quod essentia magis haberet plurificari per esse quam e converso... I *Sent.*, d. 2, q.4, a.1, f.13rb. 2) Et ideo concludo ex praemissis quod in essentia omnis formae quae recipit magis et minus est aliqua latitudo. Et non solum in esse: sed etiam in essentia sive esse sit idem realiter cum essentia sive differat. I *Sent.*, d.17, q.4, a.2, ad 4, f.37rb. Cf. II *Sent.*, d.3, q.1, ad 2, f.8rb.; II *Sent.*, d.3, q.1, a.1, f.8ra; II *Sent.*, d.1, q.2, a.2, f.4rb; III *Sent.*, d.1, q.1, obj.2, f.2ra; III *Sent.*, d.6, q.1, a.3, ff.6rb.-6va; II *Sent.*, d.13, q.1, f.9rb.

[11] Cf. I *Sent.*, d.8, q.1, a.1. After having presented two contrary opinions on the nature of the distinction between essence and *esse*, Hervaeus closes his analysis with the remark that what has been said on the question suffices for the moment... *quia locutus sum diffuse de hoc alibi.* Now this remark apparently can only refer to the *De esse et essentia*, one of four or five tracts found grouped together under the title, *De quatuor materiis*, the whole of which is directed against the *Quodlibets* of Henry of Ghent. Cf. A. Pelzer, "Godefroid de Fontaines. Les manuscrits," *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie*, 20 (1913), 370-373; R. M. Martin,

No doubt, it would require a detailed study of the text of the Hevaean *Sentences* to justify completely this last statement, an undertaking far beyond the scope of the present article. Yet a consideration of two important problems discussed by Hervaeus in his commentary on the Lombard will present strong evidence of the difficulty of coming to any other conclusion as to the fundamental character of his metaphysics of being.

1. The problem of the unicity of esse in Christ

The problem at issue in the first text to be considered arises in the context of the theology of the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures of Christ in the unique Person of the divine Word. The discussion of the metaphysical complexities involved is not at all peculiar to Hervaeus Natalis; the question, *Utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse*, was a persistent one in the theological discussions of the time.[12] The difficulty is fundamentally one concerning the precise ontological status of the human nature of the incarnate Word. Does the humanity of Christ have in any way its own *esse*, or is the divine *esse* of the *Verbum* the unique *esse* of the God-Man?

In III *Sent.*, d.6, q.1, a.3, Hervaeus comes to grips with this controverted theological problem, and so, indirectly, with the notion of *esse* itself. Having stated and rejected two opinions which would eliminate any human *esse* in the incarnate Word, Natalis presents a final long and rather complex opi-

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"La table de l'ouvrage *De Quatuor Materiis* d'Hervé de Nédéllec, O.P.," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 18 (1929), 291-295. All of the historians already mentioned place the *De esse et essentia* in the period 1302-1307, that is after the reading of the *Sentences* and before the reception of the Master's degree. Manuscript evidence confirms the fact that Hervaeus composed this work as a Bachelor. The following attribution is found in the upper right margin of *MS.* Vatic. lat. 859, f. 40r: *De essentia et esse in creaturis: determinatio Hervei bachelarii Parisiensis contra Gantensem.* While the *Sentences* are hesitant, the *De esse et essentia* firmly defends the denial of any distinction between essence and *esse.* For analysis and text of this work, see E. B. Allen, C.S.B., "The notion of being in Hervaeus Natalis: Text and Study" (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Toronto, 1958). A critical edition of the *De esse et essentia* is being prepared for publication, and we hope in a future article to present an analysis of the doctrine contained in this interesting work.

[12] For texts on this problem: E. Hocedez, "Quaestio de Unico Esse in Christo a Doctoribus Saeculi XIII Disputata," *Textus et Documenta, Series Theologica*, 14 (Rome 1933). It is interesting to note that contemporary Catholic theologians are discussing this problem with renewed interest, particularly in terms of variant interpretations of St. Thomas. Cf. the articles and notices by H. Diepen, J-H. Nicholas, M. Corvez, in *Revue Thomiste*, 53 (1953), 28-80; 421-428; 432-434. Cf. also J. Maritain, "On the notion of subsistence," *Progress in Philosophy* (Milwaukee 1955), pp. 29-45.

nion which he himself prefers as being more probable. This theory makes a first division of *esse* or *existere* into *subsistence* and *existence-in*, so that as being (*ens*) is divided into subsisting being (*ens, subsistentes*), and 'being-in-another' (*ens in alio* or *inens*), so existence (*existere*) is divided into *subsistere* and *inexistere*. To exist is to be absolutely; it is the *esse* of the supposit which is involved here. *Inexistere* is, on the other hand, the *esse* of an accident, or of anything, such as the human nature of Christ, which exists in dependence on something else.[13]

The *esse* of human nature remains in Christ, not as *esse simpliciter*, or the *esse* by which a being subsists, but rather according to the mode of 'existing-in'. The reason for this is that in Christ the human nature does not, strictly, exist, but rather is a being by its relation to another on which it depends. The *esse* of the human nature is not, then, 'being-in-itself,' but rather 'being-in-another'.[14]

This position is reasonable, argues Hervaeus, because just as that being which is substance is related to that which is accident, so is substantial existence related to the 'existence-in' proper to an accident. Now in the case at hand a substantial nature, apt in itself to constitute being absolutely, has by the divine power become a 'being-in-another'. In like manner, then, it is not unfitting that by the divine power, substantial, created *esse*, apt in itself to be an *esse simpliciter*, has become an *inesse*, in such a way that this *inesse* comes together with the divine *esse* in one *suppositum*.[15]

This formulation contains the solution which seems to Hervaeus to present the 'more probable' position on the matter. It is not an easy text to interpret, but perhaps some general observations can be made on the significance of the Hervaean doctrine.

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[13] Et ideo est alia opinio quae dicit quod esse humanae naturae remansit in Christo, sed non sub ratione esse simpliciter sive sub ratione eius quod est subsistere. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod ipsi dividunt esse sive existere in subsistere et inexistere, ita quod sicut ens dividitur in ens subsistens et in ens in alio quod potest dici inens, ita et existere secundum eos dividitur in subsistere et inexistere, quorum primum est esse simpliciter et esse suppositi vel modum suppositi habentis; sicut est in quantitate in sacramento altaris. Secundum autem scilicet inexistere, est accidentis quantum ad hoc quod alii innititur, sicut est humana natura in Christo. f.6va.

[14] ... esse humanae naturae remansit in Christo non sub ratione esse simpliciter sive sub ratione subsistendi, sed sub ratione inessendi, quia illud esse non est ipsius naturae in se, quia ipsa non est, sed est ens in ordine ad aliud cui innititur. *Ibid.*

[15] ...sicut ens quod est substantia se habet ad hoc quod sit quoddam inens, ita esse substantiale se habet ad hoc quod possit esse quoddam inesse sive inexistere. Cum ergo natura substantialis quae secundum se nata est constituere ens simpliciter virtute divina fiat quoddam inens, ita etiam non est inconveniens si virtute divina esse substantiale creatum quod de se natum est esse quoddam esse simpliciter fiat quoddam inesse, ita quod illud esse cum esse divino non faciant duo supposita, sed concurrant ad unum suppositum, ita quod unum eorum non sit esse simpliciter, sed inesse. *Ibid.*

In the first place, the division of *esse* or *existere* into *subsistere* and *inexistere* is crucial. Herveaus' rather eager, though not definitive, acceptance of it affords a valuable insight into his notion of being and existence. On the basis of this division of *esse* and the use made of it, one is strongly tempted to suspect that in the Hervaean *Sentences*, *esse* does not normally denote existential act, but rather at most a sort of mode or determination of a nature. The use of *subsistere* as one kind of *esse* does not necessarily, of course, eliminate *esse* as supra-essential act of being, but it does indicate that the attention of Hervaeus' metaphysical analysis is directed along another line. The juxtaposition of *subsistere* and *inexistere* as types of *esse* might well indicate that for our author *esse* is thought of especially as a sort of status or mode of a nature. For example, would it be inaccurate to say that, within the present context, for a substance to exist is for it to subsist, to be through itself, i.e. to be a substance? Now certainly it is true that for a substance to be is for it to be a substance, but more must be said by a metaphysician who also holds *esse* to be existential act. Is it not possible, considering Hervaeus' references to St. Thomas in the *Sentences*, that, at most, the doctrine expounded is what Professor Gilson has so felicitously termed a "Thomism of substance"?[16]

Secondly, this interpretation is supported by the statement: *Dicunt ergo quod esse humanae naturae remansit in Christo non sub ratione esse simpliciter sive sub ratione subsistendi, sed sub ratione inessendi, quia illud esse non est ipsius naturae in se, quia ipsa non est, sed est ens in ordine ad aliud cui innititur.*[17] What is especially noteworthy here is the specific indentification of the notions of *esse simpliciter* and subsistence (*ratio subsistendi*). Hisa nalysis starts with nature or essence, of which *esse* is a sort of quality or determination or status. Hence the insistence that the *esse* of human nature remains in Christ, not indeed as a *subsisting-in-itself*, but rather as an *existing-in-dependence-on-another*. The human nature of Christ, apt in itself to constitute a being absolutely (*ens simpliciter*), has become a *being-in* (although not an accident). So also, then, the *esse* of this nature is no longer an *esse simpliciter*, but an *inesse*, following, as it were, the nature concerned.

These observations do not at all deny that such notions might be compatible with a metaphysics of *esse* as existential act. But they do not at all seem orientated in this direction, and indeed, the whole approach appears to ignore completely, if not completely to deny, any such meaning of *esse*.

There has already been occasion to point out that the problem of the unicity or plurality of *esse* in the subsistent individual arises from a consideration of the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures of Christ in the unique Person of the divine Word. In this connection it is interesting to see

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[16] "Cajetan et l'existence," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, 15 (1953), 285.

[17] f.6.va.

Hervaeus Natalis in one of those rare instances when he is explicitly engaged in interpreting the text of St. Thomas Aquinas. In the text referred to above (III *Sent.*, d.6, q.1, a.3), Hervaeus is concerned with the precise problem of the unicity or plurality of *esse* in Christ. After defending a doctrine of plurality of *esse*, he turns to the historical question of the true position of St. Thomas. Hervaeus' opponents, denying any human *esse* in Christ, had claimed St. Thomas in support of their position. It is Natalis' contention, however, that the Angelic Doctor is really a supporter of his own position, rather than that of his opponents.

The first appeal made by Hervaeus is to *Quodl.* IX, q.2, a.1 and 2, wherein, he claims, St. Thomas concludes his argumentation by stating that in Christ there is but one *esse personale.*[18] His point is, of course, that this does not at all eliminate an *esse humanae naturae.* A reading of the text of St. Thomas however, does not seem to justify the conclusion which Hervaeus has drawn from it. There is, as a matter of fact, no mention of *esse personale* contained therein. After discussing the various meanings of *esse*, the 'proper' and 'true' attribution of *esse* as act to substance only, and its secondary attribution to principles by which (*quo*) a thing is, St. Thomas finally concludes that there is in Christ only one *esse substantiale*, although His accidental *esse* is multiple.[19]

In this text, St. Thomas does not at all attribute any sort of human *esse* to the human nature of Christ as such. What he does do is to admit that if it be posited that the human nature is separated from the divinity, then indeed it will have its own *esse*, which statement seems rather to go exactly contrary to Hervaeus' intent.[20]

Hervaeus' main interest, however, and evidently that of his opponents also, is the discussion of this problem in the *Tertia Pars* of the *Summa.* Hervaeus admits that in the article at issue (III, 17, 2), St. Thomas points out that if the human nature in Christ were joined to the divine Person only accidentally, there would be two acts of *esse*. In fact, however, the human nature has been assumed in the unity of the supposit in such a way that there is there but one *esse suppositi*.[21] Natalis notes that because of this, some have interpreted St. Thomas to mean that in Christ the act of being of human nature remains in no way, either as *inesse*, or as *subsistere*.[22]

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[18] Quod autem haec et non alia immediate posita fuerit de mente Sancti Thomae patet respicienti ipsum in IX Quolibet, q.2, articulo primo et secundo ex hoc quod semper in fine deductionum suarum concludit quod non est in Christo nisi unum esse personale. ff6.va.-6vb.

[19] Et sic patet quod... oportet dicere quod in Christo est unum *esse* substantiale, secundum quod *esse* est suppositi proprie, quamvis sit in eo multiplex *esse* accidentale. Mandonnet ed., p. 343 (It is art. 3 in this edition). We should not imagine, as Hervaeus does, that St. Thomas holds for a *proprium esse accidentale*, over and above and added to the *esse substantiale.* Cf. J. Albertson, "The *esse* of accidents according to St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, 30 (1952-53), 265-278.

[20] Si tamen ponatur humanitas a Divinitate separari, tunc humanitas suum *esse* habebit aliud ab *esse* divino. Non enim impediebat quin proprium *esse* haberet nisi hoc quod non erat per se subsistens; sicut si arca esset quoddam individuum naturale, ipsa tota non haberet nisi unum *esse*; quaelibet tamen partium ejus ab arca separata proprium esse habebit. *Ibid.* Mandonnet ed., pp. 342-343.

It will be noted that the terms in which the problem is posed are those of the division of *esse* into *subsistere* and *inesse* (or *inexistere*). Hervaeus next makes a distinction between the way in which an accident 'happens' to, or comes to a substance, and the way in which one substance comes into relation with another, a distinction whereby he intends to solve the problem in his own way. In the first case, the plurality of accidents (e.g. whiteness, music, heat), does not involve a multiplication of the *esse* of the substance, which remains one. On the other hand, when one substance is joined accidentally to another (*advenit accidentaliter alteri*), as clothes to a man, the accidental union does not eliminate the plurality of supposits nor, consequently, the plurality of *esse*. In like manner, if human nature, which is a certain substance, were related to the divine Person as clothing to a man, then there would indeed remain two supposits and, consequently, two *esse simpliciter*. On the basis of such a relationship God would not truly be man, but rather 'humanized,' so to speak.[23]

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[21] ...ipse dicit in tertia parte quod si natura humana adveniret personae divinae accidentaliter essent ibi plura esse. Nunc autem, quia in unitate suppositi assumitur, non est ibi nisi unum esse simpliciter suppositi sive personale. f.6vb. The relevant texts from the corpus of III, 17, 2 are as follows:

Sed illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se, impossible est in una hypostasi vel persona multiplicari, quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse.

Si igitur humana natura adveniret Filio Dei, non hypostatice vel personaliter, sed accidentaliter, sicut quidam posuerunt, oporteret ponere in Christo duo esse, unum quidem secundum quod est Deus; aliud autem secundum quod est homo.

Sic igitur cum humana natura coniungatur Filio Dei hypostatice vel personaliter, ut supra dictum est, et non accidentaliter, consequens est quod secundum humanam naturam non adveniat sibi novum esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam, ut scilicet persona illa iam dicatur subsistere, non solum secundum divinam naturam, sed etiam secundum humanam.

[22] Ex quo videtur quibusdam quod intentio eius sit quod actus essendi naturae humanae nullo modo manet, nec scilicet ut inesse, quia tunc esset accidentale; multo autem minus potest manere ut subsistere, sicut patet ex supradictis. f.6vb.

[23]. Sed hoc dicentes non attendunt differentiam inter accidere quod convenit accidenti proprie dicto, sicut albedo dicitur accidere homini, et accidere substantiae secundum quod una substantia dicitur accidentaliter advenire alteri, sicut vestis advenit homini, quia plurificato primo cui advenit esse, non plurificatur esse suppositi, sicut in homine albo et calido non sunt duo esse suppositi; sed quando una substantia advenit accidentaliter alteri ut vestis homini, non tollitur diversum esse suppositi ex tali accidente sive ex adiuncto accidentali. Unde homo et vestis sunt duo supposita. Unde homo non est vestis licet sit vestitus. Simi-

St. Thomas' intention, according to the Hervaean interpretation, is to point out this last fact — that accidental union in the Incarnation would result in two supposits and so two *esse simpliciter*.[24] The Angelic Doctor does not at all intend to deny the continuation of some sort of *esse humanae naturae* in the humanity of Christ. According to Natalis, the union is indeed such that the human nature depends *per se* on the divine supposit in such a way that it has no *esse* except in itself, i.e. evidently in its own being as a nature. The *esse* of human nature still remains, not indeed as *esse simpliciter* or as that *esse* which is *subsistere*, but rather as a certain *inesse*, without, however, inhering as an accident in the divine supposit.[25]

Such is the rather complex formulation which Hervaeus Natalis believes not only to be true in itself, but also the correct understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. The division of *esse* into *subsistere* and *inesse*, and its relation to essence (whether identical or not), is such that a proper *esse*, conceived as a sort of attribute or status of *essence*, must remain even in the humanity of Christ. In the present case, then, this human essence has its own human *esse*, not indeed a *subsistere*, as would be normal, but transformed, as it were, into a certain *inesse*, consequent upon its relationship to the divine Person. It has an 'existence-in' the divine supposit; it does not of itself subsist, yet as a substantial nature it does not inhere in the Person of the Word in the manner of an accident.

The explanation is involved and complicated and difficult to express; yet it does not lack a certain internal consistency. Given his particular way of approaching *esse* through essence, and his distinction of *esse* into *subsistere* and *inesse*, Natalis' conclusion is inevitable. As an interpretation of *Summa Theologiae* III, 17, 2, however, it seems to bear little resemblance to the text it seeks to explain. It is true that St. Thomas does not deny explicitly that an *esse humanae naturae* remains in Christ, but on the other hand, for him there is no such *esse* in the way in which Hervaeus understands it. St. Thomas admits in the article in question that *esse* pertains to both the hypostasis and the nature. But it pertains to the hypostasis or supposit as to that which is

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liter si humana natura quae substantia quaedam est adveniret accidentaliter personae divinae sicut vestis advenit homini, tunc essent duo esse suppositi et duo esse simpliciter, nec posset dici Deus homo, licet posset dici aliquo modo humanatus, id est humanitati aliquo modo coniunctus, sicut non dicitur homo vestis sed vestitus. f.6vb.

[24] Vult ergo S. Thomas quod si humana natura adveniret personae divinae accidentaliter, cum non posset advenire accidentaliter nisi sicut una substantia dicitur accidere alteri et non cedere in unitatem suppositi, essent ibi simpliciter duo esse. *Ibid.*

[25] ... facta unione in supposito, secundum quam natura humana per se dependet a supposito divino ita quod non habet esse nisi in se, adhuc maneat esse humanae naturae, sed non sub ratione esse simpliciter vel sub ratione eius quod est subsistere, sed manet sub ratione inesse, ita tamen quod accipiatur absque inhaerentia ad suppositum divinum. *Ibid.*

or has *esse*; it pertains to the nature, on the other hand, as to that *by which* something has *esse*.[26]

St. Thomas' final conclusion in the article is that since the human nature is united to the Son hypostatically or personally, there comes to Him no new *esse personale* according to the human nature, but only a new relationship of the pre-existing *esse personale* to human nature, so that now that Person is said to subsist not only according to divine nature, but also according to a human nature. There is no mention of any kind of *esse* proper to the human nature which must remain to that nature even in union with the *Verbum*.

Even though Hervaeus is far less definite in the *Sentences* than he is, for example, in the *De esse et essentia* as to the precise meaning of *esse*, there can be no doubt that his attempt to maintain an *esse humanae naturae* in Christ is the fruit of a metaphysics in which the real is seen primarly in terms of essence, its ontological center. As to the Hervaean attempt to read St. Thomas, it can only be suggested that Hervaeus is constrained to interpret St. Thomas as he does because his personal metaphysics is not that of his master; he can be loyal to Thomas only if he understands Thomas in his own way.[27]

2. The infinity of the divine power

In I *Sent.*, d.43, q.1, Hervaeus Natalis conducts a rather interesting discussion on the power of God: *Utrum potentia Dei sit infinita.*[28] Although the text is very limited in its scope, there are certain overtones evident within Hervaeus' approach to the problem of the infinity of the divine power which are intriguing, to say the least. In isolation such impressions perhaps mean little enough, and it is true that overemphasis here would be dangerous. The fact remains, however, that certain aspects of Natalis' manner of handling this question seem to betray, at least indirectly and by implication, a lack of any firm grasp of a dominance of existential act within being, and so corroborate within another context tendencies which have been noted when his thought is more directly confronted with problems involving the nature of being and the inter-relationship of its principles. Although the revelations of this text on the infinity of God's power can be considered as little more than straws in the metaphhsical wind, it is a fact that even straws give some indication of the direction of the wind, in metaphysics as well as in meteorology.

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[26] Esse autem pertinet et ad naturam et ad hypostasim; ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse... *Summa Theol.* III, 17, 2.

[27] *Ibid.* Our interest in St. Thomas' position at the moment is limited to the use which Hervaeus Natalis makes of Thomistic texts on the point in question. We do not at all intend to enter in detail into the very difficult question of St. Thomas' own doctrine of the *esse Christi*. We should note however that controversies over the meaning of his teaching are still contemporary with our own day. For references on these controversies, cf. *supra*, n. 12.

[28] f.61va.

Having first distinguished within the concept of infinite power, infinity of duration (which infinity obviously belongs to the divine power),[29] and infinity of force (*vigor*) or perfection, the *Doctor Rarus* goes on to examine this latter notion, with which he is properly concerned. It is, as it were, a question of intensive rather than of extensive infinity.

The analysis proper to the notion of what has been termed 'intensive infinity' proceeds from the observation that the power of God can be considered as exhibiting a threefold relationship: to the essence in which it is rooted; to the possible objects to which it might extend; and to the manner or mode of its activity.[30] It is in the discussion of the first of these relationships that there is evidence of a certain essentialist tendency which has already been noted in the preceding section.

The Hervaean analysis at this point is quite clear and direct: compared to the essence in which it is rooted, the power of God is quite evidently of infinite perfection, and this precisely because the divine essence is itself unlimited and infinite in perfection. The argument here conceals no subtleties.[31]

The infinity of the divine essence is shown in turn by the fact that it is not limited to any genus or species. Through his own essence God is subsistent, knowing, just, willing, powerful, and indeed, all other attributes which imply perfection, absolutely speaking.[32] The conclusion of this is, of course, that the divine essence is of infinite perfection, and so infinity of perfection belongs also to the divine power which is rooted in that essence.

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[29] Primo, distinguo de infinitate potentiae et dico quod potest dici infinita vel in duratione vel in vigore. Si loquamur de infinitate in duratione, quia eius duratio non finitur, sic constat potentiam Dei esse infinitam; et etiam alia sunt et possunt esse sic infinita sicut sol et ea quae sunt intransmutabilia secundum substantiam et proprietates suas; quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit infinitum duratione sufficit quod sit natum semper manere in eadem dispositione. Talia autem sunt intransmutabilia inquantum sunt huiusmodi, ideo etc. *Ibid.*

[30] Alio modo dicitur infinitas potentiae secundum vigorem, ut si aliquis calor esset in infinitum intensus, talis calor esset potentia calefactiva infinita in vigore. Si ergo quaeratur utrum potentia Dei sit sic infinita in vigore et perfectione, tunc adhuc distinguendum est de infinitate talis potentiae divinae, quia potentia Dei potest comparari vel considerari per comparationem ad essentiam in qua radicatur, vel per comparationem ad obiectum possibile in quod potest, vel per comparationem ad modum agendi. *Ibid.*

[31] Si ergo comparetur potentia divina ad essentiam in qua radicatur, sic est planum quod potentia Dei est infinita, quia potentia dicitur infinita perfectione per comparationem ad essentiam in qua radicatur quando essentia in qua radicatur est illimitata et infinitae perfectionis. Sed essentia divina in qua radicatur potentia divina est infinitae perfectionis. Ergo etc. *Ibid.*

[32] Sed essentia divina est huiusmodi, quia in ipsa nullo addito includitur quicquid perfectionis est simpliciter in aliquo genere; per ipsam enim Deus est subsistens sciens iustus volens et potens et omnia alia quae simpliciter perfectionem important; ergo essentia divina in qua potentia divina radicatur est infinitae perfectionis... f.61vb.

Such in brief is Hervaeus Natalis' doctrine on the infinity of the divine power. The argumentation is clear and to the point and of itself is perhaps of no great metaphysical moment. Yet, as has been said, for the purposes of this investigation it does have an interesting aspect, precisely because of the terms in which the problem is discussed and resolved. The point is one of omission: there is in the course of the Hervaean analysis no mention of the divine *esse.* The infinity of the divine power is demonstrated exclusively by reference to the infinite perfection of the divine essence. Now it cannot be maintained that such a procedure is illegitimate, even for a metaphysician holding for the primacy of *esse* as existential act, nor can such an omission prove that the author does not regard the act of *esse* as primary within being. The fact remains, however, that Hervaeus once again exhibits a sort of spontaneous tendency to turn to essence rather than *esse* in conducting a metaphysical inquiry. It may, indeed, be rash to conclude very much on the basis of this procedure in the present context, but does it not at least tend to illumine and strengthen the impression that in the *Sentences* Hervaeus Natalis is a stranger to a metaphysics of being as existential act? The point may possibly be more sharply etched if the Hervaean approach is contrasted with the procedure of St. Thomas Aquinas when confronted with the same problem.

In his own work on the *Sentences*, St. Thomas discusses the infinity of the power of God in Book I, d.43, q.1, a.1.[33] In this article, St. Thomas, like his 'disciple' Hervaeus, roots the divine power in the divine essence, the infinity of the one thus being linked to the infinity of the other. In his discussion of the infinity of the divine essence, however, he includes arguments not found in the Hervaean text. The core of the difference of approach is to be found in the following text:

> Et ideo illud quod habet esse absolutum et nullo modo receptum in aliquo, immo ipsemet est suum esse, illud est infinitum simpliciter; et ideo essentia ejus infinita est, et bonitas ejus, et quidquid aliud de eo dicitur; quia nihil eorum limitatur ad aliquid, sicut quod recipitur in aliquo limitatur ad capacitatem ejus. Et ex hoc quod essentia est infinita, sequitur quod potentia ejus infinita sit...[34]

Like Hervaeus, then, Thomas Aquinas in his *Sentences* makes the infinity of the divine power immediately dependent on the infinity of the divine essence: *Et ex hoc quod essentia est infinita, sequitur quod potentia ejus infinita sit...* The additions to the treatment are, however, significant as indicative of a more existential orientation on the part of St. Thomas even in this rather early work. The infinity of the essence of God is not, as it were, treated here as the ultimate principle operative in the establishment of the infinity of the power of God. The divine essence is indeed infinite, but precisely because God is His own *esse*, an *esse* unreceived and unlimited by any receiver: *et ideo essentia ejus infinita est, et bonitas ejus, et quidquid aliud de eo dicitur.* There is no contradiction between the Thomistic and the Hervaean text, yet the latter lacks the existential perspective of the former, perhaps a minor indication of fundamental divergence, but surely not a totally insignificant one.

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[33] Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, pp. 1002-1004.

[34] *Ibid.* p. 1003.

The treatment of the same point in the *Summa Theologiae* reinforces the contrast. The argument of the *Summa* proceeds immediately from the infinity of the *esse* of God to the infinity of His power. The analysis is essentially the same, but the very brevity of the article in the *Summa* illuminates more sharply the Thomistic approach. God's *esse* is infinite, hence it is necessary that His active power also be infinite. St. Thomas goes on to explain that power in an agent is proportionate to the principle through which the agent acts. Now, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, it follows that His power is infinite. Here also, then, infinity of power is immediately linked to infinity of essence, but the latter is seen as immediately derivative from infinity of *esse*.[35] It is this latter step which is completely lacking in the analyses of Hervaeus Natalis in his commentary on the *Sentences*.[36] The conclusion, or more accurately, the impression, created by this approach is quite evident. In isolation it lacks any probative powers as to the meaning and position of *esse* within the Hervaean metaphysics of being; the tendency it reveals, however, cannot be lightly dismissed.

Before concluding this brief introduction to the metaphysics of Hervaeus' *Sentences*, something should be said about the peculiar hesitancy of the eminent Dominican theologian concerning the specific problem of the nature of the distinction between essence and *esse*. It has already been shown that in this work Natalis consistently refuses to define clearly his own position on this issue. What is the meaning of this refusal in the face of the open denial of any real composition that has been discovered in the text of the *De esse et essentia*?[37] It is true that the character of the two works is quite different. The *De esse et essentia* is a polemical work written expressly against Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibets*. The structure of created being is a central issue between Henry and Giles of Rome, and Hervaeus can hardly avoid the issue (not that he shows any desire to do so). Yet, even though the Hervaean *Sentences* is a much more general work, the problem does arise quite often in its pages, and in each instance Hervaeus avoids any definitive declaration of his position. Is he now less sure of himself? Or has he become aware that some sort of real composition of essence and *esse* is indeed contained in the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, and does he therefore loyally avoid any direct criticism of it? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, the fact still remains that Hervaeus refers the reader of his *Sentences* to what is almost certainly the *De esse et essentia*, wherein he explicitly and repeatedly denies any real distinction between essence and being (*esse*). When it becomes possible to have access to the entire Hervaean corpus, it may become possible to give an assured answer to these questions. All that one can do at the moment is to point out the need for such answers before it is finally and definitively possible to assess the relationship of Hervaeus Natalis to St. Thomas Aquinas.

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[35] Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, secundum hoc potentia activa invenitur in Deo, secundum quod ipse actu est. Esse autem eius est infinitum, inquantum non est limitatum per aliquid recipiens, ut patet per haec quae supra dicta sunt, cum de infinitate divinae essentiae ageretur. Unde necesse est quod activa potentia Dei sit infinita. In omnibus enim agentibus hoc invenitur quod quanto aliquod agens perfectius habet formam qua agit, tanto est maior eius potentia in agendo. Sicut quanto est aliquid magis calidum, tanto habet maiorem potentiam ad calefaciendum; et haberet utique potentiam infinitam ad calefaciendum, si eius calor esset infinitus. Unde cum ipsa essentia divina, per quam Deus agit, sit infinita, sicut supra ostensum est, sequitur quod eius potentia sit infinita. *Sum. Theol.* I, 25, 2.

[36] Of course, as the texts have revealed, St. Thomas also immediately roots infinity of power in infinity of essence, for the essence as the specifying principle is that *through* which a being (in this case God) acts. The ultimate source of this infinity is, however, the infinity of unreceived *esse*. Cf. *De Potentia* I, 2, where the same problem is discussed even more strongly in terms of the infinity of act and *esse*.

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[37] Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

Widukind of Corvey and the "Non-Roman" Imperial Idea

JAMES A. BRUNDAGE

I

To speak with any precision of the "empire" or of an "emperor" in western Europe in the tenth century, it is necessary at the outset to examine the meanings assigned to these terms by contemporary writers. The object of his paper is to examine the meaning and significance of the terms empire and emperor as they are used by one historian of the period, Widukind of Corvey. The question specifically at issue here, then, is "How did Widukind formulate the qualifications for imperial office?"

In the tenth century, one or more of three conditions was generally held prerequisite to the imperial office. First of all, it was commonly held by theorists, such as the unknown author of the *Libellus de imperatoria potestate*, that an emperor was a ruler *super totum mundum aut qui praecellit in eo*, or, more concretely, a king who ruled over other kings.[1] This was a fundamental qualification for the title *imperator*, or *Caesar*, or *augustus* and, indeed, it is still commonly so considered.[2] That Widukind considered this "rule over other kings" a *sine qua non* for an emperor is abundantly evident in his *Res gestae Saxonicae* and can hardly be questioned in view of his use of such phrases as *rex erit et imperator multorum populorum*,[3] *cuius potentiae maiestatem non*

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[1] Quoted in Martin Lintzel, *Die Kaiserpolitik Ottos des Grossen* (Munich and Berlin 1943), p. 53. Lintzel goes on to remark (p. 54): "Diese Anschauung hatte nun in neunten Jahrhundert eine erhebliche staatsrechtliche und politische Bedeutung und damit zugleich eine neue historische Begründung bekommen." Lintzel's discussion of the subject (pp. 53-57) is provocative and to the point. For an extended critique of Lintzel's point of view, see Fritz Rörig, "Die Kaiserpolitik Ottos des Grossen; Gedanken zu dem gleichnamigen Buch Martin Lintzels," in *Festschrift Edmund E. Stengel zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. Dezember 1949 dargebracht* (Münster and Köln, 1952) pp. 202-222. Cf. also Helmut Beumann, "Romkaiser und fränkisches Reichsvolk," in *Festschrift Edmund E. Stengel*, pp. 163-164; Robert Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne dans l'empire germanique médiéval* (Paris 1950), p. 57.

[2] See, for example, *Webster's New International Dictionary*, second edition (Springfield Mass. 1957), *s.v.* "emperor" and "empire".

[3] *Widukindi monachi Corbeiensis rerum gestarum Saxonicarum libri tres*, ed. H. E. Lohmann and Paul Hirsch, fifth edition, *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum* (Hannover 1935), I, 25 (p. 38). This edition will be cited throughout. Other editions con-

solum Germania, Italia atque Gallia, sed tota fere Europa non sustinet,[4] *dominus pene totius Europae,*[5] and other similar expressions when referring to men whom he calls emperor.[6]

A second requirement, deemed necessary by more than one tenth century theorist for the office of emperor, was acclamation by the army. The theory that "the army makes the emperor" is an ancient one, expressed in classic form by St. Jerome in a letter written about the year 400, in which, while speaking about episcopal elections, he alludes to imperial election, saying that the presbyters elect one of themselves bishop, *quomodo si exercitus Imperatorem faciat.*[7] This martial acclamation has, of course, deep roots in the history of the later Roman empire and was a popular concept with a number of tenth century political and legal writers. It was expressly singled out for attack by Atto of Vercelli in his *Polypticum.*[8]

A third possible avenue to the title of "emperor" lay through papal consecration, anointing, and coronation. This was a theory especially dear to the papacy, for it tended to leave the final decision among candidates for the imperial office to the popes. In this theory and its consequences lay the basis of most of the claims of the papacy to interfere in imperial politics in the late eleventh century. This theory, that an emperor, in order to lay legitimate claim to the imperial crown, must receive his title from papal hands was not, however, solely a Roman or papal belief. In 871, for example, Louis II is quoted as writing to the Byzantine Emperor, Basil the Macedonian:

> Nam Francorum principes primo reges, deinde vero imperatores dicti sunt, hii dumtaxat, qui a Romano pontifice ad hoc oleo sancto perfusi sunt. In qua etiam Karolus Magnus, abavus noster, unctione huiusmodi per summum pontificem delibutus, primus ex gente ac genealogia nostra, pietate in eo habundante, et imperator dictus et christus Domini factus

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sulted were the first, edited by Georg Heinrich Waitz, in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores* III, 406-467 (1839), the third, edited by Waitz in the *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum* (Hannover 1882), and the German translation edited by Paul Hirsch in *Die Geschichtsschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit* XXXIII (Leipzig 1931).

[4] Widukind, I, 34 (p. 48).

[5] Widukind, III, 46 (p. 127).

[6] Helmut Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei: Untersuchungen zur Geschichtsschreibung und Ideengeschichte des 10. Jahrhunderts* (Weimar 1950), pp. 230-231, 252-256, 259-265; Beumann, "Romkaiser," pp. 163-164; Folz, *loc. cit.*; Carl Ermann, *Forschungen zur politischen Ideenwelt des Frühmittelalters*, ed. Friedrich Baethgen (Berlin 1951), p. 46.

[7] St. Jerome, *Epistolae*, in Migne, PL 22, 1194; cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 229; Percy Ernst Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio: Studien und Texte zur Geschichte des römischen Erneuerungsgedankens vom Ende des karolingischen Reiches bis zum Investiturstreit*, two volumes (Leipzig, Berlin 1929) I, 80 and n. 2.

[8] Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio*, I, 80: "Unter den von Atto gegeisselten Möglichkeiten [scil.: zur Krone zu gelangen] ist gleichfalls aufgezählt, dass die Grossen oder auch die Milites einen Fürsten einsetzen."

> est, praesertim cum saepe tales ad imperium asciti, qui nulla divina operatione per pontificum ministerium, proposita solum a senatu et populo, nichil horum curantibus, imperatoria dignitate potiti sunt; nonnulli vero nec sic, set tantum a militibus sunt clamati et in imperio stabiliti sunt, ita ut etiam horum quidam a feminis, quidam autem hoc atque alio modo ad imperii Romani sceptra promoti sunt.[9]

The theory that papal coronation and approbation were necessary qualifications for an emperor was elaborated by Leo IV, John VIII, Eugenius Vulgarius and others in the ninth and tenth centuries.[10]

These three main theories of the requirements for the title of emperor were held variously and in varying combinations by ninth and tenth century political philosophers, but throughout the main lines of thought remain clear. We may speak, then, of a "non-Roman" imperial idea, which means a political theory in virtue of which an emperor is qualified for that office and title by either or both of the first two prerequisites enumerated above.[11] This "non-Roman" conception is opposed to the "Roman" imperial theory, which centered around the third of the above concepts, which might be held alone or in combination with either or both of the other concepts.

There remains, however, another way in which we may differentiate between Roman and non-Roman concepts of the medieval empire, for, in addition to the above distinctions, we may classify theories of imperial authority with regard to the origins which they impute to the imperial power.

The medieval empire may, first of all, be considered a continuation of the Roman empire of classical times, and the medieval emperors may be considered successors of Augustus or Constantine. Many theoretical and practical considerations may be brought against such an interpretation of the medieval empire, but the idea was, nonetheless, important and widely held.[12]

The empire of the west in the tenth century might, secondly, be considered a renewal and continuation of the empire of Charlemagne and, in fact, it was so considered by a large and important number of contemporaries.[13] Otto I and his circle seem to have subscribed to such a theory and to have conducted themselves and their affairs consciously in accord with it.[14]

A third alternative interpretation of the tenth century empire was that it was an institution of Germanic origin, a product neither of the Franks nor of the Romans, but of the Saxons and the Anglo-Saxons.[15] The implications of this theory concerning the origins of the empire for the theory of the necessary qualifications of an emperor are obvious.[16]

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[9] This letter is quoted in the anonymous *Chronicon Salernitanum*, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores* III, 523.

[10] Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio* I, 44-67.

[11] Erdmann, *Forschungen*, pp. 1-3; Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, pp. 56-60.

[12] Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio*, I, 3-4.

[13] Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, p. 59; Erdmann, *Forschungen*, pp. 16-31.

[14] Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, pp. 60-68.

II

After outlining briefly the major points at issue in the theory of the controversy with which we are here concerned, we may now pass to the concrete problem: Widukind of Corvey and his conception of the office of emperor.

Widukind was born about 925 and became a monk of the Corvey community about 940. In the monastery he began his literary career as a writer of the lives of saints, and later, at some disputed date, he wrote the *Deeds of the Saxons*.[17] He certainly was not a member of the royal court nor was he in the princess Mathilda's retinue, as earlier writers sometimes alleged.[18] So far as can be judged from his work, Widukind was an admirer of Otto I; his admiration was, however, by no means blind adulation, for Widukind was occasionally hostile to the emperor and sometimes favored Otto's enemies. There is a sufficient number of hostile passages, indeed, to make it almost possible to argue that Widukind was an enemy of Otto's, though such a case would ultimately prove untenable.[19] Despite his failure to agree with the emperor on some points, the fact that Widukind was disposed to admire Otto stands out very definitely from his work as a whole.

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[15] Erdmann, *Forschungen*, p. 4: "Dabei kommt es für das Mittelalter nicht nur auf die Franken an... sondern auch auf die Sachsen, für die wir positive Nachrichten über das Bestehen einer Oberherrschaft haben."

[16] Erdmann, *Forschungen*, pp. 3-16; Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, pp. 58, 60-61; *Gerhardi Vita Sancti Oualdrici Episcopi*, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores* IV, 406, calls Otto an emperor on such grounds a full year before his coronation by John XII; in Ruotger's *Life of St. Bruno* (*Ruotgers Lebensbeschreibung des Erzbischofs Bruno von* Köln ed. Irene Ott, Weimar 1951; *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum*, new series, vol. X), Otto is called emperor from the beginning of his reign.

[17] Wilhelm Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter: Deutsche Kaiserzeit*, ed. Robert Holtzmann, third edition, (Tübingen 1948) I, 1, 26-27; Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 9-11; Max Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, three volumes (Munich, 1911-1931) I, 714-718.

[18] Wattenbach-Holtzmann, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen* I, 1, 28; the allegation in Robert Latouche, *Textes d'histoire médiévale, V^e^-XI^e^ siècle* (Paris 1951), p. 153, that Otto suggested to Widukind the writing of the *Res Gestae Saxonicae* seems certainly false and, in any event, no evidence is cited to support it.

[19] Cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 22; Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, pp. 54-55.

III

To discover what Widukind meant when he spoke of an "emperor," we must, then, examine his actual use of the term in the *Res gestae Saxonicae.* In speaking of Charlemagne, first of all, Widukind says that after having conquered the Saxons, Charles *imperator quippe ex rege creatus est.*[20] This phrase carries the implication that, having conquered Saxony, and having thus become the ruler of more than one people, Charlemagne was elegible for the imperial title and so was made emperor. There is a complete lack of specification as to how or by whom Charles was "created" emperor, and Widukind significantly omits all mention of the papal coronation in 800.

Widukind's remarks about Louis the Pious are equally interesting and significant:

> Inde regnante Hluthowico imperatore translatae sunt [reliquiae Sancti Viti] in Saxoniam, et ut legatus Karoli confessus est, ex hoc res Francorum coeperunt minui, Saxonum vero crescere, donec dilatatae ipsa sua iam magnitudine laborant, ut videmus in amore mundi et totius orbis capite patre tuo [i.e. Otto I], cuius potentiae maiestatem non solum Germania, Italia atque Gallia, sed tota fere Europa non sustinet. Colito itaque tantum patronum, quo adveniente Saxonia ex serva facta est libera et ex tributaria multarum gentium domina.[21]

Here, then, Louis the Pious is expressly acknowledged to have been an emperor, although the grounds for his title are not expressly stated. Moreover, there is a definite statement that Saxony was shortly to become the heir of the empire which he governed, that the empire of the Franks was, in other words, to be "translated" to the Saxons.[22]

Again, Widukind says when relating the events of 911:

> Regi autem Hluthowico non erat filius, omnisque populus Francorum atque Saxonum quaerebat Oddoni diadema inponere regni. Ipse vero quasi iam gravior recusabat imperii onus; eius tamen consultu Cuonradus quondam dux Francorum ungitur in regem. Penes Oddonem tamen summum semper et ubique fiebat imperium.[23]

These words imply very definitely that the imperial crown was in the giving of the *populus Francorum atque Saxonum.* No further approval, acclamation, or consecration is mentioned.

At Conrad I's death in 918, Widukind puts these words into the mouth of the dying monarch:

> Fortuna, frater, cum nobilissimis moribus Heinrico cedit, rerum publicarum secus Saxones summa est. Sumptis igitur his insigniis, lancea

[20] Widukind, I, 15 (p. 25).

[21] Widukind, I, 34 (p. 48).

[22] Cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei,* pp. 221-227.

[23] Widukind, I, 16 (pp. 26-27); cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei,* pp. 248-249.

> sacra, armillis aureis cum clamide et veterum gladio regum ac diademate, ito ad Heinricum, facito pacem cum eo, ut eum foederatum possis habere in perpetuum. Quid enim necesse est, ut cadat populus Francorum tecum coram eo? Ipse enim vere rex erit et imperator multorum populorum.[24]

The phrase *rex erit et imperator multorum populorum* suggests here that one of the essential qualifications of an emperor was the ruling of several distinct *populi*, or nations, in contrast to the single *populus* which, presumably, was normally ruled by a simple king.

Again there is the famous passage which describes the acclamation of Henry I as emperor by his army after his defeat of the Hungarians at Riade in 933:

> Deinde pater patriae, rerum dominus imperatorque ab exercitu appellatus famam potentiae virtutisque cunctis gentibus et regibus longe lateque diffudit. Unde et aliorum regnorum proceres eum adierunt, gratiamque in conspectu eius invenire quaerentes, fidem talis ac tanti viri probatam habentes dilexerunt.[25]

This passage shows that Widukind explicitly acknowledged the validity of the acclamation of the army.[26] The acclamation here is threefold: *pater patriae* is the equivalent of sovereign, or ruler of a tribe or a nation.[27]. The vague term *rerum dominus* may be taken to mean a hegemonic king, a position intermediate between that of a simple king and that of an "emperor".[28] *Imperator* I take to mean "emperor" here, rather than "triumphant commander," which is the meaning which Beumann assigns to the term in this context.[29] Widukind's meaning here is simply and plainly that Henry I was acclaimed emperor by the army in 935 and his report of the acclamation I take to be an acceptance of the validity of the acclamation,[30] for if Widukind did not accept the acclamation, why did he report it without comment, just as he did in the case of Otto I, whose position and title as emperor Widukind certainly respected and adknowledged? Certainly Otto I was formally crowned and anointed after his acclamation, but there is no evidence to show that Widukind knew this and, in any event, even if he did know of it, he certainly does not report it.[31]

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[24] Widukind, I, 25 (p. 38); cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 82, 237-238.

[25] Widukind, I, 39 (p. 58); cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 228, 231-237, 247, 254-255; Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, p. 57; Erdmann, *Forschungen*, p. 45.

[26] See below, p. 24.

[27] Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 234: "Den *pater patriae*... eine ehrende Bezeichnung für den Landesherrn, setzt Plassmann mit dem altsächsischen *landes ward* gleich, den der *Heliand* vierzehnmal in Verbindung mit *drohtin* u.a. gebraucht"; *ibid.*, n. 5: "Widukind versteht jedoch unter *patria* nur das engere Stammesgebiet... Man könnte also in dem Prädikat *pater patriae* eine Umschreibung für die Stammesherzogliche Gewalt sehen."

[28] Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 233: "... *rerum dominus* ist bei Widukind ein technisches Prädikat des hegemonialen *rex*, der nicht zur Imperatorwürde aufgestiegen ist."

[29] Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 234: "... der *imperator* hier den siegreichen Feldherrn bezeichnet." Since Widukind uses *imperator* with a meaning other than "emperor" in only one passage of the *Res gestae Saxonicae* (I, 18, p. 29) Beumann's case for a special use of the term here is very weak.

[30] Beumann's remark in *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 234, n. 5: "Die dreifache Stufenfolge *pater patriae* — *dominus rerum* — *imperator* bezeichnet dann den Weg der Dynastie von der Herzogsgewalt über das hegemoniale Königtum zum Kaisertum," applies, as should be noted, to Henry I (who received the threefold acclamation) and not to Otto I (who received a two-fold acclamation).

Six of Widukind's remarks upon the career of Otto I seem to bear on the points under discussion here. The chronicler remarks, first of all, in speaking of the death of Henry I:

> Cumque se iam gravari morbo sensisset, convocato omni populo designavit filium suum Oddonem regem, caeteris quoque filiis predia cum thesauris distribuens; ipsum vero Oddonem, qui maximus et optimus fuit, fratribus et omni Francorum imperio prefecit. Testamento itaque legitime facto et rebus omnibus rite compositis defunctus est ipse rerum dominus et regum maximus Europae, omni virtute animi corporisque nulli secundus, relinquens filium sibi ipsi maiorem filioque magnum latumque imperium, non a patribus sibi relictum, sed per semet ipsum adquisitum et a solo Deo concessum.[32]

This passage has important bearing both on Widukind's attitude to Henry I and to Otto I. Henry died, according to Widukind, leaving his son a "great and extensive empire", and one which he had acquired by his own efforts and which was given to him by God alone. Surely such words would be meaningless if Widukind did not regard Henry I as an emperor, for otherwise how could he be said to possess an empire? Moreover, Otto was left an empire by his father: this did not, however, make him an emperor in Widukind's eyes until after the battle of the Lechfeld in 955, when he had been proclaimed emperor by the army, an event which is related briefly by the chronicler: *Triumpho celebri rex factus gloriosus ab exercitu pater patriae imperatorque appellatus est.*[33] This is the first occasion on which Widukind refers to Otto as emperor; henceforth, Otto is rather consistently referred to by that title.

Shortly after this episode, Widukind indicates the extent of Otto's power and influence:

> Crebris victoriis imperator gloriosus factus atque famosus multorum regum ac gentium timorem pariter et favorem promeruit. Unde plurimos legatos suscipit, Romanorum scilicet et Graecorum Sarracenorumque, per

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[31] This interpretation of Widukind's meaning is further supported by the context of the passage cited in n. 25 above: after reporting the circumstances of Henry I's acclamation, Widukind goes on to list and discuss briefly the rulers of other *populi*, with whom Henry conferred.

[32] Widukind, I, 41 (p. 60).

[33] Widukind, III, 49 (p. 128); cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 228-236; Erdmann, *Forschungen*, pp. 45-47.

> eosque diversi generis munera... omniumque circumquaque Christianorum in illo res atque spes sitae.[34]

In three other places in his *Deeds of the Saxons*, Widukind also takes care to point out the extent of Otto's influence.[35] All of this would make it seem that Widukind considered that this was a highly important qualification for the imperial title — a qualification far more important, certainly, in Widukind's eyes than the coronation at Rome, which he does not even report.

Widukind was, however, certainly aware of and twice mentions the coronation of young Otto II at Rome. The first of these passages purports to be[36] a quotation from a letter of Otto I, in which the emperor says: *Filius noster in nativitate Domini coronam a beato apostolico in imperii dignitatem suscepit.*[37]

The other reference to the coronation is in the final chapter of Widukind's work:

> Mane autem iam facto, licet iam olim unctus esset in regem et a beato apostolico designatus in imperatorem, spei unicae totius ecclesiae, imperatoris filio, ut initio certatim manus dabant, fidem pollicentes et operam suam contra omnes adversarios sacramentis militaribus confirmantes. Igitur ab integro ab omni populo electus in principem transtulit corpus patris in civitatem, quam ipse magnifice construxit, vocabulo Magathaburg. Itaque defunctus est Nonis Maii, quarta feria ante pentecosten, rex gentium, divinarum humanarumque rerum multa ac gloriosa saeculis relinquens monimenta.[38]

It would be moot to inquire whether Widukind gave special recognition to Otto II's papal coronation and anointing or what his attitude concerning Otto II's imperial title was. There is simply not sufficient material to warrant any sound conclusion.

In addition to the foregoing, one further passage from Widukind may be cited to show his conception of the imperial office and the extent of Otto I's influence. This is the dedication to Book II of the *Res gestae Saxonicae*, written by Widukind to Otto I's daughter Mathilda, Abbess of Quedlinburg:

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[34] Widukind, III, 56 (p. 135); cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 92-93.

[35] Widukind, III, 20 (p. 115): "Haec omnia a Deo credimus acta, ut qui serenissimum regem plurimis populis ac gentibus preficere voluit, disceret parum in se, in Deo vero omnia posse." *Ibid.*, III, 46 (p. 127): "Pudeat iam nunc dominos pene totius Europae inimicis manus dare." *Ibid.*, III, 75 (p. 153): "Populus autem pro eius laude et gratiarum actione multa locutus memoravit eum paterna subiectos rexisse pietate, ab hostibus eos liberasse, superbos hostes Avares, Sarracenos, Danos, Slavos armis vicisse, Italiam subiugasse..."

[36] The authenticity of this letter is convincingly defended by Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 266-274, where he refutes Anna Nürnberger's contention that the letter is a fabrication.

[37] Widukind, III, 79 (p. 147).

[38] Widukind, III, 76 (pp. 153-154). In his comments on Widukind's concept of the non-Roman imperial idea, Erdmann, *Forschungen*, p. 46 and n. 3, calls attention to the fact that the emperor, when crowned by the pope is referred to as *designatus*, while, when acclaimed by the army he is referred to as *appellatus*. In view of the way in which *designatus* and *appello* are used by classical authors, however, it is difficult to see any invidious distinction in Widukind's use of them.

> Ingens opus coepturus vel certe iteraturus — nam magna ex parte peractum est — tua gratia fulciatur, quae domina esse dinosceris iure totius Europae, quamquam in Affricam Assiamque patris tui iam potestas protendatur.[39]

IV

From the evidence just reviewed, certain conclusions may reasonably be drawn. It should be noted that after the acclamation by his troops in 955,[40] Widukind consistently referred to Otto I as emperor. Although Henry I was similarly acclaimed by his army in 933,[41] Widukind did not thereafter refer to him as emperor but as king.[42] At the same time, it seems obvious that Widukind did recognize Henry as something more than simply a king, for he called him the *regum maximus Europae*,[43] recognized him as a conqueror and ruler over other kings,[44] and testified that he left his son and successor an empire.[45]

So far as Otto I was concerned, Widukind definitely considered him emperor after 955 and thereafter consistently refers to him by that title.[46] But Widukind does not mention Otto's coronation at Rome by John XII on February 2, 962, even though he does give a brief account of Otto's expedition to Italy in that year.[47] This omission is most significant, for if Widukind had deemed the papal coronation essential to the validity of Otto's imperial title, he would scarcely have omitted mentioning it.[48] One can only conclude, therefore, that Widukind did not regard ecclesiastical consecration as necessary for an emperor.

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[39] Widukind, II, *praef.* (p. 61).

[40] Widukind, III, 49 (pp. 128-129).

[41] Widukind, I, 39 (p. 58). Note that the three-fold acclamation used for Henry I in 933 (*pater patriae, rerum dominus, imperator*) was abbreviated to a two-fold aclamation (*pater patriae, imperator*) for Otto ~~I~~ in 955.

[42] Widukind, I, 39 (p. 58): "Ipse enim rex talis erat, qui nichil negaret amicis. Perrexit igitur Galliam rex, regem alloquitur..." *Ibid.*, I, 41 (p. 60): "... defunctus est ipse rerum dominus et regum maximus Europae..." *Ibid.*, II, 1 (p. 63): "Defuncto itaque patre patriae et regum maximo optimo Heinrico..."

[43] Widukind, I, 41 (p. 60).

[44] Widukind, I, 40 (p. 59): "Cum autem omnes in circuitu nationes subiecisset, Danos, qui navali latrocinio Fresones incursabant, cum exercitu adiit vicitque, et tributarios faciens, regem eorum nomine Chnubam baptismum percipere fecit. Perdomitis itaque cunctis circumquaque gentibus, postremo Romam proficisci statuit, sed infirmitate correptus iter intermisit."

[45] Widukind, I, 41 (p. 60): "... defunctus est [Heinricus]... relinquens filioque magnum latumque imperium."

[46] Cf. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 228; Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, p. 57.

[47] Widukind, III, 63 (pp. 137-138): "Rebus igitur rite compositis per omnem Franciam Saxoniamque et vicinos circumquaque gentes, Romam statuens proficisci, Longobardiam perrexit. Ergo qualiter regem Longobardorum Bernharium, duobus annis obsessum cum coniuge et filiis captum in exilium destinaverit, Romanos duobus preliis vicerit Romamque

From what Widukind says, there seem to have been in his mind two basic qualifications for the title of emperor. These qualifications were:

(1) an emperor must be the ruler of a sizable territory inhabited by several distinct peoples or nations and he must rule over other kings in that territory; and

(2) an emperor must be acclaimed by the army.[49]

It may be objected that Henry I has been shown to have filled both of these qualifications and yet that he was not regarded as an "emperor" by Widukind. There is, however, no conclusive evidence that Henry I was not regarded as an emperor by Widukind. Although, after his acclamation it is true that "Henri est appelé bientôt de nouveau roi,"[50] this is by no means a final proof

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expugnaverit, duces Beneventorum subiecerit, Graecos in Calabria Apuliaque superaverit, terra Saxonia venas argenti aperuerit, imperiumque cum filio quam magnifice dilataverit, nostrae tenuitatis non est edicere, sed, ut initio historiae predixi, in tantum fideli devotione elaborasse sufficiat."

[48] An interesting and significant reflection on Widukind's attitude toward the pope is mentioned by Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 258-259.

[49] These qualifications, taken in conjunction, qualified a ruler as an *imperator* in Widukind's usage of the term and they may be taken as constituting the essential doctrine of the non-Roman imperial idea as Widukind conceived of it. This position is not one, however, which is universally agreed with by any means. Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 228-237, 252-256, 259-265, and the same writer in his "Romkaiser und fränkisches Reichsvolk," *Festschrift Edmund E. Stengel*, pp. 163-164, argues in essence that Widukind assigned to emperor the meaning only of "ruler of kings". The restricted sense which Beumann applies to the term *imperator*, however, conflicts with Widukind's own use and treatment of the term. See, e. g., Widukind, I, 1 (p. 4), I, 34 (p. 48), III, 71 (p. 148), I, 15 (p. 25). Lintzel, *Die Kaiserpolitik Ottos des Grossen*, pp. 53-57, would also define the ninth or tenth century *imperator* as a ruler who has other kings subject to him, but he makes no explicit mention of the acclamation as an essential condition of the imperial title in Widukind's thought. Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom and Renovatio* I, 80-81, takes the view that Widukind's account rests the imperial title upon three factors: God's will, inheritance, and election. Erdmann, *Forschungen*, pp. 44-49, on the other hand, holds that Widukind believed that the title of *imperator* was bestowed by the army, that it involved kingship over other kings, and that rule over several distinct *populi* was essential. The titles *pater patriae* and *dominus rerum*, however, according to Erdmann, "nur als literarische Lesefrüchte angesehen werden können." Widukind's concept of the imperial office should be taken, according to Erdmann, as the most extreme statement of the non-Roman imperial idea. Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, pp. 56-60, also recognizes Widukind's belief that a hegemony over several distinct peoples and acclamation by the army are the bases for recognition of a ruler as an emperor.

[50] Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, p. 57; Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 228.

that Widukind did not consider him an emperor. Even Otto I, whom Widukind unquestionably regarded as an emperor after 955, is given the title *rex gentium* in a later passage.[51] Further, Henry is referred to in terms which definitely do imply that he was more than a king after 933 — such terms, for example, as *rerum dominus*,[52] *regum maximus Europae*,[53] and *pater patriae*[54] — and, moreover, he is said to have left Otto a *magnum latumque imperium*.[55]

There does remain, however, a contrast between Widukind's treatment of Henry I and Otto I. The contrast may best be explained, perhaps, by concluding that Widukind regarded Henry as an emperor and Otto as a very great emperor.[56]

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[51] Widukind, III, 76 (p. 154). This title, it is true, immediately follows the appellation *imperator Romanorum*.

[52] Widukind, I, 41 (p. 60).

[53] *Idem*.

[54] Widukind, II, 1 (p. 63).

[55] Widukind, I, 41 (p. 60).

[56] These conclusions differ from those of Beumann, who says (*Widukind von Korvei*, p. 228): "Widukind verschweigt bekanntlich die Kaiserkrönung Ottos des Grossen zu Rom, lässt ihn jedoch von dem siegreichen Heer auf dem Lechfeld zum *pater patriae* und *imperator* ausrufen. Ebenso heisst es von Heinrich I. nach der Unstrutschlacht: *Deinde pater patriae, rerum dominus imperatorque ab exercitu appellatus.* Während jedoch Otto nach der Lechfeldschlacht auch weiterhin *imperator* heisst, hat die Akklamation für Heinrich I. nur ephemere Bedeutung. Er wird anschliessend wieder *rex* genannt. Zweifellos spiegelt sich hierin die staatsrechtliche Wirklichkeit: Otto wurde, wenn auch einige Jahre später, wirklich Kaiser, Heinrich nicht." Beumann thus denies that the acclamation of Henry I had any real or lasting meaning. It follows from his argument that we should simply overlook this episode and take the acclamation of Otto I at the Lechfeld as the only instance in the *Res gestae Saxonicae* where Widukind regards the acclamation of the army as having an effective, operative result, namely in making Otto an emperor, which he had not been before. There are two major objections to Beumann's reasoning on this score: (1) it presupposes a very great inconsistency in Widukind's thought and writing, for if Widukind regarded the acclamation of Henry I as having no effect, i.e. as not making him a real emperor, then how explain why Widukind included an account of the incident at all? Certainly Widukind omitted from the *Res gestae Saconicae* any account of some other incidents which did not serve his purpose or which had no relevance to his purpose (one may think, e. g., of the papal coronation of Otto I, which Widukind completely omits). In all probability Widukind included the account of the acclamation of Henry I because he saw some meaning in it, namely because this exemplified the method by which emperors, in his view of things, were created. (2) The other objection which may be raised against Beumann's argument is this, that it overlooks the reference in Widukind, I, 41 (p. 60), where Widukind states very specifically and even pointedly that Henry left to Otto I an *imperium*, which in the context cannot well mean anything other than an empire. See above, p. 21. Beumann's view also overlooks the further references to Henry I as *imperator* in Widukind, I, 39 (p. 58), I, 35 (p. 51), and I, 38 (p. 57). One might also note the passage in Widukind, I, 25 (p. 38) where the term *imperator*, with reference to Henry I, is put as a kind of prophecy into the mouth of the dying Conrad I.

Whatever question there may be about Widukind's conception of Henry I's role, there is no doubt that so far as Widukind was concerned Otto was an emperor after 955 and that he regarded Otto as an emperor in the line of Charlemagne, not as a continuator of the line of Roman emperors in the West.[57] When Widukind speaks of Otto as Roman emperor,[58] he means that Otto was literally an *imperator Romanorum*, that is, ruler of Rome, the Romans, and Italy.[59]

Even though Widukind regarded Otto as a successor of Charlemagne, however, Otto's empire was from Widukind's point of view a Saxon, not a Frankish one.[60] Otto thus emerges, in Widukind's treatment of him, as the real founder of a Saxon imperial dynasty which, because of his own peculiar genius and good luck, was to produce a real, though short-lived, European hegemony. Widukind himself we must regard as an apologist for the Saxon empire. More definitely than any other tenth-century writer, Widukind sought to provide through his *Deeds of the Saxons* an historical basis for the Saxon assumption of the imperial title and to show that the Saxon emperors had received their imperial status through their own exertions and through the acclamation of their army, rather than through any Roman imperial coronation at the hands of the pope.

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[57] Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, pp. 218-228; Folz, *Le Souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne*, pp. 54-55.

[58] Widukind, III, 76 (p. 154).

[59] Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 262-265; Beumann, "Romkaiser und fränkisches Reichsvolk," *Festschrift Edmund E. Stengel*, p. 164.

[60] Beumann, *Widukind von Korvei*, p. 219; Widukind, I, 34 (p. 48).

Divine Infinity in Albert the Great's Commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard

FRANCIS J. CATANIA

THIS study attempts to answer the following question. Where does Albert in his Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard stand with respect to divine infinity? Does he as does his pupil St. Thomas Aquinas predicate infinity of the very being of God, or is he more in line with earlier theologians who either were silent concerning infinity or considered infinity as extrinsic to the divine being?[1]

Any student of Albert is immediately overwhelmed by the extensiveness of his writing;[2] the question arises as to which of his many works to investigate. By the use of indices and "key topics" we find that discussions of infinity occur in many of Albert's works.[3] The Commentary on the *Physics* reveals numerous discussions of quantitative infinity, while, although the index to the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* does not mention *infinitum*, we find that Aristotle's discussions of infinity are paralleled by Albert. The index to the *Summa Theologiae* reveals only eight discussions of infinity; but if this index is only as accurate as that of the Commentary on the *Sentences*, we may assume that closer investigation would reveal many more texts. The *Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis* contains whole sections devoted to infinity and finitude.[4] Of course, the importance of these discussions can be ascertained only through intensive study of the passages; we wish merely to indicate here that there is ready material for work in Albert's doctrine.

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[1] See Leo Sweeney, S.J., "Divine Infinity: 1150-1250," *The Modern Schoolman* XXXV (1957), 38-51, for a discussion of the general problem of divine infinity and the varied medieval conceptions of that attribute. Father Sweeney points out (p. 49) that merely to find the term "infinite" applied to God is in itself no indication that a doctrine of infinity is applied to the divine reality itself. That God is infinite may mean merely that He is "infinitely powerful" or "eternal," in which cases "infinity" is only extrinsically applied to the divine reality. On the other hand, if an author describes divine infinity in terms of freedom from matter and potency, then he may well be predicating infinity of the divine reality itself.

[2] For a bibliography of Albert, see F. J. Catania, "A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVII (1959), 11-28.

[3] Principal works consulted include: Commentaries on Aristotle, on the *Sentences*, and on the *Liber de Causis*; the *Summa de Creaturis*, and the *Summa Theologiae*.

[4] References to the Borgnet edition of Albert's works (see below, note 37) are as follows: The Commentary on the *Physics* is printed in vol. III (infinity in dimensive quantity, e.g. pp. 203-238, 440-444, 609-611; divine infinite potency, e.g. 523-524, 590-592, 603-608, 623-629); the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is printed in vol. VI (divine power, e.g. pp. 635-

Further, there is some indication of a real progression in Albert's thought on the subject of divine infinity. Let us merely indicate the state of the question with respect to this change in thought. The doctrine in Albert's Commentary on the *Sentences* expresses a merely extrinsic and relative type of infinity as applied to God, while Leo Sweeney, S.J., suggests that in his latest work, *Summa Theologiae*, Albert "joins Thomas and Bonaventure in declaring God's very being to be infinite".[5]

Hence, an adequate, intensive treatment of Albert, short of a full-sized volume, would have to be selective. For these reasons and the fact that an abundance of texts is discovered in Albert's Commentary on the *Sentences*, we prefer to concentrate our efforts on that one work.[6] "Infinity" in some way is discussed in all of the following texts.

1. *In I Sent.*, d.1B, a.12, qu.3, ad 3 (An diffinitio prima verbi frui sit bona?) B25, 30.[7]
2. *Ibid.*, d.1B, a.15, arg.8 et ad 8 (An Deus possit cognosci ab aliquo creato intellectu?) B25, 35-36.
3. *Ibid.*, d.1B, a.15, ad 10 (An Deus possit cognosci ab aliquo creato intellectu?) B25, 37.
4. *Ibid.*, d.2A, a.2, arg.2 et ad 2 (Utrum summum aliquid addat bono cum dicitur summum bonum?) B25, 55-57.
5. *Ibid.*, d.2D, a.13, sed contra 1 et ad sed contra 1 (An *Qui est* sit nomen Deo proprium?) B25, 68-69.

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637); the *Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis* is printed in vol. X; the Commentary on the *Sentences* is printed in vols. XXV-XXIX (for specific references see below); the *Summa Theologiae* is printed in vols. XXX-XXXII (e.g. XXXI, p. 71).

[5] See Leo Sweeney, S.J., "Some Medieval Opponents of Divine Infinity," *Mediaeval Studies* XIX (1957), 245.

[6] A Second important reason for analyzing this Commentary is the early date of the work. Much of the matter of the Commentary was developed even prior to the commencing of Albert's baccalaureate in 1240 (See O. Lottin, "Problèmes concernant la *Summa de Creaturis* et le Commentaire des *Sentences* de saint Albert le Grand," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* XVII [1950], 327). Practically all historians agree that the Commentary itself was composed within the decade 1240-1250.

[7] The reference "B" is *Opera Omnia, ex editione lugdunensi... cura et labore* A. Borgnet, Paris, L. Vives (1800-99), 38 vols. The numbers following "B" refer to the volume of the Borgnet edition and the page within that volume.

The Borgnet edition of the Commentary on the *Sentences* is one of two printed editions. The other is an earlier edition by Peter Jammy (Lyon, 1651). We have used the Borgnet edition in our study of Albert, while checking the key texts with the Jammy edition and noting any variations in the proper places.

Besides the Borgnet and Jammy editions of Albert's works, a third and critical edition has been begun by the Cologne Institute of Albert the Great under the general editorship of Bernard Geyer (Monasterii Westfalorum, Aedibus Aschendorff, 1951-). The Commentary on the *Sentences*, however, has not yet been edited by Geyer.

6. *Ibid.*, d.2D, a.13, ad q.2 (An *Qui est* sit nomen Deo proprium?) B25, 69.
7. *Ibid.*, d.2E, a.19 arg.6 et ad 6 (An termini numerales in divinis aliquid ponant?) B25, 77-78.
8. *Ibid.*, d.3A, a.2 (Quid cognoverunt Philosophi de Deo, an quia est tantum?) B25, 93-94.
9. *Ibid.*, d.3E, a.12 (Utrum ex perpetuitate arguatur aeternitas, et ex magnitudine potentiae infinitas?) B25, 101-102.
10. *Ibid.*, d.8A, a.12, sol. (Utrum verba consignificantia differentias temporis, ut *fuit*, et *erit*, possunt dici de Deo, et de omnibus creaturis?) B25, 235-236.
11. *Ibid.*, d.9A, a.2, sol. (Qualiter aeternitas intelligatur adjacere processioni personarum?) B25, 272.
12. *Ibid.*, d.9K, a.18 (An generatio Filii a Patre sit finita vel infinita?) B25, 298-299.
13. *Ibid.*, d.13E, a.8, arg.1 et ad 1 (Utrum Spiritus Sanctus possit dici ingenitus?) B25, 382-383.
14. *Ibid.*, d.17A, a.1, arg.2 et ad 2 (Utrum charitas qua diligimus Deum, sit Spiritus Sanctus vel aliquod donum habituale creatum?) B25, 462-465.
15. *Ibid.*, d.17S, a.11, sol. (Utrum Christo datus est spiritus non ad mensuram ita quod gratia ejus sit infinita?) B25, 489.
16. *Ibid.*, d.19A, a.1, arg.4 et ad 4 (An in divinis possit esse aequalitas?) B25, 511-512.
17. *Ibid.*, d.19A, a.3, sol. (Penes quid sumitur aequalitas in divinis?) B25, 515.
18. *Ibid.*, d.20D, a.5, sed contra 4 (An Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus sunt in potentia aequales?) B25, 550.
19. *Ibid.*, d.26B, a.10 (Utrum in divinis sint finitae vel infinitae relationes et omnes assistentes?) B26, 19-21.
20. *Ibid.*, d.35E, a.10, sol. (An in Deo sunt ideae omnium et maxime materiae primae?) B26, 196.
21. *Ibid.*, d.36C, a.8 (Utrum Deus sciat quae facturus est, quae fecit, quae facere potest et numquam faciet, et tandem infinita actu?) B26, 218-220.
22. *Ibid.*, d.37L, a.22, arg.1 et ad 1 (Utrum Angelus moveatur secundum locum?) B26, 257-259.
23. *Ibid.*, d.37L, a.23, sol. (Utrum Angelus moveatur secundum locum transeundo spatium?) B26, 261.
24. *Ibid.*, d.39A, a.4 (An Deus sciat actu infinita?) B26, 296-297.
25. *Ibid.*, d.42D, a.10, arg.2 et sol. ad 1 et 2 (An omnipotentia possit convenire aliis a Deo?) B26, 374.
26. *Ibid.*, d.43C, a.1 (An potentia Dei sit infinita?) B26, 377-379.
27. *Ibid.*, d.43C, a.2 (An potentia Dei possit finiri ad actus vel non?) B26, 379-380.
28. *Ibid.*, d.44B, a.1 (An Deus ab aeterno res facere potuit? et Utrum potuit prius facere mundum quam fecit?) B.26, 389-391.
29. *Ibid.*, d.46M, a.10, arg. 3 et ad 3 (An malum faciens tendat in non esse?) B26, 441-442.
30. *Ibid.*, d.48C, a.1, arg.1, sol. et ad 1 (An possibile sit nos conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae?) B26, 472-473.
31. *In II Sent.*, d.1B, a.10, arg.9, sol. et ad 9 (An Aristoteles sufficienter determinavit mundum esse aeternum sicut ei imponitur?) B27, 26-29.
32. *Ibid.*, d.25N, a.6, arg.3 (An est triplex libertas arbitrii?) B27, 434.
33. *In III Sent.*, d.1A, a.1, 1, 2, 3 (An conveniebat Deum incarnari?) B28, 4-5.

34. *Ibid.*, d.2C, a.14, ad ult. (An Christus simul sibi corpus formavit, consolidavit, et univit?) B28, 41.
35. *Ibid.*, d.3C, a.26, sol. (An Christus secundum differentem modum ab aliis fuit in lumbis Adae vel Abrahae?) B28, 65.
36. *Ibid.*, d.9A, a.6, sed contra (An dulia sit eadem virtus cum latria?) B28, 175-176.
37. *Ibid.*, d.10C, a.8 (An Christus sit praedestinatus ad gratiam infinitam? (B28, 198-199.
38. *Ibid.*, d.12E, a.8 (An Christo datus sit spiritus et gratia sine mensura?) B28, 231-232.
39. *Ibid.*, d.14A, a.1 (An Christus habuerit omnium scitorum a Deo scientiam?) B28, 254-256.
40. *Ibid.*, d.14A, a.3, sol. (Quomodo notitiae anima Christi sciverit omnia?) B28, 258.
41. *Ibid.*, d.14D, a.5, sed contra 1, 2, 3 et sol. (An Christus habuit omnipotentiam sicut scientiam?) B28, 262.
42. *Ibid.*, d.19E, a.7, ad q. (An per passionem Christi deletur omnis poena?) B 28, 245.
43. *Ibid.*, d.20B, a.6, ad 3 (An solum originale vel actuale sit causa quare indigemus redemptore?) B 28, 364.
44. *In IV Sent.*, d.11B, a.1, ad 1 (An in sacramento corporis Christi sit aliqua conversio sive transmutatio?) B29, 267.

Among the places where Albert discusses infinity, we find that attribute applied to items other than God. For example, in texts 7, 12, and 26, infinity is referred to matter; text 23 discusses infinity with respect to the power and essence of an angel; texts 28 and 31 refer to the infinite succession of heavenly movements.

On the other hand, almost all the other texts discuss infinity in relation to God. Of course, all such texts are not equally important for understanding Albert's doctrine of divine infinity. Hence, from among the above citations, we have chosen certain "Key Texts" which are especially informative and which demand more than a cursory reading. The following fourteen texts, then, seem most illustrative of Albert's position on divine infinity.

Key Text A: *In I Sent.*, d.1B., a.15, ad 8.
Key Text B: *Ibid.*, d.1B, a.15, ad 10.
Key Text C: *Ibid.*, d.2A., a.2, ad 2.
Key Text D: *Ibid.*, d.2D., a.13, ad q.2.
Key Text E: *Ibid.*, d.3E., a.12, sol.
Key Text F: *Ibid.*, d.9A., a.2, sol.
Key Text G: *Ibid.*, d.9K., a.18, sol.
Key Text H: *Ibid.*, d.19A., a.1, ad 4.
Key Text I: *Ibid.*, d.36C., a.8, sol.
Key Text J: *Ibid.*, d.39A., a.4, sol.
Key Text K: *Ibid.*, d.43C., a.1, sol.
Key Text L: *Ibid.*, d.43C., a.2, sol.
Key Text M: *In III Sent.*, d.14A., a.1, sol.
Key Text N: *Ibid.*, d.14A., a.1, ad 1.

The summary we present below is the result of analyzing each text as it appears in the treatise. The analysis includes a recognition of the context in which each text appears, the development of the main points concerned with the doctrine of divine infinity, and the awareness of certain sources upon which Albert calls.

Where, then, does Albert, in his Commentary on the *Sentences*, stand with respect to divine infinity? Our attempt to answer this question will be divided into three sections summarizing our inquiries, and a fourth section will be added drawing any conclusions warranted by our investigation. Accordingly, we will discuss the following points:

A. First, the particular contexts in which divine infinity is discussed will be noted.
B. Secondly, the main lines of Albert's doctrine will be reviewed.
C. Next, the sources of Albert's doctrine will be indicated.
D. Finally, certain conclusions will be drawn.

A. The Contexts

In any attempt to understand a man's doctrine, it is necessary to recognize the problems and questions which afford occasions for him to develop a particular doctrine. The following are the important contexts in which one discovers Albert's doctrine of divine infinity.

It is of primary importance to note a context which is *missing.* For nowhere in his Commentary does Albert ask *Utrum Deus sit Infinitus*, a question quite familiar to later theologians.[8] The closest Albert comes to such a question is to ask *An Potentia Dei sit infinita*[9] or *An potentia Dei possit finiri ad actus vel non.*[10] As we will see, however, to speak of divine infinity in terms of power is far from a characterization of the very being of God as infinite. The absence, then, of a question dealing with infinity as an essential attribute of God can have several significances. Conceivably, such an absence could mean that Albert did not consider infinity to be an important attribute of God. In fact, however, the numerous discussions of infinity in other contexts indicate that Albert, indeed, considered the attribute important. On the other hand, the absence of a direct question could mean that for Albert divine infinity had no *proper meaning* that was distinct from the meanings, say, of immensity, eternity, and the like. Albert, seemingly, does not consider infinity as an attribute to be treated as he treats unchangeability,[11] simplicity,[12] eternity,[13] equality,[14] omniscience,[15] ubiquity,[16] and omnipotence.[17] The discussions of infinity, then, for the most part[18] arise within an explanation of another attribute, characteristic, or function of God. Let us now turn our attention to these other contexts.

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[8] See note 1.

[9] Key Text K.

[10] Key Text L.

[11] I, 8, 16.

[12] I, 8, 22.

Beatific Vision.[19] In an attempt to reconcile the incomprehensibility of God with the defined doctrine of the Beatific Vision, Albert developed a twofold description of divine infinity. In the first place, the power of God is infinite by extrinsic denomination, insofar as it is the source of innumerable effects.[20] And secondly, the full reality of the divine essence is beyond the comprehension of the created intellect, although that intellect does attain the divine essence to some degree. The same divine reality is both present to the created understanding (as simple) and exceeds that understanding (as infinite).[21] In this explanation, "infinity" is simply equated with "immensity."

Eternity.[22] Eternity as identified with divine duration is characterized as "infinite" insofar as, existing entirely at once, divine duration needs nothing from without. "End" is denied (*in-finis*) of the divine duration in being. not in the sense that it lacks its end, for none is proper to it. Nor does it successively achieve its reality. Rather, the divine duration knows no past, present, or future, but simply exists whole and entire. "Infinity" in this case seems simply identified with "eternity" and is applied to the divine being as that being is not affected by time: time imposes no limit upon the divine duration. As such, infinity (as the absence of a limit by time) seems to be extrinsic to the divine being.

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[13] I, 9, 1.

[14] I, 19, 1.

[15] I, d. 35-36 and 39.

[16] I, 37, 1.

[17] I, d. 42-43.

[18] The exceptions concern the infinite power of God. Even in this case, however, note how Albert entitles the distinction (43) in which the first two articles discuss divine infinite power: "De potentia Dei in comparatione ad quantitatem: ostendens ejus immensitatem, sive quantum Deus possit."

[19] See Key Text A.

[20] Key Text A: Infinitum in quantitate est (ut dicit Philosophus) cujus partes accipienti semper est aliquid extra accipere. In spirituali autem natura increata non est infinitum in quantitate molis, sed quantitas virtutis dividitur ad extra, secundam ea in quae potest: et ideo intellectus attingens Deum attingit ipsum, ita quod multum et infinitum virtutis semper est extra ipsum: et quia virtus sua est essentia sua, ideo etiam immensitas essentiae est extra intellectum.

[21] Key Text B: ... sed tamen attingitur intellectu secundum quod simplex est, sed non secundum quod est infinitus: quia infinitum ponit rationem suam respectu ejus quod est extra intelligentem.

[22] See Key Text F.

The Trinity.[23] Albert discusses infinity in connection with two questions raised concerning the Trinity. The first discussion stems more from the divine essence than from the distinction of Persons. But, in the second, when Albert asks whether there can be equality in God, he is speaking about the comparison of one Person to another. And how does a discussion of equality suggest infinity? The type of infinity in question is infinity of power. Each Person equally has infinite power, i.e., the power of each is unlimited by any effect and thus is both infinite and equal to the power of the others.[24]

But — and this is important — in this place we find perhaps the clearest expression of divine *finitude* as well as infinity. For the equality of Persons is established not so much on divine power, which is infinite only as not limited by something extrinsic. Rather, equality is based more upon the divine power as identified with the divine essence which in itself is most finite and is shared equally and entirely by all the Persons. In an equality which is really an identity, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in their essence and in their power are in themselves most finite.[25]

The Production of Possibles.[26] Let us note that for Albert the question of the production of possibles is a question concerning the infinite power of God. Further, the discussion of God's infinite power is linked with a discussion of His knowledge of what is infinite. Basically, his position is quite simple: the objects of divine power are potentially infinite in the sense that no object nor any number of them exhausts the divine power. And in knowing His great power, God knows what is potentially infinite.[27] Note that infinity is extrinsically predicated both of the divine power and of the divine knowledge.

The Knowledge of Christ's Soul.[28] The last context which we have chosen for special consideration is the question of the content of the knowledge which Christ possesses as man. Albert takes this occasion to reaffirm his basic position on divine infinity. God cannot be comprehended and, thus, enclosed by any creature; this is what is meant by saying He is infinite. And since the soul of Christ is created, although that soul *knows* all that God knows, it does not *comprehend* the one item which is God Himself. Only God comprehends Himself because He embraces the whole extent of what He is. To Himself He is finite and determined because He is what He is through the perfect simplicity of His being.[29]

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[23] See Key Texts G and H.

[24] See Key Text H: Ad aliud dicendum quod cum dicitur virtus Patris esse infinita, non intelligitur infinita quia sic virtus sua excederet ipsum: sed intelligitur infinita eo quod non finitur extrinseco aliquo: et hujus ratio supra est explanata: et hoc modo infinitum... habet aequale licet non habeat aequale extra suam essentiam: unde sic virtus Filii aequatur virtuti Patris et e converso.

[25] *Ibid.*, ... et hoc modo infinitum quod sibi finitissimum est, habet aequale,...

[26] See Key Texts I, K and L.

[27] Key Text I (quaest. 2 sed contra): ... non est assignare quod in tantum potest, quin sit accipere amplius in quod potest: et illud accipiendum non est acceptum actu, sed potentia. Key Text J (ad 1): ... et sua scientia hoc modo infinita est: quia nihil potest cogitari vel esse, quod si esset, non esset in scientia ipsius et modo secundum quod est in scientia sua: quia ipse intelligendo se infinita posse, intelligit infinita secundum quod infinita in potentia.

[28] See Key Texts M and N.

B. THE MAIN LINES OF ALBERT'S DOCTRINE

The question we posed at the beginning of our study still remains to be explicitly answered. Does Albert predicate infinity of the very being of God, thus anticipating the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas and later theologians? Or is infinity merely extrinsically applied to God and His power?

A context in which we would expect Albert's conception of infinity to be operative with respect to the divine being and power is his discussion of creation.[30] Albert notes that the divine power is infinite in the act of creating since it produces being without the need of a pre-existing subject.[31] In another place he points out that God in His mode of acting is free from all potency.[32] Does he, however, then proceed to describe *infinity* in terms of freedom from the determination of matter and potency? As we now turn to review the main lines of Albert's doctrine, we find that such a conception is absent.

a) Albert's doctrine of divine infinity may be listed under these headings: 1) infinity through extrinsic denomination, 2) infinity through an absence of limitation by creatures, and 3) infinity through transcendency.

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[29] Key Text M: Infinitatem Dei quae non mensuratur aliquo extrinseco claudente ipsam... ipsa anima Christi non claudit comprehendendo... Key Text G: ... ipse (Deus) sibi finitus sit... Key Text K (ad 1): Nec tamen dicimus Deum esse infinitum ita quod non sit finis: sed potius finitione qua finis dicitur finitus, finitissimus omnium Deus et potentia sua et quidquid ipse est...

[30] Such is the case with Richard Fishacre, for example, a contemporary of Albert. Fishacre speaks of the divine power as infinite in the act of creating and then goes on to explain the nature of that infinity as predicated of a completely separated substance, entirely removed from the impediments of matter. See Leo Sweeney, S.J. and Charles J. Ermatinger, "Divine Infinity According to Richard Fishacre," *The Modern Schoolman* XXV (1958) 191-212.

[31] Key Text E: ... licet enim non tota potentia infinita reluceat in magno, tamen quia ipse educit magnum sine indigentia praejacentis materiae et instrumenti, sic in modo agendi cognoscitur infinitum esse in potentia et omnipotentia.

[32] See *In II Sent.* 1A, 3, ad 2: Ad aliud dicendum quod hoc est verum de agente composito in quo est aliquid potentiae quod non agit, sicut est natura et artifex: quia in illis non est principium agendi nisi forma et ideo non agunt nisi producendo formam super materiam, et ideo actio eorum necessario terminatur semper ad esse compositi. Sic autem non est de Creatore in quo nihil est in potentia et ideo ipse agit totum secundum suam voluntatem. On the four types of composition found in creatures but not in God, see *In I Sent.* 8I, 33, sol.

An item is "infinite through extrinsic denomination" when that item is called infinite *only because of* another to which "infinity" properly and directly belongs. Thus, divine power is infinite because productive of potentially infinite effects. The effects are properly and numerically infinite and the power which produces or can produce those effects is *thereby* called "infinite." [33] Again, divine knowledge is infinite because the objects of that knowledge (the possible effects of divine power) are potentially infinite.[34] Finally, divine power is infinite because it is able to bridge the infinite gap between nothing and being in the act of creation.[35] Once again, we note that some item or items outside God are properly and intrinsically infinite, and God is infinite only because of refence to those items. Infinity of power or of knowledge, then, is not an intrinsic attribute of God. True, divine power is so great as to be able to cause an infinite number of things and divine wisdom is so extensive as to embrace an infinite number of things. But such infinities are only potential and so are extrinsic to the divine being itself.[36]

Secondly, and perhaps most importantly for Albert, divine infinity is negative. But what is denied? Limitation from things outside God. God cannot be contained within and limited by place, time, or intellect.[37] The being and the power of God are so immense that no creature can contain them. Such a notion of infinity takes the term quite literally. *In-finitum*, then, means without a boundary. Thus, Albert uses *in-finitum* or, better, *non finitum*[38] with respect to possible *fines* outside God: there is nothing extrinsic to God which functions as His *finis*. We will see below, however, that God functions as *finis* for Himself as well as for creatures. At any rate, this second type of infinity once more is not intrinsic to God, but merely expresses a relation of creatures to God. That is to say, no creature limits the divine being.

Finally, we discover also an infinity by transcendency. The divine reality is such that it is above the determinaton proper to the being and knowledge of creatures. Hence, with respect to such determination, God is undetermined or infinite.[39] The primary composition of creatures is that of *quod est*, *esse*, and *aliquid esse*.[40] As we view reality from the aspect of this composition, we discover that God differs from creatures precisely in that His *quod est* is His *esse*. The being (*esse*) of creatures, then, is specified by a principle (*aliquid*) from which it is really distinct and, once specified, is received into still another principle (*id quod est*) from which again it is distinct. But the being of God is unspecified and undetermined by any principle which in any way is other than that being. Hence, God is infinite or undetermined as above and apart from genus, species, and the other categories into which creatures fit.[41] Again, we note that the divine reality must have great perfection to be so characterized. And yet, great as this perfection must be, Albert does not say that it is intrinsically infinite. The infinity or indeterminateness of the divine reality expresses the state of that reality *with respect to a* corresponding state of created reality. Perhaps we may say that infinity in this case is identical with simplicity. God is undetermined because determination stems from the specification and contraction of one principle by another from which it is really distinct and with which it is joined to form an actual composite.

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[33] This is the main doctrine of Texts A, H, K and L.

[34] This is the main doctrine of Texts I, J and N.

[35] This is the main doctrine of Text E.

[36] Key Texts A, E and I.

[37] This is the main doctrine of Texts B, C, F, G, and H.

[38] Key Text G: ... infinitum est non finitum vel mensuratum tempore, loco, vel potestate comprehendentis intellectus.

[39] This is the main doctrine of Text D.; it is also found to some extent in Texts A, G, J and N.

[40] *In I Sent.* 8A., 3, sol.: Ita dico de hujusmodi nominibus divinis. Si enim attendantur secundum ea quae nominant tantum, tunc omnia illa nomina diversitatem rationis habent de se: alia est enim per se ratio essentia, et alia ratio sapientia per se, et sic de aliis. Si autem

b) Hence, we must say that for Albert infinity is strictly extrinsic to the divine being and power. Indeed, when we coneider God in Himself and in His intrinsic perfection, we must say that He is finite. Divine finitude stems from two sources: 1) God's function as His own determinant,[42] and 2) God's function as the determinant of all creatures.[43]

God is finite to Himself because He embraces His whole reality both in being and knowledge. (This characterization is contrasted to the way creatures *partially* attain divine reality in their mode of knowing, thus allowing Albert to say that God is infinite with respect to creatures). Furthermore, God functions for Himself as a *finis* or *terminus* functions for a finite creature. "Finite," then, is taken from creatures and applied in an extended sense to God. For although there is no composition of determinable-determining,

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attendo ea secundum id in quo ponitur significatum eorum, hoc est tale quod habet indifferentiam quod est et esse et aliquid esse. Haec enim tria secundum Boetium differunt: quia *quod est*, est id quod res est vere, et suppositum: *esse* autem est essentia ejus vel actus essentiae: *aliquid* autem *esse* est per aliquid trahens ipsum ad partem vel speciem: et haec omnia idem sunt in divinis: quia in Deo idem est quod est et esse, et ipse Deus etiam est quidquid habet: et sic idem est in ipso esse et aliquid esse. Si igitur quaeratur, Quare sapientia est bonitas, et haec duo essentia ipsa? unde enim est: non dicetur, quod hoc sit a sapientia in quantum sapientia est, vel ab essentia in eo quod essentia est: sed dicetur quod hoc est propter id quia in quo sunt ista, tantae simplicitatis est quod ipsum id quod est [est] suum esse, et suum esse est id quod est.

[41] See Key Text D:... et aliquid esse est ens non simpliciter, sed determinatum aliqua specie vel genere vel differentia esse... et ideo dicit [Damascenus] quod [Deus] sit pelagus substantiae infinitum.

[42] This is the doctrine of Texts C, F, G, H, I, M and N.

[43] This is the doctrine of Text K.

potential-actual, perfectible-perfecting and the like within God, still He is completely perfect and is what He is and is distinguished from all else simply *through Himself* — through the absolute simplicity and subsistency of His own being.[44] Hence, God is a *definite* being, although without belonging to a "type" as to a genus or species.

Secondly, God is pre-eminently the *finis* of all creatures, not merely in a teleological sense, but also through His power as giving perfection. But a determinant, a *finis*, must itself be determined.[45] Hence, God more than all others is determined and is so in His power and in whatever He is.[46] Albert is saying, then, that perfection comes only from that which is perfect. But that which is perfect is determined or finite. Hence, God is most determined of all.

c) We must note the absence of any discussion of divine infinity in terms of potency and act. But is a doctrine of the divine being as free from potency *implied* in Albert's discussion? Certainly Albert conceived God as free from matter and potency. But in his Commentary he does not conceive *divine infinity* in terms of freedom from matter and potency. Rather, the divine being is without potency and still is most determined, most finite, as we have seen. Finitude, determination, "definiteness" seem to be built into form. Of Himself and by being what He is, God is most determined. The realization, then, that matter and potency exercise their own type of determination in such a way that a subsistent form may well be called infinite because of their absence seems absent from Albert's thinking at this stage. That such a realization is present in his last great work, the *Summa Theologiae*, has been suggested by Leo Sweeney, S.J.[47] Let us contrast a key text from that work with those in the Commentary.

> An infinite which is simply act and is unmixed with passive potency, is not divided internally but externally in such a way that its effects are numbered. And since it is infinite, we cannot conceive of an ultimate in the process of "external division," so that its power would halt and be unable to extend further. And such an infinite, since it is in itself pure

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[44] Key Text G: ... licet ipse sibi finitus sit, tamen non finitur ad aliquid creatum... Key Text C: Cum autem nihil sui sit extra ipsum et suum intellectum: hoc modo dicere possumus, quod ipse se finit: quia sibi (ut ita dicam) aequalis. Key Text M:... sed solus Deus comprehendit se, quia sibi soli ipse finitus est, eo quod nihil de se est extra seipsum.

[45] *In I Sent.* d.43C, a.1, sed contra 1 (See Key Text K):... omnis perfectio aut est finis aut a fine: constat autem, quod Deus non habet perfectionem potentiae ab alio fine: ergo ipse est perfectus quia finis essentialiter est secundum potentiam...

[46] See Key Text K (ad 1): Dicendum ergo ad primum quod objectio illa non procedit nisi de infinito secundum potentiam passivam et non activam: quia activa potentia non accipit aliquam perfectionem ab actu, sed potius per actum dat perfectionem aliis. Nec tamen dicimus Deum esse infinitum ita quod non sit finis: sed potius finitione qua finis dicitur finitus, finitissimus omnium Deus et potentia sua et quidquid ipse est...

[47] See above, note 5.

> act, and is in potency only to what is outside itself, while in itself it is most intelligible, to us is incomprehensible precisely because of the infinity of its power and essence. Through this infinity, it excells those items to which its power extends. Our intellect can attain but not comprehend such an infinite.[48]

Let us note both the similarities and differences of this text as compared with what we find in Key Text A.[49] Both texts discuss divine power as "externally divisible" and divine power and essence as attainable but not comprehensible.

The most important difference between the two is that the *Summa* text *explains* the incomprehensibility as well as the intrinsic intelligibility of the divine essence and power. That intelligibility and incomprehensibility stem from a state of pure actuality, without any mixture of potency. Seemingly, then, Albert is here linking infinity with freedom from potency, an indication, as we have noted, that the doctrine of the later theologians is present.

C. The Sources

The following are the sources of Albert's doctrine which we have been able to recognize.

Aristotle.[50] Aristotle developed the notion of quantitative infinity arising primarily from the division of a magnitude and conversely from the addition of parts.[51] Secondarily, he taught that infinity applies to the movement of a body over the potential parts of a circular magnitude as well as to the measure of that movement, time.[52] As such, infinity is the privation of wholeness, perfection, and actuality in these quantitative items.[53] As such, again, infinity cannot be applied directly and intrinsically to the First Principle or to His power, but only by extrinsic denomination. Thus far Aristotle, and Albert with him.

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[48] *Summa Theologiae* I, tr. 3, q.14, m.1 ad 2 (B.31, 71): Infinitum autem quod est actus nihil habens potentiae passivae, non dividitur ad intra sed ad extra, ut sic dicam potest in unum, potest in duo, potest in tria, et sic de aliis. Et si infinitum est, non est accipere in tali processu ultimum in quo stat virtus eius, ita quod non posset in amplius. Et tale infinitum, quia actus est purus in se et non est in potentia nisi ad id quod est extra se, secundum se est maxime intelligibile, nobis autem incomprehensibile propter infinitatem potentiae et essentiae, quibus excellit ea in quae potest: hoc autem attingi potest per intellectum sed non comprehendi.

[49] See note 20.

[50] Aristotle is quoted explicitly in Text A (see note 20) and implicitly in other texts.

[51] *Physics* 207a7-8. See Leo Sweeney, S. J., "Divine Infinity in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas," Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto (1954), part I, for a treatment of infinity in Aristotle.

[52] *Physics* 207b21-25.

[53] *Physics* 207b35-208a1.

But while Aristotle applies infinity to his First Mover insofar as that Principle is the source of eternal motion in an infinite time, Albert applies the characteristic in other ways: 1) Basically, quantitative infinity applies to the power of God which is so great that its effects are potentially infinite. 2) Because divine power is infinite in this way, divine knowledge concerns an infinity insofar as God knows He can produce a potentially infinite number of things.

Let us note that quantitative infinity does not apply to God in Himself, since such infinity is precisely a privation of perfection in that which is divisible or able to be added to.[54]

Furthermore, this concept of quantitative infinity seemingly provides the primary analogate within a comparison of the various ways in which "infinite" is predicated of God. For example, Albert equates *immensity* with *infinity*, while immensity means the state of exceeding any attempt to contain.[55] God exceeds the containing power of intellect or of place or of time.[56] Hence, He is infinite because His whole reality cannot be embraced by anything other than Himself. Such a notion is similar to that of quantitative infinity which in another way (i.e. with respect to its potential parts) is beyond any attempt to grasp it all at once.

John Damascene.[57] The last point we have just noted leads us directly to a discussion of John Damascene. For from Damascene, seemingly, Albert takes his notion of a negative infinity, while that negative infinity is characterized as a denial of limitation from place, time, or intellect. *Deus est infinitus loco, tempore, et intellectu.*[58] Beyond Albert's direct citations of Damascene, however, the Greek's influence is difficult to assess. Certainly, the notion of negative knowledge of God is found in Damascene; but while "infinite" is given as a negative name,[59] Damascene does not develop a full doctrine of divine infinity.

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[54] On infinity as privation and imperfection see: Text G: Infinitum non est [in divinis]: quia illud est imperfectissimum cuius partes accipienti semper est aliquid extra accipere... Text J: Mihi videtur quod actu infinitum semper est imperfectum, nec in Deo est nec in natura: .... Infinitum autem nihil boni et perfecti est, sed potius imperfectum. Text K (sed contra 1): Nihil omni modo infinitum est perfectum, ut dicit Philosophus.

[55] see Text B:... infinitum dicit immensitatem virtutis et essentiae.... et ponit rationem suam respectu ejus quod est extra intelligentem.

[56] Text K: Hoc modo autem non finitur ab aliquo alio intellectu, nec loco, quantumcumque sit in expansio sive re sive intellectu, etiamsi ponantur multi mundi quotcumque, non finitur illis Deus, sed magis finit et continet, ut supra dictum est. Nec tempore finitur: quia nunc suae aeternitatis durando excellit tempus ante et post.

[57] See Text B (obj. 8): Deus in substantia est infinitus loco, tempore et comprehensione, ut dicit Damascenus.

[58] See Key Texts A, B, C and K.

[59] See *De Fide Orthodoxa*, I, 2: (*PG* 94, 791, 799).

Secondly, Albert also takes the phrase *pelagus substantiae infinitum* from Damascene.[60] The meaning of this phrase, however, as Albert understands it, is obtained from Boethian concepts.

Boethius.[61] From Boethius Albert took his notion of created being as involving a composition of *esse, quod est*, and *aliquid esse* and of uncreated being in which these principles are identified.[62] Of particular importance is the fact that the essence of a creature is determined and contracted by its composition with the supposit and with "other principles." Composition, then, carries with it its own brand of determination: a contraction of being within some genus and species. Since, however, God is simple (i.e. without the composition of *esse* and *quod est* which, rather, are identified in Him), He is above genus and species and hence, with respect to the determination which creatures have, is undetermined.[63] By means of Boethius's distinction between creature and Creator in terms of composition and simplicity, Albert interprets Damascene's *pelagus substantiae infinitum* to mean "being as uncontracted into genus or species."[64]

Hence, Boethius's contribution to Albert may be summarized as follows:

Primary is the notion of created being as composed of *esse* and *quod est* and of uncreated being in whom these principles are identified. From this influence, we may speculate that Boethius may be the source of Albert's stressing simplicity as a primary way of considering God.

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[60] See Key Text D:... et ideo dicit quod sit pelagus substantiae infinitum. Si autem objicitur quod est oppositio in verbo Damasceni, quia substantia secundum hoc non nominat esse, sed potius aliquid esse, dicendum quod ipse non facit vim in nomine substantiae secundum rationem nominis: sed tantum accipit secundum rem, secundum quod convertitur cum essentia simplici.

[61] See Key Text D.

[62] *In I Sent.* 8D, 22, sol.: Solutio. Concedendum est Deum esse simplicem. Ad hoc autem quod objicitur, quod omne quod est ab alio habeat esse, et ab alio quod hoc est, dicendum, quod illa propositio est Boetii et Avicennae in V *Primae Philosophiae*: et intelligitur sicut ipsimet se glossant de entibus post primum, quae sunt creatura, et secunda entia: Deus enim ab eadem re habet quod est, et quod hoc est sive Deus: et hoc convenit propter indifferentiam eius quod est cum essentia sive cum esse ipsius: nisi enim poneremus ipsum esse hoc ens, nihil posset negari de ipso, sicut nec de ente secundum quod est: unde negatio aliorum de ipso conesequitur eum, quia est hoc ens: simplicitas autem consequitur eum, quia hoc ens non ponit numerum et differentiam cum esse absoluto in ipso.

[63] See Key Text D: Tamen cum dico quod substantia vel sapientia vel bonitas significant quid est Deus: esse autem vel quid est significat esse vel ens vel essentiam infinitam, sive pelagus substantiae infinitum: nolo dicere quod substantia aliquid addendo enti trahat ipsum in partem: sed quia talis determinatio fit secundum rationem intelligendi per nomen hoc, in re non est additio, sed aequalis simplicitas....

[64] *Ibid.*: ... et aliquid esse est ens non simpliciter, sed determinatum aliqua specie vel genere vel differentia esse... et ideo dicit [Damascenus] quod [Deus] sit pelagus substantiae infinitum (i.e indeterminatum).

Directly following from this primary notion is the interpretation which Albert gives to *infinitum* in Damascene's phrase. *Infinitum* is here viewed in terms of a comparison: if we consider the *determination* resulting from the *composition* found in creatures, then with respect to such determination, God is the "*undetermined* sea of substance" because He is simple.

Augustine.[65] Augustine's meager doctrine of divine infinity can hardly be said to be a source for Albert. The similarity between the two Saints lies rather in the connection they make between divine wisdom and power, while infinity enters in to express the relation which that power and wisdom have to creatures. In saying that divine knowledge is infinite, Albert understands Augustine to mean that God comprehends a potential infinity, i.e. the possible objects of His power.[66] Divine wisdom, then, is infinite through its power of creating, while that power on the one hand is never exhausted by any effect and on the other hand is incomprehensible to the created intellect.

Plotinus. The instance of Plotinus as a "source" is an example of a situation wherein we may more prudently refer to doctrinal similarity than to historical influence. We may here note that Albert's explanation of divine infinity as *transcending* creatures and the knowledge of creatures is quite similar to the infinite non-being of Plotinus's One.[67] While Albert does not actually cite Plotinus, we may suggest a possible (although indirect) avenue of the latter's influence through the *Liber de Causis.* There is, in fact, at least one text in Albert's Commentary on the *Liber* in which an infinity by transcendency is acknowledged.[68] But Albert's doctrine in the *Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis* must be given further study before any definite conclusion may be reached.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusion to our study and the answer to the question posed at the outset is that for Albert infinity is extrinsic to the divine being. The summary of Albert's doctrine presented above, we believe, adequately establishes this conclusion. But beyond this basic answer, there are two interesting points discovered in our study of the development of Albert's position.

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[65] See Key Text N: Ad hoc autem quod Augustinus dicit quod infinitae species numerorum in illius scientia finitae sunt, cujus scientiae non est numerus. Dicendum quod hoc verum est: tamen non oportet quod sciat infinita...

[66] *Ibid.*: Unde intellectus est Augustini quod sua scientia quae est causa entis et non limitatur per ens creatum comprehendit id quod est infinitum in potentia divisionis et multitudinis. id est secundum quod semper aliquid potest sumi extra ipsum...

[67] See Leo Sweeney, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus," *Gregorianum* XXXVIII (1957), 527-531, 720.

[68] For example, *Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis* II, tr. 3, c. 4 (B. 10, 553): Hoc ergo oportet quod simpliciter sit infinitum, vel si proprie loqui vellemus, est supra finitum et supra infinitum omnia excellens.

Most important of all, perhaps, is the role which quantity plays in Albert's conception of infinity and of finitude as well. In Text G we find an indication that "infinite" and "finite" have *proper* meanings as connected with composite items: the former with the production of parts, the latter with the determining of one part of an item by another.[69] As applied to God, then, these attributes are used in an extended and deeply analogous sense. Thus, God is infinite in that He is always beyond any attempt to contain Him or His power; and He is finite in that He functions for Himself as a *finis* functions for a creature.

Equally important is the function of simplicity in Albert's understanding of God. The development and use of this notion in Albert's theology is, indeed, a fruitful area for further study. We have attempted to indicate places where infinity seems, if not identical with simplicity, at least to stem from it. On the other hand, God's finitude as well seems to stem from His simplicity. In the absolute simplicity of His being, God is what He is and is distinguished from all else simply through Himself. But while determined in Himself, He is infinitely beyond any attempt by creatures to contain Him.

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[69] See Key Text G: Infinitum non est: quia illud est imperfectissimum cujus partes accipienti semper est aliquid extra accipere... Finitum etiam non est ibi: quia finitum dicitur vel quod attingit complementum post motum... Alio modo dicitur finitum contentum intra fines terminantes ipsum intra vel extra...

Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders, and the Security of Constantinople, 1097-1204: The Precarious Survival of an Ideal*

WILLIAM M. DALY

INTRODUCTION

ONE historical generalization which stood up well for a long time, despite the nearly complete disappearance of its foundations in evidence, was Lord Bryce's interpretation of the nature and role of the medieval German Empire. Among English speaking historians at least, this interpretation had a durable career. One does not have to go back many years to discover works in which the Empire takes its place beside the papacy as the "recognized centre and head of Christendom," to use Bryce's words.[1] A restatement of the view occurs, for example, in Bertrand Russell's *History of Western Philosophy:*

> Throughout the Middle Ages, after the time of Charlemagne, the Church and the Holy Roman Empire were world-wide in idea, although everybody knew that they were not so in fact. The conception of one human family, one Catholic religion, one universal culture, and one world-wide state, has haunted men's thoughts ever since its approximate realization by Rome.[2]

Similar assertions would not be difficult to find.[3]

The piece-by-piece studies of the medieval German Empire done by historians since Bryce's time make it impossible any longer to sum up the medieval international experience so simply.[4] Bryce, himself, recognized that the Empire was not institutionally equipped to carry the heavy burden of leading or ruling Christendom, though he did not dwell on the details of this inadequacy.[5] We now know that the very conception of universal, temporal empire was outside the main stream of medieval political thought. Comparatively few medieval men thought in terms of universal empire, and those who did were apt to do so in association with some limited, special enthusiasm, often antiquarian in nature.

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* This article has grown out of further research into a parallelism which emerged in my doctoral dissertation, "The Concept of Christendom in the Western Crusade Chronicles of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," Brown University and (on microfilm) Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1955. I wish to thank President Barnaby C. Keeney of Brown University for encouragement and valuable criticism, and Professor Joseph P. Maguire of Boston College for elucidating two of the passages from Byzantine chronicles cited below.

[1] James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, 3d rev. ed. (New York, 1907), 1; for a more explicit exposition, see 89-120.

[2] Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York, 1945), 282.

[3] The error appears, for example, in a chapter by A. L. Poole in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, 8 vols. (Cambridge, 1911-36), V, 342, 357. More recently Herbert J. Muller has jauntily compounded it with other errors in *The Uses of the Past* (Oxford, 1952), 236-237.

During the early Middle Ages, as it turns out, the survivals of universalist imperialism were weak and scattered. They were at most an inconspicuous part of the Carolingian outlook. To the degree that a theory of empire was articulated at that time, it meant hegemony over most of Latin Christendom, and this hegemony was nearly always conceived of as a ministry within the Church. In the late ninth and tenth centuries, the sense of Western Christian unity survived but tended, especially north of the Alps, to become progressively disengaged from the imperial ideal. Central Italy was an exception. There the Roman aristocracy, yearning for a restoration of the ancient glories of their city and, as they imagined it, of their class, liked to contemplate the reassertion of Roman world hegemony. A weakened papacy shared these ideas to some extent, while it also clung to some of the more recent Carolingian traditions. Ultimately, after the revival of the papacy in the eleventh century, popes and canonists were to construct out of these and other materials a theocratic rationale which may properly be called papal imperialism.

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[4] Among others, F.-L. Ganshof has warned against continued acceptance of the older view: "Medieval European Society is something quite different from that community of Christian peoples, that *Res publica christiana*, subject to two leaders, the pope and the emperor, about which so much has been said for centuries, but which never had real existence." *Le moyen âge*, vol. I of *Histoire des relations internationales* ed., Pierre Renouvin (Paris, 1953), 1; my translation of this passage. The best general study of medieval conceptions of empire is that of Robert Folz, *L'Idée d'empire en occident du Ve au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1953). The same author in some cases gives fuller consideration to certain points in *Le souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne dans l'empire germanique médiéval* (Paris, 1950). Each of these works contains abundant references to earlier literature on the subject. At the same time that the earlier of these two works appeared in France, Geoffrey Barraclough published in England an essay which indicated how extensively continental scholarship had undone the old theories, and he sketched out a framework for a new interpretation: *The Mediaeval Empire, Idea and Reality*, Historical Association Pamphlet (London, 1950), republished in the same author's *History in a Changing World* (Oxford, 1956), 105-130. A third independent reassessment appeared shortly thereafter: Ewart Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas*, 2 vols. (New York, 1954), II, 430-466. A more recent revisionary study of a limited period is that of Gian A Bezzola, *Das Ottonische Kaisertum in der Französischen Geschichtschreibung des 10 und beginnenden 11 Jahrhunderts* (Cologne, 1956).

[5] Bryce, *Empire*, 119, 132-133, 143, 213.

While it was an ideological weapon used by thirteenth century popes to destroy the Hohenstaufen, it was not a theory held even by all churchmen, much less by most medieval kings or the laity in general.[6]

Meanwhile in Germany since the latter half of the tenth century, a fairly continuous, if usually thin, tradition of imperialist sentiment was being developed by some of the clerical associates of the German monarchs, though its implications for universal Christian or world hegemony did not emerge very clearly until the middle of the twelfth century.[7] Many of the German monarchs, particularly the early Ottonians and the rulers of the early eleventh century, shared these ideas only to a very limited extent, some of them not at all.[8] The heyday of universalist imperialism — and it is exaggerating even to use this term — came in the late twelfth century during the reigns of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI.[9] Thereafter German claims of this sort, which had not been widely accepted, gave way before the facts of twelfth and thirteenth century European life, particularly the revived power of the French monarchy and of the papacy.[10] When Frederick II wrote to his fellow European monarchs toward the middle of the thirteenth century, he addressed them as peers, not as vassals or quasi vassals, despite the fact that within Italy he had previously sponsored the most fully articulated expression yet of the ideal of universal empire.[11]

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[6] F.-L. Ganshof, *The Imperial Coronation of Charlemagne: Theories and Facts* (Glasgow, 1949); Folz, *L'Idée d'empire*, 34-35, 39-42; Louis Halphen, *Charlemagne et l'empire carolingien* (Paris, 1949), 482, 497-498; Gerd Tellenbach, "Die Bedeutung des Reformspapsttums für die Einigung des Abendlandes," *Studi Gregoriani*, II, (1947), 148-149. The development of papal imperialism is assessed by Charles H. Mc Ilwain, *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York, 1932), 230-262, 276-288; see also R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, 6 vols. (Edinburgh and London, 1903-1936), V, 152-440; Lewis. *Political Ideas*, II, 506-585. The foundations of papal imperialism have recently been explored at length, though somewhat rigidly, by Walter Ullman, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (London, 1955). Also important in this respect are two works of H. X. Arquillière, *L'Augustinisme politique*, 2d. rev. ed. (Pari s,1955), and *Saint Grégoire VII, essai sur sa conception du pouvoir pontifical* (Paris, 1934). The former of these two works is also important for an understanding of the context of Carolingian imperialism.

[7] Folz, *Souvenir de Charlemagne*, 61, 99-101, 105, 115-123, 196, 566.

[8] *Ibid.*, 60, 64, 75-79, 95, 101; *L'Idée d'empire*, 58-63, 73-86, 121-125.

[9] Folz, *Souvenir de Charlemagne*, 186-208; *L'Idée d'empire*, 115-125.

[10] Ganshof, *Moyen âge*, 62, 108-110; Folz, *Souvenir de Charlemagne*, 239-251, 266-279, 287-290; *L'Idée d'empire*, 146-148. Many of the canonists of this era recognized the fact that old Roman law principles did not fit the pluralistic political shape of the Europe that they knew. See Sergio Mochi Onory, *Fonti canonistiche dell' idea moderna dello stato* (Milan, 1951), v, 81-84. 171, 273-285. An interesting Spanish case in point is discussed by Gaines Post, " 'Blessed Lady Spain' — Vincentius Hispanus and Spanish National Imperialism in the Thirteenth Century," *Speculum*, XXIX (1954), 198-209.

[11] Folz, *L'idée d'empire*, 125-128.

The vision of the German Empire either as a world state or as the temporal organ of Christendom had been confined to the imaginations of relatively few men before 1250. Its acceptance was bound to diminish after that date despite the enthusiasm of certain late medieval writers, of whom Engelbert of Admont and Dante are probably the best known.[12] The intensity of their advocacy apparently moved some historians to project the ideas of these men backward and outward into areas of medieval life where they did not exist.[13] As Mrs. Lewis has observed, the historical reality was otherwise:

> While the idea of universal empire certainly played a role in medieval speculations, that role was limited. It touched only certain minds, and few of those deeply ; much of the best of medieval thinking rejected or ignored it: its importance in speculation was limited to a period in which it was all but obvious that it could have no basis in fact. Moreover, much of the loyalty which did focus on the concept of empire assumed an empire not necessarily defined in universal terms.[14]

This is perhaps as well as such a complicated problem can be summed up in a few sentences.

Does it follow, therefore, that medieval men had little conception of membership in Christendom, except in the sense of being members of the Church? Professor Barraclough has rejected the older view of the Empire so completely that on one occasion he expressed doubt that the historian can validly speak of the "feeling of unity of western civilisation" which is so often attributed to the Middle Ages. "That unity," he speculated,

> if it existed at all, was either spiritual (and as such was represented by the church), or it was material (and as such was represented by a supranational empire); but from either point of view it is a conception hard to reconcile with the known facts.[15]

When he discussed the same question a few years later he had apparently disposed of this dilemma, for he then admitted that medieval men had a basic yearning, in some ways stronger than the modern one, for a "union of all Christian folk, a Christian 'commonwealth'," even though that yearning did not take form in an international state.[16]

It is significant that so experienced a historian should speak uncertainly about the medieval sense of Christendom. His uncertainty suggests that some of the older historical works, especially those which studied the great medieval controversies about the proper relationship between spiritual and temporal authorities in society, have focused our attention on certain aspects of the superstructure of medieval political thought to the neglect of at least one of its fundamental dimensions. Thus when we concern ourselves with Christendom as such, we often find ourselves groping for precise words, for there have been few monographic studies undertaken to explore the history and meaning of the concept.[17]

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[12] Lewis, *Political Ideas*, II, 441-448; Folz, *L'Idée d'empire*, 149-152, 155-159.

[13] Barraclough, *Mediaeval Empire*, 124-125.

[14] Lewis, *Political Ideas*, II, 430.

[15] Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Continuity of European Tradition," *History in a Changing World*, 38; see also 43, 45.

[16] Geoffrey Barraclough, "The International Order and the Middle Ages," *ibid.*, 100.

It would be premature, therefore, to attempt a synthesis at this time. Given the abundance of research which has gone into the study of medieval imperialism, it is comparatively easy to say what the medieval Empire was not. It is virtually impossible to say with precision what the less articulated concept of Christendom meant, exactly what varieties of form it took, how widespread or how influential it was at any moment in medieval European history.

Nevertheless, the following generalities would probably stand up fairly well when tested by the evidence which historians have so far examined. In good part on the basis of Jewish tradition reshaped by certain New Testament writings, the Christians of the first few centuries developed a sense of their special identity as a people. In the era after Constantine's conversion, membership in Christian society tended to become identified with membership in the Roman Empire. The identification, never complete, weakened in the West as several Germanic kingdoms replaced the Roman Empire there. From about the time of Gregory the Great there developed, at first beside the older idea but tending to replace it especially from the late ninth century onward, the concept of a politically pluralistic community of Christian peoples which was not the Church as such. Thereafter the concept of Christendom took various forms, among which were Hohenstaufen imperialism and papal imperialism, but neither of these nor both of them together represented the outlook of a majority of Europeans at the time. The sense of membership in Christendom was reflected in the medieval peace movement, in the response to the crusade, and in certain other phenomena of medieval European life. It survived in public opinion, statecraft, and diplomacy into the sixteenth and even into the early seventeenth centuries to a much greater extent than has commonly been recognized, at least before Professor Baumer demonstrated its importance. Conceivably, its indirect influences in secular form upon Western history may come down to the present.

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[17] The Carlyles give the problem meager attention. *Political Theory*, VI, 112-127. McIlwain, likewise, says little about it. *Growth*, 205-206, 352. An exploratory study of papal terminology for Christendom has been done by Jean Rupp, *L'Idée de chrétienté dans la pensée pontificale des origines à Innocent III* (Paris, 1939). The survivals of the concept in the Tudor period have been studied with more care than has its main development in the Middle Ages: F. L. Baumer, "The Conception of Christendom in Renaissance England," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VI (1945), 131-156; see also his "England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom," *American Historical Review*, L (1944), 26-48, and "The Church of England and the Common Corps of Christendom," *Journal of Modern History*, XVI (1944), 1-21. B. Landry, *L'Idée de chrétienté chez les scholastiques du XIII*^e^ *siècle*, (Paris, 1929) is disappointing as a study of the concept of Christendom. Although there has been little monographic study of the problem, several historians have emphasized the importance of this dimension of medieval life. It is prominent in the writings of Christopher Dawson, especially in *The Making of Europe* (London, 1932). Much of what is known, together with some new material is discussed by Denys Hay, *Europe, the Emergence of an Idea* (Edinburgh, 1957), esp. 16-116. Significant references to it will be found in the following: Ganshof, *Imperial Coronation*, 9 (with citations to other works), 14-15; Halphen, *Charlemagne*, 124-125, 226-227, 241, 249-250, 311-312, 317-328, 333, 343-344, 352-374, 482, 498-499; Etienne Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge* 2d. rev. ed. (Paris, 1944), 252-258, and the same author's *Les métamorphoses de la cité de Dieu* (Paris, 1952), 75-181; Ullman, *Papal Monarchy*, 61-65, 88-89, 125; F. M. Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307* (Oxford, 1953), 10, 12, 15-16, 24, 80-86, 207-221, 228-230, 264-269; the editors' introduction to D. C. Douglas and G. W. Greenaway, eds., *English Historical Documents, 1042-1189* (Oxford, 1953), 60; J. R. Strayer, "The Laicization of French and English Society in the Thirteenth Century," *Speculum*, XV (1940), 77, and the same author's "The First Western Union," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXVII (1951), 196-205.

Rather than seek further precision than it is possible to attain as yet on this level, it will be better to investigate one small part of the problem in some detail. It concerns an aspect of the crusades which, although some of them have noted it in passing, appears to have escaped the fine combs of crusade historians up to this time. At least once during each of the crusades preceding the fourth, an attack on the Greeks was proposed. In each case the bonds of Christian obligation were alleged against an attack. Furthermore, a sense of Christian obligation entered into attempts which some members of the army on the fourth crusade made to prevent its diversion, first to Zara and then to Constantinople. What follows is an attempt to discover the dimensions of the rationale of Christian obligation with respect to these events.

I

The first of these proposals was not explicitly directed toward an attack on Constantinople, although it could hardly have ended otherwise if it had received general support. It was advocated during the first crusade by Raymond of Toulouse in the course of his well known refusal to take the oaths that Alexius I demanded of him.[18] A review of the events immediately preceding this refusal, if it seems tedious at first glance in view of all the attention which has been given to this phase of crusade history, is nevertheless necessary if we are to understand the argument as it developed and its pertinence to the concept of Christendom.

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[18] See Stephen Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1951-1954), I, 149-163; also Runciman's chapter, "The First Crusade: Constantinople to Antioch," in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton, I (Philadelphia, 1955), 284-288; J. H. Hill, "Raymond of St. Gilles in Urban's Plan of Greek and Latin Friendship," *Speculum*, XXVI (1951), 266-267; J. H. and L. L. Hill, "The Convention of Alexius Comnenus and Raymond of St. Gilles," *AHR*, LVIII (1953), 322-327; A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453*, 2d English rev. ed. (Madison, 1952), 408.

What was to happen when the barons who led the first crusade reached Constantinople can not be completely understood without reference to the climate of opinion of that time. When he preached his famous sermon at Clermont, Urban II chose to stress the theme of Christian brotherhood alongside more pragmatic motives for going east. It is likely that he condemned in these terms the shedding of Christian blood which occurred at home during the feudal wars of his day. Indeed the theme of Christian fraternity would have been only natural in a sermon delivered in the heartland of the peace movement by a former Cluniac monk. Urban clearly used the consideration of Christian fraternity to motivate his hearers to undertake the crusade. Eastern Christians were their brothers. They were in danger and had repeatedly begged for help. To risk one's life for one's brothers was the law of Christian charity. This would seem to be the bare gist of the ideological part of the pope's plea.[19]

Although it was a personal tendency as well as an official policy of Urban's to conciliate among Christians both at home and in his dealings with the Greeks, he was not innovating when he appealed to his audience in this fashion. For some time the rationale of common Christianity had constituted an accepted part of the ideological currency in circulation between Byzantium and the West. Beginning in Carolingian times, Byzantine emperors and certain Western monarchs had diplomatically addressed each other as spiritual brothers.[20] Within the past generation the Emperor Michael VII had urged common Christianity upon Pope Gregory VII as a reason for an alliance between the Greeks and the Normans.[21] Gregory VII several times referred to the ideal as he made preparations for a military expedition to aid the Greek Christians. However, his difficulties with Henry IV and the Norman alliance, upon which he came to rely as a result of them, brought an end to the project. Eventually Gregory supported a Norman attack upon the Byzantine Empire.[22]

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[19] All the chroniclers who reported the contents of Urban's sermon mention his use of the theme of fraternal bonds with Eastern Christians. See D. C. Munro, "The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont," *AHR*, XI (1906), 236. On the sin of shedding Christian blood at home, see *ibid.* 239, and Frederic Duncalf, "The Councils of Piacenza and Clermont," *Crusades*, ed. Setton, I, 242. The influence of the peace movement upon the early development of the crusading movement has been studied by L. C. Mac Kinney, "The People and Public Opinion in the Eleventh-Century Peace Movement," *Speculum*, V (1930), 181-206. On Urban's attempts to reach a settlement of the religious grievances existing between Rome and Constantinople and the extent to which they merged with his attitude at Clermont and his crusade policy, see Bernard Leib, *Rome, Kiev, et Byzance au XI^e^ siècle* (Paris, 1924), 182-187; A. C. Krey, "Urban's Crusade — Success or Failure," *AHR*, LIII (1948), 235-250, which cites other literature; Runciman, *Crusades*, I, 102-108; Duncalf, "Piacenza and Clermont," 226-227, 229-249; Peter Charanis, "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century," *Crusades*, ed. Setton, I, 216-219.

[20] A more restricted, secular usage of Byzantine diplomacy going back to Diocletian's time, with non-Roman roots which were much more ancient, was baptized during the Carolingian period and then extended to include certain other Christian princes. Thereafter it

Nevertheless the obligations of Christians to fellow Christians did not disappear from the context of Greek-Latin relations. When Roger Guiscard had proposed the war which Gregory decided to support, the wife of the Norman ruler and some of his barons reportedly delayed his project by objecting that the war would be unjust since it would involve attacking Christians. Only after he produced a pretender to the Greek throne was Roger able to get the support he needed from his barons.[23] Despite the strains that the war put upon Greek-Latin relations, the Emperor Alexius Comnenus, capable statesman that he was, did not drop the use of the rationale of Christendom.[24] The records that we possess of his request to the pope and to certain Western leaders for military assistance are in one case jejune, and in the other corrupt, but in each there is at least the hint of an appeal to common Christianity.[25]

It should not be surprising, therefore, that talk about Christian fraternity was in the air after Urban's sermon at Clermont. In fact it became a conspic-

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had Christian overtones in correspondence between Byzantine emperors and these rulers See Franz Dölger, "Die 'Familie der Könige' im Mittelalter," *Byzanz und die europäische Staatenwelt* (Ettal, 1953), 34-69.

[21] Peter Charanis, "Byzantium, the West, and the Origin of the First Crusade," *Byzantion*, XIX (1949), 19.

[22] Duncalf, "Piacenza and Clermont," 223-224.

[23] Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, ed. Bernard Leib, 3 vols. (Paris, 1937-45), I, 44-45.

[24] Leib, *Rome, Kiev, et Byzance*, 192-207; Dölger, "'Familie der Könige,'" 47.

[25] The chronicler Bernold reports that the legates of Alexius who presented themselves at the synod of Piacenza asked the pope and all Christ's faithful to send him assistance for the defense of holy Church. Bernold, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, V, 462. The Latin enlargement of Alexius' letter to Count Robert of Flanders, if such it was, opens with a salutation to Robert, all princes of the realm, and all lovers of the Christian faith, and pleads that the Count of Flanders take action "out of the love of God and out of pious regard for all Greek Christians." Heinrich Hagenmeyer, ed., *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088-1100* (Innsbruck, 1901), 130, 133. Regarding the probable antecedent of the Latin document and its likely contents, see Einar Joranson, "The Problem of the Spurious Letter of Emperor Alexius to the Count of Flanders," *AHR*, LV (1950), 811-832, esp. 831-832. Another indication of the Greek attitude is the fact that the populace of Constantinople were reassured by diviners that when the crusaders should arrive, they would act like a recent wave of locusts, respecting Christians as the locusts had respected wheat fields. Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, II, 208.

uous part of the history of the first crusade.[26] Thus Bohemond, whatever may have been his secret motives for doing so, undergirded the well disciplined march of his army through the Balkans by repeated reminders to his men that the Greeks were Christians and that their property must be respected.[27] Likewise Godfrey's dealings with King Coloman of Hungary, as he passed through that king's lands, were filled with talk about the obligations of Christian to Christian, despite the atmosphere of tense suspicion that prevailed between the two.[28]

The same story was repeated at Constantinople. Alexius, who had probably asked for mercenaries but had received a crusade, was ready, despite his disappointment, to respect and use the familiar ideology of Christian fraternity as he went about managing the unexpected collection of problems posed by the arrival of the crusaders. His skillful combination of diplomacy, force, and ideological appeal betrays a sureness of command that none of his successors demonstrated in facing subsequent crusades.

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[26] There are two good recent accounts of the various expeditions as far as Constantinople: Runciman, *Crusades*, I, 121-171; Duncalf, "The First Crusade: Clermont to Constantinople," *Crusades*, ed. Setton, I, 253-279. Leib has discussed in detail the crusaders' recognition that the Greeks were fellow Christians. See, *Rome, Kiev, et Byzance*, 208-235. Runciman agrees, although as will emerge later, he misinterprets the attitudes of participants in later crusades with respect to Greek Christendom. *The Eastern Schism* (Oxford, 1955), 79, 85, 103-104.

[27] At the beginning of the crusade Bohemond forbade pillaging in the territory which his army was about to cross on the ground that it belonged to Christians. He appears to have used this rationale at least three times on the march to Constantinople, twice with his own men and once with enemy mercenaries. Furthermore he received in friendly fashion a religious procession which emerged from one of the towns that his men had molested. In this section of his chronicle, the anonymous Norman chronicler of Bohemond's crusade twice uses the term "*justitia terre*." To the best of my knowledge this term is not used by any other crusade chronicler. It appears to mean the immunity pertaining to lands belonging to Christians. *Histoire anonyme de la première croisade*, ed. Louis Bréhier (Paris, 1924), 20-26; see also 26, n. 1, and the editor's introduction, v, xix.

[28] Godfrey had the misfortune to be preceded down the Danube Valley by the lawless popular groups under Emich and Gottshalk. Coloman had punished their unrestrained ravages with great severity. Whether he was anxious to satisfy public opinion or was ignorant of the facts, Godfrey asked Coloman for an explanation of what he chose to consider a massacre of Christian pilgrims. Coloman related details about the misdeeds of these groups, assured Godfrey that the Hungarians were not persecutors of Christians, and pleaded necessity, a principle to which resort would be made more than once during the crusades. See below, pp. 54, 84 and n. 139. Godfrey was apparently satisfied with Coloman's explanation, for he accepted his salutation to the crusaders as "co-Christians," and he met with the Hungarian king to discuss what Albert of Aachen called "the concord and reconciliation of Christians." Despite Coloman's suspicions, the two rulers, as was the custom, exchanged the kiss of peace upon meeting and taking their leave. Nevertheless, Godfrey was obliged to furnish his brother and his family as hostages for the army's good behavior. Albert of Aachen, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, in *Recueil des historiens des croisades*: *Historiens occidentaux*, published by the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, 5 vols. (Paris, 1844-1906), IV, 300-304; hereafter referred to as *RHC Oc*.

In the spring of 1096 when the populace of Constantinople first heard that large forces of Latins were on their way east, they became understandably apprehensive. A plague of locusts intensified their sense of foreboding. The locusts, as it turned out, attacked vineyards but not wheat fields and diviners in the capital took this phenomenon as a good omen. The Westerners, they predicted, would refrain from interference in Christian affairs but fall very heavily upon the barbarian Ishmaelites who were slaves to drunkenness, wine, and Dionysius."[29] Could Alexius have been behind this reassurance to his subjects?

If he was not, he nevertheless did his best to see that the crusaders refrained "from interference in Christian affairs." His concern for the safety of Peter the Hermit, despite the lawless behavior of his followers, manifests at least a trace of sincere concern for the Christian proprieties on Alexius' part.[30] Furthermore it would prove to the leaders of the major armies, when they arrived at Constantinople, that Alexius was a man to respect his obligations toward his fellow Christians.

Godfrey's army was the first major military force to arrive at Constantinople. Alexius was anxious to complete negotiations with him before other princes arrived, and he put pressure on him to force him to take an oath guaranteeing the integrity of any Byzantine territory that he might rewin from the Turks. Godfrey resisted and there were intermittent skirmishes between their forces in the early months of 1097. Here again Alexius did his best to preserve the amenities. He and Godfrey observed a truce during the Christmas season, and despite an attack by Godfrey's men during Holy Week, Alexius, anxious, as Anna Comnena reports, to avoid "fratricide" during the holy season, took measures to limit Latin deaths. When Godfrey was forced by Alexius' superior strength to yield, the two were reconciled and exchanged the kiss of peace.[31]

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[29] Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, II, 208; the English translation is that of E. A. S. Dawes, *The Alexiad of Princess Anna Comnena* (London, 1928), 249.

[30] *Ibid.*, II, 210, 212. Albert of Aachen mentions Alexius' prohibition of attacks on Peter's followers for the reason that they were Christian, he calls him the "most Christian Emperor," and he indicated that Alexius responded out of mercy to Peter's plea in the name of Christ for aid in Asia Minor. See *Historia*, 282-289, as well as his observations on a later incident, 563-564. The Norman Anonymous, normally suspicious of Alexius, grants him this grace. *Histoire anonyme*, 6; also 142-144. See also Runciman, *Crusades*, I, 127-133. An interesting appeal to the common Christianity of Greeks and Latins occurred during an encounter between Greek naval forces and the ships transporting the army of Robert II, Count of Flanders, across the Adriatic. Anna Conena, *Alexiad*, II, 217.

[31] *Ibid.*, II, 222-224; Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 306-310.

Given the ideological climate which the foregoing events reflect, one would marvel if any serious later issue between Alexius and the crusade leaders would have escaped being argued along the axis of Christian obligation, whatever might be the political and military realities underneath it. The argument about taking the oath to Alexius which Raymond of Toulouse precipitated with him, and then with the other leaders, soon became oriented in this direction. A brief review of certain aspects of Raymond's crusade up to this point is necessary to clarify what happened at Constantinople.

It will be recalled that Raymond arrived at Constantinople later than most of the other leaders.[32] Hardship and terror had haunted his winter march through Istria and Dalmatia where "wild men," in the words of his chronicler, attacked them as they marched. When they at last reached the confines of the Byzantine Empire near Dyrrachium, they expected that they had left a land of savages and reentered Christendom. Probably the vision of Christian fraternity raised by Urban was still in their minds.[33] "We believed," remarked the chronicler Raymond of Aguilers, "that we were in our fatherland [*in patria nostra*] since we were under the impression that the Emperor Alexius and his vassals were our brothers and allies."[34]

If they expected Christian sentiment to ease their burdens this far from Constantinople, the Provençals were soon to be disappointed, for their movements hereafter were closely policed by the mercenary troops dispatched by Alexius to see them safely through his lands. The supervision which these troops imposed upon the Provençals to prevent wandering and looting was so strict that at one time or another two barons were killed, the papal legate, Adhemar of Puy, was wounded and obliged to leave the main army, and Raymond himself was attacked. Raymond's followers were naturally disposed to overlook their own lawless acts and to lay all blame for these difficulties on the Greeks. As they saw it, this was savage behavior and justified an attack on the Greek army. We may conjecture that the historic medieval allegation of Greek treachery to fellow Christians was now raised for the first time by crusaders, because Raymond of Aguilers refers indignantly to the letters of fraternity and safe conduct which Alexius had sent them. He self-righteously adds that the army refrained from taking vengeance on the Greeks.[35] This restraint was probably enforced against the wishes of many of the men in the army by Raymond's and Adhemar's determination to abide by Urban

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[32] For accounts of their expedition see Runciman. *Crusades*, I, 159-162, and Duncalf, "The First Crusade: Clermont to Constantinople," *History of the Crusades*, ed. Setton, I, 272-275.

[33] Hill, "Raymond of St. Gilles," 266.

[34] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, *RHC Oc*, III, 236.

[35] *Ibid.*

II's policy of cooperation with the Greeks. Nevertheless it would be surprising if Raymond had been in a good mood when Alexius summoned him to come to Constantinople ahead of the army.

By late April 1097 when Raymond arrived at the Greek capital, Alexius had maneuvred all of the important leaders who had arrived so far, and most of the lesser barons, into taking oaths to respect his rights in reconquered Byzantine territories and to recognize him as their overlord for all newly acquired lands. The leaders had been reluctant, and in the case of Godfrey, refractory. Yet if they were to move on to accomplish the aim which Urban II had set for the crusade, they needed the cooperation of the Byzantine state. They acceded to the emperor's conditions. It was not easy, however, for the leaders to explain their decision to the men of their armies, who simmered over what they regarded as an indignity. Like King Coloman, who justified his punishment of Gottschalk's and Emich's followers in Hungary, they pleaded that well worked medieval argument, necessity.[36] In the meantime, Alexius had been able to get some of the armies across the Straits to the coast of Asia Minor.

Raymond was not amenable to the honors and persuasive attempts of Alexius when they met. His sense of grievance at the "savagery" of the imperial soldiers must have been nursed by Bohemond's obviously close rapport for the moment with the emperor, especially if he, himself, had hoped to lead the crusade as so many historians have thought.[37] When he was received at court he flaunted his devotion to God as his only Lord and exposed Alexius' own unwillingness to lead the crusade in person. Soon afterward, he received a report of a nearly disastrous encounter which had occurred between his men, who had engaged in active looting after his departure for Constantinople, and Byzantine troops. He immediately sent representatives to the emperor to charge him with treachery.

In what followed, the emperor made it clear to Raymond that the Provençals had merited their misfortunes by their indiscipline, but he agreed to some sort of adjudication and named Bohemond as his surety. We do not have the details of the hearing. Given the high feelings in Raymond's army about what the Provençals regarded as Alexius' "unfraternal" behavior, together with the fact that the atmosphere at Constantinople was already charged with talk, and undoubtedly some emotion, about the responsibilities of fellow Christians to one another, we can conjecture that Raymond probably accused the emperor of un-Christian behavior in using force against his crusaders. In any event, the decision went against Raymond.

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[36] *Histoire anonyme*, 30; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, ed. Heinrich Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1913), 9, 175-176, 179.

[37] Runciman, *Crusades*, I, 110, 162-163; Hill, "Raymond of St. Gilles," 265, n. 1.

At this point, Raymond's army arrived, and Alexius intensified his efforts to get him to take the oath. In the ensuing controversy the rationale of Christian fraternity emerges explicitly in the documents, and one suspects that Alexius played some part in manipulating it into prominence. Raymond, we are told,

> was meditating how he could avenge the injury to his men and wipe out the shame of this disgrace from himself and his men. But the Duke of Lorraine and the Count of Flanders and the other princes abominated this, saying: 'It is the height of folly to fight against Christians while the Turks are threatening.' Indeed Bohemond avowed that he would act as the emperor's adjutant if the count should undertake anything against him or should make further excuses about the homage and the oaths.[38]

If Raymond had used Christendom as an ideological weapon against Alexius, as I have conjectured, he now had it turned back upon himself, coupled as in the first case, with the threat of force. Raymond backed down sufficiently to take a qualified oath probably of a sort familiar to his native land.[39]

Constantinople escaped its first serious threat from a crusading army. Why did the city get by with no more than a wrangle among the princes? Runciman is disposed to attribute the maintenance of peace either to the arrival of the papal legate, Adhemar, or to Alexius' manipulation of Bohemond against Raymond.[40] There is no certainty about the first reason. The second seems to emerge silently from behind the evidence that has survived. Perhaps both of these reasons are valid. What has generally been overlooked by crusade historians is the fact that there existed a common ideology about the fraternity of Christian peoples and their leaders. Undoubtedly its pertinence had been heightenend somewhat by Urban II, but it had existed both in the Byzantine Empire and in the West before 1095.

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[38] Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, III, 238; see also *Histoire anonyme*, 32. This passage is the one clear instance, and possibly the only instance, where there are significant similarities of wording between the works of these two chroniclers. Bréhier has failed to note the extent of the parallelism and assumes that it is coincidental. *Ibid.*, 33, n. 9; see also vi, xv. Both Sybel and Hagenmeyer emphasized the similarities more heavily but without close attention to detail; each of them regards the Norman Anonymous as the original. Heinrich von Sybel, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzugs*, 2d rev. ed. (Leipzig, 1881). 18-22; Heinrich Hagenmeyer, ed., *Anonymi gesta Francorum* (Heidelberg, 1890), 49-57. The more probable conclusion, however, would seem to be that the first Latin scribe, or a subsequent one, borrowed this passage from Raymond's chronicle. Four arguments favor this hypothesis: (1) Raymond of Aguilers had better access to these particular facts than did the Anonymous; (2) the length and the phrasing of the passage of the Anonymous suggest that it is a digest of Raymond's account; (3) the "*vindictam*" which Raymond of Toulouse is said to have sought can be clearly explained only by reference to Raymond of Aguiler's account of what went before; (4) borrowing at this point by a scribe who copied the chronicle of the Anonymous would fit Professor Krey's hypothesis that this chronicle was revised to suit Bohemond's later propaganda needs, since the passage underlines Bohemond's correct behavior before he broke with Alexius at Antioch. The two passages appear in an appendix below. See A. C. Krey, "A Neglected Passage in the *Gesta* and its Bearing on the Literature of the First Crusade," *The Crusades and Other Historical Essays Presented to Dana C. Munro*, ed. Louis J. Paetow (New York, 1928), 69-78.

[39] Hill and Hill, "Convention," 322-327.

[40] Runciman, *Eastern Schism*, 81-82. Actually we know nothing about Adhemar's stay

Neither Alexius nor the princes were monks. As subsequent events were to prove, their attention was fixed for political and military reasons upon Asia Minor and the eastern littoral of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless in their discussions they talked and, to a degree, acted out the ideology of Christendom. At least in this formal sense the ideology played a part in preserving peace at Constantinople.

Where individual men's emotions and the forces of public opinion are at work, one risks oversimplification to go no further. The ideology of Christendom undoubtedly had an idealistic dimension with at least some individuals. Ideals probably live to a great extent as parasites upon men's material conditions and interests. Yet in some ways they have a life of their own, too, although they seldom overcome a strong sense of material interest, especially where large groups of people are involved. Fortunately for the ideology of Christendom at Constantinople in 1097, the material interests of the majority of the leaders, as they conceived them, coincided with the accepted diplomatic ideology and such real sense of conscience as existed. Together they conspired, probably under the skilled management of Alexius and possibly of Adhemar, to save Constantinople from attack.

The history of the concept of Christian fraternity during the subsequent days of the crusade is not of concern here. It should be noted, however, that the crusaders appealed to it several times after they left Constantinople. Sometimes the leaders used it to inspire the army, sometimes it was used to shame recalcitrant leaders. Reportedly the protest which the leaders lodged with Alexius after his failure to relieve their distress during the siege of Antioch charged the Greek emperor with impious disregard of the people of God.[41]

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at Constantinople. See James A. Brundage, "Adhemar of Puy: the Bishop and his Critics," *Speculum*, XXXIV (1959), 204.

[41] Effective appeals to the ideal were made at Antioch during the darkest days of the crusaders' stay there. See Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 378-379, 418, 439. Tancred, as well as some of Baldwin's own followers, appealed to the obligations of Christian fraternity in an effort to shame Baldwin into less selfish behavior in Cilicia. See *Histoire anonyme*, 58; Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi in expeditione Hierosolymitana*, *RHC Oc*, III, 633; Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 347-348. Daimbert of Pisa, the unprincipled successor of Adhemar as papal legate, rued one instance of misbehavior when some of the leaders embarrassed him by appealing to the ideology. See *ibid.*, 500-504. For the allegation that Alexius' failure to

When the crusade was over the ideology lived on in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, where it became the basis of patriotic appeals for military reinforcement from the West, or a prop for unsteady royal authority, as circumstance might demand.[42]

II

Of greater pertinence to the present discussion, since it bears upon the later Western attitude toward the Greeks, was the propaganda war which Bohemond and Alexius waged against each other while Bohemond was making preparations to attack the Byzantine Empire a decade after the end of the first crusade.[43] Bohemond, who had returned to Europe to gather an army, worked with considerable success to convince Westerners that Alexius was a bad Christian. He used two major propaganda weapons. One was a retailored version of the chronicle written by the Norman Anonymous. The other consisted of six live, non-Christian mercenaries from Alexius' army whom Bohemond had captured sometime earlier. The Norman chronicle presented the verbal picture of a Greek emperor who had allegedly defaulted, during the later days of the first crusade, on his pledges to his fellow Christians.[44] The mercenaries constituted visible proof that Alexius had employed heathens in a war against Christians. Bohemond exhibited them at Rome and was able to obtain the support of the pope, who was probably already prejudiced against Alexius by a similar accusation made after the failure of the crusade of 1101.[45]

Like Bohemond, Alexius was an old hand at manipulating the ideology. A few years earlier, for example, some survivors of the disastrous crusade of 1101 had accused him at Jerusalem of betraying Christians. He had managed then to convince most sensible Frankish leaders in the East that he was not guilty of the charge.[46] Now he set out to counteract Bohemond's similar char-

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observe his Christian duty by not coming to Antioch justified the crusaders' disregard of their oath to him, see *ibid.*, 434.

[42] The practice began with Godfrey. See *ibid*, 499. Baldwin's chaplain, Fulcher of Chartres, idealized life in the kingdom in terms of the ideology. See the well known passage on the unity of the Latins in Outremer in his *Historia*, 748. For examples of Baldwin's resort to the ideology, see Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 667, 671-674.

[43] Relations between Bohemond and Alexius during this period are discussed by Ferdinand Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis I^er Comnène* (Paris, 1900), 217-253; see also Claude Cahen, *La Syrie du nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris, 1940), 205-251; Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 32-55.

[44] Krey, "Neglected Passage," 57-78.

[45] Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, III, 79-80; Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 584-585.

[46] *Ibid.*, 584.

ges in the West, and in doing so he made use of the rationale of Christian obligation in a way hitherto unnoticed by historians. He assured the leading maritime cities of Italy that the charges were untrue. To placate opinion north of the Alps, he purchased the freedom of some Western knights from the Turks, entertained them magnificently at Constantinople, and then sent them home as live, and presumably articulate, refutations of Bohemond's charges.[47] Unfortunately for good relations between Byzantium and the West, Bohemond's arguments convinced the pope and enough other Westerners to make a "crusade" upon Alexius possible. In the war that followed, Alexius defeated Bohemond and thus had the last word in the propaganda battle. In the negotiations which preceded the peace settlement he insisted that Bohemond recognize that his expedition had not been a crusade but rather a war that had shed Christian blood for the sake of personal gain. In the treaty itself Bohemond had to forswear future resort to the familiar religious rationale against the Greek emperor. Possibly, as Yewdale suggested, Bohemond forced Alexius to grant protection to any of the Norman army who wished to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.[48] It should be noted, however, that Alexius had already made a point of piously ransoming some Western knights and that the new offer was one of his original terms toward a settlement with Bohemond. It is conceivable that Alexius took some pleasure in reflecting that this demonstration of his own high ideals could serve simultaneously as a good propaganda tactic and as a means of weakening Bohemond's army.

The channel had now been dug which arguments between Greeks and crusaders and arguments among crusaders themselves about Greeks were generally to follow for the next century. Later controversies up to 1204 would do little more than enlarge this channel and alter its directions here and there. The second crusade provides abundant evidence of this pattern.

Both contemporaries and historians of a later day have agreed that the second crusade was an almost total failure.[49] St. Bernard, its most ardent and effective proponent, voiced his shock at the outcome of the expeditions to the East with his usual eloquence:

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[47] Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, III, 53-56.

[48] The negotiation and provisions of the treaty are discussed, with references to other works, by Ralph B. Yewdale, *Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch* (Princeton, 1924 ?), 125-131. Yewdale does not mention the theme of Christian obligation which wove its way through the whole episode. For Anna Comnena's account of the provisions of the treaty, see *Alexiad*, III, 125-139. For the preliminary discussions, see *ibid.*, 117-118. Alexius explicitly excluded a future appeal by Bohemond to the principle of Christian fraternity as an excuse for not respecting the new obligations he was now undertaking to the Greek Emperor. *Ibid.*, 126.

[49] Contemporary opinion is analyzed by Giles Contable, "The Second Crusade as seen by Contemporaries," *Traditio*, IX (1953), 213-279; esp. 266-276. Runciman subjects the failures of the crusade to through criticism. *Crusades*, II, 288. A more balanced estimate appears in the account of Virginia Berry, "The Second Crusade," *History of the Crusades*, ed. Setton, I, 465-466, 483, 512.

> We all know that the judgments of God are true; but this judgment is so deep that I could almost justify myself for calling him blessed who is not offended thereat.[50]

Recently the almost unrelieved gloom surrounding the crusade has been lifted somewhat by historians who have brought the territorial gains made by sea-borne crusaders in the western Mediterranean region into better focus.[51] Although St. Bernard at the time that he wrote the comment just quoted would propably not have approved our doing so, we may make one addition, albeit a negative one, to the short list of the accomplishments of the crusade: the armies of the second crusade which went overland refused to attack Constantinople despite its precarious military situation and despite fairly widespread irritation in the army with the Greeks.

The failure of the German Emperor, Conrad III, to attempt such an attack is probably without much significance. Comparatively little information about the German crusade led by Conrad survives. From what we know, it seems probable that the Byzantine Emperor, Manuel Comnenus, feared that Conrad had deserted their existing alliance against Roger II of Sicily and had allied himself with the Norman king, who was about to take the opportunity opened to him by the crusade to attack the Byzantine Empire.[52] This false impression probably grew stronger at the Byzantine court when Conrad found himself unable to keep discipline in his army and looting and other acts of violence multiplied as the crusaders marched toward Constantinople.[53] In addition, Conrad appears to have suspected that Manuel would not respect his imperial dignity if he should accept the Greek emperor's invitation to visit him at Constantinople.[54] Consequently there was no meeting between them to allay their mutual suspicions, which had sharpened considerably by the time that Conrad's army approached the city.

During this period, the closest that Conrad came to considering an attack on the city was no threaten that he would return the following year to conquer it unless Manuel would put certain withheld shipping facilities at his disposal.[55] We do not know to what extent the proposed attack was debated within the German army, if indeed it was discussed at all. Shortly thereafter, chastened by his disasters in Asia Minor, Conrad was to reaffirm his alliance with Manuel.[56]

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[50] St. Bernard, *De consideratione*, trans. George Lewis (Oxford, 1908), 38, cited by Constable, "Contemporaries," 275.

[51] Constable, "Contemporaries," esp. 213-214, 216-217, 220-224, 237-240, 257-260, 265; Berry, "Second Crusade," 481-483.

[52] *Ibid.*, 484.

[53] Ferdinand Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène (1118-1143) et Manuel Comnène (1143-1180)*, (Paris, 1912), 271-280; Berry, "Second Crusade," 483-485; Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 260-261.

[54] Chalandon, *Manuel Comnène*, 279-280.

If the evidence for this incident is sparse, considerable information survives about similar but more extensive proposals within the French army. Most historians who have written about the second crusade have noted these proposals, yet there is a surprising lack of agreement among them as to why the French army failed to attack Constantinople. The opinion of one group of historians has been recently summed up with some reinvigoration by Miss Joan Hussey:

> The French crusading king Louis VII was the friend of Roger of Sicily, and it was known that these two were busy discussing the desirability of capturing Constantinople as an hors d'œuvre to their main meal further east. The crusade was, however, a dismal failure, partly because of perpetual quarrels and partly because its strength was directed against Damascus...[57]

The genealogy of this opinion appears to extend backward through Ostrogorsky and Vasiliev, who repeat it, to the undocumented and inaccurate account of Edmund Curtis.[58]

It does not appear in the several pages devoted to the crusade by Chalandon, who carefully followed the chronicle of Odo of Deuil even to the point of accepting Odo's explanation of why the crusaders did not attack the city. In effect Chalandon's explanation is that the French did not carry through the plan for the attack because rumors of German successes in Asia Minor, circulated by the Greeks, excited them to fear that the Germans would leave them no victories to win. He admits that to a lesser extent, but probably not sufficiently to have carried the day, the French leaders were deterred by their loyalty to papal crusade policy.[59] Mrs. Berry's view is close to that of Chalandon. Like him she presents Louis VII as friendly to Manuel at this point, but she chooses to weight the influence of the papal legates upon the crusaders more heavily than he or other historians have been disposed to do, and probably more heavily than the circumstantial evidence bearing on the legates' personalities will allow.[60] Bréhier and Grousset, on the other hand, have apparently given sole credit to Louis VII for avoiding the catastrophe.[61] Runciman seems to be unable to make up his mind. At one point he states that Louis' conscience and his satisfaction at the good treatment which Manuel gave him at Constantinople worked together with the worldly wisdom of Bishop Arnulf of Lisieux to save the city. Elsewhere he gives all of the credit to Arnulf who, it would seem, singlehandedly persuaded Louis not to attack the city despite the king's desire to do so. In both cases, Runciman assumes that the army wanted to take the city.[62]

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[55] Joannes Cinnamus, *Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum*, vol. xxv of *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, ed. A. Meineke (Bonn, 1836), 79. If Conrad's threat is to be kept in perspective, one must place it beside his earlier attempt to explain and excuse to Manuel the misbehavior of the Germans as they marched across Greek territory. Together with the circumstances of the threat, this evidence may indicate that Conrad was talking in momentary anger or for immediate tactical purposes. See *ibid*, 76.

[56] Berry, "Second Crusade," 486, 510-512; Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 266-267, 285-286.

[57] Joan M. Hussey, *The Byzantine World* (London, 1957), 63.

[58] Edmund Curtis, *Roger of Sicily and the Normans in Lower Italy, 1016-1154* (New York and London, 1912), 221-229. Vasiliev relies on this account. See his *Byzantine Empire*, 420-421; see also George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey (Oxford, 1956), 339.

[59] Chalandon, *Manuel Comnène*, 299-300. Caspar does not regard Louis VII as an ally of Roger II at this time, although he conjectures that a party in the French army maintained

Unfortunately the problem cannot be solved by adding up the causes which have been alleged, if for no other reason than the fact that some of them are contradictory. From the discussion which follows it will emerge that we may safely dispense with a few of these alleged causes. First, Louis VII was not friendly to the cause of Roger II during this stage of the crusade. Nor was anti-Greek sentiment in the French army so strong as has often been assumed: a majority of the French leaders opposed an anti-Greek policy on every recorded instance of debate which occurred during this stage of the crusade. Finally, one of the major arguments advanced by the majority who opposed an attack on Constantinople was the fact that the Greeks were Christians. With these observations in mind, it will now be useful to turn to the facts, insofar as we can get at them. They are to be found mainly in the prejudiced, but detailed and, in its way, honest chronicle of Odo of Deuil.

A significant division of opinion about the Greeks emerged within the French army on several different occasions, not all of which have been suffi-

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contact with the Norman King. Erich Caspar, *Roger II (1101-1154) und die Gründung der Normanisch-Sizilischen Monarchie* (Innsbruck, 1904), 373-374, 378-380.

[60] Berry, "Second Crusade," 490-491. Serious linguistic and temperamental barriers to effective influence upon the army by the legates are mentioned by John of Salisbury and they suggest that neither of the legates was apt to have intervened effectively, if at all. To the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence to suggest that they did. John of Salisbury, *Historia pontificalis*, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall (London, 1956), 55.

[61] Louis Bréhier, *Le monde byzantin: vie et mort de Byzance* (Paris, 1948), 330; *L'Église et l'Orient au moyen âge: les croisades*, 5th rev. ed. (Paris, 1928), 107. For a similar view see René Grousset, *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1934-36), II, 238-239. Amy Kelly, whose account of the second crusade is inaccurate in other respects, credits Louis VII alone with saving the city. She assumes that the French barons were united in favor of an attack. *Eleanor of Aquitaine and the Four Kings* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), 41.

[62] Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 269; III, 476; *Eastern Schism*, 126.

ciently noted by historians. The first of several recorded debates in which it was a central point at issue appears to have occurred at Étampes in February 1147, where Louis VII was making arrangements for the march. At that time, there was a seemingly heated, day long discussion among the French leaders about an offer by King Roger II of Sicily, the hereditary Western enemy of the Greeks, to transport the crusade by sea from Italy. We know little of the arguments employed by the anti-Greek faction which then emerged to view, except that they cited their reading — probably of earlier crusade chronicles — and their experience as proof that the Greeks were deceivers.[63] Odo of Deuil, who was the king's chaplain, shared their views. He expressed angry disappointment when he had to record that Louis and the majority of the barons decided to avoid an entanglement with Roger II and go overland through Byzantine territory, for it seemed to him that the king was thereby unwisely putting trust in a people addicted to "deception."[64] Despite the heat and the length of the debate, we are left uninformed by Odo about the nature of the arguments of the majority who favored relying on Greek cooperation and, in effect, avoiding entanglements with the Normans. What is clear is that from the beginning, the anti-Greek faction amounted to no more than a minority.

It was not long before another division of opinion erupted in the army. Emissaries of Manuel were awaiting the French King at Ratisbon to make arrangements for the transit of the army through Byzantine territory. When they informed him that the French barons must first swear oaths not to take any of the emperor's territory and to restore to him any of his former possessions which they might rewin from the Turks, the king called a council. It should be noted that there was no controversy among the barons about the first demand; even the anti-Greek faction considered such a guarantee quite proper. Nevertheless, everyone was averse to taking the second oath, and as a matter of fact the Greek emissaries, after waiting for several days while the barons debated the issue, had to settle for the first oath alone and a promise of further negotiation at Constantinople about the second.[65]

What is significant here is the division of opinion among the barons as to why the second oath should not be taken. The anti-Greek party, whose major spokesman now emerges in Odo's narrative as the zealous Godfrey, bishop of Langres, were unwilling that Manuel should regain lost territory which the

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[63] Odo of Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, ed. and trans. Virginia G. Berry (New York, 1948), 12; Berry "Second Crusade," 477.

[64] Odo, *De profectione*, 12-14.

[65] *Ibid.*, 26-28; see also Berry, "Second Crusade," 487-488; Chalandon, *Manuel Comnène*, 289-304. Runciman is less exact. *Crusades*, II, 262. Earlier negotiations between Manuel and Louis are discussed by Berry, *op. cit.* 470.

French might rewin unless he should compensate them. The moderates were more generous, or at least more diplomatically minded. They merely wanted a precise definition from Manuel as to what territories he regarded as his, "lest the obscurity of his proposal excite future litigation."[66] As before, the debates were heated and they lasted for several days. The moderates again won, for there was no refusal to take the second oath. Instead, the question was put off until the two rulers should meet and confer personally. As a matter of fact, if we can trust the silence of the evidence, Manuel was not to bring it up again until the French army had left Constantinople and crossed to Asia Minor.

The division between the two factions had now hardened. It would persist to and beyond Constantinople. In Bulgaria, the army found supplies short and the rate of exchange unfavorable. It should not be surprising that one group blamed the Greeks for these conditions, while the other blamed the German crusaders who were preceding them along the route and "who plundered everything."[67]

Soon the anti-Greek faction discovered religious issues to inflate their list of grievances. Reports came in that Greek priests purified altars after Latin priests had celebrated Mass on them, and that they required the rebaptism of Latins before marriage to a Greek. Coupled with these reports came the information — apparently new to most of the crusaders — that the Greeks were "heretical" in their manner of celebrating the Mass and in their belief about the procession of the Holy Spirit. Odo of Deuil could now excuse the recent increase of violent acts against the Greeks which had been troubling his conscience:

> For these causes they [i.e. the Greeks] had incurred the hatred of our men, for the knowledge of their error had spread abroad even among the laymen. On this account they were judged not to be Christians and our men concluded that slaughtering them was of no account. It became more difficult to hold them back from pillage and plunder.[68]

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[66] Odo, *De profectione*, 28.

[67] *Ibid.*, 40.

[68] The long history of theological controversies between Eastern and Western Christians would lead one to assume that the liturgical and doctrinal differences would have been widely known among Westerners. Odo's implication that the laymen in the army had been generally unaware of them is clear in this quotation. To the best of my knowledge the charge that the Greeks were heretical or schismatic had not been made before by crusaders. When they were criticized on religious grounds it was for being "false Christians," that is to say ignoring their obligations to pilgrims and the like, as at the time of Bohemond's propaganda war with Alexius. See above, 57 ff. Such charges were against persons, the assumption being that normally the Greeks followed the same religious precepts as the Latins. A doubtful exception is the letter of Bohemond and other leaders of the first crusade to Urban II from

Odo and his associates probably exaggerated both the number of grievances and the extent of concern in the army about Greek religious "errors." In fact Louis VII had continually welcomed the religious processions which had come out to greet him from one Greek town after another.[69] Furthermore, an embassy which he sent ahead to Constantinople successfully argued that the emperor must call off an attack by his "infidel" mercenaries upon an advance French party outside the walls because Constantinople had obligations to them since it was a Christian city. For their part, too, most Greeks probably continued as in the past to look upon the Latins as true, if dangerous and outlandish, Christians.[70] Louis refused to change his policy or his plans even after Manuel had sent a mission to discourage him from passing by Constantinople, and after he had received the doubly unpleasant news that Manuel had concluded a truce with the Sultan of Iconium and that there had been fighting at the city between an advance party of the French and the emperor's troops. As might be expected, the opponents of amity with the Greeks had advised him otherwise. "There were those," Odo tells us,

> who then advised the king to retreat and to seize the exceedingly rich land with its castles and cities and meanwhile to write to King Roger, who was then vigorously attacking the Emperor, and, aided by his fleet, to attack Constantinople itself. But, alas for us, nay for all St. Peter's subjects, their words did not prevail![71]

Louis not only rejected the proposal but responded courteously to an assemblage of distinguished laity and clergy whom Manuel sent beyond the walls to greet him. With characteristic unconcern for his personal safety, he agreed to enter the city accompanied by only a few of his immediate followers to confer with the emperor. Upon meeting, both monarchs exchanged the kiss of peace and Manuel proceeded to show Louis unusual personal courtesies. Afterward, as Louis left the imperial palace, he and Manuel again observed the Christian ceremonial amenities, parting as brothers in the words of Odo.

Their subsequent association and relations while the French were before Constantinople were heavily laden with religious ceremonial. Louis' party visited the shrines of the city and were shown some of its precious relics. Manuel not only entertained Louis at a dinner but on the great French feast

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Antioch in September 1098. In it there is an obscure reference to Greek heresy. See Hagenmeyer, ed., *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 164. Runciman takes the reference to apply to a heretical group at Antioch. *Eastern Schism*, 87.

[69] Odo, *De profectione*, 44.

[70] *Ibid.*, 52-54. On the Greek side this point of view was voiced by Cinnamus who censured the German crusaders for their cruel acts toward Greeks who, he observed, were men of the same religion and had done them no harm. *Epitome*, 74.

[71] Odo, *De profectione*, 59. The translation is that of Mrs. Berry.

of St. Denis, he sent a procession of Greek clergy to the French camp outside the walls. For a moment the exotic beauty of their singing and vesture warmed the hearts of even the stalwarts who had done their best to make this cordial act impossible. If the Greek emperor was not particularly orthodox himself, it is evident that he could nevertheless act the part. His behavior while the French were before his capital embodied the theme of an early letter which he had sent Louis VII in which he had addressed him as "holy friend and brother."[72] Byzantine imperial diplomacy in this matter had continued to be of one piece.

No ruler with Manuel's sources of information could have been unaware of the proposals of his enemies within the French army. Among other things, his behavior toward Louis was insurance that his already difficult military problems with Roger II would not explode into unmanageable proportions. One sympathizes with his continued anxiety to have the French move across the Straits.

This anxiety soon found new substance to nourish it and again the stalwarts provided it. Some of them had accompanied Louis on his tour of the city. While the king fixed his attention on religious and diplomatic matters their alert eyes took strategic measure of the city's defences. They noted that the walls in the vicinity of the Palace of Blachernae were weak and without sufficient towers, and that the city's water supply came through conduits from outside the walls.[73] They mentally added this interesting information to the case they had been working out for mounting an attack upon Constantinople.

During the last days of the army's sojourn outside the walls and apparently without any new provocation, Godfrey of Langres opened a campaign to divert the crusade. Speaking to the assembled leaders of the army, he first emphasized the military weaknesses of the city in detail, and held out the attractive possibility of an easy siege followed by an almost automatic acquisition of the whole Greek Empire by the Latins. But what about the objections which his opponents would surely make against attacking this great Christian city? Godfrey set out to undo the impression which Manuel and Louis had built up, and which so many in the army shared, by arguing that Constantinople was not really Christian. The gist of this part of his speech appears to have been twofold: Manuel and his father, before him, John Comnenus, were guilty of oppressing the Latins at Antioch; John had even used infidel mercenaries to attack these Christians. Here was the classical Latin charge against the Comneni with which we are now familiar. But a new one which, as has been noted, had begun to simmer among the stalwarts during the march through Bulgaria now intruded itself, though less explicitly than the older one. It was the charge of heresy. In the course of his speech, Godfrey applied the term "heretics" to the Greek bishops whom the Emperor John had appointed to replace the Latin hierarchy at Antioch. And, he proceeded, Manuel was no better than his father, for he had continued this policy, setting altar against altar in contempt of the pope.[74]

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[72] *Ibid.*, 10, 58-60, 66-68; Cinnamus, *Epitome*, 93.

[73] Odo, *De profectione*, 64.

The new charge of heresy, apparently unfamiliar at least to the lay mind, was summarily minimized by the moderates among the barons when they had their turn to talk: "About their faith we are not able to judge, being ignorant of the law."[75] Nor would they argue the rights and wrongs of the imperial warfare against the Latins in Antioch. It was conceivable, they observed, that this apparently evil deed took place for just causes. Here again we meet the classical ideological reply of both Latins and Greeks during the period to charges of unchristian behavior.

Instead of rebutting these technical and probably unfamiliar allegations of Godfrey's argument, the moderates fell back on more obvious and familiar ground. The Greeks were Christians, their own purpose in coming east was to defend the Holy Sepulchre by fighting pagans. If the case were otherwise, the pope would have so informed their king. Odo's summary is interesting not only for the arguments it contains but for the spirit in which they were offered:

> It is certainly true that the king recently conferred with the pope and that he was not given any advice or command concerning this point. He knows, and we know, that we are to visit the Holy Sepulchre and, by the command of the supreme pontiff, to wipe out our sins with the blood or the conversion of the infidels. Instead of this, however, we may now attack the richest city of the Christians and enrich ourselves, but in so doing we must kill or be killed. If, therefore, slaughtering Christians wipes out our sins, let us fight. Furthermore, if harboring ambition does not harm our dead, if on this journey it is as important to die for the sake of gaining money as it is to maintain our obedience to the supreme pontiff and our vow, then wealth is welcome; let us expose ourselves to danger without fear of death.[76]

Perhaps these arguments were given shape by Godfrey's personal rival on the crusade, Bishop Arnulf of Lisieux. In any event, we can detect in the barons' argumentation the acuity and wit which medieval men before us learned to associate with the French mind.

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[74] *Ibid.*, 68-70. The events at Antioch to which Godfrey of Langres alluded had to do with the Emperor John's attempt to impose Byzantine hegemony over Antioch. See Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 206-224.

[75] "'De fide istorum non possumus iudicare legis ignari.'". *Ibid.*, 70. In my opinion, the context indicates that this translation is preferable to the one made by Mrs. Berry: "'Without knowledge of the law we cannot judge about their good faith.'" *Ibid.*, 71.

[76] *Ibid.*, 70-71. I have made a few minor changes in Mrs. Berry's translation.

The moderates as before won the day. The departure of the French to Asia Minor was speeded up when they heard false rumors, probably circulated at Manuel's order, that the German crusaders ahead of them were piling up victories and collecting glory as they fought the Turk. French concern for *gloire*, as well as French wit, is not uniquely a modern phenomenon. One is nevertheless weighting this state of soul too heavily if one attributes to it Constantinople's escape from French assault, as do Chalandon and before him Odo of Deuil.[77] The cleavage among the French barons about the Greeks was by now an old and hardened one, and the moderates had continually remained in the majority. Nothing had happened at Constantinople to change their minds.

Nor did they change their minds after they had reached the opposite shore of the Bosporus, even though Manuel severely tempered his diplomacy of kindness and made certain demands on the French, including one that they guarantee the security of his eastern territories as they crossed them.[78] While Louis and his barons would not meet the other demands, they provided the needed territorial assurances and went on.

Their decision to do so was only reached over the protests of the stalwarts who urged that it was dishonorable to do homage to a lord other than their king. They again urged the conquest of Byzantine territory. As before, the reply of the moderates was a mixture of irony and ideology, with a point of practical necessity thrown in. If multiple homage were disgraceful, why did Frenchmen practice it at home? Perhaps it should be discontinued in France! But in reality they would lose nothing by reassuring a fearful emperor in this way. Furthermore, they now needed Greek supplies and Greek guides through Asia Minor. "We are speeding on against the pagans. Let us observe the peace of Christians."[79] The familiar refrain concluded the protracted argument, at least until the crusade was over and some of its sponsors back in Europe felt the need to find a scapegoat for its resounding failure.

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[77] "Nevertheless, I believe that the bishop would have won out if the Greeks had not gained the upper hand more by treachery than by force." *Ibid.*, 71-73; Mrs. Berry's translation. See also Chalandon, *Manuel Comnène*, 299-300. Odo has already indicated that the majority of the barons from the beginning of this particular debate opposed an attack on the city. The remark just quoted was a characteristic outlet for his frustration at the king's refusal to accept the views of the party whom Odo assumed to be the wiser group of his advisers, and it is of a piece with Odo's many exaggerations on the subject of Greek "treachery." While Louis VII did not approve of the hasty departure of the French, he must have understood the mood of his barons if a remark he later made in a letter to Suger is indicative: "You may be sure of one thing: either we shall never return, or we shall come back with glory to God and the Kingdom of the Franks." By the time that he wrote this letter from Antioch, Louis had become somewhat suspicious of Manuel's intentions, yet he could still describe his reception at Constantinople as "joyful and honorable." Letter of Louis VII from Antioch to Suger, *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, ed. M. Bouquet *et al.*, 24 vols. (Paris, 1738-1904), XV, 496. See also an earlier letter for a similarly friendly tone. *Ibid.*, 488.

[78] Odo, *De profectione*, 76-78; Chalandon, *Manuel Comnène*, 300-302; Berry, "Second Crusade," 492.

A few conclusions emerge from the evidence which has just been discussed. First, there could have been no understanding between Roger II and the majority of the leaders including Louis VII. Nevertheless, although there is no positive evidence for Caspar's conjecture that some of the leaders kept in contact with the Normans, this hypothesis is conceivable, given the substance and articulation of Godfrey of Langres' proposals. The majority of the leaders, however, consistently opposed collaboration with the Normans against the Greeks. They easily won at least four open debates with the stalwarts. That they had no designs on Manuel's territory is clear both from their arguments against the minority and their willingness from the beginning to furnish reasonable territorial guarantees to Manuel Comnenus. They would have nothing to do with the newfangled gossip about Greek heresy, circulated with a show of pious reluctance by the stalwarts. They were usually willing to blame the Germans, or even themselves, more than the Greeks for mishaps which occurred along the way.

Not eager to undertake the crusade in the first place, the majority were predisposed to resist the hornet's enthusiasm of that "rash priest," as Count Thierry of Flanders later called Godfrey of Langres.[80] Most of them apparently wanted to accomplish as quickly as they could the vow in which Godfrey's enthusiasm, trumped by St. Bernard's preaching, had caught them. While the French barons would not have liked the comparison, the modern reader can catch beneath their words more than a little of the complaint of the reluctant knights in the *Song of Roland*: "We should make haste to cut this great war short."[81] When they dealt with Godfrey of Langres, they were sufficiently sure of their strength to afford the luxury of irony, and they must have enjoyed hoisting the bishop on his own argument, namely the welfare of all Christians. Probably many of them were sufficiently traditionalist to take seriously this axiom of public morality, so long as it did not conflict with overriding personal interests, and at this moment in the history of Latin-Greek relations it did not.

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[79] Odo, *De profectione*, 72-80.

[80] A recent study of Godfrey of Langres' part in the second crusade presents a detailed account of the bishop's activities but is somewhat brief about the controversy over attacking the Greeks: Georges Drioux, "Geoffroi de la Roche, évêque de Langres et la II^{e} croisade," *Cahiers Haut-Marnais*, n^{o} 13 (June 1948), 166-172. Thierry's remark occurred during the last days of the crusade when the leaders had bungled the siege of Damascus. It probably represented a long-standing sense of irritation with the bishop who had originally been the only prominent figure to urge going on crusade at a time when the French baronage were unenthusiastic. Thierry was reportedly anxious to return home, an attitude which contemporaries recognized to be widespread among Westerners at this time and for the next generation. See John of Salisbury, *Historia pontificalis*, 56-58; Odo, *De profectione*, 6, 7, n. 6; Chalandon, *Manuel Comnène*, 282; Berry, "Second Crusade," 503, n. 34; William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, in *RHC Oc*, I, prt. 2, 767-768.

In the face of the attitude of a majority of the leaders Louis VII would have found it difficult to divert the crusade. In any event, there is abundant evidence that he did not wish to do so. There were at least three reasons why he did not. One was his family and diplomatic ties through Eleanor of Aquitaine with Raymond of Antioch, who was not on good terms with Roger II.[82] Secondly, as the moderates had reminded Godfrey at Constantinople, Louis had conferred at length with the pope before the crusade had left Europe. The crusade policy of Eugenius III, if it did not emphasize the reunion of churches so heavily as Urban II had done, nevertheless contravened a Byzantine diversion.[83] Finally and, if the circumstantial evidence is indicative, most important, the fraternal obligation of Christian to Christian was a sincere issue of conscience to Louis VII at this moment in his life. Experience had made him familiar with the axiom which the moderates repeated, for among others his close friend and advisor, Suger, often voiced it at home. Perhaps the king's original intention to go on crusade flowed from a bad conscience about his own gross breach of Christian obligation at the siege of Vitry some years earlier.[84] Certainly his behavior during the crusade repeatedly reflected the calculated resolve of one determined to be a good pilgrim.[85]

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[81] *La chanson de Roland*, ed. Joseph Bédier (Paris, 1931), 1. 242; translation is that of Dorothy L. Sayers, trans., *The Song of Roland*, Penguin edition (London, 1957), 60.

[82] Berry, "Second Crusade," 470-471; Grousset, *Croisades*, II, 226; Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 326; Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 251, 255, 259.

[83] Mrs. Berry finds a suggestive parallell between the words of the moderates at Constantinople and the papal statement of the purpose of the crusade. See *De profectione*, 70, n. 24. Manuel Comnenus had requested Eugenius III to take precautions for the security of Greek territory and the pope probably discussed this matter with Louis VII during their conferences before the crusade left France. See Berry, "Second Crusade," 467, 480, 491; Constable, "Contemporaries," 264. That Manuel felt easier when a papal legate accompanied a Western army is suggested by the fact that many years later, when another crusade was projected, he asked Pope Alexander III to send a legate with the army. See Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 341.

[84] Charles Petit-Dutaillis, *The Feudal Monarchy in England and France* (London, 1936), 79; A. Luchaire, "Les débuts de Louis VII," *Histoire de la France ilustrée depuis les origines jusqu'à la révolution*, ed. Ernest Lavisse, 9 vols. (Paris, 1900-11), III, pt. 1, 11-12; Amy Kelly, *Eleanor of Aquitaine*, 23-29.

[85] Louis prepared for the crusade by visiting a leper colony at Paris. He conscientiously attended Mass and other religious ceremonies during the march. He exerted himself, though

It would have taken considerable bad planning on Manuel's part to turn the French army against his city. As we know, he played his cards well during the French sojourn before Constantinople, and not the least of these cards was the ideology of Christian fraternity. Is is going to far, however, to say that he duped the French into not attacking his capital, for they had their minds made up. At most, he speeded up their departure, if it was he who circulated the rumors about German victories.

Finally there is the question of what roles the "worldly" Arnulf of Lisieux and the papal legate with the French army played. At most, they were probably not determinative. There seems to be no explicit evidence that either took part in the debates. Some later remarks of John of Salisbury, if their implications about the personalities and actions of these two men are read back into the period when the leaders were arguing about an attack on the Greeks, would seem to indicate that Arnulf probably was one of the leading moderates.[86] On the other hand, the papal legate was hardly the sort of man to influence opinion in the army.

Insofar as the evidence which directly bears on the issue is concerned, we are left mainly with the earlier considerations. As at the time of the first crusade the situation appears to be one in which individual and group self-interest intertwined with the ideology of Christendom to prevent an attack on the Greeks. One suspects that the pragmatic motives were much stronger. At the same time, the ideology of Christian fraternity worked well in the circumstances and it would be impossible to see the events of the second crusade in full depth without it. The best indication of its pertinence is the fact that Manuel Comnenus, like his grandfather, kept it in full view as he dealt with the French.

When the French crusaders returned home, the thunder of the stalwarts reverberated in some parts of France for awhile. St. Bernard, Suger, and Peter the Venerable added their powerful voices to those who demanded a new crusade, preceded by a punitive expedition against the Greeks for their alleged part in wrecking the recent crusade. The project foundered for many reasons, not the least of which was baronial apathy. "The hearts of the prin-

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not always successfully, to preserve discipline in the army. As he would later do at Constantinople, he disregarded personal safety and observed the rubrics of Christian kingship to reassure the fearful King of Hungary that he would not harm his country as he passed through. Unlike the Emperor Conrad, he observed his obligations as a pilgrim not to take advantage from the fact that a Hungarian pretender had turned up in the army. He repeatedly extended personal generosity to those in need, and he avoided using treachery against the Greek city of Adalia despite his grievances against its citizens. Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 16, 20, 32, n. 31, 34-38, 44, 66, 74-76, 96, 98, 124, 128, 134-136.

[86] John of Salibury, *Historia pontificalis*, 54-56.

ces are untouched," complained St. Bernard."... Little or nothing was achieved by us concerning this enterprise of God at the meeting [i.e. with the barons] in Chartres."[87] Nor had the barons lost their sense of irony, for they put the unworkable project in charge of the clergy and elected Bernard its chief, an embarrassment from which his order eventually had to relieve him.[88] The bonds between the eastern and western halves of Christendom were out of serious danger for another generation, thanks to laymen whose sense of proprieties was vigorously reinforced by secular motives.

III

Not until the winter of 1189-90 did Constantinople again face a serious threat from a crusading army. The leader this time was not an inexperienced young man but the seasoned, old German Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, on his way to a crusade which he would never fight. It will be interesting to start, as was done in the case of Louis VII, with some recent remarks of Miss Hussey:

> The Germans came through the Balkans and the hostility of their leader Frederick Barbarossa, the implacable enemy of the Byzantines, led to so tense a situation that at one point the Pope was asked to bless a crusade against the Byzantine Empire. Frederick's unexpected death in Asia Minor in 1190 gave Byzantium a temporary respite."[89]

Vasiliev and Ostrogorsky place the onus for the threat to the city on Frederick, though they do so with more qualification.[90] Runciman likewise exculpates the Byzantine Emperor, Isaac Angelus, and emphasizes Frederick's antipathy to the Greeks. Only Frederick's haste to get to the Holy Land, in his opinion, saved the city.[91]

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[87] The text of this letter to Peter the Venerable was edited and published by P. Sabatin in *Études religieuses* (June 1894), 322; the translation is that of Bruno Scott James, *The Letters of Bernard of Clairvaux* (London, 1953), 473. Contemporary European comments about the failure of the crusade indicate that there were many who did not blame the Greeks primarily or at all. Constable, "Contemporaries," 272-273.

[88] The aftermath of the crusade deserves a *mise au point.* One of the most detailed accounts is that of E. Vacandard, *Vie de saint Bernard, abbé de Clairvaux* 3d. ed., 2 vols. (Paris, 1902), II, 442-449; see also Ferdinand Chalandon, *Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile, 1009-1194*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1907), II, 148-153. There are further citations in Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 331, n. 5, to which should be added Wilhelm Bernhardi, *Konrad III* (Leipzig, 1883), 811-823; Walter Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (Berlin, 1903), 44-46; and the editor's remarks and citation in Odo of Deuil, *La croisade de Louis VII, roi de France*, ed. Henri Waquet (Paris, 1949), 11-12.

[89] Hussey, *Byzantine World*, 70.

[90] Vasiliev, *Byzantine Empire*, 443-447; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 359-361.

[91] Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 12-14; *Eastern Schism*, 135-136.

These writers seem to have ignored the carefully articulated and documented analysis of Bréhier.[92] According to Bréhier's account, Frederick did not set out to make trouble for the Greeks but was forced into belligerent threats and acts against Isaac Angelus on account of Isaac's recent alliance with Saladin which involved, as one of its provisions, his obstructing the march of the German army through Greek territory. In Bréhier's opinion, Frederick's threat to besiege Constantinople was a response to this situation and it achieved its purpose by enabling him to cross safely to Asia Minor.[93] If the reexamination of the evidence which follows is sound, Bréhier's explanation is to be preferred.

If likelihood were sufficient material for historical argumentation, the case against Frederick would stand up quite well. Almost from the beginning of his reign he had run up against Manuel Comnenus' reassertion of Byzantine power in Italy and ultimately the two emperors had engaged through their allies in indirect military action against each other. While the specific issues which produced this Mediterranean power struggle at a distance were largely dead by 1189, the animosities were not. Frederick's recent peace with the papacy which had usually been the diplomatic ally of the Byzantine emperors during this period, and his marriage alliance with the ruling house of Norman Sicily, the traditional and recently active enemy of the Greeks, could easily be misinterpreted by an uncertain Eastern emperor.[94]

Perhaps Isaac Angelus was not uncertain, but if he was not, it was for lack of judgment. Cyprus had been lost to a rival, the Serbs and Bulgarians had recently won their independence from imperial control, and what was left of Byzantine territory in Asia Minor was held only tenuously. Beneath this vast territorial shrinkage, and largely responsible for it, lay old social, economic, and political ills which, in the new circumstances following Manuel Comnenus' death, were quickly eating away the muscle of Byzantine society. Isaac Angelus had recently staggered to the top of a heaving body politic by surprise and almost out of nowhere. Unprepared by temperament and experience for rule, he rarely caught up with, much less dominated, his boundless problems. If he had been a man of good sense, he would be a tragic figure.[95]

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[92] Miss Hussey has termed the work in which this analysis appears "rather heavy going." *Byzantine World*, 181.

[93] Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 352-354. Grousset's less thorough account is in agreement. *Croisades*, III, 12-13.

[94] There is a good survey of the accumulating Western threats to Byzantium in Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 331-342; see also Vasiliev, *Byzantine Empire*, 424-430; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 341-348; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 11-13.

[95] For further detail see Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 342-352; Vasiliev, *Byzantine Empire*, 433-443; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 353-360.

Despite firm assurances from Frederick Barbarossa that he would respect the integrity of the Empire, in exchange for which Isaac agreed to furnish the Germans safe conduct and fair market facilities, Isaac made a treaty with Saladin. As the price for what in his circumstances were almost irrelevant guarantees from Saladin, namely recognition of his territorial rights southward to Antioch if he should defeat the Sultan of Iconium, together with the acceptance of his own nominal suzerainty over Jerusalem, he agreed to obstruct and delay Frederick's crusade to the best of his ability.[96]

The effect of this agreement was apparent in early July almost as soon as the German army crossed the Danube into Byzantine territory. There were no Byzantine emissaries on hand. The local potentate made a show of friendship, but soon Frederick found his army bogged down as they were led off the main road to a rocky trail which had to be laboriously cleared of road blocks placed along the way. As the army approached and entered Nis, Isaac put up a show of keeping the agreement he had made with Frederick. He excused himself, half belligerently, for not sending envoys to the border to meet Frederick and he later renewed his promise to provide safe conduct and fair market facilities. Meanwhile Frederick was able peacefully to reprovision himself at Nis.[97]

Soon after leaving Nis, the crusaders again encountered obstructions similar to the earlier ones. Although Frederick had recently reasserted his peaceful intent, Isaac insisted that he was coming as an enemy and ordered the city of Philippopolis evacuated in his path. When Frederick forced his way into the city, Isaac ordered him to proceed no farther.[98] Meanwhile he imprisoned German ambassadors who had earlier arrived at Constantinople. That this action was not a mere attempt to bargain for security with Frederick, as Runciman asserts, is indicated by the fact that Isaac confiscated the ambassadors' possessions and gave their best horses to Saladin's ambassadors who were then at Constantinople. It would seem instead that the Greek emperor was observing the terms of his treaty with Saladin and was doing so with some enthusiasm.[99]

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[96] *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*, ed. Anton Chroust in *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzugs Kaiser Friedrich I* (Berlin, 1928), 15-16; Franz Dölger, ed., *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches*, 3 vols. (Munich-Berlin, 1924-32), nos. 1584, 1591; Grousset, *Croisades*, III, 12; Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 352. Vasiliev and Ostrogorsky are less exact. The latter goes against the facts when he attributes Isaac's decision to enter the agreement to Frederick's negotiations with the Sultan of Iconium, the Serbs, and the Bulgars. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 361; see also Vasiliev, *Byzantine Empire*, 446. Conceivably Isaac might have misinterpreted the nature of Frederick's correspondence with the Sultan for a safe-conduct, but his treaty with Saladin antedated, and as will emerge below, was a cause of Frederick's negotiations with the Serbs and Bulgars. One wonders, in this connection, why Isaac did not raise the issue of Frederick's correspondence with the Sultan of Iconium if he took it seriously at the time that the German army crossed the border in July 1189. See *Historia de expeditione*, 29.

[97] *Historia de expeditione*, 27-30, 33. In Runciman's opinion these incidents were beyond Isaac's control. *Crusades*, III, 12-13. More likely, they took place on his order. Natives who were taken prisoner while ambushing elements of the army confessed that they were acting on his order. *Historia de expeditione*, 28. Furthermore, the tactics of obstruction resemble those which Isaac ordered at a later time. See *ibid.*, 37, and Nicetas Choniates, *Historia*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1835), 526-527. Whatever allowances one may make for Isaac's difficult situation, it is probably too simple an explanation to say, as Runciman does, that his motive in allying with Saladin "...was not to damage their [i.e. the crusaders'] interests but to curb the power of the Seldjuks..." *Crusades*, II, 12.

Not until October did Isaac release the ambassadors. By then it was too late in the season for Frederick to contemplate a safe crossing to Asia Minor. In the meantime, Isaac had refused to consider written assurances from Frederick that his intentions were peaceful, and he had boasted to his friends of the military prowess that he would display against the Germans when they attacked his capital. Frederick now began to harry the countryside around Philippopolis. Distressed by these unnecessary hostilities, the Greek general and future chronicler, Nicetas Choniates, who then commanded troops in the area, went to Constantinople to reason with the emperor. After much frustration he shamed Isaac into saying that he would release the German ambassadors, an agreement which Isaac almost immediately dishonored. When the ambassadors were finally released and reached the German camp, their report convinced Frederick that he must make more deliberate arrangements to ensure a safe passage eastward in the spring.[100] His actions hereafter were calculated to negotiate by persuasion if possible, but by force if necessary, a trustworthy agreement with Isaac.

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[98] *Historia de expeditione*, 34, 37-39; Necetas, *Historia*, 526-527. Nicetas' account of these events is very fair. His tone suggests that he doubted the need for evacuating Philippopolis. He appears to have come to suspect only later that Isaac's treaty with Saladin was behind his failure to observe his guarantees to the crusaders. *Ibid.* 536.

[99] *Historia de expeditione*, 39, 49; Nicetas, *Historia*, 526. Runciman's account of this incident not only neglects the force of Isaac's agreement with Saladin, but it is inaccurate as well. He assumes that the German emissaries had recently arrived in Constantinople from Philippopolis and that Isaac became so unnerved at Frederick's attitude that he imprisoned them as a means of insuring the German emperor's peaceful behavior. *Crusades*, III, 13. Actually Frederick had sent the emissaries to Constantinople before the departure of the crusade from Germany. Whether intentionally or on account of his absence from the capital in the early summer, Isaac at first ignored their presence. Frederick's later recollection was that they were imprisoned before the crusade left Hungary, but more likely Isaac took the action as the Germans approached Philippopolis. *Historia de expeditione*, 18, 29, 39, 41 as well as the reference above to the remarks of Nicetas, who was both ashamed and impatient on account of Isaac's excuses to him for continuing to imprison the ambassadors.

[100] *Historia de expeditione*, 46-49; Nicetas, *Historia*, 528-536.

Probably Frederick had become aware of this necessity during his stay at Nis, for Isaac's own emissaries had apparently there confided to him what they knew of their master's attitude.[101] Nevertheless, he did not accept the offers of military assistance which Isaac's Balkan enemies made him while he was at Nis. When he had received Stephen Nemanja, the Great Ẑupan of Serbia, he was friendly but explained that as a good crusader he would not plot against any Christian prince. Not unless Isaac failed to provide the safe-conduct and fair market facilities which he had promised would he take up arms to force his way through Greek territory, and then on the premise that the Greeks were false Christians for ambushing pilgrims. Here again one notes the traditional attitude earlier expressed among others by the French moderate party on the second crusade. Frederick's reply to a communication from the Vlach potentate, Peter, is not recorded. As will appear from what follows, it could have been no more compromising than his reply to Stephen, and it was probably cooler in tone.[102]

If Frederick did not entirely close the door to alliances of this sort, he wanted to avoid them. During the late autumn of 1188 he did not abandon this attempt to obtain a trustworthy renewal of the guarantees which Isaac had repudiated. These negotiations broke down completely in December and Frederick then declared war on Isaac.[103] Between December and February parties of German crusaders scoured the Greek countryside. As their operations reached the environs of Constantinople and at the moment when Frederick was ready to conclude a military alliance with Stephen Nemanja, Isaac gave way. He acceded to Frederick's ironclad demands in a humiliating treaty and the German army safely crossed the Straits in the early spring of 1189. Once more Constantinople had escaped attack by crusaders.[104]

Its escape was probably a closer one than those of the earlier crusades. Even though he had continued to negotiate with Isaac during the late autumn,

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[101] *Ibid.*, 526.

[102] *Historia de expeditione*, 30-31. The rationale of Christendom also appears in the *Historia peregrinorum*, ed. Anton Chroust in *Quellen zur Geschichte*, 135. Subsequent events indicate that Frederick's reply to Peter was likewise negative. There is a brief, accurate account of the negotiations in Robert L. Wolff, "The 'Second Bulgarian Empire.' Its Origin and History to 1204," *Speculum* XXIV (1949), 184. As far as it goes, Vasiliev's account is accurate but it is ambiguous about Frederick's relations with these potentates. *Byzantine Empire*, 441-444. Ostrogorsky, and more explicitly Runciman, reverse the actual direction of the initiative for the negotiations between Frederick and Stephen. *Byzantine State*, 358-364; *Crusades*, III, 12-13. Bréhier exaggerates the strength of the understanding reached at this stage of the crusade. *Vie et mort*, 353.

[103] *Historia de expeditione*, 49-51, 57-58.

[104] *Ibid.*, 60-71. The provisions of this treaty reflect a precise strategical sense of what was necessary for a safe crossing and they embody requirements which Frederick had begun to think out in late October. *Ibid.*, 50, 57, and Frederick's letter to Henry VI, *ibid.*, 42.

Frederick had begun to prepare for the eventuality of war. In November he wrote home to his son, Henry VI, requesting that by March he have a naval force at Constantinople to take part in a combined land and sea assault on the city. In early December he forewarned Stephen Nemanja that he would need the military assistance he had earlier offered "if perchance war should be declared." After the declaration of war he was on the point of concluding a formal treaty with Stephen when Isaac gave way. It should be noted, however, that Frederick made ambivalent responses to the repeated offers of the Vlach leader, Peter, probably because Peter's price for an agreement was that Frederick should crown him Greek emperor. Whatever plans Frederick might have had for utilizing either Peter or Stephen, he ceased all talk of attacking Constantinople as soon as he obtained the guarantees he required from the Greeks. Ironically, shortly before crossing the Straits, he turned down on the same day offers both from Peter and the Greeks for offensive alliances, one against the other. As Zimmert long ago observed, Frederick's military plans against the Byzantine Empire were exclusively a means, not an end in themselves.[105]

What explains Frederick's single-mindedness? Undoubtedly he was shrewd enough to avoid sticky Balkan entanglements if possible, and an attack on the Greeks was not certain of success as the Normans had recently discovered. eurthermore, conditions in Italy probably did not favor the sending of an Fffective naval force to Constantinople.[106]

Yet the evidence suggests that Frederick was also very deeply motivated by religious considerations. Historians have recognized for some time that the German emperor took his responsibilities to Christendom seriously, however much he may have fought with popes. By 1188 he had made his peace with the papacy and was apparently anxious to seal his old age, as well as the authority of his Empire, with the sign of the crusader's cross.[107]

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[105] *Ibid.*, 42, 55, 58, 60-61, 69; *Historia peregrinorum*, 149; K. Zimmert, "Der deutsch-byzantinische Konflict vom Juli 1189 bis Februar 1190," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XII (1903), 72, 76.

[106] *Ibid.*, 72-76. In part, this situation seems to have been due to last minute diplomatic understandings which Isaac had reached with Venice, Genoa, and Ragusa. See Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 358.

[107] Some time ago there was a tendency among many historians to present Frederick as one or another sort of "modern" man. He is now more often thought of as a rather conservative exponent of traditional twelfth century views. See Geoffrey Barraclough, "Frederick Barbarossa and the Twelfth century," *History in a Changing World*, 73-96, esp. 73-78, 86-87; 95; see also Grousset, *Croisades*, III, 10 and *L'Épopée des croisades* (Paris, 1939), 257; Karl Hampe, *Deutsche Kaisergeschichte in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer*, 10th rev. ed., (Heidelberg, 1949), 217-219; Édouard Jordan, *L'Allemagne et l'Italie aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, vol. IV, pt. 1 of G. Glotz, ed. *Histoire du moyen âge* (Paris, 1939), 47, 148. Runci-

At an early stage of his quarrel with the Greek emperor, Frederick protested Isaac's use — hypocritical as he saw it — of the appellation "brother" in a recent communication.[108] Such protestations of high moral principle are often transparent rationalizations or acts of hypocrisy, but one would have to dismiss a great deal of circumstantial evidence to place Frederick's behavior during the crusade in this category. He consistently spoke and acted the part of a very correct and conscientious crusader. Beneath this behavior ran a persistent concern about his standing with God. To him keeping God's favor was among other things a matter of strategic importance for winning victories. He discussed this nexus at some length in the letter he sent to Henry VI to procure naval forces for the contemplated siege of Constantinople, and it recurred afterward in his remarks from time to time.[109] Anxiety to keep on the right side of God so that the crusade would succeed impelled him to do his utmost to prevent violence against the Greeks until the military situation at Philippopolis forced his hand.[110] During the warfare that followed, he disapproved excessive violence and stood fast against the growing party of knights who wished to convert the crusade into a war to take over the Byzantine Empire. The sense of relief which his chronicler expressed when Constantinople did not have to be attacked probably echoed the conservative apprehensions of Frederick and the party within the army who supported his insistence on avoiding a diversion of the crusade if possible.[111]

Contemporaries noted the German emperor's scruples about doing violence to fellow Christians. His German chronicler remarked that "... he was a person who abhorred to his very marrow the shedding of Christian blood."[112] Even

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man's criticism of Frederick's behavior toward certain Greeks during the second crusade should be judged in the light of the circumstances discussed by Chalandon, *Manuel Comnène*, 274; see Runciman, *Eastern Schism*, 125.

[108] *Historia de expeditione*, 50.

[109] *Ibid.*, 43. He confidently warned the Greeks that God was on his side and that he would win an armed struggle with them if it were forced on him. *Ibid.*, 50. Later he was equally sure of God's support against the Moslems. *Ibid.*, 83, 84, 86, 87. One is reminded of the dimension of twelfth century religious thought and practice which Paul Rousset has termed the "spiritual strategy". See his *Les origines et les caractères de la première croisade* (Neuchâtel, 1945), esp. 29-30, 34-38, 83-88, 180-186.

[110] In fact Frederick directed the Bishop of Würzburg to preach on this theme. *Historia de expeditione*, 33-34. The details differ somewhat in the *Historia peregrinorum*, 131-132, 138.

[111] *Historia de expeditione*, 37, 60, 68. Zimmert has attempted to define the composition of the group within the army who were anxious to carry the war beyond the limits set by Frederick. "Konflict," 63-64, 67-69. Acts of violence first became a problem for Frederick in August 1188. They were at their peak in December and January, especially after the declaration of war. They began to subside in February 1189. *Historia de expeditione*, 39, 41-42, 56, 58-59, 63.

[112] *Ibid.*, 57.

Greeks repeated a declaration which he made shortly before he left Greek territory in Asia Minor to the effect that he wished that he could have avoided contaminating German spears with Christian blood. The chronicler Nicetas, although he had fought Frederick's knights in the field, admired the emperor's forbearance, for he not only recorded this incident but when he came to tell of Frederick's death he bestowed upon him an unrestrained soldier's eulogy. Its substance was that Frederick had loved God beyond all other Christian princes and that he had died in the tradition of St. Paul.[113] If a Byzantine general could speak thus, the historian must make some room for the part which Frederick's twelfth century conscience played in preventing an attack on Constantinople. Possibly material considerations outweighed ideological ones, as appears to have been the case on earlier crusades, or possibly they were for once stronger. Such amalgams of human motives cannot be analyzed with precision. It is at least clear that both forces were at work, and fortunately for Constantinople, the one still reinforced the other.

IV

When one turns to the last time that crusaders considered the attractions of attacking the Greek capital one finds the array of forces much different. Before the fourth crusade had even left Europe, ideals and material interests had parted company. The results for Constantinople are too well known to need comment. It is noteworthy that none of the leaders of the fourth crusade combined in one person the practical sense, the eminence, and the moral conviction of the Emperor Frederick. In fact, a surviving son of his, Philip of Swabia, was one of the architects of the diversion of the crusade to Constantinople where it twice besieged the city, once to restore Alexius IV, the rival claimant of the reigning emperor, the second time to establish the Latin Empire of Constantinople.[114] In the course of these disgraceful events the ideology of Christian fraternity between Latins and Greeks underwent its death struggle.

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[113] Nicetas, *Historia*, 539-540, 545-546. Nicetas was probably impressed by the fact that despite renewed provocations in Asia Minor, Frederick was kind to the Greek hostages whom he held under a provision of his treaty with Isaac until he should leave Greek territory. Furthermore, he responded to appeals made by certain Greeks on the basis of their common Christianity. See *Historia de expeditione*, 67, 72, 73-74. Frederick was not so kind to Moslem hostages whom he held later along the route. See *ibid.*, 88.

[114] Historians now generally admit that there was considerable prior understanding among a handful of the leaders of the fourth crusade that the army would be diverted to Constantinople. There is not universal agreement as to how detailed the plan was or whether the Doge of Venice or Philip of Swabia was the chief architect of the diversion. See Vasiliev, *Byzantine Empire*, 450-462; Bréhier, *Vie et mort*, 362-367; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 367-370; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 110-122; Grousset, *Croisades*, III, 171-173. A good introduction to the history of the debate which lasted for two generations over the "plans" and "accidents" theories about the diversion of the crusade is Henri Grégoire, "The Question of the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade," *Byzantion*, XV (1940-41), 152 ff.

This death struggle was more noisy and protracted, and it affected the history of the crusade more deeply than most historians have recognized. Runciman, for example, observes that some crusaders opposed the decision to go to Constantinople sufficiently to leave the army, but he ignores the dimensions and the impact of their opposition to the extent of misinterpreting the sentiments of a large segment of the crusaders who persisted with the army to Constantinople. His picture of the majority is severe:

> ...the average Crusader had been taught to believe that Byzantium had consistently been a traitor to Christendom throughout the Holy Wars. It would be a wise and meritorious act to enforce its cooperation now. The pious men in the army were glad to help in a policy that would bring the schismatic Greeks into the fold. The more worldly reflected on the riches of Constantinople and its prosperous provinces and looked forward to the prospects of loot. Some of the barons, including Boniface himself, may have looked forward further still and have calculated that estates on the shores of the Aegean would be far more attractive than any that could be found in the stricken land of Syria. All the resentment that the West had long borne against Eastern Christendom made it easy for Dandolo and Boniface to bring public opinion round to their support.[115]

A recent study of the crusade is an exception to the general neglect of the opposition within the army to the diversion of the crusade. In the opinion of its author, M. Frolow, substantial opposition developed in the course of the crusade and it was sufficient at one point to threaten the disruption of the army before it reached Constantinople. He has also remarked that many crusaders were uneasy about the second siege of the city when it began. He explains the opposition as a manifestation of the ideals of the medieval peace movement.[116] A reexamination of the evidence will suggest that M. Frolow's opinion has a certain validity.

There were at least six open controversies within the French army during the course of the crusade. The first occurred at Venice after the leaders announced to the French crusaders already there that more money must be raised to cover their obligations to the Venetians for the cost of transport.[117] There were two heated controversies at Zara, one about whether to attack that city, the other about the proposal to attack Constantinople.[118] The latter lasted most of the winter of 1202-03 and was especially bitter. When the army reached Corfu conflict again broke out, and more than half the army appeared to be on the point of seceding from the expedition when the Venetians and those French leaders who were loyal to them obtained their reluctant cooperation by making apparent concessions.[119] The French were at least uneasy before the first siege of Constantinople but apparently controversy did not again erupt until the crusaders realized that their victory and the restoration of the young Greek claimant to the throne were not sufficient prizes to convince the leaders that the army should now move on to the Holy Land as they had promised at Corfu.[120] Finally when relations with the new Greek rulers had collapsed and the leaders chose to storm the city, this time for themselves, many of the crusaders displayed extreme reluctance about this second siege and were only overpowered by a concerted propaganda effort made by the leaders and those clergy who were loyal to them.[121] This chain of hesitations and quarrels stretching from Venice to Constantinople hardly constitutes a record of enthusiasm on the part of the average crusader for diversion of the crusade either to Zara or Constantinople.

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[115] Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 116. Elsewhere Runciman has stated that "...most of the knights and soldiers were delighted at the prospect of securing the cooperation of Byzantium for their movement and some of its fabulous wealth for themselves." *Eastern Schism*, 147. Bréhier likewise assumes that the great majority of the crusaders willingly accepted the plan to divert the crusade to Constantinople, *L'Église et l'Orient*, 157.

[116] A. Frolow, *Recherches sur la déviation de la IVᵉ croisade vers Constantinople* (Paris, 1955), 23-25. See also Adolf Waas, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*, 2 vols. (Freiburg, 1956), I, 246-247, which introduces one piece of new evidence but is inaccurate with respect to the nature and dimensions of the opposition.

There can be no doubt that many crusaders had good reason to discountenance unnecessary prolongation of the crusade. Few if any of them knew of the ulterior plans of the Venetians and those French leaders who were loyal to them. They could hardly have forseen the opportunities for wholesale plunder at Constantinople at a time when they were merely asked to assist in reinstating the "legitimate" Greek monarch.[122] Furthermore, as will emerge from what follows, they had to consider the possible loss of their indulgence if they agreed to the diversion. Finally, delays only increased the financial pressures upon them. Severe from the beginning, these pressures so overpowered some crusaders at Zara during the winter of 1202-03 that small groups almost daily abandoned the army, preferring to risk death or starvation in the Balkans or shipwreck on the Mediterranean to enduring further frustrations with the army. Many others considered leaving but were disdiscouraged from doing so by the disasters which befell those who did.[123]

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[117] Geoffrey of Villehardouin, *La conquête de Constantinople*, ed. and trans. Edmond Faral, 2 vols. (Paris, 1938-39), I, 60-66.

[118] *Ibid.*, 82-84, 94-98.

[119] *Ibid.*, 116-120.

[120] Robert of Clari, *La conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Philippe Lauer (Paris, 1924), 41-42; Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 200-202.

[121] Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 71-74; letter of the Emperor Baldwin to Adolph, Archbishop of Cologne, *Annales Colonienses maximi*, ed. Karl Pertz in *MGH SS*, XVII, 816; Villehardouin, *Conquête*, II, 38-42.

[122] The reasons publicly given at Zara for the diversion were the return of the Greeks to the papal fold, and the opportunity to replenish funds and supplies, together with the military assistance for the crusade in Syria promised by the young Alexius in exchange for the crusaders' restoration of him to his inheritance. *Ibid.*, I, 92-94. Undoubtedly there were crusaders, of whom Robert of Clari was one, who looked forward expectantly to the opportunity for replenishing their supplies in Greek territory. Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 16, 31-32. However, the evidence which will be discussed below indicates that a majority of the French crusaders and their leaders were unenthusiastic.

The majority of those who remained were disgruntled, and their disgruntlement occasionally burst forth into impotent anger. Then they would raise their voices, decry the useless delays and insist they would go no farther, only to subside again in the face of the hard alternatives of their predicament.[124] A host of petty tragedies flowed into the classical disaster which was to befall Constantinople in 1204. Those who have undergone similar trials will reserve a shred of sympathy for these future pillagers of the venerable capital of the Eastern Empire.

Interwoven with the material considerations just mentioned ran the thread of a familiar theme: the obligation of Christians, especially of crusaders, to respect the lives and property of fellow Christians. Given the situation, it was a theme which was bound to arise, but certain circumstances conspired to ensure that it would become a prominent part of the controversies which took place.

For one thing several concerned persons who were not with the army independently activated the issue of Christian obligation in the minds of the leaders and the crusaders. Alexius III, who despite his deficiencies as a ruler considered himself to be in the line of the great Comneni, had already utilized, as they had, the ideology of Christendom in earlier negotiations which he had conducted with the papacy.[125] Now he appealed to Innocent III to fend off the blow at his capital by reminding the pope of the horror that Latins would commit and the risk of God's displeasure upon their enterprise that they would incur if they should soil their hands with the blood of Christians.[126] Just as the blow was about to fall on his capital, he sped an emissary to the Latin camp at Scutari to remind the Latins that their goal as crusaders excluded an attack on a fellow Christian.[127] The King of Hungary, who had taken the cross, also attempted to use the same argument to persuade the crusaders if possible not to attack Zara, but the leaders ignored his reminder that he was both a fellow crusader and a brother.[128] Nor were they moved when the Zarans appealed their quarrel with the Venetians to the papal court and fixed crosses on their walls.[129]

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[123] Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 100-102. See also the other sources cited by Faral, *ibid.*, 99, n. 2, especially Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 15.

[124] For example their disapproval became vocal, among other place, at Corfu: "...they said that this affair struck them as being very long and very dangerous and they said they would remain on the island and let the army go on, [and after its departure they would obtain] vessels to go to Brindisi." Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 116.

[125] The Greek Emperor had alleged to Innocent III that he had avoided reconquering Cyprus from the Latins so as not to shed Christian blood. *Gesta Innocentii Papae III* in *PL*, 214, CXXIV.

[126] The appeal is restated by Innocent III in a letter to Alexius III, *PL* 214, col. 1123.

The failure of laymen to obtain respect for the accepted axioms of good conduct among Christians was resoundingly matched by the reverses met by all similar efforts of Pope Innocent III. There is now considerable agreement that Innocent opposed both diversions of the crusade and that he was outmaneuvred by his Hohenstaufen enemy, Philip of Swabia, and the Doge. At the same time, a certain naïveté about military and economic facts and a predisposition to compromise religious values for the sake of papal diplomatic goals rendered his efforts to prevent the diversions even more spectacularly futile than they otherwise need have been. Ultimately, he might now be considered a better Christian, if a poorer statesman, if he had been willing to countenance the breakup of the crusade in order to ensure the sanctity of the principles which he preached. Instead he placed the success of the crusade first and accordingly tried to keep the army together and to manipulate it into going to Syria. As a result, he failed to attain his chief goal, inherited a new set of ecclesiastical problems, and presided over the certain death of understanding between Eastern and Western Christendom.[130]

The language which Innocent III used of the Greeks both before and during the crusade is striking. He addressed Alexius III as one of the princes of Christendom.[131] When writing to Alexius he spoke of the Greek Church as having "...withdrawn itself from the *magisterium* of the Roman Church, its mother... [and having] long persisted stubbornly" in this state. Yet he informed the crusaders that the fact that the Greeks were "insufficiently subject" to the Apostolic See was none of their business nor did it justify an attack on them.[132] If they needed material help from the Greeks, he told them, he would write his dear son in Christ, the Greek emperor, to provide what they needed.

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[127] Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 144.

[128] *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le trésorier*, ed. M. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), 350.

[129] Letter of Innocent III to the crusaders, *PL* 214, col. 1178.

[130] There is a carefully worked out account in detail of Innocent's crusade policy and his activities at this time, together with citations to earlier works, by Augustin Fliche, *La Chrétienté romaine*, vol. X of *Histoire de l'église*, eds. Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin (Paris, 1950), 44-85. See also the works cited above, footnote 114.

[131] *Gesta Innocentii III*, *PL*, 214, cols. CXIX-CXX.

[132] *Ibid.*; letter of Innocent III to Conrad of Montferrat and other leaders, *PL* 215, col. 107.

If they unjustly forced the Greeks to yield them anything they would be robbing brothers.[133]

Short of ordering or allowing the breakup of the crusade, Innocent strove to match his words with actions. Suspicious from the beginning of Venetian intent, he conditioned his approval of their treaty with the French crusaders on there being no unjustified attack upon fellow Christians during the expedition, and he defined the exceptions so closely and traditionally that the Venetians refused to recognize them.[134] He next proceeded to send his cardinal legate, Peter of Capua, to Venice to forbid explicitly an attack on Zara, but the Venetians refused to accept Peter as a legate. He could only travel with the crusade as a preacher, they said, and they made life so unpleasant for him that he returned to Rome.[135] Thereafter, since Peter could not deal directly with the crusaders, Innocent had to work through third parties although in his letters he maintained the legal pretense of working through the legate.[136] Conrad of Montferrat, the new leader of the French, was within reach. Innocent personally forbade him to take part in the siege of Zara, but Conrad's absence was not sufficient, even when combined with more positive intervention by the pope, to prevent the siege.[137] We have now reached the point where it is possible to examine with some profit the part which the ideology of Christendom played in the debates within the army.

The major controversies which recurred during the course of the fourth crusade have already been mentioned. They had their origin at Venice. There, before the army's departure, the question of whether or not Christian knights should attack Zara soon appeared prominently alongside the more pressing financial issues which the French had been for some time debating among themselves.

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[133] *Ibid.*; letter of Innocent III to the crusaders, *ibid.*, col. 109.

[134] *Gesta Innocentii III*, *PL* 214, col. CXXXI. Regarding the Pope's apparent oral recognition that the preservation of a united army took precedence over other considerations, see below, footnotes 138, 151.

[135] *Ibid.*, col. CXXXVIII.

[136] When the Pope absolved the French crusaders after their attack on Zara on condition that they not again attack Christian lands, he had to allow them to take their oaths to the legate's representative in the army. Letter of Innocent III to the counts, barons, and others, *PL*, 214, col. 1180; Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 108, 109, n. 1; see also the letter of the crusaders to the Pope, *PL*, 215, col. 103; and his letter to Peter of Capua, *ibid.*, col. 50. Apparently Peter never joined the army on the march. Allegedly by papal authority, he appointed certain clerics, of whom the reluctant Abbot Martin of Pairis was one, to "...stay with their fellow [crusaders] through all mishaps and prevent them, insofar as it should be possible to do so, from shedding Christian blood. " Gunther of Pairis, *Historia Constantinopolitana*, ed. Paul Riant in *Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Geneva, 1877-78), I, 73; see also the Anonymous of Halberstadt, *De peregrinatione in Greciam et adventu reliquiarum de Grecia libellus*, ed. Paul Riant in *ibid.*, I, 12. When it became clear that the crusaders were bound for Constantinople, the pope directed his legate to go to the Holy Land, whence he soon returned to Constantinople to frustrate papal relations with the Latin conquerors of the city. Letters of Innocent III to Peter of Capua, *PL*, 215, cols. 50, 699-702.

[137] *Gesta Innocentii III*, *PL* 214, col. CXXIX; Villehardouin records Conrad's late arrival at Zara without mentioning the reason for it. *Conquête*, I, 90.

Undoubtedly the efforts of Innocent III had something to do with putting the issue of Christian obligation into circulation, but some individuals and groups had become concerned spontaneously about the moral issue. Some of these attempted to get released from the necessity of staying with the army and received ecclesiastical permission to go home. Others were refused this permission. Still others went home without observing any formalities. The number who left because they were low on funds was even larger.[138] The majority, most of them probably with reluctance, decided to stay with the army and chose to justify their decision on the ground of necessity. Those who still worried about the moral problem reasoned that going home with their crusade vows unfulfilled would be a greater sin as well as a greater public disgrace than committing this less serious sin of taking part in an attack on Zara. Their reasoning lays bare for us one segment of the hierarchy of values accepted by medieval public opinion. The pope, if he did not accept the argument from necessity, provided no practical way out of the dilemma. Furthermore, he in effect agreed with and therefore strengthened, the assumption that a successful crusade was more important than the preservation of the bonds of charity among Christians.[139]

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[138] Characteristically, Villehardouin admitted that a majority of the French objected to the diversion of the crusade to Zara, but he dismissed their motives as selfish. *Conquête*, I, 62-66. Ernoul's account presents the ideological dimension of the discussions which took place. *Chronique d'Ernoul*, 350. The account of Gunther of Pairis is more detailed, relying as it does on an eyewitness report. His source, the Abbot Martin, became so disturbed by the proposal to attack Zara that he tried to obtain the legate's permission to return "...to the accustomed quiet of the cloistral life...," but at that time the legate was making arrangements, probably at the pope's direction, to provide an alternative for his own presence on the crusade. (See footnote 136 above). He therefore ordered Martin to work with other clerics in his stead. The leaders chose Martin as one of their emissaries to the pope when they sought absolution for the attack on Zara. At Rome he begged to be allowed to return to his monastery, but the pope required him to go to the Holy Land to complete his pilgrimage. He eventually returned by way of Constantinople where his scruples after the fact were not sufficient to prevent him from bringing home numerous valuable relics. Gunther of Pairis, *Historia*, I, 71-74, 79-82, 118 ff. Another churchman who was disturbed by the proposal to attack Zara was Bishop Conrad of Halberstadt, though his hesitations were probably weaker than those of the Abbot Martin. The Anonymous of Halberstadt, *De pereginatione*, I, 12.

[139] Gunther of Pairis, *Historia*, I, 72; *Chronique d'Ernoul*, 350. For Innocent III's later rejection of the crusaders' plea of necessity, see his letters to the crusaders and to their leaders, *PL*, 214, cols. 1178, 1180; 215, cols. 106-107, 109-110.

By the time that the crusade had reached Zara a band of dissenters had coalesced within the army. Their role was loosely determined by Peter of Capua probably under Innocent's direction after the pope had discovered that the legate could not travel with the army. They included a handful of Cistercian monks and other clerics whose mouthpiece was soon to emerge as the Abbot of Vaux-Cernay. They were affiliated with a number of laymen whose most eminent member was Simon de Montfort, the later hammer of heretics in southern France. The Abbot of Vaux was then in possession of, or was soon to receive, a papal bull which explicitly forbade an attack on Zara, but he awaited the right moment to reveal this fact to the army. Meanwhile the dissenters set up their camp some distance from the main army.[140]

Their symbolic resistance soon became articulate. According to Villehardouin, the Zarans were disposed to negotiate a surrender of their city without a fight when the dissenters assured them that the French, being pilgrims, would not attack them. Having kindled or reinforced the Zarans' will to resist, the dissenters turned their attention to the main army. In the presence of the Doge and the French leaders, the abbot of Vaux produced and read the papal bull forbidding under pain of ecclesiastical censure an attack on Zara since it was a Christian city and they were pilgrims. The Doge, who thought that he had thwarted papal influence, grew very angry and scorned the pope's intervention. If the reminiscences of the Abbot's young nephew who was present at the scene are accurate, the Venetians were about to attack the Abbot when Simon de Montfort stepped forward and saved him. According to the same account, Simon then spoke to the Zaran representatives at the council:

> I have not come here... for the purpose of destroying Christians. No harm shall I do to you, but, whatever others may do, I make you secure from me and mine.[141]

He and his party then withdrew from the others and would have nothing to do with the siege.[142]

The effort of the Cistercians and their party had not succeeded. Zara fell after a short siege, its inhabitants were given their freedom, but the city was occupied and sacked. In the midst of the siege, however, some of the French had allegedly shown fear and appear to have cooperated only minimally with the Venetians.[143] Their leaders immediately took steps to obtain absolution from the pope. The conditions which Innocent attached to his absolution made it more likely that there would be considerable objection to any similar proposal in the future.[144]

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[140] Peter of Vaux-Cernay, *Hystoria Albigensis*, eds. P. Guébin and E. Lyon, 3 vols. (Paris, 1926-39), I, 108; see also above, footnote 138.

[141] *Ibid.*, I, 109.

[142] *Ibid.*, I, 108-110; Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 82-84; Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 14.

[143] Gunther of Pairis, *Historia*, I, 74. A remark of Innocent III may imply that the Venetians did most of the fighting: "Veneti ergo in oculis vestris subverterunt muros civitatis

The occasion for another quarrel soon presented itself. This one, which was to be the longest and bitterest of its sort that occurred during a crusade, was precipitated by the arrival at Zara of Philip of Hohenstaufen's envoys who proposed that for valuable considerations the crusaders should go to Constantinople. There they should depose the "usurper," Alexius III, and place Philip's nephew, the future Alexius IV, on the Byzantine throne.[145] The Hohenstaufen-Venetian plot which has emerged from behind this plan as historians have reexamined the evidence over the last century was probably discerned only dimly, if at all, by most of the crusaders. At the *parlement* which the leaders called for the next day to discuss the proposal it was again the Abbot of Vaux who led the opposition. Villehardouin, the propagandist for those French barons who were collaborating with the Venetians, unsympathetically reported the outcome of the meeting:

> There was discussion throughout the army. And the Abbot of Vaux of the Order of Citeaux and that party who wanted the army to break up spoke and they said that they would not agree, that this was against Christians, and they had not set out for this; rather, they wanted to go to Syria.[146]

From the early winter until the early spring of 1202-03 one bitter argument followed another. The clergy were divided among themselves and the rift reached even into the ranks of the Cistercian monks who were with the army. Some of them went about among the crusaders countering the arguments of the Abbot of Vaux. The army must be kept together; the treaty with Alexius IV would actually enable them the better to reach the Holy Land. Such were their arguments.[147] Most if not all of the bishops seem to have agreed. In fact from this time onward, it appears that a majority of the higher clergy

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ejusdem, spoliaverunt ecclesias, aedificia destruxerunt et vos cum eis Jadertinorum spolia divisistis." Letter of Innocent III to the crusaders, *PL*, 214, 1179. This hypothesis would fit well with what happened afterward: the Venetians took possession of the port section of the city and relegated the remainder to the French; within a few days a serious fight broke out between the Venetians and the French in the town. Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 88-90.

[144] The pope required that they make restitution to the ambassadors of the Hungarian King, see that no more damage was done at Zara, and recognize that there must be no future harm done en route to Christians except for real necessity in the sense recognized by the pope. Innocent III, letter to the crusaders, *PL*, 214, col. 1179; letter to the leaders, *ibid.*, cols. 1180-1182.

[145] The conditions of the offer are given by Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 92-91.

[146] *Ibid.*, I, 94-96.

[147] *Ibid.*, I, 96-98.

were ready to ignore the announced policy of Innocent III and to cooperate with those leaders who favored the second diversion of the crusade.[148] Nevertheless, for one reason or another the Venetians could persuade no more than twelve French leaders to swear oaths to support the terms of the treaty with Alexius.[149]

The doubts and frustrations of large numbers of the crusaders that winter have already been mentioned. For those who had active consciences the severe material problems of that season became all the heavier as they listened to talk about the sins they must commit if they should go to Constantinople. Some of them asked the bishops for their opinion and were reassured that their intervention in support of the young Greek prince would be an act of charity, but such explanations probably did not satisfy everyone, especially after the army came to know, probably in February, that the pope in absolving them had insisted again that they must not attack any other Christians unjustly.[150] Yet only the most daring or the most conscientious would be ready to risk the dangers now involved in leaving the army.

In this latter group were the Abbot of Vaux and those Cistercians who remained loyal to them. Together with Simon de Montfort they finally gave up the struggle as it became evident that the army would sail east. They withdrew, soon to be followed by others, and made their way to the King of Hungary, whence they returned to Italy and completed their pilgrimage to Syria. These most recent departures jolted the army[151] and probably prepared the way for a new outburst of rebellion at Corfu, the agreed upon point of rendezvous.

Hereafter the views of the loyalist clergy appear to have gone undisputed, but many laymen were discontented for one reason or another. At Corfu a majority of the French leaders seceded from the enterprise and announced that they would remain on the island until they could get transportation back to Italy. By Villehardouin's admission, more than half the army sympathized with them. Yet the Venetians and their supporters, including the loyalist clergy, managed to thwart this near reversal of their plans by engaging in a collective act of self-abasement, combined with high pitched emotional pleas and a guarantee that once Alexius was enthroned the army would speedily move on to Syria. Among other considerations the crusaders' realization that Innocent III, despite his epistolary sermons, did not want the army to break up probably argued for a final compromise.[152]

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[148] The commitment of the bishops to the diversionists emerges from the fact that they claimed the right to absolve the crusaders from the papal excommunication incurred for the attack on Zara, a claim which the pope roundly dismissed. Innocent III, letter to the leaders, *PL*, 214, col. 1180. Now the bishops favored the diversion to Constantinople to the extent of assuring doubtful crusaders that their participation in this venture not only was no sin but that it was a charitable deed, since they would be restoring the rightful heir to the throne. Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 40.

[149] Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 98.

[150] Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 15, 32, 40. Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 108; Innocent III, letter to the leaders, *PL* 214, 1180-1181. Robert's chronology is inaccurate.

[151] Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 110-112.

Perhaps the ghost of the winter's doubts momentarily reappeared shortly before the attack upon Constantinople began as a shadow of fear passed over the army,[153] but there was apparently no serious disagreement again until some time after the victorious end of the siege and the "restoration" of Alexius to the throne. Once again the French became restive at the delay in getting started for the Holy Land. They were reminded by Innocent III that their second sin must be wiped out by the prompt completion of their pilgrimage.[154] Yet it was possible for the Venetians and their allies among the leaders to still the renewed threats of the malcontents with new promises.[155] These promises, too, were not to be kept, for the leaders soon announced their determination to take Constantinople for themselves in the face of Alexius IV's inability to abide by his onerous agreements with them.

The men whom they led into the second siege of the city were not fresh nor is it likely that they were very enthusiastic. The Greeks threw them back from the walls with heavy losses. A wave of fear passed through the army and even reached into the hearts of some of the leaders. Was God punishing them at last for their sins? A council of the leaders met that evening.[156] The loyalist bishops and clergy reassured them that their fears were groundless. Against Innocent's explicit injunctions of the past[157] they declared that the war was no sin but a holy act to punish Constantinople's past disobedience of Rome.[158]

The day after next was Palm Sunday. All of the crusaders were summoned to hear sermons in which the bishops and clergy exhorted them to take courage. They excoriated the Greeks as traitors to their recent emperor and as enemies of God. The battle would be a holy one they pronounced. In exchange for fighting in it the bishops promised the crusaders absolution in the name of God and by warrant of a papal authority which they did not have. They directed them all to confess and receive the sacrament as was usual in preparation for important crusade battles. To further insure divine protection, they also ordered all the harlots in camp to be collected and expelled. The crusaders responded obediently. The women were put on a ship and sent off.[159]

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[152] *Ibid.*, I, 116-120. In their last letter to the pope from Zara, the leaders made it clear that they were aware that Innocent did not want the army to be broken up. Letter of the leaders to Innocent III, *PL*, 215, col. 104; see also the pope's letter to the crusaders, *ibid.*, cols. 107-110.

[153] Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 41-42.

[154] Innocent III, letter to the leaders, *PL*, 215, cols. 260-261.

[155] Villehardouin, *Conquête*, I, 200-202.

[156] Letter of the Emperor Baldwin to Adolph, Archbishop of Cologne, *Annales Colonienses maximi*, *MGH*, *SS*, XVII, 816; Villehardouin, *Conquête*, II, 38-42; Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 71-74. Baldwin says that the crusaders were terrified; Villehardouin speaks almost as strongly.

[157] See above, footnotes 144, 154; also his letters to the leaders and to the crusaders, *PL* 215, cols. 106-107, 107-110.

[158] Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 71-72.

The next day two bishops led the assault on the walls, their ships lashed together under religious banners. Their initial success was taken by the army as a sign of God's will.[160] Among others, the hard headed fighting knight, Robert of Clari, judged the ensuing victory to be miraculous. As the crusaders breached the walls and moved into the city, the long history of crusading respect for Constantinople ended in an orgy of bloodshed and rapine. The ideal of Christian fraternity between Latins and Greeks lay crushed in the ruins, its existence hidden to future eyes by the more obvious casualties at the surface and the subsequent recriminations which its death let loose. At least three causes had combined to produce this tragedy: Venetian and Hohenstaufen avarice, the failure of Innocent III to pay the price for his high spiritual principles, and the blind self-interest of the loyalist bishops who thwarted papal policy and misled the reluctant crusaders in their charge.

Conclusion

This examination of twelfth and early thirteenth century Latin-Greek relations yields a few interesting conclusions. Perhaps the most striking is the persistence and the numerous vigorous assertions of the belief on the part of both Greeks and Latins that they were members of one community of Christian peoples. The roots of this belief appear to go back centuries before the crusades began, and they require further investigation than they have yet received. Although the crusades enlarged the cluster of Latin-Greek misunderstandings already in existence in the late eleventh century, they also occasioned new expressions of the sense of Christian fraternity, thus activating, before they submerged it in 1204, a reservoir of common or similar traditions. During each of the first four crusades, recognition that Christians should not attack fellow Christians welled up and, joined by motives of self interest, worked to prevent proposed attacks upon the Byzantine Empire. Only in the case of the fourth crusade did this combination of forces fail to save the Greek capital.

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[159] Letter of the Emperor Baldwin to Adolph, Archbishop of Cologne, *MGH SS*, XVII, 816-817.

[160] *Ibid.*, 817; Robert of Clari, *Conquête*, 73; Villehardouin, *Conquête*, II, 44.

Even then it appears to have come within reach of preventing the disaster which finally occurred.

Undoubtedly the sense of Christian fraternity was not the strongest of these forces, although with individuals, such as Louis VII, Frederick Barbarossa, and the Abbot of Vaux, it could conceivably have been so. Nevertheless it was a significant dimension of twelfth century thought and action, and was recognized as such by both Latin and Greek contemporaries. Most historians have neglected its role in the first four crusades. In the case of Runciman, the neglect has occasionally produced seriously distorted accounts of what happened and of the way contemporaries thought about what happened. Similar distortions are present to some degree in the major recent general histories of the Byzantine Empire, with the exception for the most part of Bréhier's *Vie et mort de Byzance.*

Characteristically, men of the twelfth century rarely theorized about the ideology of Christendom, but they frequently expressed it in other ways. It persistently reappeared in diplomatic correspondence; it constituted the basic theme of one propaganda war of the period; it was the major ideological resort of those who engaged in the repeated controversies which took place among crusaders about attacking the Greeks; and it found established liturgical expression in diplomatically conceived religious processions and in the ceremonial exchange of the kiss of peace. It was not seriously challenged by allegations of schism or heresy, which seemingly do not appear in crusade documents until the time of the second crusade. Both then and thereafter up to 1204, public opinion appears to have considered such charges exotic or recondite. If the ideology of Christian fraternity was created by the Church it was no longer the preserve of churchmen. Laymen sometimes served it better. In fact it might have survived beyond 1204 as a common possession of Latins and Greeks had it not been for clerical timidity or disregard.

One may loosely sum up the content of this ideology by formulating some axioms which, with some differences of shading and a few exceptions, were probably assumed to be valid by both Latins and Greeks in the twelfth century. They would run somewhat as follows. All Christians are brothers. They should go to the relief of persecuted and endangered brethren. The shedding of Christian blood is sinful without just reason, as are unjustified war and confiscation of goods were Christians are involved. Pilgrims should be reasonably provided for. Christian captives should be ransomed from the unbeliever. Christian rulers are brothers and should observe what might be termed the liturgy of Christian kingship when they correspond and meet. Their ambassadors and hostages deserve special respect. It will be remarked also that the Latins reprehended the use of non-Christian mercenaries against them by the Greeks, and the Greeks objected to undisciplined behavior by crusaders on the march. Both cited the obligation of Christian to Christian.

Latins, and as time went on Greeks, expected the crusader to have a heightened sense of all these obligations.

It was undoubtedly rare for a Greek to refer to the killing of Latins explicitly as "fratricide," as Alexius Comnenus reportedly did. Conversely not many Latins would have spoken of the Byzantine Empire, as did Raymond of Aguilers, as their "patria" because the Greeks were their brothers. Nevertheless, an abundance of less remarkable expressions and deeds allow us to answer the question posed by Professor Barraclough with which we started. In effect he asked whether the recent paring down by historians of the German Empire's stature in the middle ages involves the evaporation of the supposed medieval "feeling of unity of western civilisation." For the twelfth century, at least, the answer would appear to be that it did not, if one will allow Christendom to stand for Western Civilization at that stage of its historical growth.

APPENDIX*

Raymond of Aguilers.	The Norman Anonymous.
Interea exercitus noster Constantinopolim venit; et post haec episcopus consecutus est nos cum fratre suo, quem infirmum dimiserat Dirachii.	Comes autem Sancti Egidii erat hospitatus extra civitatem in burgo gensque sua remanserat retro.
Mandat et remandat Alexius, pollicetur multa se daturum comiti, si quaesitum *hominum sibi faceret, quod et alii principes fecerant. Meditabatur autem assidue comes qualiter suorum injuriam vindicaret*, et tantae infamiae dedecus a se suisque depelleret.	*Mandavit* itaque imperator comiti ut *faceret ei hominium* et fiduciam *sicut alii fecerunt.* Et dum imperator hec mandabat *comes meditabatur qualiter vindictam de imperatoris exercitu habere posset.*
Sed dux Lotharingiae et Flandrensis comes, atque alii principes, hujusmodi detestabantur, *dicentes:* "Stultissimum esse *contra Christianos pugnare*, quum Turci imminerent." Boamundus vero se adjutorem imperatori pollicetur,	*Sed dux Godefridus et Rotbertus comes Flandrensis aliique principes dixerunt* ei injustum fore *contra Christianos pugnare.* Vir quoque sapiens Boamundus dixit quia,
si quicquam comes contra ipsum moliretur, vel si hominum et juramenta diutius excusaret. Consilio itaque accepto a suis, comes Alexio vitam et honorem juravit, quod nec per se, nec per alium ei auferret. Quumque de hominio appellaretur, respondit non se pro capitis sui periculo id facturum. Quapropter pauca largitus est ei imperator.	*si aliquid injustum imperatori faceret et fiduciam ei facere prohiberet*, ipse ex imperatoris parte fieret. Igitur *comes, accepto consilio a suis, Alexio vitam et honorem juravit, quod nec per se nec per alium ei aufere* consentiat, *cumque de hominio appellaretur, non se pro capitis periculo id facturum respondit.* Tunc gens domini Boamundi appropinquavit Constantinopolim.

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* See above, footnote 38. The continuous passage from the Norman Anonymous has been spread out for easier visual comparison. Closely or exactly similar passages are italicized.

The Preconium Augustini of Godfrey of St. Victor

PHILLIP DAMON

AMONG the several minor though interesting literary figures who moved among the giants at St. Victor during the twelfth century was one Canon Godfrey, poet, philosopher, friend of Stephen of Orleans, and enthusiastic disciple of Adam du Petit-Pont. On the basis of an erroneous sixteenth century manuscript ascription, historians have traditionally identified him with Godfrey of Breteuil, sub-prior at the Augustinian monastery of Ste. Barbe-en-Auge, and located him at St. Victor only during the last years of his life.[1] This identification and the biography concocted to explain it have recently been exploded, and Godfrey now appears as a life-long Parisian, a Victorine from about the age of thirty, a temporary exile in his old age, and finally a sacristan at St. Victor.[2] But the details concerning his life remain scarce, for their only sources are Godfrey's allegorical account of his early studies in the *Fons Philosophiae* and his vague, if bitter complaints in the preface to the *Microcosmus*. He appears to have been born about the year 1125 and to have passed the decade from 1140 to 1150 as a student of the arts in the schools of Paris, and particularly the school which Adam of Balsham had established near the Petit-Pont. From 1150 to 1155 he studied theology and entered St. Victor as a regular canon sometime between 1155 and 1160. In 1176 or shortly thereafter he wrote his long poem, the *Fons Philosophiae*, a work whose humanistic and pro-philosophic tone appears to have grievously offended that uncompromising fundamentalist, Abbot Walter of St. Victor. Professor Delhaye has found in Walter's anti-philosophic tirade, *Contra quatuor labyrinthos Francie*, several particularly sharp blasts which are almost certainly directed at the *Fons* and its author. It seems reasonable to associate these facts with the persecution, the exile, and the solitude which Godfrey mentions in dedicating his *Microcosmus*, written about 1185, to Stephen of Orleans, at that time abbot of Ste. Geneviève. Presumably Godfrey found himself ejected from St. Victor by his powerful antagonist. But, if we are to accept the evidence of the seventeenth century historian, Jean de Thoulouze, he found his way back as sacristan in 1194. Apart from this, nothing is known of his last years. None of the Godfreys listed in the Victorine necrology appears likely to be our poet.

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[1] See Raby, *Secular Latin Poetry*, II, 13; Manitius, *Geschichte*, III, 777; M. A. Charma, "*Fons Philosophiae*, Poème inédit du XII^e siècle," *Mémoires de la société des antiquaires de Normandie*, I, 27 (3 ser. I, 7), Caen, 1869, pp. 1 ff.

[2] Philippe Delhaye, *Le Microcosmus de Godefroy de Saint-Victor*, *Etude théologique*, Lille, Facultés Catholiques, 1951, pp. 13-49.

Now that the *De videndo Deo*, the *Vita beati Hamonis*, and the letters of "frater G. cognomento de Bretolio" (all belonging to Godfrey of Breteuil) can be eliminated from consideration, the following works may be assigned to Godfrey: the *Fons Philosophiae*,[3] the *Microcosmus*,[4] a rhythmic *Canticum beatae Mariae virginis*, and the *Preconium Augustini*, which is here published for the first time. The *Preconium* represents a literary project well suited to the talents of a speculatively inclined Augustinian canon — a panegyrical survey of Augustine's philosophical and apologetical achievement. Godfrey's method was to paraphrase selected passages from the saint's writings and connect them after a fashion with his own enthusiastic comment. Although he ranged rather widely in Augustine's works for material, the general outline of his poem is a simple one. The first third reproduces in rhythmic form the critique of the Manichaean conception of evil found in the tract, *De natura boni contra Manichaeos*. The second third contains a brief description of the terrestrial and heavenly cities assembled from various sources and the main arguments for the creation of the world and the infinity of God elaborated in the eleventh and twelfth books of the *De civitate Dei*. The remainder of the poem paraphrases some of the arguments for the resurrection of the body contained in the thirteenth book of the *De civitate Dei* and *Sermo* CCXLI (*In diebus Paschalibus* XII).

The *Preconium* is contained in two manuscripts, *Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds latin* 15154 and 14769. The first of these is from the thirteenth century and also contains the text of the *Fons philosophiae*. The second is a sixteenth century copy of 15154 and of no importance to the text; only in one instance (398) does it improve on one of its exemplar's several obvious errors. In addition to the *Preconium* and the *Fons*, this manuscript also contains the *Canticum beatae Mariae virginis*. In it the *Preconium* is preceded by this distich: Haec Augustino didici tradente magistro/officio calami cui per subiecta ministro. Unless otherwise indicated, the readings given in the apparatus are, of course from MS 15154.

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[3] The first book of this work has been published in Charma, *op. cit.*, and recently by Pierre Michaud-Quantin in *Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia* (Namur, 1956).

[4] Philippe Delhaye, ed., *Microcosmus, Texte établi et présenté*, Lille, Facultés Catholiques 1951.

PRECONIUM AUGUSTINI

Augustini glorie meritis preclare
Laudes quantum dabitur rithmo cumulare
Eius nobis imperat amor. Tu dignare,
Fons bonorum spiritus, digna dictu dare.

Ipse nobis, inclite pater Augustine,
Impetres auxilium gratie divine,
Atque tue previo lumine doctrine
Ducas ab initio, statuas in fine.

Tu vir imitabilis vite sanctitate,
Preditus ingenii perspicuitate,
Affluens eloqii mira suavitate,
Plenus sapientie celitus collate;

Tu lumen ecclesie multis extas modis
Dum vivendi regulam clero, plebi prodis,
Tenebras illuminas, hereses displodas,
Queque planas aspera dissolutis nodis.

Tu dux, tu milicie signifer celestis,
Omnis adversarie propulsator pestis,
Orbis irruentibus irruis infestis
Vel adhuc latentibus vel iam manifestis.

Tu suffocas spiritum ficti Manichei
Pollicentis cuiusvis rationem rei,
Docens quod non ratio fidei sed ei
Fides esse debeat dux in via Dei.

Cuius execrabilis heresis sentina,
Que fetore polluit quelibet vicina,
Naturarum genera somniavit bina,
Mala tenebrarum gens, bona lux divina.

Tenebrarum principem creatorem male
Rei dicit quasi sit malum naturale.
Inter mala deputat corpus hoc mortale
Quasi mori culpa sit, potius penale.

Tu demonstras verius quamlibet naturam,

Lines 21-84 are based largely on passages from Augustine's tract, *De natura boni contra Manichaeos.*

21 Gloss: De heresi manicheorum.

25-8 Manichaei... (blasphemant) inducendo duas naturas, unam bonam... alteram malam. *De nat. boni,* XLI.

29-32 — in eo quod dicunt naturam summi mali ponere se tanta bona, ubi ponunt vitam... *Ibid.*

33-6 — omnis itaque natura bona est, et omne bonum a Deo est; omnis ergo natura a Deo est. *Ibid.,* XIX.

Que non est quod Deus est, Dei creaturam
Et creantis munere bonam, rectam, puram,
Nullum in nascentibus mali genituram.

Insunt enim singulis tria quedam bona,
Ut omittam plurima creatoris dona:
Modus, ordo, species, quibus nec persona
Quelibet nec bestia caret humi prona.

Immo quicquid denique vivit vita caret,
Nichil esset bonis his quin participaret.
At naturis pessimis quis hec bona daret?
Ergo naturaliter cuncta bona claret.

Igitur si mala sunt, non conditione
Vel natura mala sunt, sed corruptione,
Boni voluntaria derelictione;
Sed sinuntur optima Dei ratione.

Hoc si parit scrupulum cogitationi,
Admones hic nomine mali nichil poni.
Non est enim malum res sed defectus boni
Sicut est silentium defectivum soni.

Anima quod portio Dei sit delirat;
Pater illam corpori desuper inspirat,
Ut debellans tenebras supera requirat,
Unde post victoriam libera regirat.

Quod si falli patitur sese cauta parum,
Diligitque tenebras partium malarum,
In eterno figitur globo tenebrarum,
Nec evadet amplius carcerem penarum.

O desipientiam sceleris supremi!
O scelestam rabiem spiritus blasphemi!
Contendentis omnium summam Deo demi,
In eternis tenebris partem Dei premi!

36 nullam cum nascentibus

37-40 haec itaque tria, modus, species, et ordo ut de innumerabilibus taceam... tamquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis. *Ibid.*, III.

41-4 ubi haec tria magna sunt, magnae naturae sunt... ubi nulla sunt, nulla natura est. omnis ergo natura bona est. *Ibid.*

45-8 malum... nihil aliud est quam corruptio. *Ibid.*, IV.

52 ... sicut silentium vocis absentia. *Ibid.*, XV.

53-6 dicunt enim etiam (esse) nonnullas animas, quas volunt esse de substantia Dei... quae non sponte peccaverint, sed a gente tenebrarum... ad quam debellandam... patris imperio descenderunt. *Ibid.*, XLII. Gloss: Alia opinio manichei.

59 horribili globo tenebrarum. *Ibid.*

61 Gloss: hic elidit eam.

Cui si quis obiecerit Deum non decere
Partem sui quamlibet mala sustinere,
Refert nichil patitur in se Deus vere
Sed qua parte voluit malis se miscere.

Hoc videri poterat sapide dixisse,
Si cavisset optimum malis miscuisse,
Aut naturam simplicem partibus scidisse,
In quo scelus arguis veritatis scisse.

Totum dicat potius quisquis sentit bene,
Quoniam quem proprie non affligunt pene,
Eum nec malicie tangunt aliene;
Si quo minus, veritas non est dicta plene.

In se quidem deitas nichil potest pati,
Sed quid erit glorie magne deitati
Si non eam stimuli pungunt in se nati,
Quam dolores cruciant a foris illati?

Nec sic Deum concipit sanus intellectus,
Ut in partes plurimas cogitetur sectus,
In his impassibilis manens et perfectus,
In his passionibus variis subiectus.

Docet adhuc alia magis his nefanda,
Que tu cum commemores non ut predicanda
Sed ne non sit cognitum quam sint detestanda,
Nobis sunt silentio potius dampnanda.

Tu de cultu demonum dampnas paganismum,
Numinum non nominum rides barbarismum,
Veteris eliminas Iude iudaismum,
Novum vocas Israel ad christianismum.

Tu doctrinam rudibus tradis christianam,
Et in sacras litteras viam pandis planam
Ad intelligentiam secretorum sanam,
Et ad eloquentiam linguam das urbanam.

Tu vita, tu studio verum perquisisti,
Cuius desiderio totus inarsisti,
De quo tamen certius nichil invenisti
Quam quod queri debeat solo ductu Christi.

65-68 quod cum defendere conantur... dicunt malae naturae commixtionem facere ista, ut bona Dei tanta mala patiatur, nam ipsam apud se ipsam nihil horum pati potuisse vel pati. *Ibid.*

69-72 haberet ista responsio qualemcumque iustitiae colorem, si... natura Dei vestri se integram impollutamque servasset. *Contra Secundinum Manichaeum*, XX.

77-80 quasi inde laudanda sit incorruptibilis natura, quia ipsa sibi non nocet, et non quia nihil ei noceri ab aliquo potest. *De nat. boni*, XLII.

89 Gloss: Contra paganos et iudeos.

93 Gloss: In libro de doctrina christiana.

Hic est enim Protheus ille latens divus,
Vultu variabili, semper fugitivus,
Quem non capit animus quantumcumque vivus,
Sed prodente numine ducitur captivus.

Veteres philosophos in naturis rerum
Gloriantes penitus se vidisse verum
Probas mentis oculum non habere merum,
Variarum proditis monstris facierum.

Ex his quidam seculis dant eternitatem,
Et per certam temporum volubilitatem
Senescentis renovant mundi venustatem,
Stellis redeuntibus ad identitatem.

Quod ut probent talibus prodeunt armati:
Non est, dicunt, competens summe bonitati
Desidis vacatio, nec eternitati
Operis initium nuper inchoati,

Quam nec eternaliter retro vacavisse
Nec recenter convenit opus incepisse
Quasi quam peniteat desidem fuisse.
Hinc fit semper aliqua Deum creavisse.

Amplius adiciunt disputantes ita:
Nulla est scientia claudens infinita.
Cum sit ergo deitas omnium perita,
Res finitas continet ratio finita.

Sed quid infinitius si, qui non vacavit
Umquam, Deus usque nunc nova procreavit?
Sic insipientia, quando Scillam cavit,
In Caribdin stultius se precipitavit.

Nam timentes dicere quod infinitorum
Habeat scientiam rex universorum,
Intulerunt circulum quemdam seculorum,
Eademque repetunt more nugatorum.

Habet tamen aliquam veri fantasiam
Hec eorum ratio, nam philosophiam
Prima monstrat facie, sed est extra viam
Dum non theologicam sequitur sophiam.

His tu validissime scutum rationis
Propugnator fidei strenuus opponis,
Atque robur dupplicis oppositionis
Obice debilitas interemptionis.

101-4 Proteus enim ille... in imaginem veritatis inducitur.... quam obtinere nemo potest... falsis imaginibus deceptus. *Contra Academicos*, III, 13.

Lines 105 to 224 paraphrase arguments found in the eleventh and twelfth books of the *De civitate Dei*.

105 Gloss: Contra philosofos.

119 ...quasi poenituerit eum... vacationis. *De civ. Dei*, XII, 17.

Non est, inquis, deitas semper operata,
Sed nec opus inchoans creditur mutata.
Operatur et non est inde fatigata,
Vacat nec desidie vicio notata.

Nec, si sapis, aliter Deum quiescentem
Affici credideris, aliter agentem.
Immo nec afficitur, quia patientem
Nefas inmutabilem predicare mentem.

Hic est admirabilis modus operandi,
Sed et ineffabilis species vacandi.
Mente nequit concipi nec sermone pandi;
Vacat, agit nesciens vices alternandi.

Igitur desipitis nimis et erratis
Quando sapientiam magne deitatis
Vestre scientiole finibus artatis,
Vermibus, homunculis summa coaptatis.

Clauditis scientiam concludentem cuncta,
Quam nec latent singula linearum puncta.
Postera, preterita, quelibet disiuncta
Sunt in hac amplissima simplici coniuncta.

Ipsa semper omnium plena rerum formis,
Uniformis, multiplex, simplex, multiformis,
Forma formosissima, formans sed informis,
Regens sine regula, norma sed inormis.

An ob hoc artabitur terminatione
Tanta res, quod quolibet in homuncione
Magna sapientia brevis est? Ergone
Numerorum careat, ut tu, ratione.

Siquidem sunt singuli numeri finiti;
Omnes tamen homini fiunt infiniti,
Duplo, triplo, quadruplo sepe repetiti.
An ad summam nequeat deitas eniti?

Numeros audebitis spernere fortasse?
Ipsi Deum numeris animam creasse,
Elementa numeris dicitis ligasse.
Non sunt ergo numeri rationes casse.

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176 rationis

152 novit quiescens agere, et agens quiescere. *Ibid.*

153-6 nos sumus homunculi, qui eius scientiae limites figere praesumamus. *Ibid.*

162 simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis. *Ibid.*, XII, 18.

169-70 singuli quique finiti sunt, et omnes infiniti sunt. *Ibid.*,

173-6 nec audebunt isti contemnere numeros... apud quos Plato Deum.... commendat mundum numeris fabricantem. *Ibid.*

Sed et nos veridica docuit scriptura,
Quoniam sub numero, pondere, mensura
Universa prodiit mundi creatura,
Nec capilli capitum carent Dei cura.

Absit sapientie numeros deesse
Cuius David perhibet numerum non esse.
Sic finita fieri Deo fit necesse
Infinita, quorum scit numeros expresse.

Nec ob hoc infinitas rerum mundi perit,
Quia Deus omnium summam mente gerit,
Ut nec impossibile nichil ob hoc erit
Quod in ore pecudis, dum vult, verba serit.

Sic emerso veteris dubii profundo
Et exploso secula volvi redeundo,
Pergunt curiosius querere secundo.
Questionem taliter replicant de mundo:

Deitas, ut dicitis, vacat et vacavit
Donec rerum facies novas inchoavit.
Dicite cur adeo tarde consummavit
Quod eterne facere se precogitavit.

Hic non ob diffugium rei minus scite
Questionem replicans solvis litem lite,
Quia si de tempore queritur perite,
Et de loco pariter queri potest rite.

Si cur Deus fecerit quando fecit mundum
Digne reddit hominis sensum scrutabundum,
Tunc et quare fecerit ubi fecit, nundum
Notum, sub silentio non pretereundum.

Quicquid enim tulerint pro solutione,
Hoc in sua sibimet ferant questione;
Aut si carent penitus loci ratione,
Cessent et a temporis inquisitione.

Si fuisse tempora somniant humane
Mentes ante fabricam machine mundane,
Extra quoque cogitent loca multa sane
Aut utrumque potius iudicent inane.

177-9 et apud nos Deo dictum legitur, 'omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.' *Ibid.*

181-2 absit itaque ut dubitemus quod ei notus sit omnis numerus, 'cuius intellegentiae,' sicut in Psalmo canitur, 'non est numerus.' *Ibid.*

197-200 videndum est istis, qui... quaerunt de mundi tempore quid respondeamus, quid ipsi respondeant de mundi loco. *Ibid.*, XI, 5.

209-16 si infinita spatia temporis ante mundum cogitant... similiter cogitent extra mundum infinita spatia locorum... ut innumerabiles mundos cum Epicuro somniare cogantur. *Ibid.*

Nam si loca dixerint extra mundum multa,
Epicuri dogmata suscitant sepulta
Opinantis plurimos mundos fide stulta,
Quod admitti prohibet ratio consulta.

Cesset ergo questio, conquiescat cura
Neque terminabilis neque profutura,
Que non minus etiam foret nascitura
Si cepisset antequam cepit creatura.

Pone centum milibus annis mundum factum.
Certe si consideres evum retroactum,
Adhuc nichilominus queres cur protractum
Opus Dei tam diu manserit intactum.

Sic triumphas hostibus fortiter elisis,
Veritatis aliqua fantasia nisis;
Heresum radicibus funditus excisis,
Pulsis et erroribus fidei invisis.

Tu divisas predicas duas civitates
Penitus contrarias per proprietates,
Differentes populos, reges et primates,
Loca, facta, nomina, leges, dignitates.

Homines et angeli cives utriusque,
Reges vero Dominus adversariusque;
Sed utrimque Dominus eo regnat usque,
Ut det digna meritis uniuscuiusque.

Nam et resistentibus ita dominatur
Si non a volentibus sibi pareatur;
Tamen de nolentibus quod vult impleatur,
Et de malis aliquid boni producatur.

Seraphin, apostoli, vel adhuc viventes
Patres sunt huic principes pie presidentes;
Huic tiranni gentium colla subigentes
Vel maligni spiritus miseros torquentes.

Hec vel sursum graditur vel est in superna
Curia iam perfruens luce sempiterna;
Illa iam caligine premitur interna
Vel iam stridens dentibus luget in externa.

Hec aut piis actibus sancte caritatis
Aut beatis ociis vacat veritatis;
Hec exercet studia prave voluptatis
Aut mensuras recipit blande pravitatis.

Hanc Syon ob fidei speculationem
Vocant vel Iherusalem pacis visionem;

231 diffidentes 249 auctibus

253-6 Babylon confusio interpretatur, Jerusalem visio pacis... Syon speculatio. *Enarratio in Psalmum LVIV*, 2-3.

Illam prorsus nomine digno Babilonem
Ob confusum viciis vite rationem.

Ista legem Domini lege tripartita
Gerit mente, predicat ore, probat vita;
Illa mortis legibus se devinxit ita
Ut sit vita moriens morte non finita.

Ista magne fidei, caritatis, spei
Sublevatur meritis ante thronum Dei;
Hec demersa viciis deputatur ei
Qui peccati caput est et perniciei.

Huius perditissime tu quandoque sortis,
Ire naturaliter filius et mortis,
Dirutis eriperis tenebrarum portis,
Civis urbis sancte fis et defensor fortis.

Immo lapsam reparas Dei civitatem,
Nos coniungens angelis in societatem,
Cuius ortum statuis mundi novitatem,
Et procursum terminas in eternitatem.

Quoniam, deposita tunica mortali,
Non, ut docent, iterum vestiemur tali,
Sed resumpta denuo carne non carnali,
Vivemus perhenniter vita spiritali.

Hec non valet ratio circulo probare
In quo solent impie mentes ambulare,
Que licet in aliis poterat constare,
Cogitur in anima sola vacillare.

Nam quid possit anima superis recepta
Demereri gaudia que iam sit adepta?
Nulla fides stultior, nulla tam inepta,
Sed nec nisi demerens perderet accepta,

Neque pace perfruens, redientis more
Huius fedi carceris trahitur amore,
Sed secura sustinet spe iucundiore,
Immortalis indui corporis decore.

Igitur que ratio cogeret nolentem,
Que lex, que iustitia tale nil merentem
In tam tetrum carcerem carnis, tam squalentem
Tam purgatam truderet, tam beatam mentem?

Porro si, ut afferunt, migrat reditura,

276 vivimus 281 quod

Lines 273 to 452 are based on the thirteenth book of the *De civitate Dei* and Sermon CCXLI (*In diebus Paschalibus*, XII).

293-6 sciunt se istae animae in coelo passuras esse rursus huius vitae miserias an nesciunt? si sciunt... quomodo sunt beatae ubi sunt sine securitate? si nesciunt, errando sunt beatae. *Sermo* CCXLI.

Aut scit aut non qualia sibi sint ventura.
Si scit, qui permaneat interim secura?
Si non, qui beata est nesciens futura?

Aut quo pacto nesciat fruens tanta luce
Quod hic scire potuit ratione duce?
An in luce ceca est ne timoris cruce
Torqueatur metuens luci tam caduce?

Itaque subtilior anime natura
Est in hac caligine corporis obscura
Quam fit cum de tenebris evolabit pura
In beatitudinis lumine futura?

O beatitudinem maximi pendendam!
Lucem totis animi viribus querendam!
In qua vel non omnia que nunc comprehendam
Vel pungentem patiar semper metum quendam!

Quis presumat sapiens talia docere,
Que si vera comprobent rationes vere,
Tamen opportunius fuerat silere
Nec suas miserias miseris augere?

Minus enim miser est qui non ista prescit
Nec sollicitudinis stimulis tabescit,
Sed beatitudinis spe vel falsa crescit
Dum que sibi mala sunt affutura nescit.

Sed est necessarium, dicunt, hec predisci,
Quia nequit aliter mens hec adipisci.
Nisi sic premonita Dei reminisci
Ceperit, non soleat virtus concupisci.

Ex quo quiddam provenit dictu non ferendum,
Nam cum Deum predicent summe diligendum
(Quod et piis mentibus non est ambigendum)
Quis in hac sententia putet hoc implendum?

Quis non fiat tepidus eius in amore
Quem sibi predidicit inimicum fore?
Cui de Deo cura sit sui desertore,
Si beatitudinis breves erunt more?

His evicti viribus quidam sategere
Animas a circulo rerum removere,
Et exutas corpore celo posuere,
Sed reddendas corpori rursus noluere.

Omne corpus anime penam putant esse
Nec libere regredi semel hinc egresse.

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301 ita ne 317 hic 320 et s.

309-16 etiam si vera essent... nonne melius nescirentur? *Ibid.*

Sic quod partim capiunt, tenebris obpresse
336 Mentes verum cernere nequeunt expresse.

Tu consentis animas ferri quidem sursum,
Sed post huius seculi temporalem cursum
His in sua corpora tribui recursum
340 Et cum stola duplici sublevari rursum.

Nec est eis quodlibet corpus onerosum,
Sed mortale, sordidum, grave, tenebrosum
Prorsus tunc amabile quando luminosum,
344 Agile, perpetuum fiet et formosum.

Ergo ne celestium spiritus spherarum
347 Miseros crediderint aut beatos parum
348 Ob eternum vinculum corporis amarum,
346 Docent eos vivere corpora stellarum.

Quos de sua pavidos dissolutione
Teste sic alloquitur opifex Platone:
Di deorum fragiles ex conditione,
352 Sed indissolubiles mea iussione.

Ecce quantum gratie donum putavere
Quod donavit opifex solvi non debere!
Ergo vel non pena est corpore manere
356 Vel pro beneficio penam censuere.

Denique que maximi corporis est vita
Et a centro numeris prodit dispertita
(Nam Platonis dogmata persuaseret ita)
360 In tam gravi corpore manet impunita.

At oportet, inquiunt, solvi mortis pena
Que de terra gerimus corpora terrena;
Quodque de materia manat aliena
364 In eandem refluit de qua fluxit vena.

Hec si stabit ratio, quomodo non cadet,
Que planetas igneas vivere persuadet?
Ignis ad originem suam sursum vadet
368 Atque mortis nescios deos morti tradet.

340 sursum 346 enim v; *hunc ordinem seq. MS 14769:* 347, 346, 348.

340 duae stolae sunt duae resurrectiones. *Ad fratres in eremo* XXVII (*De filio prodigo*).

345-56 ... (deos) in celestibus corporibus dixit inclusos. secundum Platonem (Deus) dicit, 'vos quidem immortales esse non potestis, sed mea voluntate immortales eritis. *De civ. Dei*, XXII, 25-XIII, 16.

357-9 (animal maximum) Plato ab intimo terrae medio, quod geometrae centrum vocant, diffundi... per numeros musicos opinatur. *Ibid.* XIII, 17.

360 ... in tam magna mole corporis. *Ibid.*

361-4 sed terrae, inquiunt, terra reddenda est... ex quo fit ut (terrestria corpora) sit necesse dissolvi. *Ibid.*

Vides nunc quam ceci sunt homines perversi
Male conscientie tenebris immersi,
Non curantes qualiter sibi sint adversi,
Christiani nominis odio subversi.

An natura licite deviat in celis
Quia sic philosophus docet infidelis?
Et in terris ordinem sic servari velis,
Ut non credat gratie populus fidelis?

An divine gratie fluvius procedit
Usque quo Platonica vanitas concedit
Et non magis usque quo Christianus credit,
Cui resurgens Deus spem resurgendi dedit?

An humanis potius credam coniecturis
Quibus est philosophus ductus in obscuris,
An que prophetalibus edita figuris
Revelavit spiritus Dei de futuris?

Sed irrident corpora sursum ferri posse,
Quod compacta carnea mole sint et osse.
Terre dicunt pondera supera non nosse,
Ut nec celi levia terre norint grosse.

Tu confirmas corporum sublevationem
In celestem fieri posse mansionem,
Copiosam proferens ad hec rationem
Exemplorum talium per inductionem:

Vides quantum ceteris elementis presit
Ignis, quam contrarius moli terrene sit.
Spreto tamen ordine suo, terris hesit,
Nec miraris ordinis huius causa que sit.

Artifex mechanicus ex hac massa gravi,
Que sub aquas trahitur mersa propria vi,
Formam que supernatat fingit olle navi,
Deum posse tale quid asserens erravi?

Quod si semel dederis vel de potestate,
Dubitare fas non est iam de voluntate.
Scimus qui pollicitus est in veritate,
Quia verbum Domini stat indubitate.

In terreno corpore spiritus ligatur,
A quo tamen genere magis separatur

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394 terre esit   398 sub terras *MS 15154*; sub aquis *MS 14769*   403 *post* qui d *in ras.*

377-80 an Deus non est potens quousque Christiani credunt sed quousque Platonici volunt? *Ibid.*

397-400 si enim ars humana efficit ut ex metallis, quae in aquis posita submerguntur, quibusdam modis vasa fabricata etiam natare possint, quanto credibilius modus operationis Dei... potest molibus praestare terrenis... *Ibid.*, XIII, 18.

Quam a terris sidera, cum non capiatur
Sicut illa sensibus, et quis hec miratur?

Desine iam quisquis es, desine mirari
Corpora celestibus posse sociari.
Aut cum vides spiritum corpore locari,
Incipe iam quisquis es, incipe mirari.

Fac in stella compare spiritum suspensum
Nec expertum corporis aliquando sensum.
Isne suum potius debeat descensum
Quam tu tui credere corporis ascensum?

Certe primum ratio iam premissa negat,
Cum tamen spirituum tot hic turba degat.
Ergo suus quemlibet intellectus regat,
Et quid credi dignum sit in se ipso legat.

Hec sunt minus pervia; plana proponamus.
Vides corpus quale nunc interim gestamus.
Sanum, quamvis gravius, levius portamus,
Agitamus, sistimus, ponimus, levamus.

Contra vero quotiens fuerit egrotum,
Quamvis pene nullum sit, et exhaustum totum,
Grave fit spiritui, permanet immotum,
Nec obedit penitus ad iubentis votum.

Quod si tantum valet hic umbra sanitatis
In adhuc mortalibus et distemperatis
Miseris corporibus, nichilne beatis
Superaddet claritas inmortalitatis?

Addet plane, quoniam quod nunc est inmundum
Fiet auro mundius; quod nunc moribundum
Vivens vivet; flebile fiet letabundum;
Levius volatili quod nunc petit fundum.

Novimus per angelos quosdam ferri mire
Et terrarum maxima spatia transire,
In momento temporis ire vel redire,
Nec ferentes corporum pondera sentire.

Si sic potest angelus ferre carnem meam
Ponderosam, sordidam, feculentam, ream,
Quanto magis ipsemet illam ferre queam
Quando iam malicia nulla premet eam.

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410 corporibus p.

422-8 ipse tamen ad suum corpus movendum atque portandum agilior est cum in bona valitudine... quam cum in pena vel fame. *Ibid.*

429-32 si hoc valet sanitas, immortalitas quid valebit? *Sermo* CCXLII, 10.

437-44 si Angeli... animalia terrestria rapiunt... sine labore, cur ergo... beatos... spiritus sine ulla difficultate posse ferre... sua corpora... non credamus? *De civ. Dei*, XIII, 18.

Qui nunc prestat oculis igneum fulgorem
Sed ab illo separat socium calorem,
Reddet naturalia, dabit et decorem,
448 Separans miserias, separans dolorem.

Accidente siquidem gratie medela,
Rediet quod dederat prima parentela;
Et remota penitus carnis corruptela,
452 Duum fiet unio iam sine querela.

Per hec et huiusmodi destruis acute
Quod seducti tradere visi sunt argute,
Quorum rationibus et verbi virtute
456 Poterant simplicium capi mentes brute.

Alii tam fatuo deviant errore,
Ut nec eis iudices respondendum fore;
Et spernendo frivola sapientis more
460 Destruis erronea modo meliore.

Quid est enim dignius sperni quam sentire
Vel quod Deus nichil sit vel hunc preterire
Res humanas, hominem funditus perire,
464 Mundum concurrentibus atomis prodire?

Melius huiusmodi pestis declinatur,
Declinando melius nichili probatur,
Cui si tendas obvius, aliquid putatur,
468 Et qui crudum laterem lavat inquinatur.

Tu quandoque terminos temporum transcendis,
Et ad pedes solio residentis tendis,
Et quid post iudicium restet comprehendis,
472 Solis Dei laudibus evum tunc impendis.

Tandem sublimissime mentis fers cacumen
Longe trans Uranice fabrice acumen,
Repercusso lumine summum lustrans lumen,
476 Ubi Dei discutis unum trinum numen.

Sed ecce dum laudibus tuis enarrandis
Immoramur, arduum nobis iter pandis.
Intellectum tenuem superat res grandis.
480 Evolas ab oculis quando summa scandis.

Libet ergo prosequi te vel voce precum:
O magister optime, tolle tuos tecum,
Quos hic a te deseri certe non est equum!
484 Lucis beneficio fac donari cecum!

O beate pontifex, qui nunc sanctitatis
Merito concivis es sancte civitatis
Et eterne possides regnum claritatis,
488 Nunc effunde viscera plene caritatis!

445-8 ... ab igne removere urendi qualitatem. *Ibid.*

Ora pro viantibus quos hic reliquisti,
Quos in via vite dux ipse statuisti,
Quosque summo studio post te vocavisti,
492 Possint ut in patria, te ducente, sisti!

O precellens anima, nunc, nunc recordare
Quanto desiderio veri torquebare,
Quod in pravis tenebris sic insectabare,
496 Ut nec tibi requiem posses relaxare!

Nunc ad corda respice tenebris inclusa,
Falsis ymaginibus sensuum delusa!
Nunc patronus aliis opem ne recusa
500 Quam petebas iugiter ipse prece fusa!

Scis quod viam pergimus tam laboriosam,
Obsitam periculis atque scrupulosam.
Carnem circumferimus fragilem, lutosam,
504 Sordibus odibilem, tenebris umbrosam.

Erui de carceris huius cecitate
Et in veri luminis sisti claritate,
Qua nunc letus frueris cum satietate,
508 Largiente quesumus sancta trinitate.

490 vie d. 501 pergrinus

The "De contemptu mundi" of Bernardus Morvalensis, Part One: A Study in Commonplace

GEORGE J. ENGELHARDT

TO the medieval mind man was at once pitiable and wonderful. From this paradox arose two themes in the medieval tradition, the *contemptus mundi* and the *dignitas humanae naturae.* One was the obverse and the complement of the other. When inordinate humility made man too diffident of salvation, he could be uplifted by contemplating in the endowments of his imperial race the infinite mercy of God. When on the contrary he was too much elated with pride, he could be humbled by a confrontment with the panorama of human misery.

The medieval *contemptus mundi* is most clearly expressed in the *De contemptu mundi sive de miseria conditionis humanae,* a prose discourse written by Innocent III not long before his accession to the papacy in 1198. This work is the best known of its kind today if only because it served the invention of Chaucer. A far more elaborate expression of this theme had been achieved several decades before Innocent by a Cluniac monk who signed himself *Bernardus.* Of Bernard little is known; even his surname remains obscure. Although his verses have continued especially since the Reformation to endear him to scholars of a strong religious cast, literary critics of the less zealous sort have paid him scant attention. Thus most of his editors have undertaken their task with motives avowedly sectarian. Literary historians, repelled by the severity of his theme, which they fail to perceive at once excludes and presupposes the spiritual exhilaration proper to its obverse, have been content to dismiss him with little more than what now seems to have become almost obligatory — a condescending reference to the monotony of his rime scheme. Yet it may be questioned whether Bernard's internal rimes are as obtrusive as critics would have them seem. These rimes usually involve only the arsis of the riming dactyls, and the attention of the reader is often diverted from them by the enjambment of the phrasing.[1]

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[1] Citations from Bernard are to the edition by H. C. Hoskier (London, 1929). This edition is marred by its punctuation, which distorts both meaning and prosody. Thus e.g., I.34 Surget inertibus, ima tenentibus astra benignis. *for* Surget, inertibus ima tenentibus, astra

For Bernard, furthermore, these rimes and the paronymic recurrences in which his work abounds were much more than otiose embellishments. Bernard professed to see in the facility with which he handled the phonic elements of his poem a sign that his work was divinely favored.[2] To preach against the iniquity of the world was a secular office for undertaking which a monk might well be thought by his contemporaries to need more than the traditional license of satire. But none would be quick to criticize the zeal of a work the form of which God had so manifestly countenanced.

The very sounds, then, of the verse signalize a topic upon which the poem will dwell in the second part — that imperative of Christian zeal which binds those who can to succor the spiritually infirm with the spiritual works of mercy. But this characteristic recurrence by which one set of sounds foreshadows another serves at the same time to reinforce a basic method of the poem itself, repetition. This principle manifested in the composition of the sounds informs the disposition of the words. It ranges from such verbal devices as *geminatio* and the imitation of the Hebraic infinitive absolute to the repetition of motifs by *epimone.*[3] In the sequence of thought (*taxis*), in the selection and disposition of the topics of the poem, the principle of repetition operates no less determinatively than in the ordering of sounds and words. Here it is most obvious in the recurrent dilatation of the same topic (*epimone*), most effective in the subtler correspondence of topic to topic adapted from the typological mode of scriptural exegesis. The *schema* or figure of speech dominating the stylistic of the poem is the *inculcatio determinationum.* This device, which is analyzed for the novice in the *Documentum de arte versifi-*

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benignis. I.155-156 Pastus odoribus, interioribus, atque superno, / Nectare dulcia protrahet ocia perpete verno, *for* Pastus odoribus interioribus atque superno / Nectare, dulcia etc. I.362 Jungar habentibus, aethera civibus, *for* Jungar habentibus aethera civibus, I.368 Agmine splendida, stans duce florida, perpete lauro. *for* Agmine splendida, stans duce, florida perpete lauro. I.446 Quod bene sumitur, hic bene pellitur, ille remissus, — *for* Quod bene sumitur hic, bene pellitur ille remissus. I.500-503 Tortio turpia mentis, et impia puniet oris, / Ut flagra scilicet ultio duplicet, in mala gesta / Pectora devoret, ossaque perforet intus et extra. / Audiat hoc pius, ut stet, et impius, ut cito surgat. *for* Tortio turpia mentis et impia puniet oris. / Ut flagra scilicet ultio duplicet in mala gesta, / Pectora devoret ossaque perforet intus et extra / Audiat etc. Most deplorable is the forced concurrence of rime and caesura because it abets the notion that Bernard's prosody is monotonous.

The letters, *a*, *b*, *c*, are used, when necessary, to designate the three parts into which each verse of Bernard may be divided with reference to its rime pattern.

[2] See Bernard's dedicatory epistle to Peter, Abbot of Cluny, in Hoskier, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii.

[3] The Hebraic infinitive absolute underlies such a locution as "gravans gravat" (I.381). For *geminatio* see Bernard's dedicatory epistle, Hoskier, p. xxxvi; Gregory *Moralia* VI.25, *Homiliae in Evangelia* XII.5. Citations from Gregory are to the *Patrologia Latina*, Vols. 75, 76. Gregory is eulogized by Bernard, III. 309-318. For *epimone*, see my "*Beowulf:* A Study in Dilatation," *PMLA*, LXX (September 1955), 828.

candi of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, involves the repetition of like syntactical elements or *parisa*. The static quality that might seem to attend so repetitive a style, however, is offset by the use of such kinetic devices as the elimination of connective particles in favor of *asyndeta* and variation from one mode of determination to another. Not only is the poem sparing in the use of *sincategoreumata*, it employs a parsimony of expression which very often leaves the significance much more implicit than explicit.[4] This counterpoise of static and kinetic reaches beyond style into the disposition of the topics. If the sequence of the poem is marked by recurrence, it is subject as well to the transposition characteristic of the concise or syntomic taxis. In this way the form tends toward an effect most aptly described with a Greek phrase used in a similar context by an ancient critic whose work was unknown to Bernard but whose technical apparatus belongs to the general tradition passed on through Latin intermediaries to the medieval poets. This phrase, *ἡ τάξις ἄτακτος* or "order without order," may be used, furthermore, to describe not merely the form of Bernard's poem but a motif that pervades the fabric of its thought.[5]

The theme of this poem is conversion in repentance from love of world to love of God. It is presented in two forms: the first, conversion of self; the second, which presupposes the first, conversion of others. Self-conversion dominates the first book of the poem, throughout which it is repeated at intervals by epimone. This repetition is varied in a manner appropriate to the dilatation of the theme by reference to such theological concepts as the repentant and the unrepentant, the contemplative life in its course from penitential fear to the ultimate vision of love, and the active life with its dual function of administering to the spiritual and material needs of one's fellow men. It is, however, with the material function of the active life that the first book is properly concerned because of the close association between the corporal works of mercy and the satisfaction integral to the penance of self-conversion. The other function, spiritual guidance, is a preoccupation of the second and third books or Part Two of the poem.

In these two books the dominant form of theme is the conversion of others. Each form of theme as it recurs by epimone varies between the preceptive and the paradigmatic mode of statement in accordance with the commonplace of pastoral theology that distinguishes two modes of preaching, one by precept, the other by example. When, however, in the course of the second and third books Bernard states the theme in his own person, he is not merely seeking the more forceful emphasis of the paradigmatic statement. He is at once signalizing and justifying his function as poet in the *De contemptu mundi.* As a monk, Bernard was dedicated to the contemplative life. It is rather as a poet, a poetic exemplar, that he becomes a preacher, invading the active life and assuming the agency of zeal. By the compassion with which he laments, by the mordancy with which he reproves the sinners of this world, he exhibits the zeal of charity and the zeal of rectitude, the grace of mercy and the rigor of justice, to the leaders of the world, secular and spiritual, who have become apostate to their duty. As a Christian moralist, Bernard is bound by more stringent conditions than were the pagan satirists. He is withheld from personal satire by divine as well as human sanctions. He can publicly castigate only the public sinner. He must hate sin, yet love the man that sins. The ancient *censura cachinni* becomes less facile, the satirical tear wells up from a far more terrible source in a man for whom only the final doom can mark the transition from the time of trembling when the just still unsure of their own salvation look at the reprobate and grieve to the time of exultation when the just secure at last look down at the reprobate and mock.[6]

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[4] For *sincategoreumata*, see Matthew of Vendôme *Ars versificatoria* II.46 in *Les arts poétiques du XII^e^ et du XIII^e^ siècle*, ed. Edmond Faral (Paris, 1924), p. 167.

[5] *On the Sublime* XIX-XX.

The development or dilatation of the theme in this genre has recourse traditionally to three major topics which may be termed the three commonplaces of the *contemptus mundi.* These are: the misery or vanity of the human condition — the *mala poenae* — the ills that men suffer; iniquity or the *mala culpae,* the evils that men do; and the final doom. Such is the sequence in which Innocent pursues these topics — a climactic order that respects both magnitude and chronology. Innocent, beginning with conception and ending in eternity, may therefore be said to have followed the *ordo naturalis,* the order of time.

Bernard, on the contrary, has begun with the end. As if in pursuance of the Biblical injunction *memorare novissima tua,* his poem like the liturgical year commences with the final doom. The poem then proceeds in Book One to the topic misery and in Books Two and Three, the second part of the poem, to the commonplace iniquity. Thus Bernard has adopted an *ordo artificialis,* the *σύντομος τάξις* or concise order, the method of which is to proceed at once to the critical elements. Such an order is predicated for the poem by the very concision of its reference. The poem is quite as definite in its reference as the prose of Innocent is indefinite and uncircumscribed. In the prose discourse the present refers to humanity living in any period without restriction of time; the afterlife ranges diffusely from the death of the body to the resurrection, the final judgment, and beyond. For Bernard the present is no more than his immediate generation; the future is the immediate doom. Misery and iniquity are signs and portents and not as for Innocent mere anagogical types of the eternal doom. As signs they must according to the syntomic taxis be disposed after, not before, the doom they portend.[7] Because this doom is conceived to be so imminent, the poem is not concerned with the purgatorial interim between bodily death and resurrection.

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[6] Bernard II.392, 540. Juvenal X.28-53. Gregory *Mor.* XIII.7; XVI.18. Augustine *De civitate Dei* XIV.6. Citations from Augustine are to the *Corpus Christianorum, series Latina,* Vols, 47, 48.

The choice of the syntomic taxis as the order of the whole affects the internal disposition of the first part. The signs and portents proper to the second coming of Christ, which in the natural order should begin the sequence of Book One, are displaced to the end where they provide a transition between the dilatation of misery and that of iniquity. The poem begins, then, with the advent itself (I. 1-38), in dwelling by epimone upon the imminence of which the poet ominously draws together the future life and the present. These he no less ominously removes from each other by recurring to the differences that set them apart. The second coming of Christ divides one era from the other, the acceptable time from the time of retribution. For the good this advent means the end of the time of trembling and the beginning of the time of exultation.[8] For the reprobate inversely it marks the end of the time of exultation and the commencement of the time of bitterness.[9] The second advent is accompanied by the second and bodily resurrection, which plunges the reprobate to eternal damnation but raises the elect to eternal life because they have participated with Christ in the first and spiritual resurrection, passing in the present world, in the acceptable time, from the death of sin to the life of grace.[10] A corollary of the first resurrection is the simplicity with which the journey of this present life is to be pursued; the faith that vivifies in the first resurrection expresses itself in a love of God and neighbor unmixed with the impure love of self or world.[11] The reprobate, however, are drunk — confused by a love of this world that renders them stuporous with the sleep of insensibility; the elect are sober, mounting their single-minded watch for the morning in this present world of night, the interior darkness of which foreshadows the exterior darkness of the second death.[12] These are the concepts reflected in the thematic injunctions 'vigilemus,' 'surgat homo reus,' 'surgite, currite simplice tramite.'

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[7] The syntomic taxis — the order of concision — and the peribolic taxis — the order of amplitude — both employ inversion or transposition of sequence. That Bernard is using the syntomic rather than peribolic order in the disposition of his poem may be illustrated thus:

The meaning of the poem is expressed summarily in the verse that is the first and last line of Book I: "Hora novissima, tempora pessima sunt, vigilemus!" If the connectives are supplied that Bernard in his syntomic or concise stylistic has omitted, the line can be read thus: Tempora pessima sunt; ergo hora novissima est; ergo vigilemus! The first member of this revised verse refers to the two commonplaces misery (*mala poenae*) and iniquity (*mala culpae*). Because both topics are represented by the poet as having now attained their zenith, they are designated by the superlative of "mala," namely, "pessima." But the very circumstance that misery and iniquity are now so extreme is a reason confirming the conjectural thesis or statement of fact expressed in the second member, "ergo hora novissima est." This second member, which refers to the commonplace doom, becomes in turn a reason confirming the deliberative thesis or statement of policy expressed in the third member, "ergo vigilemus!" This member refers metaphorically to the theme of the poem, conversion to God.

If Bernard in the taxis of his poem had followed the order exhibited in this revision of his verse, if, in other words, he had elaborated first the commonplaces misery and iniquity, then the commonplace doom, and lastly the theme conversion, he could be said to have been following either the natural order, if the sequence is analyzed chronologically, or, if dialectically, the peribolic taxis, since this taxis proceeds from the elaboration of the reasons to the thesis. But Bernard, manifesting in the taxis of his poem the syntomic preoccupation with comprehensibility, has proceeded first to the thesis or issue of the argument as in syntomic narrative the author hurries toward the event.

The contrasting orders may be schematized thus:

Peribolic: misery-iniquity (reasons) > doom (thesis)
doom (reason) > conversion (thesis)
Syntomic: conversion (thesis) > doom (reason)
doom (thesis) > misery-iniquity (reasons).

See Hermogenes *Opera*, ed. H. Rabe (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 282-284; also my "*Beowulf:* A Study in Dilatation," *PMLA*, LXX (September 1955), 825-830.

The second coming presents Christ to the eyes of men in the same form as the first — *in forma servi*.[13] He comes to judge justly in the same flesh in which He came to be judged unjustly.[14] As He is the paradox man-God, He is the paradox *conscius testis et judex*.[15] But the contemned lamp of the first coming — the light that burned for forgiveness — is in the second coming the light that burns for punishment.[16] Although the substance of God is one and immutable, the aspect of the Judge is dual. He is the paradox lion-lamb, appearing mild to the elect and terrible to the reprobate, who project into His countenance the terror that their guilt evokes within themselves.[17] This final judgment is public, making manifest in eternity the daily hidden judgments in which God has been engaged throughout time.[18] The elect and reprobate, intermingled in the temporal church, are publicly and irrevocably separated; from the congregation of the elect the rapine of Satan and the corruption of the unregenerate are removed.[19] Since — according to the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, which Bernard is amplifying here — the Judge will then reject the proud lovers of world and self who in the time of mercy spurned the works of mercy but will graciously receive those whose faith has shown its life in such works, Bernard exhorts to almsgiving, "Detur egentibus"; and so that these mere necessities of temporal nature may be given in the proper spirit of humility to the poor, who, returning infinitely more, will become the patrons and advocates of their benefactors on the last day, he adds, "alta parantibus ima parentur."[20] Since, however, the works of justice must precede the works of mercy if man is not in confusion to give his goods to God and neighbor but himself to sin, the poet prefaces this thematic injunction with another — "omnia fluxa laventur" — an exhortation once again to repentant self-conversion.[21] If such exhortations are phrased in baptismal terms, it is because Bernard conceived of penance as a second baptism which renews the conversion of self to God first achieved in baptism.[22]

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[8] I.3 *mala*, Gregory *Mor.* IX.96; Bernard of Clairvaux *In dedicatione ecclesiae* IV.4 (*PL* 183, 528); Robert de Basevorn *Forma praedicandi* xlvii in *Artes praedicandi*, ed. Th.-M. Charland, O. P. (Ottawa, 1936), p. 307. I.4 *anxia liberet*, Gregory *Mor.* IV. 71, XVI. 18. I.5 *pondera mentis onustae*, Gregory *Mor.* IV.68, VIII.13, XXI.8.

[9] Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* II.8.

[10] Augustine *De civ. Dei* XX.6.

[11] I.9 *currite*, Gregory *Homiliae in Ezechielem* I.ix.34. I.9 *simplice*, Gregory *Mor.* I.36, X.48, XIII.29. For pure self love see Gregory *Mor.* XIX.38.

[12] Gregory *Mor.* XXV.22, *Hom. in Ez.* I.ix.34. I.1 *vigilemus*, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XIII.3. I.32 *ebria*, Gregory *Mor.* XXXIII.66.

[13] Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XIII.4, *Mor.* XXXI.102.

[14] Augustine *De civ. Dei* XX.6, 24, 30.

[15] Gregory *Mor.* IX.35, XIII.27-28, *Hom. in Ev.* XII.3.

[16] Gregory *Mor.* X.53-54.

These topics — the imminence of the second advent, the transition from the acceptable to the retributive time, the segregation of the damned, the dual aspect of Christ, "alter at idem," coming to judge *in forma servi*, the contrast between His patience now and inexorable rigor then, between the labyrinthine obscurity of divine justice in the present time of trembling and its patency on the day of judgment — are resumed by epimone in a second passage on the advent (I.393-476), which serves to introduce an account of eternal damnation just as the first passage is prefatory to an exposition of eternal beatitude.[23] Since the context of the second passage is more proper to the *contemptus mundi*, the resumed topics are dwelt upon with greater dilatation than before, and since the poem is now addressed to the unrepentant, the thematic injunctions are here expressed in more vehement forms — in the rhetorical question and the ironic imperative. In these apostrophes, the poet refers to the confusion of the insensible and obdurate sinners whom worldly prudence has made apostate from the will of divine providence and to the duplicity of scandalous Christians who profess the faith but manifest in their actions and in their enmity toward virtue their love of world and self.[24] In the paradoxical "percute sana" Bernard exhorts the insensible to soften their obduracy with the strokes of contrition and to heal the wounds of sin with the blows of penance. He calls upon the scandalous to uncover in confession their hidden sins, which otherwise will be uncovered in the public judgment by Christ, who will spare then only those sins that have been covered by penance now.[25] Into this complex imagery of the covering and uncovering of sin, Bernard weaves an allusion to Lazarus, whose resuscitation was tropologically interpreted by medieval exegetes to illustrate the prevenience of divine grace in the order of penance.[26] This topic of divine grace, to which Bernard recurs overtly while expatiating on the mystery of God's judgments, will, in the contrast that its gratuitousness offers to the venality of human favor, become one of the most significant *loci* in the development of the poem.[27]

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[17] Gregory *Mor.* XXXII.9.

[18] I.13-14 *fideliter expositurus / Quae dabit aut dedit*, Augustine *De civ. Dei* XX.2.41-50.

[19] I.27 *renovabitur*, Augustine *De civ. Dei* XX.25.28-32. I.28 *novus*, Augustine *De civ. Dei* XX.10.8-13, XX.6.73-82; Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.x.9-10. I.28 *albus ab atro*, Gregory *Mor.* XXXIII. 29. I.30 *tyrannis*, Gregory *Mor.* XII.42-43.

[20] Gregory *Mor.* XXI.29-30, *Hom. in Ev.* XL.10.

[21] Gregory *Mor.* XIX.38; cf. Augustine *De civ. Dei* XV.7.38.

[22] Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* X.7; Bernard of Clairvaux *In octava Paschae* I.7 (*PL* 183, 295). I.11 *vacat*, Gregory *Mor.* IX.104.

[23] I.419 *sustinet*, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* X.7. I.445 *abyssus*, Gregory *Mor.* XXIX.57. I.455 *ovili*, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XIV.3. I.473, Gregory *Mor.* XXVII.54. I.474, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* II.8.

To sustain the terror requisite to an exhortation of the unrepentant, Bernard in the second passage dwells by epimone on the cosmic precursors of the second coming and anticipates by a single reference (I.415) to the judicial fire of eternal damnation the topic next to be dilated in the sequence of the poem. There is in this second passage another single reference — emphatic by its uniqueness — to a quite different fire,the purifying fire of the ultimate conflagration, which, since it relates to the eternal disposition not of the damned but exclusively of the elect, is properly amplified in the first passage.[28]

It seems to have been the opinion of Bernard, as it was of Augustine, that when in the last judgment the Proud City will be separated from the Humble City, the spiritually inert, who love only themselves, will sink to an eternal fire in depths no human being knows; the benign, who love even their enemies, will be rapt up into the higher reaches of the heavens while below them the earth, the works that are in it, and the lower reaches of the heavens, once the realm of storm, will be renovated by a transient fire of purification to become their eternal abode.[29] This will be the supreme change, superseding with an eternal fixity all those vicissitudes of this temporal world which are but types of that last vicissitude.[30]

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[24] I.393 *impia*, Gregory *Mor.* XVIII.12; this verse exemplifies the thought-word-deed *locus* common in Bernard. I.395 *gramina dura*, Gregory *Mor.* XXI.7. I.399 *retro ceditis*, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.ix.4-6. I.400, Gregory *Mor.* XX.40. I.403 *phrenetica*, Gregory *Mor.* VI.26; *quo properatis*, cf. Eccles. 9:10.

[25] I.412 *Vulnera detege flendoque contege*, Gregory *Mor.* IV. 27, VIII.36-37; *percute*, Gregory *Mor.* XXIII.40. I.414 *tergere*, Gregory *Mor.* XXV.22; *tergere* and *flere* are synonymous.

[26] I.411, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XXVI.6.

[27] I.450, *punctuate* et — tibi gratia — quisque; cf. I.457.

[28] I.33-38, 461-462, Augustine *De civ. Dei* XX.16.

The dilatation of the eternal rewards (I. 39-392) and punishments (I. 477-718), to which these sections on the advent are prefatory, comprises more than half of Part One. By dwelling first upon the bliss of the elect, Bernard inverts the usual sequence.[31] If this poem were a homily, the author, seeking first to convert sinners with terror and then to console the penitent with hope, might well treat the miseries of the damned before the joys of the elect. But Bernard, working in the genre of the *contemptus mundi*, is not concerned with the dual function of the preacher. This function the *contemptus mundi* splits with its complementary genre, the literature of the dignity of man. Preoccupied not with fortifying those whom repentance has humbled but with striking terror into the unrepentant, Bernard chose the inverted sequence because it is the more emphatic. No perceptive contemporary would have missed the significance of a disposition which thus draws closer together the passage on the damned and the topic of Part Two, iniquity, while removing that topic as far as practicable from the passage on beatitude.

The long passage on the blest (I. 39-392) conforms in both choice and arrangement of topics to the climactic formulation of beatitude with which Augustine closes *The City of God*: "Ibi vacabimus et videbimus, videbimus et amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus." The elaboration does not progress in syntomic fashion by discrete grades any more than the *schema* itself of the Augustinian formulation; rather the dilatation of any one topic may, after the peribolic method, be interrupted for the anticipation or resumption of any other.[32]

The elaboration begins (I.39-50) with topic one, the rest that the elect will enjoy in their deliverance from the primeval curse of death and toil (I. 45-46), from the misery of this world (I. 40c-41b), and from the iniquity abounding in its last epoch (I.44), when Babylon steeps the reprobate in the wine of her wrath (I.41c, 42c) and lusts, ventral and sub-ventral (I. 42a-b).[33] In keeping with this deliverance, the physical universe is to be freed from the necessity of cyclical movement; motion is supplanted by fixity (I.49-50). The sky, purged of tempest, is adapted in its new serenity to that perfect clearness with which the blest will see (I. 47-48). Thus in the elaboration of the first topic the second (I.51-108), the vision of the blest, is anticipated.

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[29] Augustine *De civ. Dei* XIV.13, XX.14, 16, 18, 24-26; Gregory *Mor.* VIII.2, *Hom. in Ez.* II.i.6.

[30] Gregory *Mor.* XVII.11.

[31] Gregory *Mor.* XXVII.22.

[32] For *peribole* see my "*Beowulf*: A Study in Dilatation," *PMLA*, LXX (September 1955), 825-830, 834.

[33] Rev. 14:8, 22:3; Augustine *De civ. Dei* XX.8.111-115.

In the divine light of this beatific vision the blest are transformed. Because in the second resurrection the spiritualized bodies of the elect are restored to their souls, the stars, symbolizing the abode of the blessed souls before this resurrection and representing metonymically in this context of the poem the elect themselves, are said to receive a double light (I.52). Since Matthew had written that the blest will shine as the sun — a sun construed after Isaiah to shine with sevenfold light — medieval exegetes had educed fourteen beatitudes, seven pertaining to the body and seven to the soul.[34] Perhaps because the resurrection of the body rather than the immortality of the soul had been from antiquity the stumbling block in Christian eschatology, Bernard lists only the seven physical gifts, amplifying them with examples like Caesar, the exemplar after Pliny of *libertas*.[35] The spiritual gifts, although implied in the dilatation, do not serve as structural *loci*.

The divine light, rendering the bodies luminously clear, enables the blest to see in one another the inward sins hidden in the acceptable time not by hypocrisy but with repentance.[36] They see with immunity the punishment of the damned, who envy (*invidere*) the glory that they will never see (*videre*).[37] To these kinds of vision the elect respond no longer as in the time of trembling with shame or anxiety for themselves or with compassion for the wicked.[38] Rather in this time of exultation the blest praise God for His gratuitous mercies toward them and His merited justice toward the reprobate.[39]

With these sentiments the poet anticipates the fourth topic, the praise of God, while dilating the second. The fourth topic is anticipated also in the statements of theme interspersed throughout the elaboration of the second topic. In these statements the poet reverts to such earlier thematic motifs as the first resurrection of the spiritually sober, no longer asleep in the stupor of sin (I.63b; cf. 73a, 107b), and the race or quest in this life for our spiritual abode in the next.[40] In the precepts "praefer honesta" (I.101c) and "confer eis, ea nil fore terrea gaudia cernis" (I.68), he adverts to the notion of order, a notion essential to the concept of peace that will recur throughout the poem. The motif of peace and that of the spiritual abode, the journey's end, however, are both germane to the first topic, rest. It is rather by dwelling on joy, the adjunct of praise, that the poet anticipates the fourth topic in these thematic statements, opposing the joy of the blest to the joy of vanity (I.64), to the misery of this life (I.53a, 70b-c, 102), and to the misery of Hell (I.87-100) and amplifying this motif with the *parabole* of the robber derived perhaps from the example of the thief crucified with Christ.[41] Yet even the allusions to the misery of this world are not quite irrelevant to the elaboration of the second topic, since the eyes that now weep will someday see God.

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[34] I.52-53, Isa. 30:26; Matt. 13:43; Adamus Scotus *De tripartito tabernaculo* xcvii (*PL* 198, 703); Guigo Carthusiensis *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei* III. 1-28 (*PL* 184, 353-363). I.52b tibi *for* ibi.

[35] I.54b-62, Pliny *Natural History* VII. xxv. 91-92.

[36] I.71-81, Gregory *Mor.* XVIII. 77-78, 81.

[37] I.87-100, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XL.2, 8. I.95 *albus ab atro*, Gregory *Mor.* XXXIII.29.

[38] Gregory *Mor.* VI.48, XVI.18, XXXIV. 37-39; Augustine *De civ. Dei* XXI.24.

[39] Gregory *Mor.* IV.72.

[40] I.62-63, 100a, Isa. 55:6.

In the parabole of the robber Bernard alludes to the motif of power, which he explicitly links with the second topic, vision, and its adjunct, knowledge, in the promise "illa videbimus, illa tenebimus, illa sciemus / gaudia coelica" (I.69-70a) and in the *antonomasia* for Christ "sapientia sive potentia patria" with which he paraphrases the scriptural formula for the passage from Church Militant to Church Triumphant, from journey to journey's end.[42] To this link he recurs implicitly in the apostrophe to his voice, the organ of prayer and praise, which in assuming the active life of the preacher is imitating herebelow the evangelical function of the angels, with whom it will be associated hereafter in the perfected life of contemplation (I.82-86). This apostrophe, even more subtly than the thematic references to joy, anticipates the fourth topic, praise. Meanwhile such thematic precepts as "lubrica reprime (I.101b) and "fletibus angere" (I.102a) anticipate the third topic, love, which answers to the concupiscible soul as vision with its adjunct knowledge answers to the rational and praise with its adjunct joy to the irascible.[43] These precepts enjoin the elect to curb their desire here so that it may be satisfied in the divine plenitude hereafter. Rest, vision, and love — the first, second, and third topics — commingle in the promise "flendo merebere coelica festa, / luce replebere jam sine vespere, jam sine luna" (I.102b-103). The ensuing antithesis "solvet aenigmata veraque Sabbata continuabit" (I.108) provides a transition from the dilatation of the second topic to a resumption of the first.[44]

The blest repose in peace and freedom: these are the two adjuncts of rest upon which Bernard dwells in resuming the first topic (I.109-158). The blest are no longer slaves — either unwilling slaves to the apostate spirits (I.109) or merely faithful servants to God (I. 114, 117b).[45] They are citizens of the divine commonwealth (I.112a, 114, 130a, 141) and adoptive sons of the Father (I.151b). Full of every good, they are devoid of every evil. They have been separated from the reprobate, from iniquity (I.118c, 119a), and from the dual heritage of vanity, the proneness to sin (I. 128a, 129a) and the tribulation of sin (I.120a, 128, 129b, 132b). The thorns of the primeval curse have given way to the flowers of paradise. No longer is the path of the elect beset with misery or iniquity; rather they walk at large amid the sweet savor of their good works, which done by the grace of God herebelow follow them hereafter.[46] Now that their bodies have been restored to the souls of the blest, their gratuitous redemption is complete (I.126a, 127a). The complement of the divine society is full since the gap left by the apostate angels is now filled by the blessed meek.[47]

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[41] I.65-68, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* II.8; Guigo *Ep. ad frat.* III.1, 16 (*PL* 184, 353, 361). For *parabole* and *exemplum* see Quintilian *Institutio oratoria* V. xi. 1.

[42] I.105-106a, I Cor. 15:24.

[43] Bernard of Clairvaux *In Festo Omnium Sanctorum* IV. 5 (*PL* 183, 474).

[44] I.108 *aenigmata*, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.iii.13, *Mor.* XVIII. 90.

[45] I.109 *dominantibus*, Gregory *Mor.* IV. 42, 71.

The elaboration of the adjunct peace presupposes on the one hand the Augustinian definition of peace as the tranquillity of order and on the other a conceptualization of history enunciated, for example, by Bernard of Clairvaux in which the Christian era is divided into four periods: the first, when the Church was attacked from without by the secular powers; the second, when the Church was attacked from within by the heresiarchs; the third, the contemporaneous epoch, when the Church, free from such attack, was ostensibly at peace; and the fourth, the tribulation of Antichrist.[48] The contemporaneous *pax Christiana* was envisioned, however, as an illusory peace, a peace without peace and order without order, a peace already yielding to the final onslaught of Antichrist, since it was rent by the schismatics, who professed the faith of the Church but rejected its authority, and by the hypocrites — the "scandala" — who felt constrained by the universal dominion of the Church to profess a faith which they contradicted in the apostasy of their thoughts and in the waywardness of their actions (I.129c, 131). They are therefore excluded by the poet from the peace of the blest, unitary in concordant diversity of its rewards, the "pax in idipsum" to which only the immaculate are admitted, in whose mouth there is no lie, in whose heart no apostasy of pride, in whose action only the constancy of order.[49] The peace of God is opposed to the strife and wrath of Babylon (I.111c, 118a, 119c, 128a, 129c, 131a, 132a); the tranquillity of His order, to the confusion for which the very name Babylon itself stands (I. 111b, 118b, 119b, 120b-c).

In the citadel of the new Zion (I.132c), then, the strong soldier whose leader is Christ will find rest from the warfare of this life (I.109a, 142a, 151c, 154a); the faithful servant whose Redeemer is Christ, from the servitude of the primeval curse (I.109b, 152, 154b-c). The active life, enjoined upon this life but ending with it, is superseded there by the contemplative, voluntary in this life, perfect only in the new Jerusalem.[50] The elect, traversing the way in this life to the fatherland in the next, are prefigured by the Hebrew, crossing, as his name suggests, from the bondage of Egypt, the land of darkness, toward the promised land, which like the garden of Eden merely foreshadows the fatherland of light.[51] The perpetual Sabbath which the elect will enjoy there in the contemplation of the one God is symbolized numerologically by the fiftieth year ($7\times7+1$), the year of jubilee consecrated to rest in Leviticus.[52]

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[46] I.113b-c, 125, 155-158a, Gregory *Mor.* XX. 76; Bernard of Clairvaux *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum* XLVIII. 1-2 (*PL* 183, 1012-1013); Rev. 14:13.

[47] I.112, 149b-150a, Gregory *Mor.* XXV.21, XXXI.99.

[48] Augustine *De civ. Dei* XIX.13; Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* XXXIII.14-16 (*PL* 183, 958-959).

[49] I.121-123, 130, 153a, Gregory, *Mor.* IV.70; Rev. 14:5.

In this resumption of the first topic, the poet, it will be noticed, recurs frequently to the second topic (I.111a, 113a, 113c, 153b-c) and once even to its adjuncts power and knowledge.[53] This commingling of topics determines the choice of names: "Ebraeus," *transiens*; "Israhelitus," *videns Deum;* "Sion," *speculatio;* "Jerusalem," *visio pacis*.[54] But this vision of peace is, according to theological commonplace, the refection of the blest (I.127b, 133-134), who will be filled with light.[55] Christ, seen then *in suo decore*, in divine form, not in the mere *forma servi*, the human form of the first and second advent, will replenish them with His love.[56] While they rest and see, they will see and love. Thus Bernard interposes in the resumption of the first topic — already interspersed with allusions to the second — the elaboration of the third (I.127b, 133-140, 143-147, 155-156).

The topic love has for its adjunct the refection by which the appetite of the loving or concupiscible part of the soul is filled. This appetite achieves fruition only in the life hereafter and then only because the elect, unlike the unworthy, do not use God or other men now so that they may enjoy the goods of this world, but rather use these transitory goods in this time of faith and hope so that they may enjoy God when charity is perfected in eternity.[57] This fruition is symbolized by the Apocalyptic marriage feast of the Lamb prefigured in the Gospel parable of the marriage feast. In Bernard's accomodation of this parable the wedding garment is replaced by a net from the Gospel parable of the net. The image of the net, in turn, is accomodated to suggest the recurring motif of peace. The net is imagined to be whole for the meek, who by obeying God have kept their integrity — whose flesh has remained subject to their souls because their souls have stayed subject to God; it is torn for the reprobate, who has lost his oneness in the apostasy of pride. Peace, likewise, is envisioned by the poet within the concupiscible part of the blest soul itself. There hunger and satiety are no longer irreconcilable opposites; neither is hunger beset with anxious desire, nor satiety with surfeit.[58] This tranquillity of order Bernard extends to the irascible soul as well and thus if only implicitly contrasts the water of life (cf. I.139c) perfecting the blest to the wine of wrath and fornication (I.131a, 134b-c) with which Babylon deranges and debauches the wicked now and the cup of His wrath (I.148a) with which God punishes them forever.

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[50] I.120, 135-136, 150b-c, 156b, Gregory, *Hom. in Ez.* I.iii.9-10, *Mor.* VI. 61. I.135 *ambulat*, Gregory *Mor.* XXXI, 102; *utitur, ergo fruetur*, Gregory, *Mor.* II.15, Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XV.7.46. I.150b-c, Gregory, *Mor.* XX.69.

[51] Gregory, *Mor.* XXVI. 21; Bernard of Clairvaux *In Festo Omnium Sanctorum* V. 11 (*PL* 183, 482).

[52] Gregory, *Mor.* XXXV. 16, *Hom. in Ez.* II.v.15.

[53] I.115-116, Gregory, *Mor.* VI.53.

[54] Gregory, *Hom. in Ez.* I.iii.11, II.ix.10; Bernard of Clairvaux, *In Festo Omnium Sanctorum* V.11 (*PL* 183, 482).

[55] I.103a, 153c, Gregory, *Mor.* XXXI.99-100.

[56] I.137, Gregory *Mor.* XXXI.102.

[57] Gregory *Mor.* II.15.

The life of the blest is represented as a perpetual spring following the harvest of the last judgment.[59] In this harvest the reprobate are gathered and burnt like weeds sown by the devil. The elect, sown by Christ, are gathered to God.[60] While good seed, the elect are also good sowers, who reap life everlasting.[61] Yet the elect are good sowers precisely because they were sown by Christ when He sowed Himself in His incarnation and resurrection. Christ is the flower of the field, the lily of the valley, the "Rex Nazarenus" (I.154), whose birth was appropriately announced at a village named "flower", the lily whom, as St. Bernard wrote, "our earth brought forth to a new blessing" so that new men (I.149), flourishing in His grace (I.157b) and redolent with the fragrance of His virtue, might grow beside the thorns and thistles, the evil men and the ills, of the inveterate curse.[62] In the sweet leisure of eternity, where the blest "expatiate" after walking (cf. I.135) the strait and narrow of this bitter time and where, since there is no evil, there is no fetidness, the blest are suffused with a twofold fragrance, the fragrance of God, who is all virtue, and the fragrance of their own works that follow them and praise them in the gates.[63] Praised by God, they attain to the plenitude of glory, graciously given because they shunned vainglory (I.107a, 127, 146, 151a). Thus loved and praised, they love and praise.[64]

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[58] I.138-140, Gregory *Mor.* XVIII.91.

[59] I.148, 156, Matt. 13:39-42, 49-50.

[60] Matt. 13:37-39.

[61] I. 150b, Gal. 6:8.

[62] Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* LXX.5 (*PL* 183, 1118); Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XXXVIII.7.

[63] I.155-158, Prov. 31:31; Rev. 14:13.

[64] Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux *In Festo Omnium Sanctorum* II-IV, *In dedicatione ecclesiae*

The adjuncts of the fourth topic, praise (I.158-392), are joy and grace. This joy of the blest presupposes the beatific peace, vision, and love in the ineffable enjoyment of which the blest praise God.[65] Because this joy consummates these three rewards of the blest, the poet in his elaboration of this adjunct is induced to return by epimone to the three preceding topics. He dwells once again upon the rest which the elect will enjoy from the two kinds of earthly scandal – the internal scandal within the body of every man that stirs up the flesh against the spirit and the external scandal within the body of the Church Militant afflicted by its false members, the false Christians, who are in truth members of Babylon or Confusion.[66] He recurs to the freedom that the elect will enjoy from the just ills by which man is punished for his sins and the unjust ills by which man sins -- the freedom which as citizens of the New Jerusalem the elect will enjoy in the contemplative life of the vision of peace, emancipated from the bondage of the active life with its obligation to discipline oneself by the works of justice and to succor one's neighbor by the corporal works of mercy.[67] This passage from the present world and its active mode of life to that future world in which the contemplative life is perfected is symbolized by such traditional figures as the change of name from Jacob to Israel and the opposition of Leah and Rachel, Martha and Mary, seed and fruit and by the anagogical interpretation of the angel's announcement to the women at the sepulchre of Christ.[68] The allusions to such penitential works as the works of justice and the corporal works of mercy serve also to remind the reader that the theme of Part One is the conversion of self to God.

The elaboration recurs likewise to the second topic, the beatific vision by which the blest will see and know the truth in the new light of pure day, merely the promise of which the elect now hear and the shadow of which they now see in this night of trembling.[69] At intervals the elaboration reverts to the third topic, love, and the replenishment without satiety or anxiety, the refection

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IV, *Serm. in Cant.* LXX (*PL* 183, 462-475, 526-529, 1116-1121). Because the poem is preoccupied with the imminence of the final judgment, it provides no occasion to dwell upon the state of the souls of the blest before the resurrection of their bodies or to distinguish, like St. Bernard for example, between *pax in idipsum* and *pax Dei* or between *atria* and *domus Dei*, reserving the first term in each pair to the state of the blest souls before resurrection, the second to the state after resurrection.

[65] Cf. Guigo, *Ep. ad frat.* III. 18 (*PL* 184, 362).

[66] Bernard of Clairvaux, *In Festo Sancti Michaelis* II (*PL* 183, 451-454).

[67] I.197 *inutile*, Joseph Knabenbauer S.J., *Commentarius in Librum Job* (Paris, 1886), p. 203: "*inutilis* hebr. proprie *putridus* vel *putrescens*." Cf. I.761, 817. I.268 *dextera Pythagoraea*, refers to the Pythagorean letter, the Greek upsilon, symbolizing the diverse ways of virtue and vice. Cf. II. 760-761.

[68] I.226b-c, Mark 16:7.

[69] I.190b-c, I.189c *spes speciei*, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* II.x.17.

not of mere faith but of perfect vision, to symbolize which the poet accommodates the Pauline distinction of *lac* and *esca* (I.221b-c).

As the joy of the blest consummates their other rewards, so the beatific grace of God consummates the redemptive grace of Christ. The redemptive grace, the "fons patens domus David," is superseded by the beatific grace, the "fons modo rivus," the "patens sinus," when the acceptable time yields to the time of retribution,when the Law fulfilled by the Redeemer is transformed in the consummation of the world to the glorious liberty of the sons of God.[70] Then the beatific grace fills all the elect as God becomes, in the Pauline phrase, "omnia in omnibus" – "omnia," since He gives rest to the hopeful, vision to the faithful, and love to the charitable – "in omnibus," since the reprobate, long suffered within the Church Militant, are excluded from the Church Triumphant.[71] There, although each man is rewarded according to his merit, no envy is felt by the lesser for the greater. Rather joy is at once individual and social, and in each man it is full.[72] Neither do the blest forget the disparity between their merit and their reward, nor will they ever cease in their praise of God to give thanks to the redemptive grace of the Mediator who adjusted that disparity.

The praise of the Redeemer is elaborated antonomastically with reference to His person in the Trinity, to His dual nature as God-man, and to traditional metaphors. Thus He is compared to the golden ring of the Roman knight, construed by Bernard as a symbol of manumission. He is the true morning-star and the rising sun.[73] He is, as in the Johannine formulation, the way by His example and therefore the door or gate through which one goes to God, the truth by His preaching and therefore the doorkeeper or boatman, the life by His reward to the blest and therefore the atrium or the port of the New Jerusalem.[74] He is the paradox of the giver of virtue who is the gift given to virtue, the paradox of the lion who judges the reprobate in the second advent and yet the lamb who was judged by them in the first coming.[75] His redemptive grace is prefigured typologically by the pleasant garden of Eden with its tree of life and fourfold river; anagogically these, like the Promised Land flowing in milk and honey, prefigure the beatific grace of God symbolized in the Apocalypse by the river of the water of life and the tree of life bearing twelve fruits, which Bernard particularizes as the "laurus et insita cedrus hysopo."[76]

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[70] I.230c, Matt. 5:18; Gregory, *Hom. in Ez.* II.viii.20.

[71] Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XVIII. 49, XXII.30.

[72] I.291-296, Gregory, *Mor.* XXXV.46.

[73] I.250c repeats by *interpretatio* I.250a-b.

[74] Bernard of Clairvaux, *In Ascensione Domini* II.6 (*PL* 183, 304); Adamus Scotus, *De tri. tab.* xcvi (*PL* 198, 702-703).

[75] Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XXII. 30.26-27.

[76] Cf. Adamus Scotus, *Sermones* XXVI.7-10 (*PL* 198, 248-251). I.241, laurel is a pagan,

For Bernard as for medieval exegetes, the light and color of jewels and flowers are emblematic of virtue, and since men are virtuous by virtue of Christ, He is the flower by virtue of which the elect flourish in virtue, becoming purple as the violet in the martyrdom of penance, red as the rose in the martyrdom of blood, and white as the lily in the martyrdom of chastity.[77] If the elect are thus, in the Pauline metaphor, the "Dei agricultura," they are also the "Dei aedificatio." Christ is the wall in the protection of which, the precious stone on the foundation of which, the just build themselves as living stones in the erection of the city of God.[78] This edifice is cubicular to symbolize the three theological virtues with which the elect are endowed by divine grace. The blest sing there on the decachord to commemorate their devotion to the decalogue.[79] This timeless city is shoreless because in the new heaven and earth the sea, symbolizing the turbulence of the old world, is no more and yet built upon the safe shore, the perpetuity of eternal quiet prefigured by the beach of the sea of Tiberias upon which the resurrected Christ stood.[80] Of this city, the Church Triumphant, Christ is the spouse in sacramental union as in spiritual union He is the spouse of the just soul.[81] The love of the soul for God expressed in this spiritual union is the principle of the contemplative life.

The dilatation of the fourth and last topic in the long passage on the blest mingles the hymnodic and the thematic. By praising the Church Triumphant the poet adumbrates the praise with which the Church Triumphant will glorify God. He adumbrates the perfect life of contemplation that the Church Triumphant will enjoy in the eternity of praise by exemplifying in his own person and in that of the pious soul and the Church Militant, both betrothed to Christ, the three kinds of limited contemplation granted to the elect in this time of prayer.[82] The first kind, which contemplates the grandeur and immensity of God, initiates the soul on its quest of God, opens the eyes that were spiritually blind, and commences the conversion of the soul from profane love to divine, waking it from the spiritual death of iniquity and disengaging it from the preoccupation with vanity. This conversion is confirmed by the second and third kinds of contemplation. The second, which contemplates

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cedar a scriptural symbol of immortality; hyssop is a scriptural symbol of purity — Gregory *Mor.* VI.56; Bernard of Clairvaux, *In dedicatione ecclesiae* I.4 (*PL* 183, 520).

[77] Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* LXXI.1 (*PL* 183, 1121).

[78] Bede *Explanatio Apocalypsis* xxi (*PL* 93, 194-206).

[79] *PL* 93, 646.

[80] Bede *Expl. Apoc.* xxi (*PL* 93, 194); Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XXIV.2.

[81] Innocent III, *De quadripartita specie nuptiarum* (*PL* 217, 923-924).

[82] Hence I.385-388a. See Adamus Scotus, *De triplici genere contemplationis* (*PL* 198, 795-842).

the justice of God and the awesomeness of reprobation, is intended to deter the soul thus initiated from presuming too confidently upon its election. It induces the soul to discipline itself by the works of justice, to judge itself now so that it may not be judged adversely in the judgment of God, to wash away its sins in the second baptism of penance, to hide them from the omnipresent eye of God not with the hypocrisy of the proud but with the tears of the humble, and to stand fast against the flesh with its false ardors, the world with its benumbing cares, and the Devil, whose victory makes wicked men fear physical death.[83] The third kind contemplates the mercy of God and the grace of election, serving to counteract with hope that spiritual pusillanimity which might otherwise succumb to despair, evoking in the virtuous soul the solace of expectation and the tedium of life.

The elaboration of the rewards bestowed gratuitously upon the blest is followed by the second passage on the second advent (I.393-476), which repeats by epimone the first passage on the second coming. Both these passages are prefatory — the first to the elaboration of the gratuitous rewards, the second to the dilatation of the punishments justly imposed upon the damned in hell. Because the misery of the damned is prefigured anagogically by the misery that characterizes the vanity of this world, the poet will place after his elaboration of the eternal misery a dilatation of the commonplace vanity and the temporal misery that it entails.[84]

To this temporal misery the poet has already referred in a contrast (I.387-388) placed toward the close of the paradigmatic statements of theme with which he concludes his elaboration of the beatific rewards. In this contrast Bernard, adverting to the primary sense of *miser*, opposes to the reprobate bereft of spiritual sight even in the present world the elect endowed in the Church Militant with access, though limited, to the contemplation of God. This motif of spiritual blindness is resumed by epimone in the ensuing passage on the second advent. Here Bernard, as if to dissociate himself from the reprobate, reverts to the preceptive statement of theme, exhorting the lapsed to rise with Christ once again — in repentance as they had in baptism — lest in the resurrection of the body they die the death of the spirit, to return to the order with which the city of God journeys now toward the vision of peace, to avoid the confusion with which the rout of Babylon hastens toward hell. He apostrophizes the sinful as rocks and weeds — the defectors and hypocrites of the Gospel parables — thus effecting by reversion an implicit contrast with the jewels and flowers that symbolize the elect and subtly anticipating two *loci* of subsequent importance, the very real tribulation portending Antichrist that incites such defection and the illusory peace of Christendom that fosters such hypocrisy.[85] He addresses those who love vanity more than God as Jews forsaking manna for Pharaoh and as the mad protagonists of ancient pagan tragedy. After confronting the proud at length with the rigor of divine justice and the awesome mystery of divine election, he turns to the elaboration of hell (I.477-718).

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[83] I.363-364, "lue pectoris intro" is to be related to "carne, libidine," i.e., "carnis libidine;" "foris hoste" with "morte, timore," i.e., "mortis timore" (Gregory, *Mor.* VI. 49); and "labore" with "frigore, grandine."

[84] Guigo *Ep. ad frat.* III. 1 (*PL* 184, 353).

The punishment of the damned is elaborated antilogically to the remuneration of the blest.[86] The damned do not rest or see or love or praise. Joyless and graceless, hell abounds not with the water of life but with the ferment of the second death. There the cup of divine wrath boils like a pot for those who have preferred the pit of damnation to the bosom of grace.[87] The reprobate are suffused not with that fragrance which symbolizes the glory of virtue but rather by the fetidness or infamy of sin. They are filled not with love but with horror; they are not fed with love, they are fed upon by torment. While denied the vision of God, they are exposed to the vision of Satan. In the gloom of the second death they remember their past sins and see revealed before all the sins of one another. These visions and memories, unlike those of the blest, serve to remind the damned not of God's mercy but rather of His rigorous justice. The blest are granted the perfect repose of the just when time yields to eternity and the preordained number of the elect is complete. But when at that same end of time the number of the reprobate is likewise complete (I. 477-478), they are fixed in a perpetual agitation symbolized by the image of incessant passage between snow and fire accommodated from Job. The lost are denied that tranquillity of order essential to peace. The very properties of hell seem to be at strife with themselves. There death sustains while it kills. Horror does not erect but deject (I.600b, 623b). Heat does not mitigate cold nor cold heat. Heat is cold, and cold is hot. Fire is water, and its flames burn but cast no light to dispel the shadows of the second death. In this sense hell may be said to have no order, and the poet, as if to emphasize its confusion by his tactical form, has not only not developed its punishments in the discrete fashion of the syntomic method, he has even abandoned the climactic formulation with which he arranged the rewards of the blest in favor of the quite confused disposition (σύγχυσις) of extreme peribole.[88]

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[85] Matt. 13:20-21, 38-41.

[86] For the elaboration of hell see Gregory, *Mor.* IX.95-104, *Hom. in Ev.* XXXVIII.13.

[87] I.291 *patens sinus*; I.637 *puteus patet.*

[88] For *synchysis* see my "*Beowulf:* A Study in Dilatation," *PMLA*, LXX (September 1955), 834.

If confusion reigns in hell, divine order governs none the less, and therefore Bernard, while opposing the punishments of the damned to the rewards of the blest, relates these punishments analogically to the iniquity by which they were deserved. The sins of the reprobate prefigure anagogically their eternal torments.[89] This anagogy requires that men who choose confusion in the acceptable time should be requited with confusion in eternity, that those who abound in iniquity here should abound in misery hereafter, that those who put their wills before and above the divine will should be crucified head downward, face backward, that those who pray without feeling or cherish a secret pride in the time of patience should repent unavailingly in the time of retribution,[90] that false Christians — symbolized by the scriptural image of the fruitless tree — whose professed faith does not live in works, should perish in the second death, that those who love world and flesh (I.515) too much to rise with Christ in the first and spiritual resurrection should after the second and bodily resurrection sink into the second death, that sinners who choose not to convert themselves from inner darkness to the light of eternal life before the first death should be separated in the outer darkness from that light by the shadow of the second death, that the damned should suffer in mutual sorrow with those whom they loved here more than Christ as the blest rejoice in communal joy with those whom they loved here in Christ, and that, as in the next world there are grades of bliss reserved for the blest, in hell like sinners, bound in the metaphorical bundles of Scripture, should be consigned to like punishment.

In these references to sin the poet anticipates the commonplace of Part Two and the threefold division of iniquity which there prevails. This division, stemming from a passage in the First Epistle of St. John (2:15-18) which may be called the text of the *contemptus mundi*, ascribes iniquity to the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life. Pride has for its obverse spiritual inertia, since in the paradox of pride exaltation is ruin and the human will that lifts itself in selfish ardor against God falls from God by that very apostasy into the torpor of sin.[91] From pride as the beginning of sin derive the lusts of the eyes and of the flesh. The lust of the flesh comprises the sins of the body; the lust of the eyes, the sins of the spirit, such as avarice with its violence and fraud or the inordinate pretension of the human intellect. It is with respect to such pretension that the poet, like Augustine and Gregory, disparages the pagan notion of the afterlife, opposing to the fanciful netherworld of ancient poets and philosophers with its transient purgation, bodiless personifications, and phantoms the hell of Christian revelation and citing for his conception of a hell that is beyond human experience the more than human authority of Job, the Psalms, and Christ.[92] The poet, accordingly, insists upon the eternal duration of hell, the penal function of its torments, and their dual nature. Damnation must be everlasting if the co-principle of eternal salvation is to obtain.[93] The damned must suffer punishment rather than purgation since they share the doom of Satan. Consumed by the worm of conscience, they must suffer as they sinned, spiritually and physically — their souls, in which the lust of the eyes had extinguished spiritual fervor, frozen by an eternal cold that makes the teeth gnash, their bodies, once burning with the lust of the flesh, now burnt by an eternal fire the smoke of which blears with endless weeping the eyes that would not see.[94] Thus in the paradoxical image of the "crux sine stipite" the poet is referring not to the insubstantiality but to the perpetuity of a torment that without ever being consumed forever consumes the damned. These are the members of the false Lucifer, symbolized by the Assur of Ezekiel, the archetype of pride. They are the citizens of the city of Confusion, symbolized by Jezebel and the Apocalyptic figure of the harlot Babylon. Her lilies and her glitter, emblems of vainglory, suggest implicitly the contradistinctive lilies and jewels of Jerusalem, the city of divine order and bride of the true Lucifer. The cup of Babylon, brimming with the wine of wrath and fornication, represents the iniquity that will abound in the last days when charity grows cold.

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[89] Wisd. 11:17.

[90] I.586a, 623a, Gregory *Mor.* XXXIV.48: "laudes suas tacitus clamat."

[91] Augustine *De civ. Dei* XIV.13.

The Johannine division of iniquity is sustained in the figure of the nameless paradox, the "dives egenus," which, anticipated in a verse at the beginning (I.486), dominates the conclusion of the passage on hell.[95] The opposition between the meek city of God and the proud city of man, which had remained implicit in the elaboration of the allegorical Babylon, now emerges explicitly in the opposition of Lazarus and Dives. As the long passage on hell thus concludes, the frequency of the thematic statements increases. Sparse before, they accumulate with an emotional increment about the figures of Dives and Lazarus. This emotional force is intensified by the rhetorical *assimilatio finis principio* which repeats in a final verse of the conclusion (I.715) the initial "est modo Lazarus hic, ibi Tartarus" (I.665) and by a shift in thematic mode from the preceptive to the paradigmatic.[96] At the same time the thematic emphasis, which had already proceeded from the works of justice to the ironically permissive "ludite, vivite" (I.639), is transferred to the corporal works of mercy.

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[92] I.551-558, Gregory *Mor.* XV.35. I.573-574, Job 24:19. I.588b-c, refers to Vergilian personifications, *Aeneid* VI.273-281.

[93] I.577-580, Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XXI.23.

[94] Cf. Augustine *De civ. Dei* XXI.9.

[95] For Dives see Gregory, *Hom. in Ev.* XL. I.690-692, Gregory, *Hom. in Ev.* XL.5; Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XVII.20.97-115.

[96] Robert de Basevorn, *Forma praedicandi* xlvii in *Artes praedicandi*, ed. Th.-M. Charland, O. P. (Ottawa, 1936), p. 310.

The works of justice and mercy are the works in which faith lives, the way of sobriety by which the city of God makes its pilgrimage in this world. The works of justice, through which a man gives himself to God, and the corporal works of mercy, through which he gives his goods to the pious poor, together implement the conversion of self to God.[97] When the just man supplies the material needs of the poor in Christ, he exchanges his temporal goods for an eternal reward. The iniquitous, on the contrary, exchange their temporal goods only for temporal gain and so receive at last an eternal loss. Those who have much and will not give even a little are thus reduced ultimately to seek in vain the least.

Both the affluence of Dives, emphasized in the catachrestic "illeque multus" (I.693), and his inebriety — his infatuation with love of self and world — are like the image of the Babylonian cup emblematic of that abundance of iniquity which will signalize the last days before the second advent according to the prophecy of Christ that becomes a text for the second part of the poem: "Et quoniam abundavit iniquitas, refrigescet charitas multorum" (Matt. 24:12). This diminution of charity is prefigured by the venality of Dives, who is utterly incapable of giving gratuitously. Thus the poet, while concluding the elaboration of hell, anticipates both the last commonplace of his poem, the iniquity that provides material for Part Two, and the last topic in the dilatation of his first commonplace, the signs preceding the final doom. Before turning, however, to this last topic of his first commonplace, he interposes the dilatation of his second commonplace (I.719-993). This is the misery or vanity of the world, which Bernard has anticipated in the figures of Babylon and Dives through the traditional imagery of evanescence and dissolution.

All goods that pass away are vain.[98] Compared to the uncreated Being of

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[97] I.703-704, Gregory, *Mor.* XIX.38; Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XV.7. 33-47.

[98] The dilatation of the commonplace vanity and misery (*mala poenae*) includes verses 719-993. I.719 *copia*, Gregory *Mor.* XXII. 5. I.720 *status aruit*, Gregory *Mor.* XI. 67-68, *Hom. in Ev.* XXVIII. 3. I.722 *turbine*, Gregory *Mor.* XV.56. I.733, Gregory *Mor.* VIII. 46. I.734, Gregory *Mor.* VI.8. I.740, Gregory *Mor.* XII. 37; Ecclus. 10:9. I.741 *mollis*, Gregory, *Mor.* X. 42. I.742, Gregory *Mor.* XXXI. 2, XXXIII. 49. I.750, Juvenal X.172-173; Gregory, *Mor.* XVI.83. I.758, Gregory, *Mor.* XVII.10, XI.67. I.761 *inutilis homo*, Job 15:16; see note 67. I.790 *instar aquae*, Gregory *Mor.* XIX.51, *Hom. in Ev.* XXVI.9. I.791 *occidit ut pecus*, Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* LXXXII.5 (*PL* 183, 1179-1180). I.831 *non ens*, Gregory *Mor.* XII.1, XVIII.81. I.855-856, Gregory, *Mor.* XVII.10. I.861-863 *bulla, fumus*, Gregory, *Mor.* XVII.10. I.863 *imago*, Gregory *Mor.* XI.68; "imago" = *umbra* as in verse 774, where "laus imaginis" and "umbra nominis" are chiasmic synonyms for "ancestral image." I.864 *massa*, Bernard of Clairvaux *In Nativitate Domini* II.1 (*PL*

God, all created beings are as if no being. It is by their eventuation that all things are to be judged. The corruptible flesh that ends in the grave, the ambiguous and fugitive joys that end in sorrow, the gifts of nature and the gifts of fortune that no man can retain are vanities. The human flesh is subject to a putrefaction not only like the decay of beasts but still more abhorrent. Even the health of miserable man is a kind of disease, and every moment that he lives is a moment of dying. Only the doomed are subject to eternal misery, but in this world elect and reprobate alike are miserable.

Man is miserable because he has loved more than God the pleasures of the flesh, the reward and regard of the world, and the friend, whom he may love with a compassion that renders him only more susceptible of misery but whose affection for him may well prove the selfish opposite to gratuitous love, the kind in which God abounds for His creatures. Because man in original and personal sin has preferred mutable goods to the Immutable God, he has deprived himself of that Good.[99] This preference constitutes the iniquity — the *malum culpae* — of the world. This deprivation constitutes the misery — the *malum poenae* — of the world. Deprived of the strength and stability that reside only in God, man has rendered himself infirm and unstable, prone

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183, 120). I.864 *unda voraginis*, a truncated form of such a phrase as *abundantia voraginis corruptionis*, which in turn is a circumlocution for *abundans corruptio*. For *vorago* cf. I.44 and Gregory, *Mor.* VIII. 22, "corruptionis voraginem," XXVI.29, "luxuriae voraginem"; for *unda* = *abundantia* cf. I.213, "undans," I.629, 1001, "undat"; for *unda* as a symbol of mutability cf. I.955 and Gregory *Mor.* XI.68, "unda mundi," *Hom. in Ev.* XXIV.2, "undis vitae corruptibilis." I.866 *vapor*, Gregory *Mor.* XVII.10. I.867, Gregory, *Mor.* XI.65-70, XII. 37. I.868, Pliny VII.i.2, xvi.72. I.872 *modicum*, Gregory *Mor.* XVII. 10. I.876 *amat, pavet*, Innocent III *De contemptu mundi* I.26 (*PL* 217, 714-715). I.878 *dat, rapit, it, fremit*, to be construed as *antithetum*: "Fortune gives, man grabs, the wheel of fortune goes, man roars"; for *antithetum* see Matthew of Vendôme *Ars versificatoria* III. 25-29 in *Les arts poétiques du XII^{e} et du XIII^{e} siècle*, ed. Edmond Faral (Paris, 1924), pp. 173-174. I.878b-879b, cf. I Cor. 3:3. I.879 *ad mala crescit*, Gregory *Mor.* XII. 44-45: "ad nequitiam excrescit"; VIII.66, 81; *Hom. in Ev.* I.3: "Ad hoc enim crescit [mundus], ut cadat." I.880, Gregory, *Mor.* XVI.83. I.881, Gregory *Mor.* XXXII.13. I.882 *aestuat*, Gregory, *Mor.* XV.27. I.883 *rota*, Gregory *Mor.* XVI.79. I.884 *Dives eget, tremit altus*, Gregory *Mor.* XII.47, XV.9, 26-27. I. 891-893, Gregory *Mor.* VIII.66-76, XI.42, XV.3-4. I.897-898, Gregory *Mor.* XV.4, 49. I.900, Gregory *Mor.* IX.40; Ecclus.14:12. I.917 *ultio duplex*, i.e., hanging and piercing — see II Kings 18:9-15; hence I.918, "caro... caesaries." I.932, Juvenal X.168-172. I.949 *Diva Philippica*, Juvenal X.125. I.963-964, Gregory *Mor.* VIII.40, 50. I.965, Bernard of Clairvaux *In Festo Omnium Sanctorum* I.11 (*PL* 183, 459): "et ipsi quotidie Evam suam, carnem videlicet, audiunt plus quam Deum;" Augustine *De civ. Dei* XIV.3. I.971 *laboras*, Gregory *Mor.* VI.16. I.973 *vente*, Gregory, *Mor.* VIII.28. I.977, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XXVIII.3. I.983, Gregory, *Mor.* XI.68. I.984 *mare*, Gregory, *Hom. in Ev.* XXIV. 2. I.985 *glarea*, Gregory *Mor.* XX.36. I.988 *arundo*, Gregory *Mor.* XXXIII.7, *Hom. in Ev.* VI.2. I.993 *somnia*, Gregory *Mor.* XV.7.

[99] Augustine *De civ. Dei* XII.8.

to sin and bound to die. He sows the thorns of iniquity and reaps the thorns of misery.

As the race of living men draws toward its end, this infirmity grows. The human race is beset more and more by spiritual enemies that would destroy with sin the souls of living men and by physical enemies that would attack their bodies. This increase of tribulation is symbolized by the imagery, accommodated from the pagans, of a world withering in senescence.[100] This imagery is mingled with that of a wheel or ball wrapped in mist and hurled toward catastrophe by a whirlwind. These images recall the whirlwind and mist enveloping the damned and thus emphasize the anagogical analogy of the temporal misery to the eternal.

The city of the world comprises those men who have averted themselves from God, who do not use the goods of the world so that they may enjoy God but enjoy these transient goods and even the penal labor by which they are got and kept as if these were the proper end of mankind. Thus they contemn their proper end, the unique Good or *Honestum* that is to be enjoyed for itself. They remain inwardly and outwardly in the corrupt nature bequeathed by Adam — "terraque terrea mente reponens" (I.832) — the "old men" of an aging world, jealous, contentious, growing in iniquity, alternating between prosperity and adversity like the wheel of fortune (I.857c), confusing prosperity and adversity like the wheel of the Psalm (I.883a). They are the "carnal men" symbolized by the inferior part of their nature, the flesh, which in turn is designated "massa putredinis, unda voraginis" (I. 864) since in the beginning the earth, from which the body was formed, was created *in massa*, since at present the infirmity and iniquity that burden and agitate the spirit are most patent in the body, and since after death the putrefaction to which the corruptible flesh is subject will teem with an abundance like that of the last iniquity. Bernard, using the paradigmatic mode for greater force, summons these carnal men to inward renewal through self-conversion so that, rising inwardly now with Christ, they may loose themselves inwardly from the perverse love that is iniquity and thus, rising in the second advent, may be loosed inwardly and outwardly from the misery of eternal privation. Hence he dwells by epimone on the miserable passage of man in the corruptible flesh — sordid in conception, wailing at birth, abased by disease, injury, and decay — so that the mind may not be induced through lust of the flesh to regard the body as the good to be enjoyed, not a good to be used with restraint. So that the pride of life may be humbled in the inner man, the poet dwells on the rebelliousness of the flesh, a misery to which the mind is subject as rebel in pride to God and through which the mind is tempted to iniquity as

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[100] Pliny VII.xvi.73.

Adam was tempted by Eve, a misery that will end only when the integrity of mind and body is restored in the renovation of the world (I.967-968).

The dilatation of misery is sustained throughout by a recurrence of the tropes and rhetorical questions which had from ancient time become all but obligatory in such a discourse. Some of the images involved in the dilatation, such as the cinerary urn, the baths, the ancestral image, and the equestrian ring, are appropriate to pagan antiquity, not to medieval Christianity. These anachronisms serve to insinuate that the standards of the poet's contemporaries that belong to the city of this world are rather those of pagan than of Christian Rome. The appeal to the two *loci* — *utile et honestum* — of ancient deliberative oratory has the effect similarly of employing the criteria of the secular past against the secular present.[101] The dilatation is concluded with an *assimilatio finis principio*, a return to the image of the senescent world. Here Bernard denounces vanity to his contemporaries, the "old men" of the now aged world, admonishing them by the examples of those "old men" who were strong with the strength of the world when the world was young that pride of life addicted to the quasi-immortality of fame, lust of the eyes, inquisitive or acquisitive, and lust of the flesh that feeds worms and feeds upon their food are vain.

In the last portion of the first book (I.994-1078), the poem returns to the elaboration of the eschatological commonplace with which it began.[102] In the first portion of Book One the poem elaborates the last judgment and the eternal joys and miseries then assigned to the blest and the damned. In the last portion of the first book, the poem dwells upon the signs, some already come to pass (I.1039), that precede the last judgment and manifest its imminence. Among these signs are the iniquity and senescence of the contemporary world.

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[101] Cicero *De inventione* II.li.156.

[102] I.995 *lunaque ferrea*, Joel 2:31; Acts 2:20; Rev. 6:12. I.996a, Joel 2:31; Rev. 6:12. I.996b-997a, for this reference to earthquakes cf. Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* I.1. I.999, Augustine *De civ. Dei* XX.20. I.1001, Matt. 24:12; *Gratia*, thus Ovid *Metamorphoses* I.145 concerning the iron age: "fratrum quoque gratia rara est." I.1003a, the persecution of the just under Antichrist preceding the second advent. I.1003b-1004, Matt. 24:7. I.1005 *teguntur*, otherwise applied to the sins of the elect; cf. Gregory *Mor.* IV.27, XXXII.2. I.1014 *amor jacet*, thus Ovid *Met.* I.149 concerning the iron age: "victa iacet pietas." I.1026b-1027, 1029, dilated from the Pauline "homo peccati, filius perditionis" (II Thess. 2:3); *bestia* 1027c, repeating *ferus* 1026b, refers to the savageness of Antichrist's persecution and to the Apocalyptical "bestia quae ascendit de abysso" and "de mari bestiam ascendentem" (Rev. 11:7, 13:1-8). I.1028, Gregory *Mor.* XXXII.22-25. I.1030 *caput*, Gregory *Mor.* XII.48, XV.19. I.1039, cf. Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* I.1: "Sed cum multa praenuntiata jam completa sint, dubium non est quin sequantur etiam pauca quae restant, quia sequentium rerum certitudo est praeteritarum exhibitio."

This cosmic senescence, exhibited in the unprecedented suffering, the deformity of monstrous births, and the ruin of empires, pertains as well to the second commonplace of the *contemptus mundi*, the vanity and misery of this world, a topic that the poem has already developed in the medial portion of Book One. The iniquity of the world, likewise, forms the third commonplace of the *contemptus mundi*, a topic that will be the subject of Books Two and Three. Thus Bernard has joined the second and third commonplaces to the first as signs of its imminence.

The misery of this world is to be consummated in the great tribulation that will precede the second advent. Bernard professes to believe that this tribulation has already begun. The apparition of the dragon lately seen in the sky by knights and peasantry alike is for him a sign that the ancient serpent Satan has been released from the abyss to commence the great tribulation, while the apparition of demonic troops racing across the heavens (I.997b-998) recalls the infernal hosts that Joel and St. John had foretold Satan would then let loose upon the wicked. Even instances of the pseudochrists and pseudoprophets linked with this final epoch in the prophecies of Christ are forthcoming. Bernard adduces a false Christ from the west and a false Elias from the east: the whole world is thus infected.[103] Supreme among these human agents of the great tribulation will be Antichrist, the imminence of whose coming foreshadows the imminence of Christ's *parousia*, the false *dominus*, under whose tyranny so antithetic to the meekness of our Lord misery will tyrannize as never before, the head — like Satan — of a mystical body the members of which are the reprobate as Christ is head of the mystical body of the elect.

Bernard employs in this dilatation of Antichrist several *antonomasiae*, some Apocalyptic, others drawn from an obscure passage in the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians.[104] Bernard, like many exegetes of the middle ages, saw in this passage a covert allusion to the authority of the Roman government, which by maintaining law and order throughout the world was deferring the emergence of Antichrist, the lawless one ("*ὁ ἄνομος*"). When this power should suffer its decline ("recessio," I.1034), justice would withdraw from the world just as the virgin Justice is fabled to have withdrawn ("recessit," I.1011; cf. "recedunt," I.993) to the heavens in the iron age of Roman myth.[105] Then, amid the confusion of right and wrong Antichrist would be revealed. Bernard proclaims this decline and sees a foreshadowing of this revelation in the very openness with which his contemporaries, like the men of Sodom before their judgment, flaunt even those perversions of fleshly lust which in times of law and order are practised secretly if at all. Here, then, is the pride of life erupting into violence, the lust of the eyes exercising itself in fraud, the lust of the flesh manifesting the ultimate degeneracy. Here is approaching its zenith — and its nadir — the moral confusion which the poet has elsewhere personified in the harlot Babylon. Here is the abounding iniquity, the charity grown cold that Christ prophesied for the last epoch in a passage which Bernard makes the text of Part Two. Because this very consummation of iniquity is itself a symptom of the great tribulation and a sign of the last judgment, Bernard forewarns of Antichrist and heralds now as at the beginning of his poem the second advent of that twofold Light, soft to the good but dire to the evil. He warns allusively of the seventh vial which shall then be poured to the destruction of Babylon, abounding now in the cup of iniquity, abounding then in the cup of divine vengeance. He alludes expectantly to the seventh trumpet, which shall be sounded at the second coming to the glorification of the new Jerusalem, the Church Triumphant. Then the earth and sky will give signs of Christ's coming, signs now portended for Bernard in the earthquakes, comets, eclipses, and bloody moons ("luna ferrea," I.995) symptomatic of an aging cosmos. Then in the second resurrection the dead shall be gathered from the four quarters, a convocation foreshadowed in this dying world by the apparition of dead hosts flowing together across the sky.

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[103] For the universal sway of Antichrist see Rev. 13:3, 7. Note further that as in the Apocalypse the beast that Bernard identifies with Antichrist arises from the sea, i.e., the west and the beast that is the false prophet (Rev. 13:11-18; 20:9-10) arises from the earth, i.e., the east, so in Bernard the false Christ arises in Spain, the false Elias in the east.

[104] II Thes. 2:1-12; see Joseph Knabenbauer S. J., *Commentarius in S. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas*, V (Paris, 1913), 141.

[105] Ovid *Met.* I.149-150.

The poem, accordingly, resumes by epimone at the end of Part One its thematic exhortation to the first resurrection. It insists that the lovers of this world, fugitive and unstable, should purge their eyes of worldly blindness, should, renewing their baptismal conversion, cover with the tears of repentance from the light of the great Judge sins practised in these last days with contemptuous overtness. It urges the worldly to undertake the works of justice that make faith live, to fix their hope not in the flux but in the changeless, and to conceive while there is time that fear of God which is the beginning of sacred love. The poem proceeds in these thematic utterances from the preceptive command to the paradigmatic exhortation. By this shift to the paradigmatic mode in the final lines of Part One, the poem formally emphasizes the theme of this part, the conversion of ourselves to God, which must precede the conversion by us of others, the theme of Part Two. Thus the first part ends with the Pauline exhortation "vigilemus", the closing member of the last verse, which by an *assimilatio finis principio* repeats verbatim the first verse of the poem.

This verse does not merely enclose Part One, it epitomizes the meaning of the whole poem. As the third member, "vigilemus," expresses the theme metaphorically, the second member, “tempora pessima sunt,” comprises in a phrase of Micah the two commonplaces misery and iniquity. Here the superlative “pessima” is apt because misery, the *malum poenae*, and iniquity, the *malum culpae*, are associated by the poet with the extreme aggravation of the last epoch. The first member, “hora novissima,” relates to the commonplace doom. In this member Bernard adverts explicitly to a passage from St. John implicit elsewhere throughout the poem (I John 2:15-18). This passage from the disciple whom Jesus loved is the text of the *contemptus mundi* in the Christian tradition: “Nolite diligere mundum neque ea quae in mundo sunt (theme). Si quis diligit mundum, non est charitas Patris in eo quoniam omne quod est in mundo concupiscentia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et superbia vitae quae non est ex Patre sed ex mundo est (commonplace of iniquity). Et mundus transit et concupiscentia eius. Qui autem facit voluntatem Dei manet in aeternum (commonplace of vanity or misery). Filioli, novissima hora est, et sicut audistis quia Antichristus venit, et nunc Antichristi multi facti sunt; unde scimus quia novissima hora est (commonplace of doom)”.

Caxton's "Eneydos" and the Redactions of Vergil

LOUIS BREWER HALL

CAXTON'S *Eneydos*, a translation of the *Livre des Eneydes*, was attacked by Gavin Douglas, and with some truculence, only twenty-three years after it was published in 1490, when Douglas translated the *Aeneid* into Scottish:

> Thocht Williame Caxtoun of Inglis natioun
> In pross hes prent ane buik of Inglis gros,
> Clepand it Virgill in Eneados,
> Quhilk that he sais of Frensch he did translait,
> It hes na thing ado therewith, God wait,
> No ma mair like than the devil and Sanct Austyne;[1]

A few pages later in the prologue he added that the *Eneydos:*

> ...is na mair lyke Virgill, dar I lay,
> Na the owle resemblis the papyngay.[2]

Caxton's source was rather slighted when the *Eneydos* was published for the Early English Text Society. In a second foreword Salverda de Grave discusses the differences between the *Livre des Eneydes* and the Old French *Roman d'Eneas*, and he concludes: "The chief difference is this, that the candour, the spontaneity of the *Roman d'Énéas* have disappeared; this is also the principal reason why the prose *Eneydes* is infinitely less interesting for the history of literature than the Old-French poem."[3] M. T. Culley in his introduction to this same edition has enumerated the differences that exist between the *Eneydos* and the *Aeneid*,[4] but since that time, except for the attention critics have shown to Caxton's prologue and its story of "egges" and "eyren" at "forlond," the *Eneydos* seems to have been generally ignored.

The *Eneydos* has genuine interest, however, for it can be said that it represents an intermediate stage between the freedom of the earlier medieval adaptations and the direct translations, which had their start for the English tradition with Gavin Douglas. Let us take some redactions of the *Aeneid* representative of the Middle Ages and compare the changes from Vergil that we find in them with the changes that exist in the *Eneydos*. The redactions we shall consider are the anonymous *Excidium Troiae*, which had its origins before the Middle Ages, but one of its principal manuscripts is thirteenth century;[5] the *Roman d'Eneas*,[6] the *Ilias Latina* of Simon Aurea Capra,[7] the story of Dido and Aeneas in the *Primera Crónica General*,[8] in Chaucer's *Hous of Fame* and his "Legend of Dido".[9] Caxton's translation of the French *Livre des Eneydes* is so close that what can be said about the one can generally be applied to the other, and because the *Eneydos* has the advantage for us of its easy availability, we shall confine our remarks to it.

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[1] *Complete Poetical Works*, ed. John Small (Edinburgh, 1874), "Proloug" II:7.

[2] *Ibid.*, II:11.

[3] *EETS ES* 57, eds. M. T. Culley and F. J. Furnivall (London, 1890), p. xxvii. Hereafter cited as Caxton.

[4] Caxton, pp. vii-xix.

The process of medievalization, which transformed the *Aeneid* between the early thirteenth century and the late fifteenth, had many characteristics. Let us consider some of the more fundamental of these: the use of the *ordo naturalis*, the suppression of most of book six, the partial rejection of the divine paraphernalia, the use of roughly contemporary although idealized characters and setting, the expansion of the text outside of Vergil. The first of these, the use of the *ordo naturalis*, was generally preferred to the *ordo artificialis*, which the Middle Ages noted Vergil employed.[10] All the redactions we are considering, except the *Roman d'Eneas*, take events directly from Troy to Carthage, then to Sicily and Italy, and they do not have Aeneas relate his wanderings to Dido as a story within a story. While in the *Eneas* the order of events is generally from Troy to Carthage, the author twice interrupts the chronology. The events of the Trojan war before the fall occupy only eighty-two verses, but these are inserted between verses 101 and 183. Also after the banquet at Carthage has been described, 343 verses are devoted to the adventure which Aeneas described, from verses 854 to 1197. The *Eneas* then returns to the love story. The *Eneydos* has to be included among those other redactions which use the *ordo naturalis* with no major interruptions in chronology.

Starting as they do in Troy, some of the redactions include a survey of the history of the Trojan war before the fall. This is of varying length and content. About the first third of the *Excidium Troiae* is given to this material, which in this redaction commences with the marriage of Peleus and Thetis.[11] Simon allows about the same proportion of his *Ilias Latina* for this early history, and he starts with the birth of Paris. The redactions in the vernacular, the *Primera Crónica General*, the *Eneas* and those by Chaucer, did not report events before the fall. The *Eneydos*, however, is typical of the Latin redactions, because the first chapter begins with a statement on the founding of Troy, the murder of Polydorus, then the attack led by Agamemnon.

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[5] eds. E. Bagby Atwood and V. K. Whitaker (Cambridge, Mass. 1944). See pp. LXXVII-LXXXV for discussion of Mss.

[6] ed. J. Salverda de Grave, 2 vols. (Paris, 1925, 1931). Hereafter cited as *Eneas*.

[7] Ed. André Boutemy, *Scriptorium* I (1946-47), 267-288. Hereafter cited as Simon.

[8] Ed. Ramon Menéndez Pidal in *Nueva Bibliotheca de Auctores Españoles* (Madrid, 1955), I:33-44. Herafter cited as *Crónica*.

[9] 2 ed. F. N. Robinson (Cambridge, Mass. 1957); *Hous of Fame*, pp. 283-286, vv. 140-467; "Legend of Dido," pp. 500-504.

[10] Bernard Silvestris, *Commentum super sex libros Eneidos Vergilii*, ed. W. Riedel (Greifswald, 1942), pp. 1-2.

For a second characteristic we notice that there is a general tendency in the redactions during the Middle Ages to suppress the events of book six. In the *Excidium Troiae* Aeneas sails directly from Carthage to Sicily and then to Italy. Simon relates the trip through the underworld in twenty verses. The *Eneas* has retained more of the descent than any of the redactions, from verses 2263 to 3020. Chaucer, in the *Hous of Fame* relates the story in 11 verses, but like the *Primera Crónica General*, and for the same reason, a primary interest in Dido, the "Legend of Dido" omits this episode. In respect to this characteristic the *Eneydos* is more closely related to the *Excidium Troiae*, because the events of book six have been rejected and on the basis that these events are feigned:

> In-to this temple went Eneas / and there he wolde reste hym self awhyle. There dwelled the goddesse Cryspyne, which shulde haue brought eneas in-to helle, for to see the sowle of Anchises his fadre / and the sowles of alle his meynee that were decessed / but this mater I leue, for it is fayned and not to be byleuyed / who that will knowe how eneas wente to helle late hym rede virgyle, claudyan, or the pistelles of Ouyde & there he shall fynde more than trouthe.[12]

The prophecies of Anchises about the future glory of Rome from book six, 765-883, are transferred to the end of the redactions as brief catalogues of Roman rulers, further preserving the *ordo naturalis*. The last three pages of the *Excidium Troiae* are devoted to this material, and in the *Eneas*, after Aeneas has married Lavinia and has been crowned, their progeny-to-come are listed in the last twenty verses of the poem. In the *Eneydos* the history of Rome makes up the last chapter, a page and a half in length. This suppression of book six in the redactions emphasizes proportionately the romance of Dido and the fight with Turnus, and thus the *Aeneid* becomes a story of Aeneas consisting of two major episodes.

The redactions of the *Aeneid* were organized in a causal sequence which tended to make the machinations of the Roman gods unnecessary although they were preserved with various changes. The storm which casts Aeneas on the shore of Lybia in the *Aeneid*, we recall, was brought about by Juno with the help of Aeolus, then stopped by Neptune (*Aeneid* I: 34-141). As Albert C. Friend has indicated[13] both Simon Aurea Capra in the *Ilias Latina* and Chaucer in the *Hous of Fame* use the cooperation of Juno and Aeolus to inaugurate the storm but have substituted Venus for Neptune in bringing it to a close. The *Roman d'Eneas* motivates the storm by the intervention of Juno alone, and in the *Excidium Troiae* and in Chaucer's "Legend of Dido" the storm has to be accepted by the readers as a natural one. In the *Eneydos*, the motivation for the beginning of the storm is preserved as it was in the *Aeneid*, but later, unlike the account in the *Aeneid*, Neptune joins with Aeolus to intensify the storm. In the *Eneydos*, also, the storm is not allayed by divine interference, but interest in it passes when Aeneas' fleet is cast on the shore of Lybia.[14] A later storm which drove Dido and Aeneas into the cave, followed upon a delicate interplay between Juno and Venus (IV: 90-128). In the *Excidium Troiae* both goddesses are preserved, and they are at first opposed to the union between Dido and Aeneas. In a council later, however, Juno quickly agrees with Venus, but why she changes her mind we are not told.[15] Chaucer includes this storm in the "Legend of Dido", but it is a natural storm, not caused by any goddess.[16] The storm, as well as the whole sequence of hunt, storm, and cave, are omitted from the other major redactions, the *Primera Crónica General*, Simon's *Ilias Latina* and Chaucer's *Hous of Fame*. The *Eneydos*, contrary to these, preserves the debate and the attempts on the parts of Venus and Juno to outmanœuver each other.[17]

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[11] Atwood discussed the source of this material, *Excidium Troiae*, pp. xxi-xxx.

[12] Caxton, p. 120. It is obvious that the original adaptor was not learned, or at least not acquainted either with the allegorical tradition of the *Aeneid* or with the historical tradition of Justin, as we shall see.

To initiate events that lead eventually to Aeneas' desertion of Dido, Fama, we recall, carried the news of their union to Iarbas, whose prayers and sacrifices are heard by Jupiter. Jupiter then instructs Mercury, who makes two visits to Aeneas (IV: 173-237; 554-570). This series of events was adapted in various ways. The *Excidium Troiae* unifies the two trips of Mercury, but because Aeneas, far from being frightened by Mercury's visit, ignores him, Mercury acts very much like the conniving servant manipulating a plot against his master. He goes to Dido and tells her Aeneas is planning to leave, then returns to Aeneas to warn him against Dido, paraphrasing *Aeneid* IV: 569-570, "*quia varia et mutabilis semper femina est.*"[18] The *Roman d'Eneas* has retained Fama, but this personification plays no direct role in the chain of events leading to the desertion. Although Mercury has been omitted, Aeneas still received a message on behalf of the gods.[19] Chaucer subtly manipulated the whole operation of the gods so as to cast doubt in the reader's mind on their interference in human affairs.[20] The author of the *Primera Crónica General* does not introduce Mercury at all but motivates the desertion by adapting the events in a special way. The wealth of Carthage and his marriage to Dido have made Aeneas rich and powerful, but seeing the frescoes on the walls of the temple of Juno he tells Dido that, since before he did not have the wealth to honor the sepulchre of Anchises, now he does and is able so to honor his father. Thus he should depart.[21] In this instance it is only the *Eneydos* among the redactions which includes the complete instructions of Jupiter to Mercury, the repetition of those instructions when Mercury delivers them to Aeneas. The *Eneydos* also includes the second visit of Mercury.[22]

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[13] "Chaucer's version of the *Aeneid*," *Speculum* XXVIII (1935), 317-323.

[14] Caxton, pp. 39-40.

[15] *Excidium Troiae*, p. 34.

[16] Chaucer, vv. 1218-1223.

[17] Caxton, pp. 49-52.

[18] *Excidium Troiae*, p. 36.

To motivate the events of the war in Italy the Latin redactions tend to preserve the appearance of divine manipulation, the vernacular redactions to suppress it. None of the redactions preserves the discussion of Juno and Iris at the beginning of book nine. The escape of the ships in IX: 108-121 is no longer miraculous. The conference of the gods at the beginning of book ten is preserved in Simon's *Ilias Latina*, verses 799-808. The spectre of Aeneas which appears to Turnus after he has killed Pallas (X: 633-653), we recall, was the work of Juno to save Turnus. It is thus reported in the *Excidium Troiae* and by Simon.[23] In the *Eneas* it is an archer who entices Turnus to the ship. In the *Eneydos* "the fende" has been substituted for Juno, a unique instance where a devil has been substituted for a Roman goddess:

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[19] *Un jor estoit dedanz Cartage,*
de par les deus vint uns mesage,
que li comande de lor part
qu'il laist ester icel esgart
et qu'il s'en alt an Lonbardie...
Eneas, verses 1615-1619.

[20] See E. F. Shannon, *Chaucer and the Roman Poets* (Cambridge, Mass. 1929), p. 204.

[21] Much era bien andant Eneas en Affrica con la reyna Dido: primamiente que auie e ella por muger, que era muy fermosa e muy sesuda; demas que auie el sennorio de Carthago e de tod aquella tierra, e fazien todos quant el mandava, e otrossi muy grandes riquezas ademas quel diera ella; y estas cosas le frazien seer uicioso e rico e poderoso... dixo que quando so padre muriera en Cezilia quel prometiera de fazer grandes onras en su sepultura e de dar mucho por sa alma quando conseio ouiesse que lo pudiesse fazer, ca estonce no lo uuiara complir nin tenie de que; mas pues que era rico e abondado, que en todas las guisas tenie que lo deuie complir, e por end querie yr alla (*Crónica*, p. 39).

[22] Caxton, pp. 60-64; 9-394.

[23] Iuno videns partem Turni debilem esse, volens eum de morte liberare, se in cultu Enee transfiguravit, et se obviam in cultu Enee Turno ostendit et cepit contra eum velle dimicare (*Excidium Troiae*, p. 46).

Sed Frigis effigiem mentitur, ut eximat illi
Turnum quem cupiens Iuno iuuare nocet.
Hac siquidem simulante fugam Frigii ducis, instat
Turnus et Eneam dum fugat ipse fugit.
Simon, vv. 887-890.

> The fende that sawe that Eneas sought Turnus for to slee hym / that wolde not that he sholde be ded so soone, to thende that he sholde doo yet moche harme, and euylles more than he hadde doon all-redy, dyde transforme hym self In to the fygure of eneas, & came a-fore turnus...[24]

Later in the *Aeneid* (XII: 411-419) Japyx is to cure the wounded Aeneas and is supplied an herb by Venus. Her help is preserved in the *Excidium Troiae* and by Simon, but omitted in the *Eneas* and the *Eneydos*.[25]

The ideal expressed by Vergil in the *Aeneid* has, during the Middle Ages, to be transformed into new medieval terms. A method of exaggeration is employed which Dorothy Everett, in her *Essays on Middle English Literature*, called the idealization of ordinary life.[26] Dido and Aeneas become paragons of beauty and handsomeness. The most restrained description of Dido can be found in the *Primera Crónica General*. Aeneas marries her because she is very beautiful and very intelligent as we noticed. In the *Ilias Latina*, by contrast, Simon tells us that if we take away the possibility of dying, Dido lacks nothing of being a goddess.[27] Chaucer, in the "Legend of Dido", makes Dido a goddess by suggesting that the Christian God might find her worthy if He "Wolde han a love;" she is also an ideal queen:

> ...she was holden of alle queenes flour,
> Of gentillesse, of fredom, of beaute.[28]

In their descriptions of Aeneas the adaptations emphasize his handsomeness and high station. In the *Crónica*, Aeneas, like Dido, is "muy fermoso," and when he takes off his armor, Dido notices that he is well fashioned in both body and limbs.[29] In the *Roman d'Eneas* he is a rich baron of heavenly ancestry.[30] Simon is able to utilize a well-worked *traductio* between Venus and *venustus: Hec natum Veneris plus ipsa matre uenustum*.[31] In Chaucer's "Legend" Venus has superiority over her son in appearance.

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[24] Caxton, pp. 140-141.

[25] *Excidium Troiae*, p. 25; Simon vv. 973-976; *Eneas* vv. 9552-9553; Caxton, p. 159.

[26] (Oxford, 1955), p. 8.

[27] *Vis breuiter doceam dotes Dydonis? Eidem*
Posse mori demas nil uetat esse deam.

Simon, vv. 853-584.

[28] Chaucer, vv. 1009-1010.

[29] ...muy bien faycionado de cuerpo e de mienbros (*Primera Crónica General*, p. 38).

[30] *De le celestial ligniee*
ot an Troie un riche baron;

Eneas, vv. 572-573.

[31] Simon, v. 589.

For after Venus hadde he swich fayrnesse
That no man myghte be half so fayr, I gesse.[32]

This use of exaggeration in describing Dido and Aeneas is absent from the *Excidium Troiae*. In the *Eneydos*, Venus' description of Dido is not included, and when Dido describes Aeneas to Anna she calls him only "valuyaunt / strong / & puyssaunt."[33]

The heightened setting necessary for these idealized actors can be most vividly observed in the *Roman d'Eneas*. Carthage is a typical medieval walled city on a high rock ideal for defense, one side protected by a river, the other by a marsh. Its defense was further enhanced by its magnetic wall, where any armored knights who approach are held fast.[34] Dido's castle is described in detail, and the feast for Aeneas is not only elaborate but also had what must have seemed one of the greatest of medieval luxuries, sufficient light.[35] While Simon mentions some of the furnishings of the castle, he depends for his effect on a use of the superlative.[36] For the feast Chaucer in the "Legend" says only:

What nedeth yow the feste to descrive?
He nevere beter at ese was in his lyve.

And for the castle mentions:

To daunsynge chaumberes ful of paramentes,
Of riche beddes, and of ornementes,
This Eneas is led, after the mete.[37]

In neither the *Excidium Troiae*, the *Eneydos*, nor the *Hous of Fame* are Carthage, the castle, or the banquet elaborated.

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[32] Chaucer, vv. 1072-1073.

[33] Caxton, p. 41. We shall discuss later the tribute to Dido taken from Boccaccio (Caxton, pp. 22-38), and the description in the Iris-Proserpine section (pp. 109-114).

[34] *Tot anviron ot fet trois rans*
de mangnetes par molt grant sens
d'une pierre qui molt est dure;
la mangnete est de tel nature,
ja nus hom armes n'i venist
que la pierre a soi nel traisist;
tant n'an venissent a halbers
ne fussent sanpre al mur aers.
Eneas, vv. 433-440.

[35] *El palés ot clarté molt grant;*
tant i art cierges, ja par jor
lumiere ni aust greignor.
Eneas, vv. 836-838.

[36] *Regia regine Phebo satis aut Ioue digna*
Talis erat, qualis nec fuit ante nec est.
Simon, vv. 561-562.

[37] Chaucer, vv. 1098-1099; 1106-1108.

When Vergil has included a description in the *Aeneid* it generally appears in the redactions only slightly exaggerated. Dido's dress for the hunt is an example (*Aeneid* IV: 136-139). In the *Roman d'Eneas* the gold decoration is applied to everything Dido is wearing, even to her arrows which become solid gold.[38] This episode is omitted from the *Hous of Fame*, and Chaucer in the "Legend of Dido" synthesizes the description of the saddle (IV: 134-135) and of Dido into six verses:

> Upon a thikke palfrey, paper-whit,
> With sadel red, enbrouded with delyt,
> Of gold the barres up enbosede hye,
> Sit Dido, al in gold and perre wrye;
> And she as fair as is the bryghte morwe,
> That heleth syke folk of nyghtes sorwe.[39]

In the *Eneydos* the details of the description have been slightly rearranged. Dido went on the hunt in:

> a grete mauntelle of veluet cramoysin, pourfylled rounde about with brawdrye, moche enryched wyth precyous stones, after the custome and manere of that tyme / Her herys bounden wyth thredes of golde / and her ryche gyrdell, that appyered moche precyous, alle a-boue her raymentes / She hadde also a fayr tarcays, couered wyth fyne cloth of damaske, alle fulle of arowes / and therwythalle the bowe for to shoote to the wylde beestes, and otherwyse atte her playsaunce.[40]

Only in the *Excidium Troiae* was the description made less ornate than it was in the *Aeneid*. Here only the head band is of gold.[41]

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[38] *La raine se fu vestue*
d'une chiere porpre vermoille,
bandee d'or a grant mervoille
testot le cors desi as hanches
et ansemant totes les manches.
Un chier mantel ot afublé
menuement ert d'or goté;
a un fil d'or ert galonee
et a teste ot d'orfrois bandee.
Aporter fist un coivre d'or
qu'el fist traire de son tresor;
cent saietes i ot d'or mier,
les fleches erent de cormier.
Eneas, vv. 1466-1478.

[39] Chaucer, vv. 1198-1203.

[40] Caxton, pp. 53-54.

[41] In tali cultu Dido exiuit: in Arpalice vestita (veste virili) calcas in pedibus, ciclade induta, fibulam habens, alte cincta; atque vittam ex auro et gemmis super comam capitis sui constrinxit (*Excidium Troiae*, pp. 34-35).

The changes that occurred in adapting the details of the war in Italy were less exaggerated than those in adapting the romance of Dido. For the attack on the fortified camp on the Tiber (*Aeneid* IX: 503-514) the *Excidium Troiae* gives no details at all. Simon combines the assault with the earlier challenges (IX: 25-41) and the later firing of the tower (IX: 525-575). Details of the assault are lost except for the circling of the beseiged.[42] The *Roman d'Eneas* has added some specific details to the account in the *Aeneid*: slings, three assaults, and the number of the dead, 3000. The ladders and the fact that the ditch was filled in has been omitted, and in the *Eneas* the dead fall into the bottom of this open ditch.[43]

The *Eneydos* renders the assault in this manner:

> And thenne they of the ooste blew vp their trompettes for to gyue a sharpe sawte / And taried not, but dyde hie theim for to fylle the dyches / and for to dresse vp the laddres ayenste the walles / And they that were there vpon the walles, brake theyr sheldes and theyr pauesses / And the hardy knyghtes troians that had lerned for to defende / casted vpon theym grete logges, with sharpe yron atte the ende, and gret stones. They that cam firste to assawte the place, myght not suffre no lenger the strengthe of the troians, that were vpon the walles of theyr fortresse.[44]

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[42] *Quid loquar assultus, cedes, incendia, predas,*
Dum Rutili cingunt obsidione Friges?
Damnius insultat quasi iam sub carcere clausis;
Sed qui tela tenent nulla cathena tenet.
Exprobat et dextras et cor muliebre uirorum,
Vt Friges in campum uel pudor ipse trahat.
Explorans aditus per quos irrumpere possit,
Circuit obsessos sicut ouile lupus.
Quo iaculante faces in turrem, dum furit ignis,
Obruit inclusos tanta ruina Friges.
Simon, vv. 761-770.

[43] *Cil sont desus et cil sont bas,*
de maintenant fierent el tas
et botent les par les lancieres,
brisent escuz, percent ventrieres,
les chars lor lessent jus aler,
trois mil an i ont rait ruser,
qui el rossé chieent al fonz;
ileuc les ocient a monz;
ne peut estre qui ileuc chiet,
que a grant poine s'an reliet.
Teus trois asalz lor font lo jor,
Toz tens an ont lo noiallor.
Eneas, vv. 5331-5342.

[44] Caxton, p. 138.

Certain other details of the attack as Vergil wrote it are still missing: that part of the Volsci sought a place where they might enter, and that they sought to position the ladders where the ramparts were less defended. A detail is added: the "grete logges wyth sharpe yron atte the ende."

Let us notice at this point that the *Eneydos* is typically a medieval redaction in its use of the *ordo naturalis*, the use of the earlier history of Troy and the later history of Rome, and in the suppression of the events of book six. It seems closer to the *Aeneid*, on the contrary, than any other single adaptation in the use of the Roman gods and in the absence of actors and setting idealized and otherwise transformed for the medieval audience. Several additions to the text of the *Aeneid* which are included as part of the *Eneydos* need special examination.

The *Eneydos* included a version of the Dido story based on Boccaccio's *De Casibus Virorum Illustrium*. The *De Casibus Virorum* was based ultimately on what was considered in the Middle Ages as the true story of Dido — the version given in Justinus' *Historia ex Trogo Pompeio* - and before the *Eneydos* the *Primera Crónica General* included both versions of the Dido story and took its material directly from both Vergil and Justinus.[45] For the second time the original author of the *Eneydos* wonders about truth. Boccaccio in the fifteenth century has almost the authority of Vergil, for the author questions why Boccaccio, "an auctour so gretely renommed, hath transposed, or atte lest duyuersifyed the falle and cass otherwyse than vyrgyle hath in his fourth booke of Eneydos."[46] There is little attempt in the *Eneydos* to reconcile these versions except that the *Eneydos* finds a political lesson in both. About the Boccaccio version the *Eneydos* comments, "the countrey (Carthage) is in surety, delyuerd from bataylle by thy ryght dolorouse deth, whiche hathe quenched the playsaunt fygure of thy grete beaulte."[47]

In the *Aeneid* Dido knows that Aeneas is of divine parentage, because *degeneres animos timor arguit* (IV: 13). This idea in the *Eneydos* is expanded with specific details which describe the actions of base folk:

> For they whiche ben borne of basse parentage, ben ouer moche ferdeful & couuerte in theyr fayttes / and drede theym fleynge, and kepe theym oute of the palayces & courtes of grete lordes / And yf it happen theym to entre, anone they retourne or hide theym in corners vnder the tapytes, or byhinde the grete fote of the yate for to yssue and goo oute first wythoute makyng ony bruyt or medlynge...[48]

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[45] A. Hortis, *Studi sulle Opere Latine del Boccaccio* (Trieste, 1879), p. 479. The *Primera Crónica General* is a rarity among medieval chronicles in that it utilized not Justin but Vergil and Ovid as sources. See F. Rühl, *Die Verbreitung des Justinus im Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1872).

[46] Caxton, p. 23.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

The doctrine that a knight will intuitively act in a knightly manner, and a "vilein" with "vileinye" is, of course, a romance cliché and can be found widely dispersed, from *King Horn* and *Libeaus Desconus* to Malory's story of Gareth. The reference to the Caucasus in the "*nec tibi diva parens*" speech of vituperation (IV: 365) is explicated in eighteen lines of the *Eneydos*, starting "whiche is a mountayne terryble in ynde all ful of harde stones of dyuerse fygures."[49] The *Eneydos* has enlarged the reference to Daedalus in book six (VI:14-19) into a full account of his story. The reference to the background of King Latinus (VII: 45-46) is expanded to trace the descent of the rulers of Italy from Latinus to Julius Caesar. We recall that at the end of book four Dido is not quite dead and Juno sends Iris down to clip a lock of Dido's hair thus releasing the soul from the body (IV: 693-705). In the *Eneydos* this incident proceeds not unlike the debates between the daughters of God in medieval dramas, for example the debate of Mercy and Pec with Rytwysnes and Trweth in the *Castle of Perseverence*.[50] According to the *Eneydos* Dido has been relieved from the damning responsibility of her suicide by being described as "dyspowrueyed of witte" and as a victim of "deceptyon of frawdulent induction," so in exchange for Dido's soul Iris gives Proserpine a lock of hair.[51] Dido is not punished for suicide in Dante's *Commedia*, we recall, but for *lussuria* on the second level of hell ("Inferno" V:69).

These expansions in the *Eneydos* are obviously intended to make clearer what is implied in the story of the *Aeneid*.[52] They explain references to persons and places, comment on sources, and explicate possible obscurities. Thus they suggest the scholia and glosses which have been part of the Vergilian texts throughout their history. If we separate the expansions from those parts of the *Eneydos* which are adapted directly from the *Aeneid*, as the scholia and glosses were separated, then the relationship of the *Eneydos* to the *Aeneid* becomes even more apparent.

We notice that the *Eneydos* does not have the rhetorical splendours of Simon's *Ilias Latina*, the imaginative plotting of the *Primera Crónica General*, the colorful pageantry of the *Roman d'Eneas*, nor the careful synthesis of the *Hous of Fame* and the "Legend of Dido." We can certainly say that it is closer to the *Aeneid* than any of these. For the first time in the vernacular the ideal in the *Aeneid* is not wholly transformed to suit the tastes of its audience. Only the *Excidium Troiae* presents an equally untransformed adaptation, and the difference in language between the two illustrates the difference in popular taste between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries.

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[50] See Hope Traver, *The Four Daughters of God* (Philadelphia, 1907) and R. Klinefelter, "The Four Daughters of God: a new Version", *JEGP* LII (1953), 90-95. Neither mentions this episode in the *Eneydos*.

[51] Caxton, p. 113.

[52] The informationis obviously not derived from Servius nor from any glossated manuscript in the Bodleian. In Servius the Caucasus is said to be in Scythia, according to the *Eneydos* it is in India. The apparent metaphysical inconsistency in IV: 696 is eventually resolved in the Servius Danielis by a differentiation between *fata denuntiativa* and *fata condicionalia* cf. ed. of. G. Thilo and H. Hagen (Leipzig, 1878-1901): I, 529; 582-584.

The reader of the *Eneydos* is asked to accept a more nearly Vergilian Aeneas in a more nearly Vergilian setting than any reader of a vernacular before it. Thus the *Eneydos* was already looking forward to the sixteenth century and the wider use of the vernacular in transmitting Vergil. In its purpose it was also forward-looking. Its prologue tells us that the *Eneydos* is a work:

> In whiche may alle valyaunt prynces and other nobles see many valorous fayttes of armes. And also this present boke is necessarye to alle cytezens & habytaunts in townes and castellis / for they shal see, How somtyme troye the grau*n*te / and many other places stronge and inexpugnable, haue ben be-sieged sharpely & assayled, And also coragyously and valyau*n*tly defended / and the sayd boke is atte this present tyme moche necessarye / for to enstructe smale and grete, for eueryche in his ryght / to kepe & defende / For a thynge more noble is to dye / than vylanously to be subdued.[53]

This is the attitude taken toward the *Aeneid* by such sixteenth-century figures as Sidney in "An Apologie for Poetrie":

> Only let *Aeneas* be worne in the tablet of your memory; how he gouerneth himselfe in the ruine of his Country;... and I thinke, in a minde not preiudiced with a preiudicating humor, hee will be found in excellence fruitefull...[54]

In its use of the vernacular and in its presentation of the *Aeneid* as a guide for princes, the *Eneydos* seems to have taken the first two steps towards the Renaissance.

We have seen, however, that the original author of the *Eneydos* formed it to a preconceived standard of truth. After the *Eneydos* at least one more step remained to be taken before the attitudes of the Renaissance could be fully realized. That final step was a translation of Vergil not governed by a sense of preconceived truth but governed by a sense of Vergil, himself, and it was this step that Gavin Douglas undertook. The *Eneydos*, then, stands between this Scottish translation and the other medieval redactions of the *Aeneid*.

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[53] Caxton, p. 10.

[54] In G. Gregory Smith, *Elizabethan Critical Essays* (Oxford, 1950), I, 179-180.

Gilbert of Poitiers, Author of the "De Discretione animae, spiritus et mentis" commonly attributed to Achard of Saint Victor

NICHOLAS M. HARING

I

UNDER the shelf number 1773 (Ii. 3. 9), the catalogue of the University Library of Cambridge lists a manuscript described as *a folio, on parchment, containing ff. 165, in double columns of 33 lines. Date, the XIIIth century.*[1] Good paleographical reasons favour the view that the manuscript is from the end of the twelfth century.[2] The catalogue describes the contents of the first 107 folios as *S. Augustini opera varia.*[3] These are followed by the *Explanatio fidei S. Ieronymi* (ff. 107-109). Although the next item (109-111) is supposed to be an anonymous tract on the Eucharist, it is really copied from Lombard's *Collectanea* in 1 Cor. 11:24,[4] to which the scribe has added three short paragraphs.[5]

Equally anonymous is the next work (ff. 111-118) whose title, *De Substantia interiori*, seems to be original. This title is added again by a later hand in the upper right-hand corner of each succeeding folio. On folio 112 the same later hand has added: *De Anima et potentiis eius.*[6] The tract ends on line 22 in the first column of folio 118v, leaving a space that has been filled by short paragraphs, *De Fide, De Imagine*[7] and some short excerpts from St. Augustine.

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[1] *A Catalogue of the Mss. preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge* III (Cambridge 1858), 412.

[2] F. W. Maitland suggests in *The Law Quarterly Review* 13 (1897) 133, that the date is "near but rather before than after the year 1200."

[3] *Catalogue*, pp. 412-413.

[4] PL 191, 1641C-1645D.

[5] The addition reads: Caro Christi dicitur *nubes* quia nobis refrigerium praestat contra incentiva vitiorum: *levis*, quia sine peccato fuit.

[6] The foliation given agrees with that of the catalogue. According to the more recent numbering, folio 112 is folio 113.

[7] The first paragraph reads: Est fides mortua, est fides ficta, est fides probata. Fides mortua est cui caritas vita non est. Per caritatem enim fides movetur et quasi vegetatur ad bene operandum. De hac dicitur: fides sine operibus mortua est. Hanc quidem daemones

These texts, unrelated to the previous paragraphs, were likely added by the scribe in order to fill the entire folio.

On the next folio (119) begins the *De Quinque haeresibus*, written by a different but contemporary scribe (ff. 119-125). It is followed by *De Agone christiano* (ff. 126-133) and a sermon by Bede (attributed to St. Augustine). The catalogue also fails to provide the name of the author of the next tract: *De Sancta Trinitate* (ff. 138-146). It was written by Walter of Mortagne.[8]

Then we find *Magistri Vacarii Tractatus de Assumpto Homine* (ff. 145-150).[9] Vacarius, a Lombard, taught Roman Law in England in 1147 and, to the best of my knowledge, no other copy of this tractate is extant. Vacarius is also the author of the next work found in our manuscript (ff. 150-158). It is his *Summa de matrimonio*, edited by F. W. Maitland[10] and not extant in any other known manuscript. The rest of the *codex* contains an *Expositio simboli* (ff. 158-165), attributed to St. Augustine.[11] The manuscript was once owned by a Magister Walter Crome, professor of Sacred Theology, who had bought it from Magister William Lavender in 1432. In 1444 Crome bequeathed it to the University Library of Cambridge.

The work that interests us here bears the title: *De Substantia interiori* and is identical with what Germain Morin has published as *Un Traité inédit d'Achard de Saint-Victor.*[12] Morin used only one manuscript (Paris, Bibl. Maz. 1002, fols. 242v-247), in which the title of our treatise reads: *Tractatus magistri A. de discretione animae, spiritus et mentis.* The title does not seem to be an addition by a later hand. At the end of the last century, Morin had already

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habent (*Jac.* 2:19): Credunt enim et contremiscunt. Fides ficta est quae vitam quidem secundum initialem recipit caritatem sed veniente temptatione tamquam abortivum deficit. Haec est malorum Christianorum. De quibus dicitur quia ad tempus credunt et in tempore temptationis recedunt. Fides probata est quae vitam, caritatem scilicet, in se habens operatur ex dilectione. De qua dicitur quia iustus ex fide vivit. Quae probata dicitur. Vas enim figuli probat fornax et iustum temptatio tribulationis. Fides daemonum non probatur. Mortua enim prorsus est nec quicquam habet vitae. Fides ficta probatur et deficit. Fides (probata) probatur, tribulatur et proficit. Then follows a paragraph which reads: Triplex est imago: imago creationis, imago recreationis, imago similitudinis. Imago creationis est in qua creatus est homo, scilicet ratio. Imago recreationis est per quam reformatur imago creata, scilicet Dei gratia quae menti reformandae infunditur. Imago similitudinis est ad quam factus est homo qui factus est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, non Patris tantum vel Filii sed totius Trinitatis. Per memoriam similis est Patri, per intelligentiam Filio, per dilectionem Spiritui sancto. This second paragraph is based on Lombard, *In Ps.* 89:19; PL 191, 842A.

[8] PL 209, 575-590.

[9] An analysis and edition has appeared in *Mediaeval Studies* 21 (1959), 147-175.

[10] *Magistri Vacarii Summa de matrimonio* published in *The Law Quarterly Review* 13 (1897) 270-287.

[11] *Catalogue*, p. 415.

[12] *Beiträge*, Suppl. III, 1 (1935) 251-262. Morin had copied the text as early as 1888.

dealt with the problem of authorship in a short article entitled: *Un traité faussement attribué à Adam de Saint-Victor.*[13] In it he agrees with Paul Lejay's view that the tract is not the work of Adam of Saint Victor.[14]

On the authority of C. Oudin, the *Histoire littéraire* attributes it to Achard of Saint Victor.[15] Oudin lists two copies, one preserved at the library of Saint Victor in Paris and one at the library of "Saint-Benoit de Cambridge." The library of saint Victor must have owned two copies, one of which (Bibl. Maz.) was used by Morin while the second is now at the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris.[16] We have seen that the first of these two manuscripts (Bibl. Maz.) attributes the work to *magister A.*, but the second is anonymous and bears the title: *De Discretione animae, spiritus et mentis.* The main reason why Morin took Achard to be the author was the title found in a copy already listed by Oudin (Saint Benoit), still extant at Corpus Christi College,[17] Cambridge: *Tractatus magistri Achardi de divisione animae et spiritus* (fol. 131). Morin admits that Hauréau expressed doubts concerning Achard's authorship.[18] Yet he maintains that internal evidence is in Achard's favour: "Les caractères intrinsèques de l'opuscule suppléent assez bien à ce qui nous manque en fait de témoignages externes. C'est tout à fait le style et la manière d'Achard: son génie subtil et lucide tout ensemble, sa hardiesse à scruter les mystères de l'être humain, jointe au mysticisme dont toute son école porte l'empreinte; avec cela un ton vif, ingénieux, éloquent même par endroits, incomparablement plus attrayant que celui des scolastiques de l'âge suivant."[19]

It is difficult to see how Morin could state: "C'est tout à fait le style et la manière d'Achard," for he fails to offer a single example to illustrate Achard's style and mannerisms. And what we know of Achard's style does not seem to confirm Morin's assertion. The excerpts from Achard's works published by various scholars[20] reveal a Latin style that is good but clearly different from that found in our treatise. The same appears to be true of the two excerpts from Achard's *De Trinitate* quoted by John of Cornwall.[21]

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[13] *Rev. Bén.* 16 (1899) 218-219.

[14] *Rev. d'hist. et de litt. rel.* 4 (1899) 161-165.

[15] *Hist. litt. de la France* 13, 455. C. Oudin, *Commentarius* II, 1299. B. Hauréau, *Hist. litt. de la Maine* I (Paris 1870) 11.

[16] *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 14842, fols. 17-20. St. Victor, nº. 522.

[17] *Ms.* Cambridge, Corpus Christi College 451, fols. 131-134. Cf. M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue* II (Cambridge 1912) 372-375.

[18] *Rev. Bén.* 16 (1899) 218.

[19] *Ibid.* p. 219.

[20] Jean Chatillon, "Achard de Saint-Victor et les controverses Christologiques du xɪɪᵉ siècle," *Mél. F. Cavallera* (Toulouse 1948) 326 ff. M.-Th. d'Alverny, "Achard de Saint-Victor," *RTAM* 21 (1954) 305 f. M.-M. Lebreton, "Recherches sur les principaux thèmes théol. traités dans les sermones du xɪɪᵉ siècle," *RTAM* 23 (1956) 5-18. Chatillon and Lebreton offer excerpts from sermons, while Miss d'Alverny offers transcriptions from Achard's *De Trinitate.*

The author of the *De Discretione* makes two references to previous writings, but they are likewise insufficient to solve the problem of authorship. He remarks on one occasion that the substance of which he is speaking is nothing but a power (*potentia*) "as has been shown elsewhere".[22] Morin says in a footnote: *De quonam opere hic agatur, ignarus sum.*[23] Later in the treatise the author makes reference to his *Quaestiones de peccato.*[24] These *Quaestiones* have not been identified. But Morin draws attention to some unpublished *Quaestiones diligenter pertractatae a magistro Achardo abbate Sancti Victoris*[25] and to the fact that Achard's name is cited in connection with the opinion that original sin consists in the *privatio justitiae.*[26] The *Quaestiones diligenter pertractatae* were hardly written by Achard. They date back to Odo of Ourscamp or his school.[27]

Far from overestimating the value of these references, Morin bases his acceptance on the explicit attribution of the work to Achard in the manuscript preserved at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. It is, of course, presumptuous to question such external evidence, unless serious reasons militate against it. But we must admit that there *are* good reasons to question Achard's authorship.

Among the four manuscript copies of our work two are anonymous, one offers the initial *A.*, and one the full name. This is sufficient reason for the assumption that the work was first circulated without the name of its author, for if an author's name is missing, the normal presumption would be that the scribe did not have it in his exemplar. We have seen that the library of Saint Victor owned two copies, one anonymous (*P*) with the appropriate title written in large letters: *De Discretione animae, spiritus et mentis.*[28] The script is that of the early thirteenth century. In the second copy (*M*) once owned by St. Victor, likewise written in the thirteenth century, we find the tract with material of an entirely different sort. Its first section contains the *sermones Godefridi, canonici S. Victoris* and such smaller items as the *epitaphium Godefridi,*[29] while the second section contains works by Hugh of St. Victor. In this second section is found the *Tractatus magistri A. de discretione animae, spiritus et mentis* (fol. 242vb). A glance at the variants shows that both copies belong to the same family and one may well be inclined to suspect that the attribution to *magister A.* originated in that very family. It is quite possible that the addition was made at St. Victor where Achard had been abbot until he became bishop of Avranches in 1161.

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[21] *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertium*; ed. N. Haring, *Med. Stud.* 13 (1951) 267. Miss d'Alverny, who is preparing an edition of Achard's *De Trinitate* which she had the rare fortune to discover, writes in a letter: "I am trying to use this *De Anima* — quite interesting, indeed — to correct some sentences in my very poor *ms.* of Achard's *De Trinitate*... Achard's mannerisms are not so obvious in the *De Anima*, but I found several parallels."

[22] *De Discretione*, 6.

[23] *Beiträge*, Suppl. III, 1 (1935) 254. At an earlier date, Morin had suggested that the reference might be to his *De Trinitate.*

[24] *De Discretione*, 20.

[25] *Ms.* Dijon 219 (181), fols. 204-216. *Cat. Gén.* 5 (1889) 67.

[26] *Alleg. in Nov. Test.* VI; PL 175, 887A: Cujus justitiae privatio dicitur originale peccatum secundum magistrum Achardum. See also the *Quaestiones in Epp. Pauli*; PL 175, 531C.

[27] Without any introduction, the Quaestiones diligenter pertractatae a magistro Achardo begin as follows: Oratio 'Per ea quae sumimus potiora sumamus'... The text is found in Odo's *Quaestiones* edited by J. Pitra, *Anal. Nov. Spic. Sol. Altera Continuatio* II (Paris 1888) 21. The question (fol. 205v) dealing with the Holy Trinity is found in Pitra II, 22. The question (fol. 205vb) which begins: Augustinus, Quanto indebita tanto gratiora is also found in Pitra II, 23. The same is true of the question beginning with the words: Gregorius: In omnibus quae agimus (fol. 207ra) and the question: Quaeritur utrum hoc mandatum Diliges Deum (fol. 207rb), both of which are contained in Pitra's edition (II, 27 f.). A number of other questions attributed to Achard are identical with those published by Pitra. However some seem to be absent from Pitra's collection.

The copy extant at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, belonged to St. Mary's Abbey, York, and is contained in a *codex* written by different scribes at the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries.[30] Its variants agree with those of the two copies (*MP*) once owned by the library of St. Victor. In other words, the three (*CMP*) belong to one and the same family. One (*P*) of the three copies is anonymous. But if the scribe who made the copy had found the author's name in his exemplar, he would surely have passed it on.

The assumption that the treatise was originally anonymous is strengthened by its anonymity in the manuscript preserved at the University Library in Cambridge.[31] This allows us to conclude that, in all probability, the author's name was prefixed to the treatise at a later date, presumably not by the author himself. Anonymity was not uncommon in the twelfth century.

It now remains for us to examine whether the attribution to Achard, no matter where or by whom it was made, was correct. Internal evidence points clearly to another author who generally failed to attach his name to his works: Gilbert of Poitiers. Anyone familiar with Gilbert's style and terminology will recognize him in such a sentence as: Quamvis enim nonnisi unum sit, quo (Deus) vult vel potest, non tamen unum est quod vult vel potest. Nec idem est ipsum velle vel posse et hoc et illud, licet eodem utrumque velit et possit.[32] Our writer means that, although the action or *id quo* of God's will and power issues from one and the same simple substance, the object or aim of the action is not one and the same. In addition we are told that it is not the same to say: God wills this and that, and to say: God can do this and that, despite the fact that an act of his will or an act of his power proceeds from one and the same divine substance. However, since the divine will and power produce numerous effects, Scripture speaks of many powers (*Ps.* 105:2) and many wills (*Ps.* 110:2) in God. Our author also claims that, for a similar reason, Scripture speaks of the 'manifold Spirit of Wisdom' (*Sap.* 7:2) and calls the divine Wisdom *multiformis* (*Eph.* 3:10).

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[28] *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes* 30 (1860) 51.

[29] A. Molinier, *Cat. des MSS. de la Bibl. Mazarine* I (Paris 1885) 501. Cf. Ph. Delhaye, "Les sermons de Godefroy de Saint-Victor," *RTAM* 21 (1954) 195-197.

[30] M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue* II (Cambridge 1912) 375.

[31] *A Cat. of the MSS* III (Cambridge 1858) 412.

Although Gilbert's *Commentary on the Psalms* does not go into the reasons why Scripture uses the plural of will and power in God,[33] his commentary on *Eph.* 3:10 tells us why the Wisdom of God is called *multiformis*. He says: *Multiformis sapientiae Dei* i.e. quam Dei sapientia, in substantia quidem simplex sed rerum a se conditarum effectu multiformis, constituit...[34] Our author speaks in this context of the divine potentia sive voluntas secundum substantiam simplex et una, secundum multa tamen, quae utrique subsunt, multiplicatur...[35] The words may vary to some extent, but the thought expressed by both writers in explaining the same term is the same: the *substantia simplex* may well be called *multiformis* in view of its numerous effects.

The author of the *De Discretione animae* quotes another text from St. Paul (I *Cor.* 14:14 f.) to show that the Apostle distinguishes between *spiritus* and *mens*.[36] In his commentary on this text, Gilbert writes: *Si* enim *orem* i.e. loquar *lingua*, *spiritus* quidem *meus orat* i.e. illa inferior vis animae rerum quoquo modo significatarum similitudines suscipit. What Gilbert calls *illa inferior vis* is the spirit in relation to the mind later described as *vis animae altior*. He continues: *Mens autem mea* i.e. altera vis animae altior *sine fructu* intelligendi *est*. This second and higher power, as we have noted, is the mind in relation to the spirit. The commentator goes on to say: *Quid ergo* faciendum? *Orabo spiritu, orabo et mente; et psallam spiritu, et psallam mente*, ut scilicet et rerum signa formentur in spiritu et refulgeat eorumdem signorum intellectus in mente. *Ceterum*, quasi: qualiter dictum est, intellectus mentis necessarius est post linguam et spiritum...[37]

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[32] *De Discretione*, 9.

[33] See Gilbert's comments on *Ps.* 105:2 and *Ps.* 110:2 in *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 12004, fols. 141v and 150v.

[34] *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 14441, fol. 77rb.

[35] *De Discretione*, 9.

[36] *De Discretione*, 26. Cf. Lombard, *Collect.* in I *Cor.* 14:14; PL 191, 1667A. Lombard used Gilbert's commentaries on the Psalms and on St. Paul.

[37] *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 14441, fol. 40v. See also Lombard, *ibid.;* PL 191, 1667C. It should

It is important to note that, according to Gilbert, the *rerum signa*, also called *imagines*, are formed in the spirit but are properly understood only in the mind. The author of our treatise also holds that the spirit forms the images of things[38] and that the proper understanding of those images can be achieved only by or in the mind.[39] For him, too, the mind is above the spirit: Est enim mens in summo, anima in imo, spiritus in medio.[40]

We learn from the same treatise that in *Eph.* 4:23, St. Paul means *mens* where he uses the word 'spirit'. The comment reads: *Reformamini spiritu mentis vestrae* i.e. spiritu QUI est mens vestra.[41] The significance of this comment must be seen in the relative clause whose function is to identify spirit and mind: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," made no sense in our author's psychology where mind and spirit are two distinct powers. For that reason the phrase 'the spirit of your mind' had to be interpreted "intransitively," as his contemporaries used to put it. Accordingly, 'the spirit of your mind' means 'the spirit which is your mind'. This qualification is made in order to stress the view that the spiritual renewal of which the Apostle speaks takes place in the highest power, the mind, and not in the lower power, the spirit.

In commenting on the same text, Gilbert expresses the same thought by using a relative clause: *Renovamini* autem *spiritu mentis vestrae* i.e. mente QUAE spiritus est. It is here immaterial whether the mind is identified with the spirit or the spirit with the mind, but the method is obviously the same. Gilbert continues: Simile dictum *in expoliatione corporis carnis* (*Col.* 2:11) i.e. carnis QUAE corpus est. Omnis enim caro corpus est. Non vero omne corpus caro est... Similiter omnis mens spiritus est sed non omnis spiritus est mens. Nam et Deus et ventus et tam pecoris quam hominis anima et illa vis animae, ad quam pertinent imagines corporum, dicitur 'spiritus' et altera via animae, ad quam intelligibilia pertinent i.e. mens, 'spiritus' dicitur. Ideoque, cum praemiserit *spiritu*, quo volens intelligi addit *mentis*. Et qualiter posset in mente haec innovatio fieri, docet dicens: *Induite...*[42] The *ima-*

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be mentioned here that, if Gilbert is proven to be the author of the *De Discretione*, a greater precision and a certain amount of doctrinal development may be expected in the more mature work. To offer an example, in commenting St. Paul's letters, Gilbert calls both the mind and the spirit a vis animae. The author of the *De Discretione*, however, teaches three formally distinct powers of the inferior substance: mind, spirit and soul. As a consequence he can no longer call either the mind or the spirit a vis animae.

[38] *De Discretione*, 47 and 60 f.

[39] *De Discretione*, 49-51.

[40] *De Discretione*, 31.

[41] *De Discretione*, 63. See Lombard, *Coll. in Eph.* 4:23; PL 192, 205A.

[42] *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 14441, fol. 79va-79vb.

gines corporum mentioned in this text are the *rerum signa* of the passage quoted above. We are told again that they belong to the spirit whereas the *intelligibilia* belong to the mind. This is also the doctrine in our treatise.[43]

The writer of the *De Discretione animae* is very familiar with Sacred Scripture and notes that scriptural usage is not quite uniform. To illustrate this, he quotes I *Thess.* 5:23 and concludes: Hic igitur aut nomine 'spiritus' duo comprehenduntur superiora aut nomine 'animae' duo inferiora.[44] Gilbert is not so explicit in commenting on the same text. He simply takes the word 'spirit' to signify the mind: *Ipse autem Deus* dator *pacis sanctificet vos per omnia ut* scilicet *et spiritus vester*, de quo alibi: *Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae* (*Eph.* 4:23), QUI scilicet est mens, quae servit legi Dei, *servetur integer*...[45]

The text just quoted is another example of Gilbert's method in the use of the relative clause. At the same time it shows again that according to Gilbert the justification of man takes place in the mind. He expresses this thought in a sentence found in his commentary on Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus* where he speaks of the effect qui ipso (Deo) nos iustificante vel mentem nostram ad agendum officio et fine officii bene constituente vel ipsam mentem ad sic agendum movente provenit.[46]

The author of our treatise explains at length the meaning of the phrase *exaltare Deum.* He is quite anxious to point out that the *exaltatio* takes place in the two powers of the mind, viz. the intellect and the will.[47] Then he goes on to say: Sic profecto, dum *accedit homo ad cor altum* (*Ps.* 63:7), vere exaltatur Deus. He sees in this text the confirmation of his theory. This is also the opinion voiced by Gilbert in his commentary on *Ps.* 63:7: *Ad cor altum* i.e. ad alti cordis intellectum, ut scilicet de divinis inquirat. *Et* ibi *exaltabitur Deus.*[48] In other words: the *exaltatio* is located in the power of the mind, the intellect.

In discussing the *exaltatio*, the author of the *De Discretione animae* sees in the contemplation of the divine majesty an important element of the *exaltatio.* He writes: Intellectus... deitatis maiestatem contemplatur et immensam et incomprehensibilem...[49] The same association of ideas occurs in Gilbert's comment on *Ps.* 63:7 where he remarks: Ubi etiam exaltatur quia sic maiestas eius magis et magis incomprehensibilis invenitur.[50] In his famous preface to the commentaries on the *opuscula sacra* he also speaks of Deus... contemplatione incomprehensibilis.[51]

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[43] *De Discretione*, 39.

[44] *De Discretione*, 74.

[45] *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 14441, fol. 91vb. Lombard, *Collectanea* in I *Thess.* 5:23; PL 192, 310A.

[46] *Expositio in Boethii De Hebdomadibus*, 47; ed. N. Haring, *Traditio* 9 (1953) 210.

[47] *De Discretione*, 68.

[48] *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 12004, fol. 78v. Cf. Lombard, *In Ps.* 63:7; PL 191, 578B.

[49] *De Discretione*, 67.

A comparison between Gilbert's manner of writing and that found in the *De Discretione animae* strengthens the conclusion that he wrote the tract. Gilbert's scriptural commentaries, however, still lack the maturity and polish of style so characteristic of his later commentaries on Boethius. The close similarity in this respect between his later works and the *De Discretione animae* suggests that Gilbert wrote our treatise at a relatively late date of his life. A few examples may suffice to illustrate some peculiarities of Gilbert's style. In his commentary on the *De Hebdomadibus* we read: Unde et in eadem mundana sphaera aër et aqua ita sunt media quod igni aër quam aqua similior... Sic et terrae aqua loco quam aër est vicinior quoniam ipsa quoque similitudine est illi quam aër coniunctior.[52] This construction reflects a personal style for which Gilbert must have had his own reasons, for the average writer of his day would have said: aër similior igni quam aqua... et loco aqua vicinior est terrae quam aër... et similitudine aqua est coniunctior terrae quam aër. But that is not Gilbert's style, in which we find a careful balance and a thrifty economy of words. The use of *ipsa* and *illi* does not make the reading easier, but Gilbert often makes use of such pronouns rather than repeat a noun.

The author of the *De Discretione animae* raises the question: quae (est) in potentia unitas Veritatis quam imaginis amplior?[53] Another writer would have written: quae est amplior unitas in potentia Veritatis quam imaginis? Gilbert's combination of *ita...quod* is also found in the *De Discretione animae:* ita plures dicitur et est potentiae quod eas in se comprehendit pariter universas.[54] Both the grammatical construction and the word order in the sentence: Mens quoque in his tribus intima est: spiritus mente exterior sed animâ interior[55] are certainly uncommon for this period but they illustrate Gilbert's careful balance of words and conciseness of expression. The result is surely stylistically superior to: spiritus est exterior quam mens sed interior quam anima. In Gilbert's commentary on the *De Trinitate* we meet the same construction in the sentence: Neque enim homine homo maior aut dignior esset...[56] When we find, in the *De Discretione animae*, the sentence: Spiritus vero mente carni quidem est propinquior sed animâ remotior,[57] we cannot but admit that the style points to Gilbert again.

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[50] *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 12004, fol. 78v.

[51] *Expositio in Boethii de Trinitate*; ed. N. Haring, *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers* (Toronto 1955) 32.

[52] *Expos. in Boethii de Hebdomadibus*, 16; ed. Haring, p. 195.

[53] *De Discretione*, 10.

[54] *De Discretione*, 20.

[55] *De Discretione*, 32.

[56] *Expos. in Boethii de Trinitate* 1, 1, 6; ed. Haring, p. 43.

Perhaps even more convincing is the following sentence taken from the *De Discretione animae:* Cui enim potius quam Spiritui Dei attribuenda fuerat locutio spiritualis, divinitus spiritu et spirituum spirituali spiritualiter formata ministerio, in spiritu quoque a spiritu spirituali percepta modo?[58] This is Gilbert's style and compactness as we know it through his commentaries on Boethius. And if further corroboration were necessary, we could recognize the bishop of Poitiers in the subtle sarcasm with which the author of the *De Discretione* disposes of those who doubt whether angels possess a mind: De mente illorum si quis ambigit, de eo quidem utrum mentem ipse habeat ambigi potest nisi quia sine mente nemo de re aliqua ambigere potest.[59] That Gilbert was quite capable of such sarcasm is well known.[60]

It is, of course, the cumulative evidence that leads us to the conclusion that not Achard but the bishop of Poitiers is the author of the *De Discretione animae, spiritus et mentis.* If we now return to Morin's characterization of Achard and substitute Gilbert's name, we shall find it surprisingly accurate. The *mysticisme* of which Morin speaks actually adds an interesting touch to our concept of Gilbert's personality: when Gilbert analyzes the *exaltare Deum* and speaks of the internal joy and happiness which makes the spirit dance and leap,[61] he appears to speak from personal experience.

II

An analysis of Gilbert's treatise should be especially valuable for those who may be less familiar with his style. The first sentence reads: "The interior substance, together with the body, constitutes man. According to the various activities or functions which this substance has or can have, it is usually divided into various powers which we also call its virtual parts" (1).[1] However, that substance is by itself and in itself a power essentially one, simple and undivided. By means of this power, Gilbert continues, the substance can do whatever its nature enables it to do. Accordingly, the substance has power by itself, though not from itself. In the first respect, it has a likeness to God; in the second respect, it differs from God, for God has power both in himself and from himself (2).

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[57] *De Discretione,* 61.

[58] *De Discretione,* 55.

[59] *De Discretione,* 57.

[60] See his praefatio to *De Trinitate*; ed. Haring, p. 33, and his *Contra Eutychen* 4, 25 and 7, 9; ed. Haring, *AHDLM* 21 (1954) 303 and 330.

[61] Cf. *De Discretione,* 67f.

[1] The numbers in brackets refer to the numeration in the edition below.

For Gilbert it is no contradiction to say that God is at once substance and power or at once power and substance. Nor is it, in like manner, a contradiction in the creature made to God's likeness, a likeness which it bears in so far as its natural power is no quality or form but its very essence which is nothing else but the substance itself (2).

Gilbert offers two reasons for this identification: if the power were not (identical with) its substance but rather its form, something would be required to support or carry that power, something to which the substance would be united accidentally, not substantially. The result of this union would be a thing that could no longer be considered to be simple since it would be composed of the power as form and of the recipient, whether the recipient of the form is matter or quasi-matter (3). Hence we would be confronted with a composition in the realm of substances and this union could be dissolved by mental distinction, if not in reality (4).

To strengthen his argument, Gilbert raises some questions which lead into his second reason. If we imagine something that supports the power and constitutes that substance together with the power, what would this something be? Would it be a property? Would it be a substance? But a property cannot be the substratum of a property. If it were a substance, it would be either corporeal or incorporeal. Yet that which is corporeal cannot be part of something incorporeal. If the substance were incorporeal, it would be either rational or irrational. But a rational substance can have neither a corporeal nor an incorporeal substance as a part (5).

Gilbert remarks that he has already shown elsewhere that the substance under discussion is nothing but a power. He proposes to join the arguments of his previous exposition to the reasons given above (6).

As stated before, this power is simple in essence but multiple in the performance of its functions. For that reason and on account of its various relationships to other things, it is called one power in many things or many powers in one, or rather one is called many and many one (7).

We perceive here a similarity with God, whose image this power is. For God is power or will, simple and one in substance. Yet in relation to the many things that originate from and depend on both, God's power or will is multiplied. As a consequence, we speak of God's power and will in the plural (8). Sacred Scripture testifies to this fact when we read: *Quis loquetur potentias Domini* (*Ps.* 105:2) or *omnes voluntates eius* (*Ps.* 110:2). But although that from which God's acts of will and power originate is only one substance, the objects of these acts are by no means one. Gilbert then declares: Nec idem est ipsum velle vel posse et hoc et illud, licet eodem utrumque velit et possit (9). He means that we must differentiate between divine volition and divine power, although both originate from the same divine essence as their common *id quo.* For a similar reason, we learn from Gilbert, the Spirit of wisdom is called *multiplex* and God's wisdom *multiformis* (9).

Anticipating an objection, Gilbert continues: But if you mean to say that with regard to unity and multiplicity, both the divine power and the power under discussion present identical cases of relationship, where then do we find, in this matter, that eminence of the Creator's simplicity over that of the creature, or where can we detect, in this power, a greater unity in the Truth (God) than in its image (10)?

Now we are told to consider either power, not, however, from the point of view of how many objects it is related to, but rather how it is related. For if you turn your attention to the multiplicity of objects to which either power is or can be directed, you will find in either case a multiplicity which, in God, surpasses the multiplicity found in man to the same extent as the divine power surpasses the human (11). But this multiplicity is, as it were, extrinsic since it refers to that which issues from the two powers, not to that which is or can be in these two powers.

If, however, you examine the manner (*modus*) in which either power is or can be related to its action, you will find a multiple intrinsic plurality in man, but none in God (12). For God's power remains immovable in all that he does. This is so because the divine power is not affected in various ways by its various actions. Nothing affects it. Hence it moves everything without moving itself. In acting and in not acting it always remains the same (13).

An inferior power, on the other hand, is affected or changed in various ways. Not only according to its different effects but also because of its various passions is it or can it be subjected to many changes. Hence it is clear that although there is no multiplicity of essence in it, there is a multiplicity of what happens or goes on in its essence (14). The essence of this power, or rather the essence that is this power, undergoes various influences (*affectiones*) through which the essence, though simple in itself, is moved or changed or divided in many ways (15).

The temporary changes (*affectiones*) which take place in it are qualities of a sort by which the same essence or power receives various forms in such a manner that it is not essentially but formally multiplied into various powers. Although the power itself is one in essence, none of these various powers can be said to be identical with any of the others because of the formal distinction by which their plurality is determined (16).

Therefore the will is not and cannot be called reason nor the sense imagination nor the intelligence memory. In fact, we may state the general rule: no power is the other; no power can be called the other. And rightly so (17). The reason for this is seen by Gilbert in the origin or the *causa inventionis* of the words designating those powers. The formation of these words is based precisely on those varying conditions, not on the essence which remains one in all those powers. Hence the signification is attached to those changing states rather than to the one essence. As a result, the words designating the various powers express distinction rather than identity (18).

Moreover, these powers happen to be called qualities because the entire reason for this division of things and words is to be seen in qualities. Yet it is beyond doubt that each and every one of them is the substance and that all of them are one single substance (19).

Gilbert mentions in this context that he had already shown in some *Quaestiones de peccato* that reason and will are one single substance. So he does not wish to pursue the subject further (20).

Now Gilbert goes on to say that the substance or power, which in itself is one, does or can receive forms in various ways according to the multiplicity of temporal changes. Hence it is called, and is in fact, various powers to such a point that the substance comprises all these powers in an equal degree, while none of them can comprise the entire substance. That is why these powers appear to be related to the substance like parts (20). In reality, as a closer examination confirms, they are all that one substance or power. At the same time, each of them is, according to its essense, that entire substance (20).

Our author now turns to theology to elucidate or illustrate his teaching. He points out that when we speak of God, certain words apply only to the divine persons individually: for instance, the words 'Father,' 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit.' Others apply to all persons alike as does the word 'God.' Others apply to two, e.g. 'proceeding from the Father,' which is said of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. In a similar fashion, two persons, viz. Father and Son, are called the cause and principle (*causa et principium*) of the Holy Spirit (21).

If we return to man's interior substance or power, we shall detect a similar use of terminology. Some nouns apply to a single power: for instance, the words 'reason' and 'will'. But other terms such as 'soul' and 'spirit' are applied to different powers. And other nouns, for instance 'mind', apply to several powers, as do 'soul' and 'spirit' which are so interchangeable that one often assumes the meaning of the other. According to one usage, 'soul' and 'spirit' are as completely identical in meaning as *ensis* and *gladius* (21).

It should be noted that the word *anima* occurs here for the first time in Gilbert's exposition. One now obvious reason for this apparently strange silence was the current ambiguity in the use of the word *anima*. Gilbert explains why the words 'soul' and 'spirit' may be used as synonyms. Both nouns, he tells us, designate the one neutral interior substance impartially: ambo enim indifferentem et indifferenter designant substantiam (22). They designate the *incorporeal part* which together with the body constitutes man. They designate that part, not by defining it specifically according to one or several of those three powers into which it is divided, but by determining it in itself as the one simple power by which alone that substance is able to do whatever it does through all the various powers attributed to it. In summarizing his doctrine, Gilbert declares: una est ipsa et omnes ipsa sunt una, affectionibus et effectionibus numerose distincta (22).

Gilbert then notes that the interchangeable use of the words 'soul' and 'spirit' is a frequent occurrence in written as well as spoken language (23). He quotes two texts from Sacred Scripture, one of which (*Matth.* 10:20) contrasts *anima* and *corpus* whereas the second (*Eccle.* 12:7) uses *spiritus* and *pulvis* to express the same contrast. However, when these words are not used broadly to designate the entire part of the interior man but are used to signify definitely and distinctly one of its powers (*virtutes*), then their signification is usually as different as the words themselves. Such a distinction is based on the realities (*res*) to which the two words correspond. These realities are distinct not only from each other but also from the mind. In other words, Gilbert will not use 'soul' and 'spirit' as synonymous. He distinguishes three powers: soul (*anima*), spirit (*spiritus*) and mind (*mens*).

Our author holds that St. Paul distinguishes clearly between spirit and mind in his first letter to the Corinthians (14:14 f.). In the Gospel (*Matth.* 22:37), on the other hand, the mind is distinguished from the soul. And if the text in which we are told to love God "with our whole heart" means the spirit, it would indicate that the spirit is distinct from both soul and mind (26). The same passage would also seem to suggest that man's entire interior substance which is capable of loving (*dilectio*) is, in its totality or with all its powers (*virtutes*), included in these three (27). Gilbert is obviously anxious to build his psychological theory on divine revelation.

In order to understand the following argument, we must return to an earlier sentence that reads: In Evangelio autem 'mens' ab 'anima' discernitur, ubi Deus ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente diligi praecipitur (26). With reference to this text Gilbert states: Unde ex quo ibi dictum est Deum ex his omnibus et totis diligendum esse, adiectum est: *et proximum* i. e. ex tota virtute. Although the textual tradition of the addition is not quite certain, Gilbert's intention seems to be clear. He means that the distinction between soul, spirit and mind is found not in their substance, which is indivisible and strictly the same for all of them, but in the manifold direction of the power of that substance (28). Gilbert sees another proof in the addition: *et ex omnibus virtutibus* (*Luke* 10:27). The reason why the love of God seems to come forth "from all of these" is not because the love of God as such could be in all these three powers properly speaking, but rather because all powers must be exercized, directed, and formed in accordance with that love (29).

The meaning of this statement is further clarified by Gilbert in the next paragraph where he tells us that the act of loving God is performed in the highest powers. Only the mind "takes up" the love of God directly. After taking up that love the mind communicates it to the spirit as far as possible by way of loving acts and effects, and through the mediation of the spirit communicates it to the soul. In other words, the mind communicates it by moving, conditioning and preparing the two inferior powers: spirit and soul (30).

The power of loving is in the mind: Virtus siquidem dilectionis est in mente *sicut unguentum in capite* quod a capite *in barbam* i.e. a mente ad spiritum *descendit* (*Ps.* 132:2). Gilbert describes the continuation of this process in the same imaginative manner: Quasi a barba *in oram vestimenti*, a spiritu in animam secundum qualemcumque sui descendit profusionem (31). This doctrine is based on the hierarchy of these three powers: the mind is uppermost, the soul the lowest, the spirit in the middle (31). Among these three, the mind is also innermost, the spirit more outward than the mind but more inward than the soul. Then Gilbert resumes his previous comparison: Hinc est quod anima et vestimento comparatur quasi extima et orae quasi infima. Spiritus vero barbae conferri potest secundum quod ipse menti vicinior est. Gilbert now advises us not to understand this order locally but rather as a superiority in nature and activity (32).

The next lines in our treatise present us with some important definitions which suggest themselves as conclusions from the previous exposition: Mens enim est quae veritatis rebus utique aliis et dignitate superioris et subtilitate interioris et intellectu et affectu naturaliter capax est (33). The mind is by nature capable of grasping and embracing that sort of truth which is higher in dignity and deeper in subtlety than all other things. This definition is given the following significant explanation: Intellectu per cognitionem; affectu per dilectionem: imaginem Dei habens in potentia cognoscendi, similitudinem habens in potentia diligendi (33). Thus by its very nature the mind is capable of knowing and loving. By virtue of the former capability, it is image of God; by virtue of the latter, likeness. It is easy to see that Gilbert had *Gen.* 1:26 in mind when he made this distinction.

The definition of the soul is worded as carefully as that of the mind: Anima vero est quae per instrumenta corporis ad ultimas rerum species, ad corporales scilicet formas et proprietates sensu percipiendas et sensualitate concupiscendas quasi inferius et exterius, quantum in ipsa est, se potest effundere (34). Through the instruments of the body the soul can "spread itself out" and, as it were, lower itself to reach the last species of things. These last species of things are the corporeal forms and properties of those things that are to be grasped by the senses and to be longed for by a desire accompanying the senses.

Gilbert now explains that he has used the expression *quantum in ipsa est* to restrict the natural faculty of the soul. Although the soul is not capable of such activity when it is separated from the body, it always retains in itself the natural faculty of being reunited to the body and of operating again through it (35).

In proposing the definition of the soul Gilbert uses the terms *sensus* and *sensualitas.* He defines a sense organ as the faculty of perceiving corporeal things in themselves: Sensus quidem potentia est corporalia in semetipsis percipiendi (36). The *sensualitas* is then described as the faculty of longing for and delighting in those corporeal things: Sensualitas vero est potentia ea appetendi et in eis delectandi (36). If one perceives something through the sense of sight or the sense of hearing and then longs for it or delights in it, the perception itself belongs to those senses but the desire and delight to the *sensualitas* (36).

Even if the reaction of those senses is not one of delight but the very contrary and even if you abhor and flee the object, it is also in the *sensualitas* that this process takes place. For that which makes the soul desire the things agreeable to the flesh is likewise the source of the opposite reaction. And that which causes the soul's delight in the enjoyment of things is also the source of its sadness when it suffers (37). All these things, therefore, are naturally based on or derived from the *sensualitas.* Gilbert compares this to the will which is one single power in the mind by which it both loves what is good and hates what is evil, or by which it delights in the good and deplores what is bad (38).

These then are natural dispositions (*affectiones*) either of the mind and will in the realm of intellectual things or of the soul and the *sensualitas* with regard to corporeal objects. Although these dispositions are natural, they are called low and sensual in relation to vice, not in relation to their nature (39). Not those who merely desire to delight or actually delight in the inferior things perceived by the senses ~~are~~ called low and sensual, but those who do so without proper moderation (39). The word 'low' does not fully reflect the term *animalis* used by Gilbert. Since the *anima* is the lowest power, the adjective *animalis* (derived from *anima*) implies the lowest degree in the realm of the three powers. It applies, therefore, to those who prefer the lower pleasure of the soul to the higher and better pleasure of the mind (39).

In Gilbert's opinion the Apostle had this distinction in mind when he said he would not count his soul more precious than himself (*Acts* 20:24). By adopting the word "himself" the Apostle intended to designate his own mind. He did so in keeping with the philosopher who wrote: *Mens cuiusque is est quisque.* Other examples gathered from Sacred Scripture lead Gilbert to the distinction of soul and spirit (40).

It is the task of the spirit to take possession of the images of the things which the soul perceives: Spiritus siquidem est rerum, quas anima percipit, imagines percipere. The power enabling the spirit to perform this act is called "imagination" (*imaginatio*). "Imagination" does in the spirit what sense perception does in the soul. The sensible objects are not the images. But the rivalry between the sensible objects and their images in the spirit is so strong that, because of the close likeness between the images and the corresponding sensible objects, we say that both the images and the objects are perceived on account of and in the objects. Unlike the soul, the spirit does not perceive the objects immediately in themselves but in the images alone. Yet it perceives the images in themselves without a medium. For that reason it is quite accurate to say that the spirit perceives the images. However, the spirit perceives them only through the process of "imagination". At the same time it must be kept in mind that the object of the verb *imaginari* is not the images but only the things of which the images are formed (42).

For Gilbert it is obvious that *imaginari* means to perceive a thing through its image and not through itself: Imaginari quippe rem aliquam est eam per imaginem suam percipere et non per semetipsam. But such images do not have other images through which the images themselves could be perceived. The consequence of this fact is clear. If I reflect on the image of some human being whose corporeal form I do not see but of whom I see an image similar to that corporeal form, I do not view by "imagination" (*imaginari*) the image of that human being but the human being itself or its corporeal form (43). Gilbert then declares that although such an image could be called a form of something corporeal, the image itself is not corporeal, for a thing cannot be called corporeal unless it is matter or from matter or in matter. You will, Gilbert tells us, find nothing of the kind in or about the image which is the object of our present study (44).

These considerations serve Gilbert to clarify the distinction between the two intellectual processes. No matter how similar soul and spirit are, they differ widely in the manner of their perception. It is true that both are said to perceive the same thing, yet the soul alone perceives it in itself, while the spirit perceives only the image. The soul acts only in the region of matter, but the spirit outside of that region. The soul acts only through the body, the spirit through itself. The soul acts outside, the spirit inside. The soul does not perceive all that the spirit perceives, yet the spirit perceives whatever the soul perceives (45).

Whatever reaches the perception of the soul by way of any one of the senses, i.e. by way of its image, presents itself to the perception of the spirit without any passage of time. But the images that the spirit perceives cannot pass on to the soul's perception either by themselves or by way of other images (46).

The spirit perceives in an equal degree the images of things absent or present, of things existent or non-existent, while the soul can only perceive the (forms and) properties of existent and present things. The spirit, however, cannot perceive anything except by way of the properties perceived by the soul (47). Thus the perception of the spirit is patterned after the perception of the soul. And in like manner, the inclination of the spirit imitates that of the soul. The soul, as we know, is moved by the properties of corporeal things. In a similar fashion the spirit is affected and moved by the images of those properties (48).

As a conclusion Gilbert offers the following definition of the spirit: Est ergo spiritus potentia corporalium rerum imagines non-corporales iuxta sensus similitudinem percipiendi et ex eis ad similitudinem sensualitatis afficiendi (49). We have previously seen that the *sensualitas* is, properly speaking, a temporary state of volition or desire in the soul. In the definition of the spirit it is used to establish an analogy illustrating a similar condition in the spirit. Another analogy is made between sense perception in the soul and the perception found in the spirit.

This analogy, as Gilbert shows, enables us to understand what goes on in dreams. Whatever we do or endure in our dreams in such a way as if we did or endured it in the body, and whatever presents itself to us there as if it came to our senses from outside, belongs to the spirit (49). That is the reason why it is said that Pharao and Nabuchodonosor saw *in the spirit* what they saw in their dreams, whereas Joseph and Daniel are said to have seen *in their mind* what they saw in their dreams. Both Pharao and Nabuchodonosor saw the images of sensible things but Joseph and Daniel understood the meaning of their dreams without the intervention of a corporeal form or an image similar to a corporeal form. All such things belong to (the perception of) the mind just as all corporeal forms belong to the perception of the soul and all their images to the perception of the spirit. That is why we say that the ecstasies of the saints, the revelations or visions and whatever else is formed inside by way of "imagination," take place in the spirit (50).

Now we can see what St. John meant by saying that when he saw "his Apocalypse" or the revelation made to him by God, he was "in the spirit" (*Apoc.* 1:10). It is true that the revelation is presented either entirely or almost entirely through images of corporeal things, yet the fact that John understood what those images signified was not to be ascribed to the spirit but to the mind (51). Gilbert holds that, for the same reason, even the Prophets are said to have seen "in the spirit" what was revealed to them, for with their spiritual eyes they saw most of it from outside in figures and images. And even the words themselves which, as we read in Scripture, were addressed to them are believed to have been conveyed not through real sound but through images of corporeal sounds produced through the spiritual ministry of angels and consequently heard spiritually rather than bodily (53).

Gilbert then raises the question: how is it that the Holy Spirit is said to have spoken in and through the Prophets, although "the Word of the Father" and the Son as the Word would seem to deserve this appropriation? Gilbert believes that the usage was brought about by the expression "in the spirit." He agrees that such an entirely spiritual process should be attributed to the

Holy Spirit (53). Gilbert's reason for this preference is based on his psychology: the spirit which is in us and in which the spiritual communication takes place shares, first of all, the name with the Holy Spirit. But, what is more important, there is in addition a special kind of relationship common to both the spirit in us and the Holy Spirit. For just as the Holy Spirit is a sort of bond (*conexio*) between Father and Son, the spirit in us is a link (*vinculum*) between the mind and the soul. In fact, the spirit is so important a link that one may be inclined to think that mind and soul can be joined only by the spirit and can, as a consequence, not exist in the same being without the spirit (54).

Gilbert offers some illustrations. The soul, he affirms, appears to exist without mind and spirit in those animals that are deprived of memory. In those, however, that are not deprived of memory, soul and spirit are found without the mind (55). Beings which have no capacity for reason and intelligence have no mind. Yet they would not have life without a soul. And they would not have memory without the spirit (55). For memory exists either in the spirit or in the mind: in the spirit if it refers to corporeal objects or to objects which are in the soul or in the spirit (56). Of all these objects is formed what Gilbert calls *imaginaria memoria* which may mean that the images are stored away in the spirit. All objects that are above the perception of soul and spirit are preserved in the memory of the mind, for only the mind can perceive them (56).

In angels there is perhaps a spirit together with the mind, but no soul. That there is no soul in angels is beyond doubt for Gilbert. He grants that one may have doubts concerning the existence of the spirit in angels. If, however, anyone expresses doubts concerning the existence of the mind in angels, one might well wonder about the existence of that person's mind, except that nobody can express doubts about anything without having a mind (57).

In God there is only mind without any admixture of soul and spirit. Whenever the Spirit of God is called 'soul' or God is called 'spirit', the meaning of those two words is far removed from the meaning in which they are used in this treatise.

To sum up, Gilbert tells us that the soul is sometimes found alone without spirit and mind. The mind is found without soul and spirit. Yet that does not seem to mean that the spirit is found without both soul and mind. It is true, Gilbert continues, that soul and spirit happen to exist without mind. Mind and spirit are perhaps found somewhere without the soul. Yet soul and mind cannot in like manner be found without the spirit. Gilbert sees the reason for this in the affinity of the spirit to both mind and soul. On the strength of this affinity the spirit can unite itself to both (59).

Since mind and soul are much farther apart, they do not 'consent' to a union without the mediation of the spirit. Once the spirit joins and unites them, it is not at all improper to call the spirit their bond (60). Such a union occurs only in man. Nowhere else does it happen that these three are found to exist together in one being at the same time. We learn from Gilbert that among these three the soul is closest to the 'flesh', because the soul is united to the 'flesh' and infused into it without an intervening medium. But the mind is farthest removed from the 'flesh,' since both the spirit and the soul are placed in between. Hence the spirit is closer to the 'flesh' than the mind but farther away from the 'flesh' than the soul. For between the 'flesh' and the spirit there is only the soul, just as between the soul and the mind there is only the spirit (61).

Gilbert now describes their affinity. Although the soul is united to both the 'flesh' and the spirit without a medium, and although the spirit is joined to both the soul and the mind without a medium, there seems to be a closer relationship between the soul and the spirit than between the soul and the 'flesh', and a greater affinity between the spirit and the soul than between the spirit and the mind (62). Gilbert argues that, although the soul is in the 'flesh', the soul is not and cannot be of the same substance as the 'flesh', while the spirit and the soul are of one and the same substance. Moreover, although the spirit is consubstantial with the soul and the mind, it is closer to the soul than to the mind in its perceptions and volitions (62).

However, it happens occasionally that the three terms, viz. mind, spirit and soul, are interchanged. Thus St. Paul says: *spiritu ambulate* (*Gal.* 5:16). He uses the word 'spirit', yet he means the mind. When he uses the expression *spiritu mentis* (*Eph.* 4:23), St. Paul means not 'the spirit of the mind' but the spirit that is the mind (63). When we use the word *spirituales*, we really mean those in whom the mind (not just the spirit) dominates (64). On the other hand, it happens sometimes, though less frequently, that the term 'mind' is used to designate the spirit. We read, for instance, in the *Acts of the Apostles* that, *per excessum mentis* (*Acts* 10:10), St. Peter saw heaven standing open and a certain vessel coming down, etc. But, as St. Augustine tells us, this happened in the spirit, not in the mind, because those things appeared to St. Peter in the manner of corporeal objects (64). It is Gilbert's conviction that St. Paul meant the spirit when he said that he had seen and heard the Lord *in stupore mentis* (*Acts* 22:17) while he was praying in the Temple (65).

Occasionally even the word 'soul' is employed to designate the mind. When The Blessed Virgin Mary says: My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God my Saviour (*Luke* 1: 46 f.), the word 'soul' may, as Gilbert carefully puts it, signify the mind, for we magnify the Lord with our intellect and will, not with our senses or sense reactions. The senses perceive nothing but sensible objects, and only sensible things are the object of sense reaction (66). Both the intellect and the will magnify the Lord: the intellect when it rises above the objects of the senses and their images, when it leaves itself behind and soars above itself to contemplate God's immense and incomprehensible majesty: a majesty presiding over all things without pomp, judging all things with tranquillity, arranging all things with great mildness; the will magnifies the Lord when it submits itself entirely to God's majesty in chaste fear, and reaches for God's majesty in hope and desire, despising all things out of love and, in boundless joy, somehow forgetting itself and all other beings (67).

Gilbert admits that for those who are not capable of such heights there are several other less lofty ways of magnifying God. He does not wish to discuss them, however. He merely adds that "such a Virgin and Mother" possessed the highest degree of that spiritual perfection (68-69).

After describing the function of the mind, Gilbert turns to the activity accompanying the function of the mind in magnifying the Lord. Just as the mind magnifies the Lord, the spirit rejoices in God its Saviour (69). The rejoicing takes place in the spirit when it receives from God some first-fruits of its eternal happiness and is deluged with such internal bliss that it leaps and bounds, unable to contain itself, so sweet is its delight. Although that sweet pleasure or delight is nothing material, it has some resemblance to bodily joy, but with a far greater abundance of purity and gladness (70). The enjoyment which arises from this and which stirs man from within now strongly, now softly, is the exultation of the spirit in God. Gilbert's conclusion reads: Spiritus siquidem est exultare, mentis vero gaudere. Gilbert then mentions that he cannot remember hearing or reading anything to the effect that the word 'mind' is used to designate the soul (71). At the same time he believes that the word 'spirit' is perhaps used in the expression *spiritus vitae* (*Gen.* 6:17) to signify the soul, which elsewhere is called *spiritus carnis.* The soul, which is inferior to the spirit, is infused into the flesh, and the soul is its source of life (72).

Gilbert finally points out that in such texts the word 'soul' or 'spirit' could be understood to mean the entire interior substance. Wherever the soul is, there also is the spirit or the mind; whatever the soul does or experiences is also done and experienced by the spirit or the mind, for they are all one and the same substance. To encompass this substance in its totality and make sufficiently clear distinctions, occasionally only two words are used. Thus St. Paul speaks of *integer spiritus vester et anima* (I *Thess.* 5:23), and Gilbert tells us that there are two possible explanations of the meaning of those two terms: either the word 'spirit' comprises the two higher powers (mind and spirit), or the word 'soul' stands for the two lower powers (spirit and soul). With this statement the treatise ends.

III

If we compare Gilbert's tract with others written on the same subject about the middle of the twelfth century, it must be granted that despite certain similarities in thought Gilbert went his own way. The three powers: mind, spirit and soul are the subject of his work. The treatise *De Spiritu et anima*, commonly attributed to the Cistercian Alcher of Clairvaux covers, broadly speaking, the same field in dealing with: *sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus* and *intelligentia.*[1] Isaac de Stella, at whose request Alcher is said to have written his work about the year 1162, teaches the same five "steps towards wisdom."[2] It is quite interesting to find the same division in Thierry of Chartres who, with a slight change of terminology, presents the powers of the soul as: *sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intelligentia* and *intelligibilitas.*[3] The difference in terminology is in fact even less pronounced than it may seem, for Alcher identifies *intellectus* and *intelligentia.*[4]

It is not at all improbable that the Cistercian psychology as taught by Alcher and Isaac borrowed more from Thierry than the five steps to wisdom. Under the name of Boethius, Alcher cites a text from Plato's *Timaeus* which is quoted several times by Thierry to show the high position of the *intelligentia.*[5] Alcher's statement: *Deus siquidem est rerum universitas*[6] agrees literally with

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[1] *De Spiritu et anima*, 4; PL 40, 782. Étienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York 1955) 632, speaks rather critically of this work but recommends it to those interested in the history of psychology: "When looking for the source of a psychological definition, it is often advisable to try the patchwork of Alger". Some valuable contributions to the question of Alcher's sources are found in P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen* (Freiburg, Schweiz, 1956) 67 ff. A. Wilmart expresses hesitation concerning Alcher's authorship in *Rev. d'Ascetique et de Mystique* 8 (1927) 251.

[2] *Epistola de anima*; PL 194, 1880B. The abbey of Stella (Étoile) in the diocese of Poitiers joined the Cistercian Order in 1145. In 1147, Isaac became its abbot. He died about the year 1169. According to F. Bliemetzrieder, "Isaak von Stella," *Divus Thomas: Jahrbuch f. Phil und spek. Theol.* 18 (1904) 23, Isaac received his education in English rather than Parisian schools. Bliemetzrieder (p. 31) holds that Alcher's *De Spiritu et anima* is a reply to Isaac's letter. Concerning Isaac's sources see P. Künzle, pp. 65 f. See also E. Bertola, "La dottrina psicologica di Isacco di Stella," *Riv. Filos. neo-scol.* 45 (1953) 297-309.

[3] *Glossa super lib. Boethii de Trinitate* II, 4-8; ed. Haring, *AHDLM* 23 (1956) 279. Endre von Ivanka, "Zur Überwindung des neuplatonischen Intellektualismus in der Deutung der Mystik," *Scholastik* 30 (1955) 190, maintains that Isaac's source for the five steps was Proklos. Unfortunately, he leaves it to others to confirm this far-fetched theory. E. Bertola (p. 304) suggests St. John Damascene.

[4] *De Spir. et anima*, 37; PL 40, 808: Intellectus sive intelligentia ea vis animae est qua de divinis, quantum homini possibile est, cognoscitur.

[5] *Ibidem*, 37; PL 40, 808: Boethius tamen dicit intelligentiam solius Dei esse et admodum paucorum hominum. Thierry, *Glossa* II, 9; ed. Haring, p. 280. *Librum hunc;* ed. W. Jansen p. 7*. *Timaeus* 51E (Chalcidio interpr.); ed. Wrobel, p. 66.

[6] *De Spir. et anima*, 12; PL 40, 788.

Thierry's: *Deus est rerum universitas.*[7] There are other possible though less certain points of contact. Thierry states: Sic itaque anima primum est sensus ex arteriis a cerebro profluentibus quinquepartito. Deinde, visarum recolens imaginum, fit imaginatio utens phantasticae cellae spiritu in imaginando.[8] Alcher knows of similar steps: In prima parte cerebri vis animalis vocatur phantastica i.e. imaginaria... in media parte cerebri vocatur rationalis... in ultima parte vocatur memorialis.[9] It is less certain whether Alcher borrowed these notions from Thierry because his immediate source may have been either William of Conches[10] or the *Pantegni* of Ali Ibn al Abbas, known as Constantinus.[11] Gilbert never refers to the *cerebrum*, never suggests that there is such a thing as a *cella phantastica.*

Thierry defines *imaginatio* as vis animae comprehensiva formarum atque figurarum necnon imaginum tactu materiae corruptarum, absente materia.[12] If we ignore the addition *tactu materiae corruptarum* — which expresses one of Thierry's favorite notions — we find two significant elements in the definition: the objects of the *imaginatio* are forms, figures and images; they must be absent. A simpler definition is offered by Alcher and Isaac: Imaginatio est vis animae quae rerum corporearum corporeas percipit formas sed absentes.[13] We have seen that, according to Gilbert, *imaginatio* takes place in the spirit, not in the soul.[14] The soul is in immediate contact with the body and thus is able "through the instruments of the body" to reach the last species of things, i.e. the corporeal forms and properties. The instruments of the body are the senses. The senses reach the corporeal object in itself.[15] The function of the *imaginatio* in the spirit corresponds to the function of the senses in the soul: the *res sensibiles* as presented through the soul become *imagines* in the spirit through the power aptly called *imaginatio.* The soul perceives only objects that are present and existent.[16] The spirit, on the other hand, forms images of things present and absent, existent or non-existent.[17] The soul perceives the object in itself, the spirit perceives the same object in the image, not in itself.[18]

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[7] *Glossa* II, 13; ed. Haring, p. 281.

[8] *Glossa* II, 9; ed. Haring, p. 280.

[9] *De Spir. et anima*, 22; PL 40, 795.

[10] *De Philosophia mundi* IV, 24; PL 172, 95B.

[11] Cf. Tullio Gregory, *Anima Mundi* (Florence 1956) 169f.

[12] *Glossa* II, 5; ed. Haring, p. 279.

[13] *Ep. de anima;* PL 194, 1881. *De Spir. et anima*, 11; PL 40, 786.

[14] *De Discretione*, 34.

[15] *Ibidem*, 36.

[16] *De Discretione*, 47.

[17] *Ibidem*, 47.

[18] *De Discretione*, 45.

There is no doubt that the psychology of our two Cistercians could have gained considerably by a study of Gilbert's doctrine. Unfortunately, Gilbert does not discuss the function of the *ratio*, which Alcher defines as ea vis animae quae rerum corporearum naturas, formas, differentias, propria et accidentia percipit.[19] On a later occasion he defines it as vis animae supra corporalia et infra spiritualia collocata.[20] Finally he declares sweepingly: Ratio est quaedam vis animae quae omnia discernit et judicat.[21] It is no lack of charity to say that such a variety of definitions and statements is caused by a confusion which only increases with the definitions of *intellectus* and *intelligentia*. The former is once defined as rerum vere existentium perceptio.[22] On an earlier occasion we are told: Intellectus est ea vis animae quae invisibilia percipit sicut angelos, daemones, animas et omnem spiritum creatum.[23] Isaac of Stella comes to the conclusion: Intellectus igitur ea vis animae est quae rerum vere incorporearum percipit formas.[24] Of the highest step in the progress towards wisdom Alcher writes: Intelligentia est de solis rerum principiis i.e. de Deo, ideis, hyle et de incorporeis substantiis pura et certa cognitio.[25]

Gilbert's system shows much greater simplicity. He holds that all the powers of the interior substance are sufficiently expressed by three terms mind, spirit and soul.[26] The incorporeal images of corporeal things belong to the realm of the spirit,[27] as does the memory of these things.[28] But all things that are beyond the perception of both soul and spirit or are perceived only by the mind belong to the realm of the mind and are preserved only in the memory of the mind.[29]

We have noted that in Gilbert's exposition we find no references based on the medical or physical concepts of his time. He mentions no *cella phantastica* and would scarcely have written Alcher's sentence: Sensualitas corporis est quaedam vis ignea.[30] According to Gilbert, the *sensualitas* is linked to the senses: while the senses are powers for perceiving corporeal things in themselves, the *sensualitas* is the power of desiring and enjoying those things.[31] The same *sensualitas* is activated when the object causes disgust, hate or similar reactions against the object.[32] Whereas the *sensualitas* is in the soul, the power called 'will' is only in the mind: in mente sola voluntatis vis est qua naturaliter et bona sua diligit et mala odit.[33] The same is true of the intellect.[34]

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[19] *De Spiritu et anima*, 11; PL 40, 787. Isaac, *Ep. de anima;* PL 194, 1884AB. Cf.Thierry, *Glossa* II, 6; ed. Haring, p. 279.

[20] *De Spiritu et anima*, 37; PL 40, 808.

[21] *Ibidem*, 38; PL 40, 809.

[22] *Ibidem.*

[23] *De Spiritu et anima*, 11; PL 40, 787.

[24] *Ep. de anima*, PL 194, 1885B.

[25] *De Spir. et anima*, 38; PL 40, 809.

[26] *De Discretione*, 27.

[27] *De Discretione*, 49.

[28] *De Discretione*, 56.

[29] *De Discretione*, 56.

[30] *De Spiritu et anima*, 38; PL 40, 808.

There is also some likeness of the *sensualitas* in the spirit, as we learn from Gilbert's definition of the spirit: Est igitur spiritus potentia corporalium rerum imagines non-corporales iuxta sensus similitudinem percipiendi et ex eis ad similitudinem sensualitatis afficiendi.[35] Gilbert assigns to the spirit a well defined range of operations. Dreams, for instance, belong to the spirit. Divine revelation may also operate through images in the spirit. But the understanding of such images can only be achieved by the mind.[36] The spirit may also be filled from above with an "internal sweetness" which makes the spirit rejoice in God. Yet the real delight is in the mind.[37] Although the love of God, on the other hand, begins only in the mind, its effects may flow over into the spirit and, whenever possible, into the soul.[38]

It is obvious from our brief comparison that Gilbert's exposition is a remarkable achievement: his treatise is largely the product of careful personal observation and study. He was quite aware that the scriptural use of the terminology that he adopts was not uniform and was therefore subject to interpretation. Despite the theories of others with which he must have been familiar, he was fully convinced that the wealth of activities affecting man's interior substance was sufficiently encompassed by an analysis of the actions, reactions and inter-actions of mind, spirit and soul. And the definitions of these three powers of the one interior substance are fine examples of his masterly penetration into the field of psychology, while his repeated recourse to Sacred Scripture reveals his constant endeavour not to contradict its teaching.

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[31] *De Discretione*, 36.
[32] *De Discretione*, 37.
[33] *De Discretione*, 38.
[34] *De Discretione*, 66 f.
[35] *De Discretione*, 49.
[36] *De Discretione*, 49-51.
[37] *De Discretione*, 71.
[38] *De Discretione*, 30.

IIII

Four manuscripts have been used to establish the text of the *De Discretione animae, spiritus et mentis.* The text nearest the original is found in the codex preserved at the University Library of Cambridge. The other three belong to the same family and show traces of transpositions, additions and corrections introduced to make easier reading. Although the manuscript of Cambridge University offers the best text, the folio numbers of all four manuscripts are indicated in the footnotes.

A — *Ms.* Cambridge, University Library 1773 (Ii. 3. 9), fols. 112vb-118va (according to the modern numbering of folios). s. xii ex. A folio on parchment, containing ff. 165, in double columns of 33 lines. The tract is anonymous; its title: *De Substantia interiori.*[1]

C — *Ms.* Cambridge, Corpus Christi College 451, fols. 131-134. Our tract is written in single columns of 32 lines. The *codex* belonged to St. Mary's Abbey, York, and was not written by a single scribe. The date given in the catalogue is the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.[2] The script of our treatise points to the late twelfth century. Its title reads: *Tractatus magistri Achardi de divisione animae et spiritus.*

M — *Ms.* Paris, Bibl. Mazarine 1002 (942), fols. 242vb-247rb. s. xiii. Written in double columns of 33 lines. It once belonged to the library of Saint Victor's in Paris and contains mainly writings of Geoffrey and Hugh of Saint Victor.[3] Our tract is among works composed by Hugh of Saint Victor and is entitled: *Tractatus magistri A. de discretione animae, spiritus et mentis.* This manuscript was used by Germain Morin whose transcription is remarkably accurate.[4]

P — *Ms.* Paris, Bibl. Nat., *lat.* 14842, fols. 17-20v (Roman numerals). s. xiii. Written in single columns of 34 lines. L. Delisle[5] describes the contents of the entire codex as follows: Extraits des livres de S. Denis.- Guill. de Paris sur les Sacrements. — Gloses sur le Grécisme. — xiii s. One former owner was the library of Saint Victor. Our tract is anonymous. Its title reads: *De Discretione animae, spiritus et mentis.*

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[1] Cf. *A Catalogue of the MSS. preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge* III (Cambridge 1858) 412.

[2] M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue* II (Cambridge 1912) 372-375.

[3] Cf. A. Molinier, *Cat. des MSS. de la Bibl. Mazarine* I (Paris 1885) 501 f.

[4] *Beiträge,* Suppl. III, 1 (1935) 252-262.

[5] *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes* 30 (1869) 51. I learned of the existence of this copy through the kindness of Mlle. M.-T. d'Alverny.

<DE DISCRETIONE ANIMAE, SPIRITUS ET MENTIS>[1]

1 Substantia interior, quae una cum corpore constituit hominem, secundum varia ipsius[2] exercitia sive officia, quae vel habet vel habere potest, in varias distribui solet potentias quae et partes[3] ipsius virtuales nominantur. Ipsa tamen secundum se et in se potentia essentialiter est una,[4] simplex et indivisa. Et eâ potest quicquid[5] ipsa[6] naturaliter potest. Semetipsâ itaque[7] potens est, licet non a semetipsa. In illo similis est ipsa[8] Deo, in hoc autem[9] discernitur.[10]

2 Deus namque et seipso potens est et a seipso.[11] Quemadmodum autem[12] in Deo repugnans non est ipsum[13] esse substantiam, cum sit potentia, vel potentiam, cum sit substantia,[14] sic nec in re ista[15] ad ipsius imaginem[16] facta, quam et[17] in hoc ipso gerit, quia naturalis eius potentia non qualitas est vel forma sed ipsius essentia[18] quae aliud non est quam ipsa.

3 Si enim ipsius potentia ipsa non esset sed forma ipsius, etiam substantialis, aliquid ei subesse oporteret cui[19] ipsa non substantialiter sed accidentaliter adveniret. Ex quorum concursu[20] fieret quod simplex non esset, utpote compactum ex potentia forma et ex formam[21] suscipiente vel materia vel quasi-materia.

4 Compositio itaque hic esset secundum substantiam quoque quae, si non actu, intellectu tamen dissolvi posset.[22] Id[23] etiam, quod potentiae subesset, rem istam cum potentia constituens, quidnam esset? Essetne proprietas? Essetne substantia?

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[1] De substantia interiori *A* fol. 112vb. Tractatus magistri Achardi de divisione animae et spiritus *C* fol. 131. Tractatus magistri A. de discretione animae, spiritus et mentis *M* fol. 242vb. De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis *P* fol. 17.

[2] eius *C*.

[3] *M* fol. 243ra.

[4] potentia est essentialiter una *A*.

[5] quae *C*.

[6] *om. CMP.*

[7] *suprascr.* ipsa *A*.

[8] illa *C*.

[9] *om. A.*

[10] *A* fol. 113ra.

[11] semetipso *CMP*.

[12] *om. M.* et *C.*

[13] *om. CMP.*

[14] *A repetit:* vel potentiam cum sit substantia.

[15] ipsa *C*.

[16] ad imaginem ipsius *A*.

[17] *om. CMP.*

[18] *om. C.*

[19] *C* fol. 131v.

[20] cursu *A*.

[21] forma *ACM*.

5 Sed proprietas proprietati subiecta esse non potest. Substantia autem si esset, aut corporea aut incorporea.[24] Sed quod corporeum est, rei incorporeae pars esse nequit.[25] Si vero incorporea esset substantia, aut rationalis aut irrationalis.[26] Sed neutram[27] rationalis substantia partem habere potest.

6 Quia autem tam[28] hac[29] quam aliis rationibus substantiam, de qua nunc agitur, non aliud nisi potentiam quandam esse, alibi ostensum est, eas hic[30] conectere propono.[31]

7 Potentia autem haec, ut praefati sumus, in essentia est simplex, in officiis[32] multiplex, ut, ad aliud et ad[33] aliud consideratione habita, et potentia una in multis dicatur et multae in una vel potius una multae et multae una.[34]

8 Sic et in Deo, cuius haec imago est, cum sit potentia sive voluntas, secundum substantiam simplex et una; secundum multa tamen, quae utrique subsunt, utraque multiplicatur, ut multae ibi assignentur[35] tam potentiae quam voluntates. Huius rei habes scripturam testem ubi legis: *Quis loquetur potentias Domini?*[36] Et item: *Magna opera Domini: exquisita in omnes voluntates eius.*[37]

9 Quamvis enim nonnisi[38] unum sit, quo vult vel potest, non tamen unum est, quod vult vel potest. Nec[39] idem est[40] ipsum velle vel posse et[41] hoc et[42] illud, licet eodem utrumque velit et possit. Iuxta causam consimilem in *Libro*

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[22] potest *A.*

[23] idem *C.*

[24] esset *add. C.*

[25] non potest *P.*

[26] esset *add. C.*

[27] neutrum *CM. A* fol. 113rb.

[28] *M* fol. 243rb.

[29] hanc *C.*

[30] *om. CMP.*

[31] postpono *CMP.*

[32] est *add. A.*

[33] (aliud et ad) aliquid *P.* ad *om. M.*

[34] potius multae una et una multae *CMP.*

[35] assignantur *P.*

[36] *Ps.* 105:2. Cf. Gilbert, *In Ps.* 105:2; *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 12004, fol. 141v.

[37] *Ps.* 110:2. Cf. Gilbert, *ibid.*, fol. 150v.

[38] non ubi *A.*

[39] tamen unum est quod vult vel potest nec *om. CMP.*

[40] nec est idem *CP.* non est idem *M.*

[41] *om. CMP.*

[42] vel *P.*

Sapientiae[43] Spiritus sapientiae *multiplex*, et in *epistola* Apostoli[44] *ad Ephesios* sapientia Dei *multiformis* appellatur.[45]

10 Sed si haec, inquies, secundum rationem unitatis et multiplicitatis in utraque[46] potentia se[47] eodem habent modo, quae est ergo in parte hac simplicitas Creatoris prae creatura? quae in potentia unitas Veritatis quam imaginis amplior?[48]

11 Considera itaque utramque potentiam, non tamen[49] ad quot[50] se habeat[51] sed magis qualiter. Si enim numerositatem attendis eorum ad quae[52] utraque extenditur[53] vel extendi potest, occurrit multiplicitas eo maior ibi[54] quam hic quo potest plura Deus quam homo.

12 Sed[55] multiplicitas haec quasi extrinseca est: secundum ea videlicet[56] quae ex potentiis et non secundum ea quae in potentiis[57] vel sunt vel esse possunt consistens. Si autem modum respicias[58] quo se utraque in agendo habet vel habere potest, multiplicem hic intrinsecam, ibi autem[59] nullam reperis pluralitatem.

13 Dei namque potentia in universis quae facit immobilis persistit. Non enim ex diversis actionibus suis ipsa diversis afficitur modis quia nec in ipsam ulla prorsus[60] cadit[61] affectio. Unde et omnia movet sine sui motu: et in agendo et in non agendo se semper eodem[62] habens modo.

14 Potentia autem inferior varie afficitur nec modo secundum effectus varios sed et[63] ex passionibus variis multiplici subicitur vel subici potest alterationi. Etsi ergo in ipsa multiplicitas non sit secundum essentiam, est tamen secundum ea quae sunt[64] in ipsius essentia.

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[43] *Sap.* 7:2.

[44] Pauli *CM.*

[45] *Eph.* 3:10. Gilbert, *In Eph.* 3:10; *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 14441, fol. 77rb.

[46] utriusque *CM.*

[47] *A* fol. 113va.

[48] unitas amplior Veritatis quam imaginis *A.*

[49] modo *CMP.*

[50] quod *A.*

[51] habet *CMP.*

[52] *M* fol. 243va.

[53] ostenditur *A.*

[54] scilicet in *Deo add. CMP.*

[55] *P* fol. 17v.

[56] *om. A.*

[57] et non secundum ea quae in potentiis *om. CMP.*

[58] *om. CMP.*

[59] *om. CMP.*

[60] *om. A.*

[61] *om. M.*

[62] est *add. CMP.*

[63] *om. A.*

[64] *A* fol. 113vb.

15 Essentia siquidem ipsius sive potius essentia,[65] quae ipsa est, diversas in se suscipit affectiones quibus ipsa[66] secundum se et in se simplex multipliciter movetur, variatur atque distinguitur.

16 Affectiones autem, quae in ipsa fiunt, qualitates quaedam sunt quibus essentia sive[67] potentia eadem varie informatur, ut, licet non essentialiter, formaliter tamen in varias plurificetur potentias. Quae omnes quamvis secundum essentiam una sint potentia[68] illa,[69] propter distinctionem tamen formalem, qua earum[70] determinatur pluralitas, nulla illarum dicit potest alia.

17 Hinc enim est ut nec voluntas ratio nec sensus imaginatio nec intelligentia memoria universaliterque nulla earum[71] quaelibet[72] de reliquis[73] vel sit vel nominari possit. Nec immerito quidem.

18 Earum quippe vocabula[74] magis affectiones,[75] quae diversae sunt, quam essentiam, quae eadem est in omnibus, inventionis suae causam habuerunt. Unde et ipsorum in illas potius[76] quam in hanc redundat significatio, ut propter illarum diversitatem magis ab invicem denegentur quam ob huius[77] identitatem ad invicem praedicentur.

19 Ex hoc ipso etiam qualitates contingit nominari huiusmodi potentias, quia[78] ex qualitatibus videlicet tota in eis consistit tam rerum quam nominum discretionis ratio. Earum tamen unamquamque substantiam esse et omnes unam convincit veritas.

20 Quia autem unitatis huius assertionem de duabus illarum, id est de ratione et de [79] voluntate, in quaestionibus[80] quibusdam de peccato satis absolvisse videor, hic eam sive de his sive de aliis diutius persequendam[81] non assumo. Quia vero substantia sive potentia secundum se una, prout affectione multiplici vel actu vel possibiliter variis informatur modis, *ita* plures[82] dicitur et[83] est potentiae[84] *quod* eas in se comprehendit pariter[85] universas, illam vero nulla illarum totam,[86] id est secundum omnes ipsius distributiones comprehendere potest, ideo iuxta quandam partium proprietatem se ad illam habere videntur, cum vivaciore et veraciore rationis examine non modo universae illa sint una sed et[87] singulae iuxta essentiam illa sint[88] tota.

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[65] *om. CM.*
[66] ipsas *A.*
[67] vel *CMP.*
[68] *M* fol. 243vb.
[69] *om. P.*
[70] eorum *CMP.*
[71] harum *CMP.*
[72] alia *add. CMP.*
[73] de reliquis *om. CMP.*
[74] *C* fol. 132.
[75] affinitiones *A.*
[76] potius in illas *CMP.*
[77] *A* fol. 114ra.
[78] quod *CM.*
[79] *om. CMP.*
[80] quae omnibus *A.*
[81] *om. CMP.*
[82] vel *add. CMP.*

21 Quemadmodum[89] autem circa Deum quaedam vocabula personis conveniunt singulis ut *Pater* et *Filius* et *Spiritus sanctus*, quaedam vero omnibus ut *Deus*, quaedam[90] duabus ut *procedere a Patre*[91] Filio et Spiritui sancto, et *esse causam vel*[92] *principium Spiritus sancti*[93] Patri et Filio, ita et[94] hic alia quidem[95] nomina ad singulas se habent[96] potentias ut *ratio*,[97] *voluntas* et similia, alia autem ad diversas[98] ut *anima* et *spiritus*, nonnulla vero ad aliquas ut *mens*.[99] Anima quoque et spiritus secundum intelligentiam accepta[1] significationis alterius et secundum quidem priorem acceptionis modum[2] ut ensis et[3] gladius sic prorsus idem est[4] anima et spiritus.

22 Ambo enim indifferentem et indifferenter designant substantiam, partem videlicet hominis incorpoream ipsius cum corpore constitutivam, non eam determinando specialiter secundum aliquam vel aliquas earum, in quas ipsa[5] distribuitur, potentiarum sed absolute secundum[6] semetipsam,[7] potentiam simplicem et unam, qua sola potest quaecumque omnibus illis potest.

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[83] vel *CMP*.
[84] vel est vel dicitur potentiae *P*.
[85] *om. CMP*.
[86] *om. A*.
[87] *om. CMP*.
[88] sunt *C*.
[89] *A* fol. 114rb.
[90] vero *add. A*.
[91] et *add. C*.
[92] et *CMP*.
[93] et *add. CM*.
[94] *om. CMP*.
[95] (alia quidem) quaedam *CM*.
[96] se ad singulas habent *A*.
[97] et *add. CMP*.
[98] universas *M*.
[99] *P* fol. 18.
[1] *om. CMP*.
[2] priorem acceptionis quidem modum *CMP*.
[3] *om. CMP*.
[4] sunt *CMP*.
[5] *om. CMP*.
[6] *om. M*.
[7] seipsam *CMP*.

Omnes enim,[8] ut dictum est,[9] una est ipsa. Et omnes ipsa sunt una affectionibus[10] numerose distincta.

23 Frequens autem[11] est usus tam in scripturis quam in communi sermone animam et spiritum taliter accipere. Ut enim unum[12] de multis vel singula de utroque scripturarum sumantur exempla, non aliter[13] Veritas[14] animam nominavit in Evangelio cum ait: *Nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus, animam autem occidere non possunt, sed eum timete*[15] *qui potest animam et corpus perdere in gehennam.*[16]

24 Simili quoque intellectu in *Ecclesiaste* spiritus accipitur ubi[17] dicitur: *Revertatur pulvis* i.e. caro *in terram suam unde erat et spiritus redeat ad Deum qui dedit illum.*[18]

25 Quando autem nomina haec non communiter ad totam interiorem[19] hominis partem sed determinate et distincte ad quasdam ipsius referuntur virtutes, tunc ut diversae voces sic[20] et diversae solent esse significationes secundum quas[21] res eis subiectae discernuntur non modo a se sed et[22] a mente.

26 Inter spiritum enim et mentem manifeste dividit Apostolus in *Epistola ad Corinthios prima*[23] dicens: *Nam si oro lingua, spiritus meus orat, mens autem mea sine fructu est. Quid ergo? Orabo spiritu, orabo et mente: psallam spiritu, psallam et mente.*[24] In Evangelio autem mens ab anima discernitur, ubi Deus *ex toto corde* et *ex tota anima* et *ex tota mente*[25] diligi praecipitur. Si[26] autem et[27] nomine cordis spiritus ibi intelligitur, sic ipsius quoque ab utraque illarum discretio innuitur.

27 Id quoque ibidem insinuari videtur quia[28] substantia hominis interior,[29] quae dilectionis capax est, in his tribus secundum se totam i.e. secundum omnes ipsius vires comprehenditur et in haec tria universitas potentiarum eius sufficienter distribuitur, ut nulla scilicet[30] illarum sit quae non in horum aliquo contineatur.

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[8] (omnes enim) sit *A.*

[9] est *add. M.*

[10] effectionibus *A.*

[11] enim *C.*

[12] *om. A.*

[13] (non aliter) taliter *CMP.*

[14] *M* fol. 244rb.

[15] potius *CM.*

[16] *Matth.* 10:20. Cf. Alcher, *Lib. de spir. et anima,* 43; PL 40, 812.

[17] cum *CMP.*

[18] eum *A. suprascr.* illum *A. Eccle.* 12:7.

[19] interioris *A.*

[20] ita *CMP.*

[21] quam *A.*

[22] *om. CMP.*

[23] ita *CM.* ita *add. P.*

[24] et psallam mente *A. I Cor.* 14:14f.

[25] *Marc.* 12:30.

[26] *A* fol. 114vb.

[27] *om. CMP.*

[28] quod *CMP.*

28 Unde ex quo ibi dictum[31] est Deum ex his omnibus et totis[32] diligendum esse, adiectum est: *et proximum* i.e. *ex tota virtute*,[33] ad notandum scilicet distinctionem inter[34] haec tria non secundum substantiam, quae indivisibilis est et prorsus eadem in[35] omnibus, sed secundum multiplicem[36] unius substantiae virtutem[37] esse factam[38] et quia nil[39] virtutis eius est relictum[40] quod in his tribus non sit inclusum.[41].

29 Haec eadem vero determinationis adiectio in Lege manifestior[42] habetur ubi ex quo[43] praeceptum est ut Deus diligatur[44] ex totis his tribus,[45] statim quasi[46] expositio sequitur: *et ex omnibus viribus*.[47] Non autem ideo Deus ex his omnibus praecipitur[48] diligi quia ipsius dilectio iuxta sui proprietatem in eis[49] omnibus possit esse, sed quia omnes secundum ipsam exerceri debent, ordinari atque formari.[50]

30 Sola namque mens dilectionem Dei secundum se et immediate suscipit: susceptam vero secundum quosdam affectus et effectus ad spiritum et, spiritu mediante, ad animam, prout potest, transfundit, inferiores videlicet vires ex illa et secundum illam movendo, afficiendo[51] atque disponendo.

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[29] substantia interior hominis *CMP*.

[30] *om. CMP*.

[31] *M* fol. 244va.

[32] et totis *om. CMP*.

[33] et pro. i.e. ex tota virtute *CMP*. For obvious reasons, Morin (p. 255) cancelled the words: pro i.e.

[34] in *CMP*.

[35] *om. CMP*.

[36] *om. CMP*.

[37] virtutes *CMP*.

[38] *C* fol. 132v.

[39] nihil *MP*.

[40] relictum est *CMP*.

[41] conclusum *A*.

[42] maior *CMP*.

[43] ex quo *om. CMP*.

[44] *om. CMP*.

[45] ex his tribus totis *CMP*.

[46] quoque *CMP*.

[47] *Deut.* 6:5.

[48] videtur *A*.

[49] *A* fol. 115ra.

[50] exerceri, ordinari atque formari debent *CMP*.

[51] *P* fol. 18v.

31 Virtus siquidem dilectionis est in mente *sicut unguentum in capite*[52] quod a capite *in barbam* i.e. a mente ad spiritum *descendit:*[53] quasi[54] a barba *in oram vestimenti:* a spiritu in[55] animam secundum qualemcumque sui descendit profusionem. Est enim[56] mens in summo, anima in imo, spiritus in medio.[57]

32 Mens quoque in his tribus intima est: spiritus mente exterior sed animâ[58] interior. Hinc est quod anima et[59] vestimento comparatur, quasi extima, et orae, quasi infima. Spiritus vero barbae conferri[60] potest secundum id[61] quod ipse menti vicinior es. Non autem haec[62] intelligenda est distinctio[63] secundum ordinem locorum sed proprietatum et perceptionum.[64]

33 Mens enim est quae[65] veritatis rebus utique aliis[66] et dignitate superioris et subtilitate interioris et intellectu et affectu naturaliter capax est:[67] intellectu per cognitionem; affectu[68] per dilectionem; *imaginem* Dei habens in potentia cognoscendi; *similitudinem* habens[69] in potentia diligendi.

34 Anima vero est[70] quae per instrumenta corporis ad ultimas rerum species, ad corporales scilicet formas et proprietates sensu percipiendas et sensualitate concupiscendas quasi inferius et exterius,[71] quantum in ipsa est, se potest effundere.[72]

35 Ideo autem[73] apposui:[74] quantum in ipsa est, quia, etsi a corpore divisa id non potest, facultatem tamen in se[75] retinet naturalem qua et corpori possit uniri et id per corpus operari.

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[52] *Ps.* 132:2.

[53] quod a capite i.e. a mente in barbam descendit *CMP.*

[54] vero *add. CMP.*

[55] ad *P.*

[56] autem *CMP.*

[57] Cf. Alcher, *Liber de spiritu et anima,* 34; PL 40, 803f. Isaac, *Epist. de anima* PL 194, 1878 B.

[58] *om. A.*

[59] *om. CMP.*

[60] *M* fol. 244vb.

[61] *suprascr. A.* It ought to be omitted.

[62] *om. A.*

[63] est distinctio *om. A.*

[64] perceptionum et proprietatum *CMP.*

[65] *om. CMP.*

[66] aliis utique rebus *CMP.*

[67] *om. CMP.*

[68] *A* fol. 115rb.

[69] *om. CMP.*

[70] est vero *C.*

[71] quasi inferius et exterius *om. CMP.*

[72] (se potest effundere) pertendit *CMP.*

[73] *om. CMP.*

[74] dico *CMP.*

[75] in se *om. CMP.*

36 Inter sensum vero[76] et sensualitatem animae, prout notavi, sic distinguitur quod sensus quidem potentia est corporalia in semetipsis percipiendi. Sensualitas vero est potentia ea appetendi et in eis delectandi. Cum quid enim visu vel auditu sive quolibet alio sensu percipis et id appetis vel[77] in eo delectaris, ipsa quidem perceptio talis ad sensum pertinet; appetitus vero et delectatio ad sensualitatem.

37 Quando etiam ex eo, quod sentis, non delectatione sed contraria afficeris passione nec[78] id appetis sed abhorres et fugis, haec quoque in eadem fiunt sensualitate. Unde[79] enim anima sibi sive[80] carni suae consona appetit, ex hoc[81] ipso et adversantia fugit. Et ex qua natura eius[82] est delectari, quando illis[83] fruitur, ex eadem et eius[84] est contristari, quando ista[85] patitur.

38 Ex sensualitate itaque et circa sensualitatem haec omnia in anima habent naturaliter[86] fieri quemadmodum et in mente sola voluntatis vis est, qua[87] naturaliter et bona sua diligit et mala odit; et qua per dilectionem[88] de istis gaudet, de illis vero per odium dolet.

39 Quamvis autem ut hae mentis vel voluntatis ex intellectualibus sic et illae animae vel sensualitatis ex corporalibus naturales sint affectiones, non tamen iuxta naturam sed ex vitio *animales* vel *sensuales* nominantur non hi quidem, qui in his inferioribus ex perceptione sensuum sensualitate delectari appetunt vel delectantur, sed qui in hoc modum transgrediuntur, qui hanc videlicet[89] animae inferiorem superiori et meliori praeponunt mentis delectationi.

40 Contra quod ait Apostolus se non facere *animam suam pretiosiorem quam se,*[90] mentem scilicet suam[91] se appellans iuxta illud philosophi quia *mens cuiusque is est quisque.*[92] Quemadmodum autem anima, cum ab ea nominatur

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[76] *om. A.*
[77] et *CMP.*
[78] non *CM.*
[79] *A* fol. 115va.
[80] sibi sive *om. A.*
[81] *M* fol. 245ra.
[82] ei *CMP.*
[83] eis *P.*
[84] ei *CMP.*
[85] ipsa *CMP.*
[86] naturaliter habent *CMP.*
[87] *om. C.*
[88] delectationem *M.*
[89] scilicet *CMP.*
[90] *Acts* 20:24: Nec facio animam meam pretiosiorem quam me.
[91] *om. CMP.*
[92] Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis* II, 12, 7; ed. F. E. Rockwood (Boston 1903) 17. Cf. Macrobius, *Comm. in somn. Scipionis* II, 12, 7; ed. F. Eyssenhardt (Leipzig 1893) 625.

homo[93] *animalis*[94] et in his Apostoli verbis iuxta eam quae determinata est quasi partialem ipsius intelligitur significationem, ita et[95] in Evangelio, ubi Dominus praecipit *ne simus solliciti*[96] animae nostrae quid manducemus et ubi animam suam turbatam dicit[97] vel tristem usque ad mortem.[98] Secundum ea vero, quae sunt in anima, se habent et ea, quae sunt in spiritu.[99] Etsi enim non sint[1] prorsus eadem ipsa,[2] haec tamen illorum[3] similitudinem exprimunt.

41 Spiritus siquidem est rerum, quas anima percipit, imagines percipere. Unde et vis ipsius, qua hoc facit, *imaginatio* dicitur. Quod enim sensus est[4] in anima, hoc et imaginatio in spiritu. Rerum autem sensibilium et earundem imaginum tanta est aemulatio, ut, quamvis hae[5] non sint illae, propter expressam tamen[6] harum ad illas similitudinem, quando percipiuntur, istae propter eas et in eis asserantur[7] percipi et illae.

42 Non enim ut anima sic et spiritus illas percipit immediate in semetipsis sed in solis imaginibus suis. Istas vero in semetipsis immediate percipit. Ideo non modo vere sed et proprie istas dicitur percipere. Quamvis autem ex vi imaginationis sola[8] eas percipiat spiritus, non tamen ipsas[9] sed solum ea, quorum[10] sunt imagines, dici potest imaginari.

43 Imaginari quippe rem aliquam est eam per imaginem suam percipere et non per semetipsam. Imagines autem huiusmodi alias non habent imagines per quas et ipsae percipi possint. Cum ergo hominis cuiuspiam, cuius formam corporalem[11] non video, similem tamen formae corporali[12] imaginem apud me volvo, non ipsius imaginem sed ipsum imaginor hominem sive formam ipsius corporalem.[13]

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[93] *A* fol. 115vb.
[94] I *Cor.* 2:14.
[95] *om. CMP.*
[96] *Matth.* 6:25.
[97] *P* fol. 19. *John* 12:27.
[98] *Matth.* 26:38.
[99] quae sunt in spiritu *MP.*
[1] sunt *CM.*
[2] *C* fol. 133.
[3] *M* fol. 245rb.
[4] quod enim est sensus *CMP.*
[5] hic *M.*
[6] *om. C.*
[7] asseruntur *A.*
[8] solas *A.*
[9] eas *CMP.*
[10] *A* fol. 116ra.
[11] *om. CMP.*
[12] corporalis *A.*
[13] sive ipsius formam corporalem *CMP.*

44 Imago autem, licet rei corporalis forma quaedam[14] nominari possit, ipsa tamen corporalis non est. Corporalis siquidem res dici non potest nisi quae[15] materia vel de materia vel in materia est. Horum autem nihil circa eam, quam nunc consideramus, reperies imaginem.[16]

45 Hoc ergo inter animae et spiritus, quantumcumque[17] similes[18] sint, distat perceptiones,[19] quod, quamvis uterque rem eandem[20] percipere dicatur, anima tamen eam percipit[21] in se. Spiritus vero nonnisi in imagine.[22] Et[23] anima non agit nisi circa materiam: spiritus vero extra materiam. Anima per corpus solum: spiritus per semetipsum. Anima exterius: spiritus intus. Anima quoque non percipit quicquid spiritus. Spiritus vero percipit quicquid anima.

46 Quicquid enim ad animae perceptionem[24] secundum quemcumque ipsius venerit[25] sensum, id per imaginem suam absque omni temporis interstitio perceptioni quoque[26] spiritus occurrit. Imagines[27] vero, quas spiritus percipit, neque per semetipsas[28] neque per imagines suas ad animae possunt exire perceptionem.

47 Spiritus quoque aeque[29] absentium ut praesentium et aeque[30] eorum, quae non sunt, ut eorum, quae sunt, percipit imagines. Anima vero solas existentium atque praesentium percipere potest[31] proprietates. Nihil tamen percipere potest spiritus nisi secundum proprietates ab anima perceptas.

48 Quemadmodum autem perceptio spiritus secundum animae formatur perceptionem, sic et ipsius affectio illius imitatur affectionem. Prout illa namque ex rerum corporalium afficitur proprietatibus, in modum consimilem[32] et iste ex illarum proprietatum afficitur imaginibus.

49 Est igitur spiritus potentia corporalium rerum imagines non[33] corporales

[14] quidem *CMP.*
[15] quod *CMP.*
[16] imaginem reperies *CMP.*
[17] quamcumque *A.*
[18] *M* fol. 245va.
[19] comprehensiones *CM.*
[20] eandem rem *MP.*
[21] percipit eam *CMP.*
[22] (in imagine) imaginem *A.*
[23] *om. CMP.*
[24] perceptionem animae *AC.*
[25] *A* fol. 116rb.
[26] *om. A.*
[27] imaginum *C.*
[28] seipsas *A.*
[29] aequa *CM.*
[30] *om. CM.*
[31] imagines... percipere potest *om. CMP.*
[32] similem *A.*
[33] *om. C.*

iuxta sensus similitudinem percipiendi et ex eis ad similitudinem sensualitatis afficiendi. Ad spiritum itaque pertinent[34] quaecumque in somniis sic agimus vel patimur quasi corporaliter ea ageremus aut pateremur et quaecumque nobis ibi[35] ita occurrunt velut ab exteriori carnis occurrerent sensui.[36]

50 Hinc Pharao et Nabuchodonosor quae in somniis[37] suis viderunt, spiritu[38] vidisse dicuntur; Ioseph vero[39] et Daniel mente. Illi namque ea viderunt secundum rerum sensibilium imagines.[40] Isti autem eorum intellexerunt significationes: nec formam corporalem nec formae corporali similem habentes imaginem. Talia vero omnia ad mentem[41] quemadmodum omnes formae corporales[42] ad animae, et omnes earum imagines ad spiritus pertinent perceptionem. Unde et[43] exstases sanctorum et revelationes sive[44] visiones[45] et quaecumque alia ab interiori imaginabiliter[46] formata[47] in spiritu fieri dicuntur.

51 Hinc Iohannes *in spiritu* se fuisse asserit[48] quando *Apocalypsim* suam i.e. revelationem sibi divinitus factam percepit. Revelatio siquidem illa aut tota aut ex parte maxima secundum rerum corporalium[49] imagines proposita est. Quod autem imagines ille, quid significationis gererent, intellexit, hoc siquidem[50] non spiritus sed mentis fuit.

52 Prophetae etiam[51] nihilominus ratione eadem ea, quae sibi revelata sunt, in spiritu vidisse perhibentur. Eorum namque plurima in figuris et imaginibus[52] ab interiori[53] spiritualibus perceperunt oculis. Ipsa quoque verba, quae[54] ad eos facta[55] leguntur, non corporaliter sonuisse sed omnia[56] prope iuxta corporalium imagines sonorum spirituali angelorum formata ministerio magis spirituali quam carnali percepta creduntur auditu.

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[34] *M.* fol. 245vb.
[35] *om. CMP.*
[36] sensu *corr. ex* sensui *A.*
[37] *A* fol. 116va.
[38] in spiritu *CMP.*
[39] *P* fol. 19v.
[40] imaginem *M.*
[41] pertinent *add. CMP.* Legendum puto *ad mentis* (perceptionem).
[42] *om. A.*
[43] *om. CMP.*
[44] *om. CM.*
[45] vivificationes *A.*
[46] imaginaliter *CMP.*
[47] fiunt *CMP.*
[48] *Apoc.* 1:10.
[49] secundum corporalium rerum *CMP.*
[50] quidem *CMP.*
[51] *om. CM.*
[52] imaginationibus *CMP.*
[53] exteriori *AC.*
[54] *A* fol. 116vb.
[55] *M* fol. 246ra.

53 Ut quid enim, cum Dei Patris sit Verbum[57] et Deus[58] Filius[59] Verbum ipsum, unde et[60] ad eorum[61] proprietatem locutio magis spectare[62] videtur, magis tamen de Spiritu sancto quam de Patre vel Filio dici solet, quamvis non magis de eo verum sit quia *in Prophetis* vel *per Prophetas* ipse locutus est? Ut aestimo, propter modum locutionis in spiritu eis factae intelligi potest id solere dici. Cui[63] enim potius quam Spiritui[64] Dei attribuenda fuerat[65] locutio spiritualis, divinitus in spiritu et spirituum spirituali[66] spiritualiter[67] formata ministerio, in spiritu quoque[68] a spiritu[69] spirituali[70] percepta modo?

54 Spiritus quippe iste,[71] qui in nobis est et in quo talis formatur et auditur locutio, non solum quidem propter eiusdem vocabuli communionem sed ob aliquam proprietatis[72] similitudinem ad Spiritus sancti potius quam ad Patris vel[73] Filii refertur proprietatem. Ut[74] enim ille Patris et Filii conexio quaedam est, ita et iste,[75] inter mentem et animam[76] non loci sed gradu naturae medius, vinculum quoddam eorum non immerito censetur adeo, ut sine eo illae non putentur iungi posse et in eodem esse.

55 Anima enim in brutis animalibus illis, quae memoria carent,[77] non modo sine mente sed et sine spiritu videtur[78] esse. In illis vero, quae memoriam[79] habent, anima et spiritus reperiuntur sine mente. Mentem namque non habent quae rationis et intelligentiae capacia non sunt. Sine anima vero[80] non viverent. Et sine spiritu memoriam habere non possunt.[81]

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[56] *C* fol. 133v.

[57] Dei sit Patris Verbum *M*.

[58] Dei *CMP*.

[59] sit *add. CMP*.

[60] *om. CMP*.

[61] ipsorum *CMP*.

[62] pertinere *CMP*.

[63] cur *M*.

[64] spiritu *A*.

[65] fuerit *A*.

[66] spiritali *CMP*. formaliter *add. A*.

[67] spiritaliter *CMP*.

[68] *om. CMP*.

[69] *om. C*.

[70] spiritali *MP*.

[71] *om. CMP*.

[72] proprietatum *A*.

[73] et *CM*.

[74] sicut *CMP*.

[75] et iste *om. CMP*.

[76] *A* fol. 117ra.

[77] carent memoria *CMP*.

[78] videntur *A*.

[79] *M* fol. 246rb.

56 Omnis enim memoria aut in spiritu consistit aut in mente.[82] In spiritu siquidem,[83] si de corporalibus fuerit vel de his quae in anima[84] sive[85] de his[86] etiam quae in ipso fuerint spiritu. De his enim omnibus imaginaria formatur memoria. Cetera vero, quae ad animae vel spiritus perceptionem pervenire[87] non possunt, ut mente sola percipiuntur sic et in[88] mente sola memoriter retinentur.

57 In angelis autem sine anima[89] spiritus est fortasse cum mente. De anima enim constat ipsam ibi non esse. Circa spiritum vero,[90] utrum ibi sit vel non sit, ambiguitas aliqua esse potest. De mente vero[91] illorum[92] si quis ambigit, de eo quidem utrum mentem ipse habeat[93] ambigi potest, nisi quia sine mente nemo[94] de re aliqua[95] ambigere potest.[96]

58 In Deo autem mens sola est absque omni animae et spiritus[97] admixtione. Si enim[98] anima[99] in Deo vel Spiritus Dei vel spiritus nominatur Deus, significatio alia est et ab ea secundum quam de anima et spiritu nunc loquimur[1] remotissima. Non[2] autem quemadmodum anima alicubi[3] sola est[4] sine spiritu et mente,[5] et mens alicubi[6] sine anima et spiritu, ita et[7] spiritus sine illarum utraque alicubi videtur esse.

[80] autem *CM.*
[81] possent *CMP.*
[82] aut in mente consistit *CMP.*
[83] quidem *CMP.*
[84] sunt *add. CMP.*
[85] *om. CMP.*
[86] ipsis *M.*
[87] venire *CMP.*
[88] *om. CMP.*
[89] *om. A.*
[90] circa vero spiritum *CMP.*
[91] *A* fol. 117rb.
[92] illarum *CM.*
[93] habeat ipse *CP.*
[94] *om. CMP.*
[95] qualibet *CMP.*
[96] non potest *CMP.*
[97] et spiritus *om. C.* ac spiritus *P.*
[98] *om. CM.*
[99] si anima enim *P.*
[1] quam nunc loquimur de anima et spiritu *CMP.*
[2] nunc *C.*
[3] alicui *CMP.*
[4] inest *CMP.*
[5] *P* fol. 20.
[6] alicui inest *CMP.*
[7] *om. CMP.*

59 Non etiam, ut anima et spiritus alicubi absque mente,[8] et mens et spiritus[9] alicubi forsitan[10] absque anima reperiuntur, sic anima et mens alicubi[11] absque spiritu reperiri possunt. Spiritus enim, utpote utrique illarum affinis, utrique potest uniri per se.[12]

60 Illae vero, a se distantes longius, sibi[13] ad unionem nisi spiritu mediante non consentiunt. Proinde spiritus eas conectens et in confoederationem[14] unam compagemque[15] adducens non incongrue quasi quoddam ipsarum dici potest vinculum.

61 In solo autem homine talis occurrit conexio. Nusquam enim alibi omnia haec[16] tria simul in eodem[17] contingit inveniri.[18] Est autem anima in his tribus carni proxima utpote ei immediate unita atque infusa. Mens vero a carne est[19] remotissima, spiritu et anima interpositis. Spiritus vero mente carni quidem est[20] propinquior sed animâ remotior. Inter carnem enim[21] et spiritum sola est anima quemadmodum inter animam et mentem solus est spiritus.

62 Quamvis autem absque medio anima coniuncta sit carni et spiritui, spiritus quoque et[22] animae et menti, cognatione tamen[23] quadam anima ad spiritum quam ad carnem, et spiritus ad animam quam ad mentem maiorem habere videtur affinitatem.[24] Anima siquidem, licet sit in carne, non tamen cum ipsa ut cum spiritu eiusdem est aut[25] esse potest substantiae. Spiritus vero, etsi consubstantialis animae et menti, in perceptionibus tamen et affectionibus suis magis accedit ad conformitatem animae quam mentis.

63 Aliquotiens autem[26] in his tribus, mente scilicet spiritu et anima, transmutatio fit vocabulorum. Nonnumquam enim nomine spiritus mentem intelligimus. Secundum hoc namque apud Apostolum legimus: *Spiritu ambulate.*[27]

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[8] *M* fol. 246va.

[9] et spiritus et mens *MP*. et spiritus mens *C*.

[10] forsan *MP*.

[11] *om. CMP*.

[12] per se uniri potest *CMP*.

[13] *om. P*.

[14] foederationem *CM*. et in *add. CMP*.

[15] compagem *CMP* (et in unam compagem).

[16] *A* fol. 117va.

[17] *om. CMP*.

[18] invenire contingit *CMP*.

[19] *om. CMP*.

[20] *om. CMP*.

[21] inter enim carnem *A*.

[22] *om. CMP*.

[23] *C* fol. 134.

[24] maiorem habere affinitatem percipitur *CMP*.

[25] est aut *om. CMP*.

[26] vero *CMP*. *M* fol. 246vb.

[27] *Gal.* 5:16. Gilbert, *In Gal.* 5:16; *Ms.* Paris, B. N. *lat.* 14441, fol. 73rb.

Et item: *Reformamini spiritu mentis vestrae* i.e. spiritu qui est mens vestra.[28] Necnon et illud: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et*[29] *spiritus adversus carnem.* In Evangelio quoque: *Spiritus quidem promptus est, caro autem infirma.*[30]

64 Et multa in hunc modum scripta reperies.[31] Ex acceptione eadem *spirituales*[32] nominantur in quibus mens ceteris sibi dominatur subiectis.[33] Sed et[34] econverso spiritus[35] interdum, etsi rarius,[36] mentis[37] appellatione intelligitur. Sic etenim in *Actibus Apostolorum*[38] Petrus per *excessum mentis* caelum apertum et vas inde summissum et cetera quae ibi leguntur vidisse dicitur. Quod Augustinus[39] quia secundum rerum[40] corporalium configurationes[41] factum est, in spiritu, qui mente inferior est, factum esse[42] testatur.

65 Non aliter quoque Paulus se, cum in templo oraret, *in stupore mentis*[43] factum et vidisse et audivisse[44] Dominum asserit. Mens etiam vocabulo animae nonnumquam significari videtur. In Cantico siquidem beatae Mariae *anima* fortasse mens intelligenda est, cum *anima* Virginis et *Dominum* magnificare et *spiritus* eius *in salutari* suo exultare, eadem ipsa asserente, pronuntiatur.[45]

66 Non enim Dominum magnificare est sensus et sensualitatis sed intellectus et voluntatis. Sensus enim[46] praeter sensibilia nihil[47] percipit; nec sensualitas, eisdem exceptis, quicquam appetit; nec aliunde suam delectationem[48] ipsa[49] trahit.

67 Intellectus autem et voluntas Dominum magnificant, dum intellectus, non modo sensibus subiecta eorumque imagines transgrediens sed et[50] semetipsum quodammodo sub se[51] relinquens et supra se attollens deitatis[52] maiestatem contemplatur et[53] immensam et[54] incomprehensibilem: sine elatione omnibus praesidentem, cum tranquillitate omnia iudicantem et[55] cum suavitate magna[56] omnia disponentem, et voluntas[57] se totam et illi per timorem castum subicit et in illam per spem et desiderium extendit: prae illius caritate alia omnia contemnens et prae illius gaudio semet etiam[58] ipsam cum aliis omnibus[59] quodammodo obliviscens.

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[28] *Eph.* 4:23. Gilbert, *ibid.*, fol. 79va.
[29] *A* fol. 117vb. *Gal.* 5:17.
[30] *Matth.* 26:4.
[31] et in hunc modum scripta multa reperies *CMP.*
[32] viri *add. CMP.*
[33] subiectis dominatur *CMP.*
[34] *om. CMP.*
[35] mens *A.*
[36] minus usitate *CMP.*
[37] spiritus *A.*
[38] *Acts* 10:10 ff.
[39] *De Gen. ad litt.* XII, 11, 24; PL 34, 462 f.
[40] rem *A.*
[41] configurationem *CMP.*
[42] esse factum *CMP.*
[43] *Acts* 22:17.
[44] et audivisse *om. CMP.*
[45] *Luc.* 1:46f.
[46] *A* fol. 118ra.
[47] nil *C.*
[48] dilectionem *C.*
[49] *om. C.*
[50] *om. CMP.*

68 Sic profecto, dum *accedit homo ad cor altum*,[60] vere[61] exaltatur Deus, ut *cum perverso perversus* ita et[62] *cum sancto sanctus* i.e. cum illo depressus, cum isto elevatus. Verum qui adeo magnifice per tantam mentis elevationem Deum elevare et[63] magnificare non potest, habet ex scripturis alios quamplures et inferiores[64] Deum[65] magnificandi modos de quibus nunc dicendum non[66] est.

69 Hunc[67] enim prae ceteris elegi et specialiter[68] hoc loco notavi quia eum, aliis excellentiorem, excellentius etiam quam dici possit tantae Virginis et Matris excellentiae constat non defuisse. Ut autem mens Dominum magnificat, ita et[69] spiritus[70] *in Deo salutari* suo[71] exultat.

70 Hoc autem fit in spiritu, dum et ipse divinitus primitias quasdam percipiens salutis aeternae aspersione quadam concutitur dulcedinis internae: tripudians[72] et saliens, et prae suavitate tanta seipsum[73] non capiens. Dulcedo autem[74] sive suavitas ista, licet corporalis non sit,[75] nonnullam tamen illius

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[51] sub se *om. CMP.*
[52] Dei *CMP.*
[53] *om. CMP.*
[54] *om. CMP.*
[55] *om. CMP.*
[56] *om. M.*
[57] *P* fol. 20v.
[58] *om. CMP.*
[59] omnibus aliis *P.*
[60] *Ps.* 63:7.
[61] *om. CMP.*
[62] *om. CMP.*
[63] elevare et *om. CMP.*
[64] *A* fol. 118rb.
[65] dominum *CM.*
[66] *om. A.*
[67] haec *A.*
[68] spiritualiter *A.*
[69] *om. CMP.*
[70] eius *add. CMP.*
[71] *om. CMP.*
[72] tripidians *A. M.* fol. 247rb.
[73] seipsam *A.*
[74] enim *CMP.*
[75] non sit *om. C.*

habet similitudinem sed puritatis et iocunditatis[76] abundantiam longe inaequalem.

71 Delectatio[77] itaque hinc exoriens et hominem ab interiori fortiter suaviterque concutiens exultatio spiritus est in Deo.[78] Spiritus siquidem est exultare; mentis vero gaudere. Quod autem ut anima mentem sic alicubi[79] mens animam designet, me vel[80] audivisse vel legisse non recolo.

72 Spiritus autem fortasse pro anima accipitur quandoque ut in *Genesi*[81] ubi in carne *spiritus vitae* esse dicitur[82] et alibi etiam spiritus carnis nominatur.[83] Anima namque spiritu inferior, ut ostendimus, carni est infusa. Et haec ei causa est vitae.

73 Nihil tamen praepedit[84] quin in locis huiusmodi vocabulo animae vel spiritus tota interior substantia possit intelligi. Ubi enim est[85] et quod facit vel patitur anima,[86] spiritus vel mens ibi est. Idemque facit ipsa vel patitur quia haec et[87] omnia et singula una est ipsa.

74 Aliquando autem[88] ad ipsam totaliter comprehendendam et sufficienter distribuendam non haec tria sed duo sola iunguntur vocabula. Sic[89] enim in *Epistola ad Thessalonicenses prima* scriptum est: *Ipse autem*[90] *Deus pacis sanctificet vos per omnia ut integer spiritus vester et anima et corpus sine quaerela in adventu Domini nostri*[91] *Jesu Christi servetur.*[92] Hic igitur aut[93] nomine *spiritus* duo comprehenduntur superiora aut nomine *animae* duo inferiora.[94]

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[76] iocunditatis et puritatis *MP*.

[77] dilectio *C*.

[78] exultatio est in Deo ipsius spiritus *CMP*.

[79] alicui *C*. quoque *add. CMP*.

[80] *om. CMP*.

[81] *Gen.* 6:17.

[82] dicitur esse *CMP*.

[83] *A* fol. 118va.

[84] impedit *CMP*.

[85] ubi est enim *CMP*.

[86] vel *add. CMP*.

[87] *om. CP*. quia et haec *M*.

[88] *om. CM*. etiam *P*.

[89] sicut *A*.

[90] ipse autem *om. CMP*. propterea *add. M*.

[91] *om. A*.

[92] I *Thess.* 5:23.

[93] autem *A*.

[94] No *explicit* is added in any one of the four copies. *C* has about two blank lines left on fol. 134, while *M* adds one line (34 instead of 33) to take care of the last five words of the tract. *P* has eight lines left blank and nothing, except a marginal note, is found on the next folio.

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The Fifteen Signs before the Judgement: Further Remarks

WILLIAM W. HEIST

THOUGH I have long given up any intention of carrying out the probably pointless task of collecting and studying all the extant versions of the extremely popular mediaeval legend of the Fifteen Signs Before the Judgement, I recently took advantage of some spare time in the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal in Paris and in the Bibliothèque Royale in Brussels to see what additional specimens might be turned up in some of the great European manuscript collections. My search of the Bibliothèque Royale was quite systematic and thorough, that of the Paris libraries more cursory. What follows is almost the last that I intend to say on the subject of this legend.

In an earlier article I edited and commented on four French versions of the legend from manuscripts in the Bibliothèque Nationale,[1] and I have no other versions from this library to report. In the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, on the other hand, MSS. 2997, 3516, and 5204 contain texts of the legend that have not, so far as I know, been published or studied. Of these, however, the text in MS. 5204 is merely another of a well-known version, the oldest of which is that in Anglo-Norman dialect in Tours MS. 927, dating from the twelfth century . Likewise, the text in Arsenal MS. 2997 is a fragment of the same poem, occupying only the last column of the last folio (fol. 130), written in a different hand from that of the preceding matter (the *Estoire de Merlin* and *Saint-Graal* of Robert de Boron), and evidently added merely to fill out the manuscript. At the head of the fragment, and in the same hand, is the date: *Anno domini millesimo tricesimo primo*. If the rest of the poem was ever present, it was perhaps written on a loose sheet which has disappeared.

The remaining Arsenal manuscript, MS. 3516, however, contains a previously unpublished version expanded from the well-known form of the legend in the *Legenda aurea* of Jacobus à Voragine as printed by Graesse. But there are certain departures from the Voragine form of the legend, or from any of its subtypes that I have encountered, that seem to point to contamination from other types. The sign of the third day, for example, includes the return of the sea to its normal level, after sinking nearly out of sight on the previous day, along with the gathering together and bellowing of the fishes and sea monsters typical of the *Legenda aurea.* This return of the sea to its normal level is the sign of the third day in the Pseudo-Bede and Damien types of the legend; but it is missing from Peter Comestor, from whom Voragine derived the legend for his original collection, if Wyzewa's edition, which is supposed to be based on the oldest manuscripts of the *Legenda aurea,* is to be trusted. And although in later recensions details are added from the Damien type, I have seen no other forms that seem to be derived from the *Legenda aurea* in which this particular item occurs.

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[1] "Four Old French Versions of the Fifteen Signs Before the Judgment," *Mediaeval Studies*, XV (1953), 184-198.

It is of course possible that some recension of Voragine's work existed in which the return of the sea to its normal level occurred as a part of the sign for the third day (the thirteenth day before the Judgement). Certainly nobody has done enough research on the manuscripts of the *Legenda aurea* to establish the contrary. My own knowledge of the matter is limited to Graesse's edition, Wyzewa's edition in French translation, and Pierce Butler's study,[2] with the addition of certain inferences and deductions that I have been able to make from studying a number of versions of the legend of the Fifteen Signs belonging to this type.[3] But since the general trend of the development of this legend in the *Legenda aurea,* from the earliest to the latest recensions, seems to have been toward addition of signs from Damien, I doubt that this detail was first added and then dropped out. It seems more likely that the version in Arsenal MS. 3516 represents a change independent of its main source, the whole being obviously greatly changed in this adaptation in any case.

Another departure from Voragine is the addition to the battle of the stones as the sign of the seventh day of the stars' loss of their light, the sun's darkening, and the moon's turning to blood, all evidently derived from Signs 2, 3 and 4 of the Old French type of the legend, though ultimately from such apocalyptic matter as Revelation 6: 12-13. Further, Sign 11 omits the standing open of the sepulchres, the part of this sign that Voragine derived from Damien; and Sign 13 has, instead of the death of all the living, the resurrection of the dead — evidently a stupid misunderstanding of Voragine's *morientur viventes, ut cum mortuis resurgant.*

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[2] *Legenda Aurea — Légende dorée — Golden Legend. A Study of Caxton's Golden Legend with Special Reference to Its Relations to the Earlier English Prose Translation* (Baltimore, 1889).

[3] But in fact astonishingly little is known of the textual history of the *Legenda aurea,* considering its enormous popularity and great importance. In the present discussion I sometimes speak for convenience of Voragine as though he were the author of the collection in the form in which Graesse prints it. But to what extent this is true is quite uncertain.

I have said above that the addition to Voragine's Sign 7 is evidently derived from the Old French type of the legend, rather than directly from the canonical Book of Revelation. To assume that another form of the legend of the Fifteen Signs is a more likely source of this addition than so familiar a passage of Scripture would not, of course, be justified without additional evidence of use of this other form. Such evidence, however, exists in the sign for the sixth day, where Voragine has *Sexta ruent edificia. In hac etiam die, ut dicitur, flumina ignea surgent ab occasu solis contra faciem firmamenti usque ad ortum concurrentia.* Here the second part, omitted in our French poem, is Voragine's addition from Damien and may not have been present in the French poet's source. But though this omission is not evidence of influence from other forms of the legend, the poet has provided us with such evidence in his addition of an explanation of the fall of the buildings:

Al sisme jor apres, se li escris ne ment,
Des .iiii. pars del mont venteront .iiii. vent:
Li un vers miedi, l'autre vers orient,
Li tiers vers mienuit, l'autre vers occident;
L'un venra contre l'autre issi tres durement,
N'i aura tor de piere a terre ne cravent,
Ne maison ne palais, ne nul haut mandement,
Ne moster a apostle, martir, ne innocent,
Dont carront a li terre tot edefiement.
Qui adont sera vis, si orra grant torment;
Cascun de sa maison s'enfuira erranment,
En terre feront fosses por la paor del vent
Ou il se reponront, mais n'iert pas longement.

This reminds one of Sign 11 of the Old French type of the legend, in which winds from all directions shake the earth. It is true that the passage is even more obviously reminiscent of the introductory matter *preceding* the Fifteen Signs in the text of the poem in Arsenal MS. 5204:

Confaitement Zodiacus
Court encontre le firmamant;
Li planetes ne sont pas lent,
La nature des elemens
Et la seducion des vens.
Car li une est en orient
Et li autres en occident,
Et li autres vers mienuit.

It would be dangerous, however, to take the strong resemblance of these two passages as positive evidence of direct relationship. For the four winds — les Quatre-Vents — is both too obvious to any people oriented to four cardinal points of the compass and too commonplace in French tradition to indicate much more than a familiarity with that tradition. It goes back, no doubt, to the Classical habit of associating winds with the points of the compass; and Les Quatre-Vents occurs as a place name and is still fairly popular as a name for a café. Hence, one could argue that this parallelism is too weak to indicate a literary source for the enumeration of the winds in Arsenal MS. 3516; and I admit that I do not put much faith in it, especially since we have as supporting evidence of contamination from the Old French type of the legend only the signs in the sun, moon, and stars in Sign 7, itself dubious. But the fact that the two parallels occur in successive signs adds some weight to their testimony, and I rather think that the poet who versified the *Legenda aurea* version in French had running through his mind some version of the Old French type that he had read or heard.

It is interesting, however, to point out that a wind or winds that blow down buildings as one of the signs before the Judgement represents a persistent and fairly venerable tradition. It may, as I once suggested, be present in the fifteenth homily of the tenth-century Vercelli Book, which reads: "þæt þonneariseð eorðan frymðe fram norð-dæle *ond* fram east-dæle; *ond* eorðan grundas bioð grimetiende, *ond* ealle ge-nið-timbernesse gefylleð on ðæm dæge." My suggestion was that *frymðe* "origin," which does not make much sense, represents a scribal corruption of *wynde*, for *winde*, in this homily, which is essentially a translation of the Latin *Apocalypse of Thomas*, the main source (as I believe) of the legend of the Fifteen Signs.[4] The tradition is certainly present as the sign of the fourth day in the seven-day list of the *Debate Between the Body and the Soul* of MSS. Harleian 2253 and Digby 86, in what is clearly a close relative of the legend of the Fifteen Signs: here a wind blows down castles and halls and makes the hills even with the dales. In a Welsh version extant in four manuscripts, which I published some years ago,[5] the tenth sign is as follows: "The tenth day a cruel [?] wind will come to blow every impurity from off the earth; and then the people will flee to the earth to seek shelter," curiously combining the wind and men's seeking shelter in the earth as in the present poem. Yet this Welsh version seems to belong to the Comestor type of the legend. But perhaps the cyclone cellar is an obvious invention, even though no commonplace in medieval Europe.

Perhaps it is useless to invoke these parallels, with the problems they pose, in a discussion of our little post-Voragine poem, which has doubtless borrowed the detail from a version of the Old French type. If I mention them here, it is rather to illustrate the difficulty and uncertainty of tracing the relationships of such loosely related matter in the Middle Ages, or of popular matter in any period, than to throw light upon the origins of our present poem.

[4] William W. Heist, *The Fifteen Signs Before Doomsday* (East Lansing, 1952), pp. 68-69 and notes 19 and 20.

[5] "Welsh Prose Versions of the Fifteen Signs Before Doomsday," *Speculum*, XIX (1944), 424-425.

This poem is written in hexameter verse in strophes, or *laisses*, on a single rhyme, varying in length from seven to twenty lines. The text follows.

Or ores de Jugement et des .xv. signes: (Col. 1)

Segnor, or faites pais, s'entendes ma raison,
Que Dex doinst a nos tos vraie confession,
Quant verra a li mort, et face vrai pardon
De trestos les pechies dont corecie l'avon.
Des signes[6] del juise molt briefment vos diron,
En .i. livre d'Ebrieus que nos lisant trovon,
Et de la grant dolor que nos iluec verron;
Onques si grant ne vit en cest siecle nus hom.

Li angle et li arcangle ilueques trambleront,
Et les sains et les saintes si grant paor aront,
Mais ce n'iert pas por ax, car bien defi sauront,
Que il erent tot sauf, ne ja rien n'i perdront;
Ains ert por nos caitis que il se cremiront,
Que ne soions danpne en infer le parfont.
Car selonc nos desertes li Saint nos jugeront,
Qui bien sauront nos œuvres si que rien n'i falront.
Li bon erent el ciel, o Deu sans fin manront,
Et li mal en infer a tos jors descendront;
Molt ert plus grant la torble de cex qui la iront
Que il ne soit des autres ki el ciel monteront.

Car li mons est si grans de la grant malvaiste:
Li sires vers son home ne tient pas verite,
Sovent li tolt le sien, ce qu'il a conqueste,
Soit a tort ou a droit, ne li chaut le malfe.
Ne l'omme son segnor ne porte feelte:
Ce que li doit garder li a sovent enble.
La feme son baron ne porte loialte,
Ne li hom a sa feme, ce est sovent prove.
Li ostes a son oste, sovent les ont robe,
Et dedens son ostel mordri et estrangle.
Li pechie sont partut issi espes seme
Que jo n'aroie awan tut le mal aconte
Qui est partut le mont, et en loing et en le.
A ce voil repairier dont io ai en pense;
Des signes del juise vos dirai verite,
Ensi com Saint Giromes nos a dit et conte.

Saint Giromes li pros, qui tant sot deviser,
En .i. livre d'Ebrieus que vos oi nomer,
.XV. signes trova qui[7] molt font a douter,

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[6] MS., sieges.
[7] MS., que.

Que devant le juise nos voldra Dex mostrer.
Le premer jor croistront totes aighes de mer,
.XL. aunes en haut les verra on lever
Desor le plus haut mont que on porroit trover,
Si droites com .i. mur les verra on ester.
El secont jor apres, quant verra ajorner, (Col. 2)
Aval jusqu'en abisme les verra avaler.
Et al tiers jor apres, quant verra ajorner,
En lor premerain sieges les porra on trover.
Adonques li poisson aparront sor la mer,
Et les bestes marines qui soloient noer
Crieront et moront, bien les orra on cler,
Jusc'amont vers le ciel, ce temoigne li ber,
Saint Giromes li prous, qui bien en sot parler;
Et adonques morront totes sans demorer.

Li mers et tot li mons al quart jor ardera,
Et totes aighes douces plus nule ni corra.
Et la quint jor apres, quant il ajornera,
Les herbes et les pres, quant qu'el mont est, ardra;
Tot sanglante suor cascune suera,
Et li arbre ensement que .i. seus n'i faudra,
De sanglante rosee cascun arousera,
Cascun qui ce verra molt s'en esmaiera.

En cel meisme jor tot hoisel del mont
Par molt grant compaignie en l'air s'asambleront,
Et descendront a terre, ilueque s'aserront;
Cascun en son langage molt forment se plaindront.
Ce ert vis a tos ceaus qui adont les verront,
De por paor de mort ensamble parleront;
Apres cele dolor ilueques se morront.

Al sisme jor apres, se li escris ne ment,
Des .iiii. pars del mont venteront .iiii. vent:
Li un vers miedi, l'autre vers orient,
Li tiers vers mienuit, l'autre vers occident;
L'un venra contre l'autre issi tres durement,
N'i aura tor de piere a terre ne cravent,
Ne maison ne palais, ne nul haut mandement,
Ne moster a apostle, martir, ne innocent,
Dont carront a li terre tot edefiement.
Qui adont sera vis, si orra grant torment;
Cascun de sa maison s'enfuira erranment,
En terre feront fosses por la paor del vent
Ou il se reponront, mais n'iert pas longement.

Et quant venra apres droit[8] al setisme jor,
L'une piere vers l'autre venra par tel vigor

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[8] MS., drait?

L'une brisera l'autre, n'i ara point d'amor;
Et totes les estoiles perderont lor luor,
Lor rais espanderont et mueront color.
Li solaus tornera en molt grant tenebror,
Et la lune ert sanglante, oies com grant dolor!

Al huime jor apres, quant il ajornera,
Adont par tot le mont la terre crollera;
Ainc si oriblement a nul jor ne crolla.
Al noefme jor apres trestote fondera,
Ja plus par tot le mont ne mont ne val n'aura.
Al disme jor apres, quant il esclaircira, (Col. 3)
Cascun de sa caverne adonques istera,
Assi com fust derves par les cans s'enfuira;
Ne parlera a autre, tant n'en encontrera,
Car por la grant dolor nus parler ne porra.

Et al .xi.isme jor, ce trovons nos lisant,
Li os de tot le mont qui ainc furent vivant
Isteront fors des terres, tot et petit et grant;
Desor lor sepultures erent aparissant,
Iluec s'arengeront par le Jhesu commant.
Et al .xii.isme jor, par som l'aube aparant,
Dont carront les estoiles cascun[9] del firmament:
Ja plus ne verra on ne decors ne croissant.
Adont crieront totes les bestes en plorant,
Et li hom et les femes, quanque erent vivant.
Li per contre son per morront en dolausant.
Et al .xiii. jor verres miracle grant,
Car dont reviveront trestot de maintenant;
Sor les sepulcres erent et prest et aparant,
N'atendront se tant non com lor die et commant
De par le creator, 'Venes trestot avant.'
Adont venront trestot, nus n'ira atargant.

Al .xiiii.isme jor oies que avendra,
Uns fus venra del ciel qui trestot ardera,
Si haut com la funkiere del sacrefice ala
Que fisent a lor idles li Sarrasin pieça;
Et la terre ensement trestote brulera
Si parfont com li hom par engien le troua.
Car Dex en l'ewangille le nos dist et mostra
Que li ciels et la terre encor trespassera,
Mais la siene parole a tos jors durera.[10]
Et al .xv.isme jor, quant il ajornera,
Nus ciel et nueve terre Damedex refera,
Mais ja home ne feme en celui ne manra;

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[9] MS., chascun.
[10] MS., duerra.

Car li glorios Deus .ii. cites avera
U les bons et les mas trestos herbergera.

Li .iiii. angle del ciel es .iiii. pars del mont
De .iiii. grant buisines adonques corneront,
Tot cil ki el mont erent asses cler les oeront.
El son de lor buisines a tos commanderont
Que al juise vienent; adont s'emoveront,
Al grant plait Damedeu adont tot encorront.
Li .i. erent dolant, li autre lie seront,
Car cascun en droit foi molt bien defi saront,
Que selonc lor desertes lor loies averont.
El Val de Josaphas tot droit asembleront;
Le Salveor del mont iluec atenderont.

The poem then continues, as promised, with a conventional description of the Last Judgement, which I omit.

One might almost say of so short and popular a legend as that of the Fifteen Signs that the only way to be sure it is *not* in a medieval manuscript, even though this has been described in a quite full catalogue, is to read the entire manuscript with considerable care. It occurs as an independent piece of a convenient size to fill out a column, and it is found incorporated into works of the most diverse kinds, but not necessarily in more than a single manuscript of the work. I have, for instance, examined eight manuscripts of Peter of Riga's *Aurora* in the Bibliothèque Royale in Brussels. One of them, as noted in the printed catalogue,[11] contains a version of the legend of the Fifteen Signs, in Latin verse, preceded by St. Augustine's Latin version of a Greek acrostic formerly attributed to the Erythraean Sibyl and well known in the Middle Ages, when it was often associated with the Fifteen Signs. The other seven manuscripts do not contain either of these, at least in the corresponding place (between Peter's verse paraphrases of the Book of Job and the Song of Songs). The Fifteen Signs of Bibliothèque Royale MS. 14881 may, then, be by Peter of Riga, or more probably, like Augustine's translation of the Sibylline acrostic that precedes it, it may not — there is nothing in the manuscript to indicate that both of them are not Peter's work. But I have not encountered this version of the Fifteen Signs elsewhere.

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[11] J. Van den Gheyn, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique*, I (Brussels, 1901), 85.

[12] The manuscripts of the *Aurora* in the Bibliothèque Royale in which I did *not* find the Fifteen Signs are numbers 8673-74; 19225; 21846; 701-4; 1804; 19226; and 20028-29. On Peter of Riga and his *Aurora* see Migne, *Patrologia latina*, t. CCXII, cols. 18-41, and *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XVII (Paris, 1832), 26-35. Some manuscripts call the poem *Bibliotheca*, a name otherwise given to the poet himself.

The manuscript is a vellum of the thirteenth century, consisting of 242 folios plus two guard sheets.[12] The poem is as follows:

De quindecim signis ante diem Iudicii

Hec ter quinque diem precedere signa supremum
Scribit Ieronimus, quod pagina dictat Hebrea.
Fluctibus excrescens pontus montes superabit,
Murus ut erectus primo cubitis quadraginta.
Subtraitur visu, tantum petet ima, secundo.
Tercia clamabit frendendo belua marina.
Quartus aduret aquas, tunc ardebit mare totum.
Sanguineum fletum quinto dabit arbor et herba.
Funditus in sexto sternetur fabrica queque.
Septima collidet petras pugnando vicissim.
Octavo terrebit omnes terre motus generalis.
Equabitur solum nono; decimoque cavernis
Exibunt homines amentes, nulla loquentes.
Surgent undeno super omnibus ossa sepulchris.
Decidet e celo duodeno stellica ponpa.
Tertio post decimum consurget mortua turba.
Quarta dies decima celum terramque peruret.
Quindena celum renovabitur et nova tellus;
Et revocante Deo, mortalis quisque resurget.
Post, ut in occasum decurret fulgur ab ortu,
Cum signis mortis cernetur Christus ab alto,
Iosaphat vallem veniens ut iudicet orbem.

This version belongs to the Comestor type of the legend. Marginal notes give additions from Comestor not included in the verses, and both marginal and interlinear glosses give either readings from Comestor that have been altered in the verse paraphrase (e. g., *mare* written above *pontus*, line 3), explanations (e. g., *sanguinis guttas* in margin opposite *Sanguineum fletum*, etc., line 8), or other references (e. g., *Non remanebit lapis super lapidem* in margin opposite line 9, evidently in reference to Matt. 24: 2, Mark 13: 2, Luke 21: 6, or the like).

The only essential difference from Comestor's version in this poem, however, is the resurrection of the dead on the thirteenth day instead of the death of all the living. This is exactly the departure from the original that we have noticed in the French poem of the Voragine type in Arsenal MS. 3516. But there is no connection between the two; confusion as to the day on which the dead arise is common in the legend, and especially in versions of the Comestor type.

Bibliothèque Royale MS. 19088-89, a vellum of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries entitled on the spine *Liber Exemplorum piorum Frat. Humberti. De tribus essentialibus votis*, is a very miscellaneous collection that contains Comestor's text as an independent piece on folio 143. There seems also to be a direct translation from Comestor into German in Bibliothèque Royale MS.

11083-84, which is chiefly devoted to the second part (Nos. 19-47) of the sermons of Berhtolt, the thirteenth-century Franciscan, though it has no connection with these sermons other than inclusion in the same manuscript. It is a paper manuscript of the fourteenth or fifteenth century. The only departure from Comestor in this German version of the Fifteen Signs is the rendering in the sign of the first day of Comestor's *quadraginta cubitis* as *funfzehen claaftern.* This is precisely the change that Brun von Schönebeck makes in translating a Latin version of the Voragine type into German in his *Hohes Lied*; but Brun's poem can hardly be connected with this prose piece.[13]

A French prose version of the Comestor type of the legend occurs in Bibliothèque Royale MS. 9106, which is mainly occupied by *La Somme le Roi* of Laurent du Bois. There are some departures from the Comestor tradition: on the seventh day, in place of Comestor's *petrae ad invicem collidentur*, the French text has, *Le septime iour les roches et montaignes fonderont et cherront*; Comestor's thirteenth sign has dropped out, and those of his fourteenth and fifteenth days have been moved back one day; while for the fifteenth day there appears a new sign that I have not encountered in any other text: *Le quinzieme iour / Les planettes qui orendroit sont continuellement en mouvement ne se mouveront adont. Et alors le soleil sera en orient / Et la lune en occident.* This seems to represent a filling out of the commonplace of "signs in the sun, and the moon, and the stars," to provide signs for the necessary fifteen days, after Comestor's thirteenth sign had been lost.

There is also, in Bibliothèque Royale MS. 11874-80, which is a theological miscellany in Latin, on paper and of the sixteenth century, a version that claims Comestor's *Historia scholastica* as its authority. But there are two additions from the Damien type in the signs for the fifth and eight days, as in Voragine; and though the other additions from Damien that appear in Graesse's edition of the *Legenda aurea* are missing here, I should take it to be without question a member of the Voragine group were it not for the reference to the *Historia scholastica*, which Voragine does not give. There are a number of possible explanations of this ascription: the author may have followed Comestor, as he says, but conflated his text from the Damien type of the legend, just as Voragine (or somebody revising Voragine's collection) did. He may have followed a text of Comestor as well as one of Voragine, or merely have followed Voragine but recalled that Comestor had also dealt with the legend. Or some form of the *Legenda aurea* may have cited Comestor as its source of this legend. The present text does not provide any basis for choosing among these possibilities.

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[13] For a discussion of various medieval treatments of these numbers, see Heist, *The Fifteen Signs Before Doomsday*, p. 135.

The possibility of secondary conflation, that is, of following Voragine but incorporating additional material from one of Voragine's sources, just suggested as one of the possible explanations of the above version, seems despite its strangeness to be the soundest explanation of another Latin version incorporated in a sermon on the Judgement in Bibliothèque Royale MS. 675-78, a paper manuscript of the year 1471 devoted to the *Postillae super Matthaeum* of Augustine of Trionfo (or of Ancona) and to various theological matter, mostly sermons. Though this version is pretty clearly based on the *Legenda aurea*, there are a number of changes, some more interesting than others. In place of Voragine's sign (or signs) for the sixth day, we find the hills and mountains reduced to dust. This is anticipated from the sign for the tenth day, where it is repeated. In Voragine this is the sign of the ninth day, those of the ninth and tenth days being reversed in the present version. These accidental changes are merely what one expects to find from time to time and suggest nothing but faulty transmission of texts.

But the signs for the third and fourth days seem to have been somewhat expanded from Damien's own text, independently of Voragine's use of Damien. In Sign 3 Voragine has only *marinae belluae apparentes super mare*, etc., whereas this version has *belue marine et omnia que moventur in aquis*, echoing Damien. And Sign 4 reads *quod maria redigentur in primum statum qualia ab exordio creata sunt*; *et hoc fiet per ignem*, as in Damien's third sign, where Voragine, following Comestor only, does not have the return of the sea to its usual place. However, the *et hoc fiet per ignem*, the sense of which I do not clearly understand, apparently echoes Voragine's *Quarta ardebit mare et aquae*, which is not in Damien.

The only other version of the Voragine type that I have discovered in the Bibliothèque Royale is a more or less directly copied text that appears in the *Tractatus de judicio* of a miscellany labelled *Traités ascétiques*, which is MS. II. 193, on folios 57ᵛ-58ʳ of this fifteenth-century paper manuscript.

Likewise there is a copy of Damien's version of the legend in MS. II. 962, folio 168. This is a vellum manuscript in various hands, written from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, and is labelled *Stephanus Cantuar. Archiep. in Numeros*; that is, Stephen Langton's commentary on the Book of Numbers. It came from the Abbay of Cambron and is labelled in a late (sixteenth century?) hand *Liber beate Marie de Camberone.*

Finally, in Bibliothèque Royale MS. 9229-30, a fourteenth-century vellum constituting the second volume of a collection entitled *Recueil de légendes pieuses*, there occurs on folios 70ʳ-71ᵛ a text of the well-known poem that heads the Old French type of the legend, almost identical with the text from Arsenal MS. 5204 described above.

If this little roundup of unpublished texts of the legend of the Fifteen Signs proves anything, it is that though one may find many texts of known versions, and even no small number of unpublished versions of familiar types of the legend, in European libraries, versions that add much to our knowledge of the origin and development of the legend are few. This is hardly surprising, since, except for the Voragine type, whose history we know better than that of any other, all of the main lines of development had reached a comparatively stable form by the twelfth century, before which period manuscripts are by no means plentiful.

The new versions turned up here, of which I have given the text of the most interesting, present minor problems of affiliation, but these all seem to be problems dealing with the later treatment of texts established by the twelfth century — that is, after the legend had crystallized into fixed forms, and also after texts of it had become common enough so that contamination of one type by another might well be expected. The problem of the formation and early development of the legend is rather different, at once more difficult and more fascinating. But with this the handful of versions here discussed seem to have little to do.

On the Tradition of Troilus's Vision of the Little Earth

ALFRED L. KELLOGG

CHAUCER'S manifest indebtedness to Boccaccio's *Teseida* (XI, 3-24) for the scene of Troilus's ascent to heaven (*TC*, V, 1807-1827) has rather precluded the customary question of Chaucer's sources and has instead focussed attention on Boccaccio's. According to present opinion these sources may be summarized as (1) Macrobius's *Commentary on the 'Somnium Scipionis'* (2) Lucan's *Pharsalia* (3) Dante's *Paradiso*[1] — two pagan works with overtones added from a later Christian work. It is the contention of the present essay, however, that the Christian language of Boccaccio's passage is attributable less to Dante than to Boccaccio's use of a previously unnoticed source — commentary on *Isaiah* XL as incorporated into the *Somme le Roi* of Frère Lorens. A possible indebtedness of Chaucer to the same source is further suggested.

In Chapter XL of *Isaiah*, the prophet is instructed to preach the majesty and power of God. The peoples of the earth are to Him as a drop in a bucket, the islands of the sea as dust. He sits upon the vault of the earth and its inhabitants appear before him as grasshoppers; He spreads out the heavens as a tent for mankind to dwell in. The youngest and most vigorous of mankind shall fail, but those who hope in the Lord shall renew their strength and take wings as eagles.[2] The picture so presented is in essence a kind of visualized sermon on contempt of the world, and St. Jerome, its most authoritative commentator, treats it as such. He points out, for instance, the passing of mighty earthly powers: "Ubi est Xerxis innumberabilis ille exercitus?"[3] and the ridiculous contrast between man's pride and his tiny stature in the universe: "If we consider the various nations in the whole world... from ocean to ocean... we perceive every race of mankind dwelling in the middle like grasshoppers. *Quid igitur superbit terra et cinis*?" (*Ecclus.* X, 9).[4] More interesting, however, than his rather conventional treatment of human insignificance is his interpretation of the final verses of *Isaiah* XL: "They that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength (*mutabunt fortitudinem*). They shall take wings as eagles." This text St. Jerome associates with *Ps.* CII, 5: "Thy youth shall be renewed like the eagle's," and points out that the eagle, the only creature able to gaze upon the brilliance of the sun, is able to give new vigor to his old age by changing his feathers. Likewise, he implies, the saints shall be able to gaze upon the spiritual sun and "having put on an immortal body... shall be caught up in the clouds to meet Christ."[5]

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[1] A general treatment of Boccaccio's sources is to be found in H. R. Patch, "Chauceriana," *Englische Studien*, LXV (1930-31), 357-359. For a full summary of recent bibliography, see M. W. Bloomfield, "The Eighth Sphere," *MLR*, LIII (1958), 408, n. 1.

[2] Ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae... ecce insulae quasi pulvis exiguus. / Qui sedet super gyrum terrae, et habitatores ejus sunt quasi locustae; qui extendit velut nihilum caelos, et expandit eos sicut tabernaculum ad inhabitandum. / Deficient pueri, et laborabunt, et juvenes in infirmitate cadent. / Qui autem sperant in Domino, mutabunt fortitudinem, assument pennas sicut aquilae, current et non laborabunt, ambulabunt, et non deficient (*Isaiah* XL 15, 22, 30, 31).

[3] *Comment. in Isaiam, PL* 24, 424.

Subsequent comment on *Isaiah* XL consists almost entirely of variations upon Jerome's basic interpretation.[6] In the course of this commentary, two tendencies may be observed. The first is to reduce *Isaiah's* rather complex set of contrasts between God and man to the simple one of size. Thus Haymon of Halberstadt (9 cent.) restates Jerome's "grasshopper" passage: "Let us examine all the nations of men, from the east to the west, and from the south to the north... and we shall see that in comparison with God... they are small and mean."[7] Hervey of Bourg-Dieu (12 cent.) intensifies this contrast: "*quasi locustae*, id est minimi."[8] The second tendency is to give the final verse a strongly ascetic flavor. Gregory the Great in the *Moralia* begins this line of interpretation by construing the words "mutabunt fortitudinem" in a fashion basically different from Jerome's. "*They who trust in the Lord*... change strength, because they who had before been strong in the flesh, seek to be strong in the work of the spirit. They take wings like eagles, because they fly in contemplation."[9] In this new Gregorian interpretation, the emphasis has shifted from the universal problem of human salvation to the more particular problem of the convert who has turned from the world, but is nevertheless being constantly tempted by it. In consequence, the term "fortitudo" has itself undergone a change. It has in some measure lost the more general sense of strength derived from God — which it has in Jerome — and has shifted to something very close to the specific virtue "Fortitudo" by which the Christian, or more particularly the contemplative, resists the temptations of the world. Thus Gregory says: "We change strength, when being converted (by the fire of Divine Love), we flee the present world with as much strength (*virtute*) as before we used to pursue it."[10]

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[4] Si enim in toto orbe consideramus varias nationes... ab Oceano usque ad Oceanum... omne in medio hominum genus quasi locustas habitare cernimus. *Quid igitur superbit terra et cinis*? (*PL* 24, 423). Italics my own.

[5] Qui autem non in suis viribus, sed in Deo habeant fiduciam... audiant: *Renovabitur sicut aquilae juventus tua* (*Ps* CII, 5) ... Crebro diximus, aquilarum senectutem revirescere mutatione pennarum, et solas esse quae jubar solis aspiciant... Itaque et sanctos repuerascere, et assumpto immortali corpore, laborem non sentire mortalium, sed rapi in nubibus obviam Christo... (*PL* 24, 426-427). Cf. I *Thess.* iv, 16.

[6] St. Jerome's commentary passed with very little alteration into the *Glossa Ordinaria*, where it became in a sense standard (see Nicholas of Lyra, *Biblia Sacra cum Glossa Ordinaria* [Lyons, 1589] or, for a less complete version, *PL* 113-114). However, not only the *Glossa Ordinaria* but all subsequent commentary echoes St. Jerome.

[7] Consideremus ab oriente usque ad occidentem, et a meridie usque ad septentrionem, omnia genera hominum... et videbimus quia, ad comparationem Dei... parva sunt et modica (*Comment. in Isaiam*, *PL* 116, 912).

[8] *Comment. in Isaiam*, *PL* 181, 386.

During the late Middle Ages, a work of great popularity, as is attested by the impressive number of existing manuscripts, was the *Somme le Roi* of Frère Lorens. This treatise, written in 1279, was widely known not only in France, but also in Italy and England, where it existed both in the French original and in translation. In England it will be remembered as the source of the *Ayenbite of Inwit*, the *Book of the Vices and Virtues*, and Caxton's *Royal Book*.[11] In the *Somme le Roi*, Frère Lorens presents an elaborate schematization of the vices and virtues, according to which the seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost conquer the seven deadly sins and leave in their places the seven virtues. Running through this schematization is the theme of contempt of the world, and in connection with it Frère Lorens twice makes use of *Isaiah* XL. The first occurs in connection with the virtue of Humility. In his treatment of Humility, Frère Lorens follows the established pattern of his work by pointing out that the gift of Fear drives out the sin of Pride and leaves in its place the virtue of Humility. Humility teaches the Christian to flee praise and seek solitude; solitude in turn favors contemplation; and through contemplation the holy soul may attain the vision of *Isaiah*.[12]

> [whan] sche (the holy soul) is rauessched vp to heuene, sche lokeþ aȝen to þe erþe from feer, as Ysaias seiþ, and seeþ it so litle as to regard to þat gret fairenesse and so derk to regard of þilke grete liȝtnesse, so bare and naked to regarde of þilk grete plente of ioye and goodnesse, þan despiseþ he and blameþ hernesfulliche al þat euere is in þe world; richesse, honoure, fairenesse, noblesse...[13]

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[9] Mutant quippe fortitudinem, quia fortes student esse in spiritali opere, qui dudum fuerant fortes in carne. Assumunt autem pennas ut aquilae, quia contemplando volant (*Moralia*, XIX, xxvii, 50; *PL* 76, 131).

[10] Fortitudinem mutamus, cum conversi tanta virtute praesens saeculum fugimus quanta hoc ante quaerebamus (*Moralia*, XVIII, xxviii, 45; *PL* 76, 61).

[11] For the above information I am indebted to the excellent introduction by W. Nelson Francis to his edition of the *Book of Vices and Virtues*, EETS OS 217 (London, 1942).

[12] *Book of Vices and Virtues*, pp. 126, 140-141.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 141. A transcription of the comparable passage from the *Somme le Roi* follows:

The attainment of this vision is akin to the experience of the Apostles at Pentecost, and means that the Holy Ghost has filled the soul with "grete herte" or Magnanimity, the virtue that "makeþ to despise þe world."[14] Further on, in his discussion of Magnanimity proper, Frère Lorens makes a second allusion to *Isaiah* XL:

> Who-so haþ þis vertue, he biholdeþ þe world from fer, as seiþ Ysais þe prophete, and hym þingeþ al þe world litel, as a sterre semeþ to vs; þan al þe world and alle þe werkes and alle þe bisynesses, grete and smale, of þe world semeþ to hym as nouȝt or as copwebbes, wher-of Salamon seiþ... 'Vanite, vanite, vanite...'[15]

From a comparison of the two *Somme le Roi* passages with the preceding commentary on *Isaiah* XL, two principal points emerge. First, although the influence of Jerome may be detected (cf. "rapi in nubibus" and "rauessched vp to heuene"), it is the influence of Gregory that is controlling. Thus the *Isaiah* vision is attained in contemplation; the virtue through which it is attained is associated with contempt of the world; the virtue itself is bestowed by the Holy Ghost. Second, the vision itself is no longer that of tiny human grasshoppers, as in the earlier commentators, but of the little earth suspended in space. The vision is now expressly "de contemptu mundi."

In the early fourteenth century, contempt of the world reached perhaps its most finished expression in Book XI of Boccaccio's *Teseida*. The soul of the heroic Arcite:

> se ne gì volando
> ver la concavità del cielo ottava,
> degli elementi i convessi lasciando;
> quivi le stelle ratiche ammirava,
> l'ordine loro e la somma bellezza,
> suoni ascoltando pien d'ogni dolcezza. 8

"quant ele est ravie dusques au ciel, ele resgarde la terre de loins, com dit Ysaïes, et la voit si petite au resgart de la grandece du ciel, si leide au resgart de cele grant biauté, si orbe au resgart de cele grant clarté, si vuide au resgart de cele grant plenté [de ioye], lors despit et desprise a certes quanqu'il a au monde de richeces, d'oneurs, de biauté, de noblece" (Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms Fr 24780, f. 102^{r}). The manuscript is fourteenth century and is the most typical, in regard to this passage, of the group of manuscripts I have been able to see. For assistance with this and the following transcription, I am indebted to Professor Alfred L. Foulet of Princeton University. For loan of the necessary microfilms, I am indebted to Mr. Norman R. Fournier who is preparing a much needed edition of the *Somme*.

[14] *Book of the Vices and Virtues*, pp. 142, 165.

[15] *Ibid.* p. 164. The comparable passage in the *Somme* reads: "Qui ceste vertu a, il resgarde le monde de loins, comme dit Ysaïes li profetes, et ausi li semble le monde comme une estoile feit a nous; donc tous li mons et toutes les cures et les grans besoignes du monde li semblent ausi comme noïent, et pour ce les prise noïent nes que toille d'araignes; donc Salemons dit... "Vanité, vanité... vanité" (Ms Fr 24780, f. 119^{r}).

> Quindi si volse in giù a rimirare
> le cose abandonate, e vide il poco
> globo terreno, a cui intorno il mare
> girava e l'aere e di sopra il foco,
> e ogni cosa da nulla stimare
> a rispetto del ciel; ma poi al loco
> là dove aveva il suo corpo lasciato
> gli occhi fermò alquanto rivoltato;
> e seco rise de' pianti dolenti
> della turba lernea, la vanitate
> forte dannando dell' umane genti,
> li quai, da tenebrosa cechitate
> mattamente oscurati nelle menti,
> seguon del mondo la falsa biltate,
> lasciando il cielo; e quindi se ne gio
> nel loco che Mercurio li sortio.[16]

Here well recognized influences are at work. The heroic soul, viewing from the heavens its own funeral rites, seems to have been suggested by Lucan's *Pharsalia*, IX, 1-14, and Arcite's lofty smile of disdain is apparently from the same source, reinforced in all probability by *Paradiso*, XXII, 133-135.[17] Most important of the recognized influences is, however, that of the *Somnium Scipionis*. From this Boccaccio clearly derived the general background of his scene: the "stelle ratiche" and the music of the spheres. It has further been supposed that from the *Somnium* Boccaccio also derived the vision of the little world and the idea of contempt connected with it.[18] It is worth while to examine the principal passage on which this supposition rests.
Says Africanus to Scipio (Chapter VI):

> If the earth seems to thee as small as it really is, keep, then, thy eyes fixed on those heavenly objects; look with contempt on those of mortal life.[19]

Certainly one finds here a strong general resemblance to Arcite's feelings about the world, and in view of other borrowings, Boccaccio might reasonably be supposed to have made use of this passage as well. However, it is also to be borne in mind that the *Somme le Roi* was well known in fourteenth century

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[16] *Teseida*, XI, 1-24 (ed. Salvatore Battaglia, Florence, 1938, pp. 321-322).

[17] See Patch, *Englische Studien*, LXV, 357-359. For an argument that Dante is a major source rather than a contributing source as Professor Patch suggests, see E. J. Dobson, "Some Notes on Middle English Texts, *English and Germanic Studies*, University of Birmingham, I (1947-48) 61-62.

[18] R. K. Root (*Book of Troilus and Criseyde* [Princeton, 1926], p. 562) regards the contempt of the world idea as also derived from the *Somnium*, and F. N. Robinson (*Works of Chaucer*, 2nd ed. [Boston, etc., 1957], p. 837) apparently follows him in this.

[19] *Parlement of Foules*, ed. T. R. Lounsbury (Boston, 1877), p. 13.

Italy,[20] and it is likely that the *Somme* possessed for Boccaccio at least two major advantages in his presentation of Arcite's final thoughts. Since the first of these possible advantages involves the much argued question of the location of Arcite's, and after him Troilus', vision,[21] it will be discussed in some detail.

From Frère Lorens' phrase "ravie dusques au ciel," Boccaccio would certainly have understood the *Isaiah* vision as occurring at the sphere of the moon, the traditional dividing line between things mutable and things eternal.[22] That this location is essential to the moral of worldly vanity Boccaccio intends is made abundantly clear. In the passage of the *Teseida* reproduced above, Arcite perceives the true beauty and order of eternity by contrast to the false beauty and mutability of the world, symbolized by the four elements locked within the "concavità" of the sphere of the moon. According to the standard Aristotelian cosmology, as stated by Vincent of Beauvais, "above the moon there is neither hot nor cold, moist nor dry; their place is beneath the moon.

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[20] Francis points out the existence of three separate translations in Italy during the fourteenth century (*Book of Vices and Virtues*, "Introduction," pp. xxx-xxxi).

[21] Root and Robinson (cited above n. 18) agree on the sphere of the moon for both Arcite and Troilus. More recent scholars emphatically do not. Jackson I. Cope believes that Chaucer changed Troilus' "resting place" to the sphere of Saturn (*MLN*, LXVII [1952], 245-246);Forrest S. Scott argues that Chaucer transferred him to the sphere of Mercury (*MLR*, LI [1956], 2-5); and Morton W. Bloomfield considers that the tradition of the ogdoad caused both Boccaccio and Chaucer to place their heroes in the eighth sphere, that of the fixed stars (*MLR*, LIII [1958], 408-410).

[22] Frère Lorens describes the soul as being "ravie dusques au ciel" (see above n. 13). The question then is: What would Boccaccio have understood by the term "ciel"? If he had read the commentators on *Isaiah*, he would have encountered the following standard interpretation of *Isaiah* XL, 22: "*qui extendit caelos, et expandit eos sicut tabernaculum ad habitandum.*" It states: "sub eis [caelis] quasi sub tabernaculum habitant homines, supra angeli & sancti" (Nicholas of Lyra, *Biblia Sacra*, cited above n. 5; see also Haymon of Halberstadt, *PL* 116, 912). According then to the *Glossa*, the term "coelum" designates the point of division between mortal and immortal. In the standard cosmology this point of division would be represented by the sphere of the moon. Thus Macrobius: "Infra autem nihil est nisi mortale... supra lunam sunt aeterna omnia" ("Somnium Scipionis," c. IV, in *Macrobii Ambrosii Theodosii Opera* [Leipzig, 1848], I, 7). If Boccaccio had not known the *Isaiah* commentaries, he would have found exactly the same usage of the word "coelum" in Dante. As summed up by M. A. Orr (*Dante and the Early Astronomers* [London, 1913], p. 441): "The pure region of the spheres, 'il paese sincero,' is immortal as the spirits themselves [*Par.* vii, 130-132]; but below the lowest celestial sphere ('la celestial c'ha men salita', *Par.* iv. 39) all is mortal and transitory, as the Greeks and Latin poets had said. This is expressed in the Letter to Can Grande, when Dante contrasts the spheres (*coelum*) and the elements, and says: 'illud incorruptibile, illa vero corruptibilia sunt' [Ep. x, 435-437]". Boccaccio would therefore have understood that "ravie dusques au ciel" meant "carried up to a point beyond the elements, that point at which mortal and corruptible things end and immortal begin." This point could only be the sphere of the moon.

Consequently, there is here (above the moon) no diversity, no *mutability*."[23] Dante makes exactly the same point, contrasting the "corruptibilia," the elements beneath the moon; and the "incorruptibile," the "coelum" or heavens above the moon.[24] It is therefore evident that the sphere of the moon is the optimum — and perhaps the only possible — location for perception of the contrast of mutability and eternity upon which Boccaccio's moral depends. That it is in fact at the sphere of the moon that Arcite's vision occurs is made clear by the details of his flight. He moves upward toward the "cielo ottava" (line 4) — a common way of numbering the sphere of the moon;[25] he leaves behind him the successive "convessi" of the elements[26] — which could exist only beneath the moon; he arrives at a temporary location where he can see both temporal and eternal — which again could be, ideally, only the sphere of the moon; *thence* "quindi" he departs to his assigned place,[27] guided by the psychopomp Mercury.[28] Both in Boccaccio and in Chaucer flight, vision, and resultant morality require a location at the sphere of the moon.[29] In contrast to his understanding of the *Isaiah* vision, however, Boccaccio could not have failed to see that the *Somnium* vision occurs at a vast distance from earth — beyond the seven spheres in the Milky Way.[30] From this point Scipio had difficulty in making out the Roman Empire, and it is unlikely that Arcite could have observed those mourning his death.[31] It is perhaps of importance to note in this connection that the vision of Pompey in the *Pharsalia* occurs at the sphere of the moon, and not in the Milky Way.[32]

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[23] supra lunam nec est calor nec frigus, nec humiditas nec siccitas; harum igitur locus est sub luna. Inde nulla ibi est diversitas, nulla mutacio (Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum Naturale* [Strassburg, 1473], XVI, xix). The above extract is the opinion of Aristotle as paraphrased by Vincent. Although Vincent later indicates that he disagrees with the conception that mutability does not exist in the realm beyond the moon, the view he is quoting was the prevailing one (see above n. 22).

[24] See above, n. 22.

[25] This number is of course obtained by counting inward from the eighth sphere, or sphere of the fixed stars. It is this system which is followed in the *Somnium Scipionis*, Boccaccio's major source (cf. Root, p. 561). Both Chaucer (cf. Bloomfield, *MLR*, LIII, 409) and Dante (cf. Orr, *Dante*, p. 440) on occasion made use of the inward numbering system as well as the outward.

[26] Root quite correctly interprets "degli elementi i convessi lasciando" (line 5) as referring to the elements beneath the sphere of the moon. Miss Orr substantiates his point: "Aristotle seems to have regarded the four elements as flowing into each other, so that these lowly spheres beneath the moon were not sharply divided, but his mediaeval disciples, following the Greek idea to its logical conclusion, conceived them with boundaries as definite as those of the celestial spheres" (*Dante*, p. 442). It is these "convessi" that Arcite is shown leaving behind in his upward flight.

[27] It is absolutely essential to observe here that neither Boccaccio nor Chaucer has a word to say about the final resting place of his hero. Each poet describes a flight to the sphere of the moon; from this lofty seat the hero has a vision of the pettiness of earth and the grandeur of heaven. From *that* place — "*quindi* se ne gio" (line 23) and "*forth* he wente" (*TC*, 1826) — the hero goes to the place assigned him by the psychopomp Mercury. We are never told what that place is, for both Arcite and Troilus are virtuous pagans, and in the fourteenth century difficult to house authoritatively. The problems of where the vision takes place and what final dwelling place is intended are separate and distinct. As to the latter problem, I think Bloomfield has found the most likely solution (*MLR*, LIII, 410), although neither Boccaccio nor Chaucer gives us much to go on.

[28] For this useful conception, I am indebted to Bloomfield, *op. cit.* p. 410.

A second advantage the *Somme* possessed for Boccaccio was that, although similar to the *Somnium* in its contempt of the world, the *Somme* contained Christian rather than pagan reflections, and these Boccaccio seems to have preferred for the autobiographical Arcite. It is precisely here, in the language in which Boccaccio conveys Arcite's reflections, that the influence of the *Somme* becomes most clearly apparent. Boccaccio's "da nulla stimare" "a rispetto del ciel" and "forte dannando" (lines 13, 14, 19) are Frère Lorens "prise noïent" "au resgard... du ciel" and "desprise a certes" (see transcriptions above, notes 15, 13); Boccaccio's "vanitate" (line 18) is the Somme's "vanité, vanité, vanité." No such close verbal correspondences to the *Somnium*, or indeed to Dante, exist.

Boccaccio's brilliant lines, Chaucer, a judge of good poetry, took over stanza by stanza, but characteristically made them functional to his own poem in a way they can hardly be said to be in Boccaccio's. To reproduce these three stanzas in their entirety would serve no useful purpose, but since it has from time to time been suggested that Chaucer knew Frère Lorens either directly or in translation,[33] it may be relevant to compare a single stanza (lines 1814-1820) with the two passages from the Middle English translation reproduced above (pp. 206-7). Thus:

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[29] If it be granted, as I think it must, that Arcite's vision takes place at the sphere of the moon, it must follow that Troilus's does also. The same contrast of mutable and immutable is made; the same flight is described. The term "eighthe spere" should then obviously be understood as designating the sphere of the moon; i.e. Chaucer has followed Boccaccio's inward numbering as Boccaccio himself followed the inward numbering of the *Somnium*. The reading "seventhe spere" in the majority of the manuscripts seems to be simply an error in the use of Roman numerals. See Root, *op. cit.*, p. 561.

[30] It is clear from a reading of the *Somnium* that the position of the two Scipios in the Milky Way is outside of the seven spheres. They are obviously looking down through the spheres to the earth (c. 3, 4). Macrobius defines the Milky Way as "unus e circis qui ambiunt celum" (*Macrobii Opera*, I, 86), and an illustration of the *Somnium* in Bodleian Library Ms. Can. Class. Lat. 257 (f. 1^v) shows the events of the vision transpiring in the Milky Way and shows the Milky Way as a circle cutting across the sphere of the fixed stars (eighth sphere) just inside the primum mobile. Dante understood the Milky Way as being a group of fixed stars (eighth sphere), so minute that they are not individually visible from earth (Orr, *Dante*, p. 305).

[31] This point, applied to Troilus, is made by Root, *op. cit.* 561.

[32] *Pharsalia*, IX, 1-14. As Scott points out (*MLR*, LI, 5, n. 1), Pompey has essentially the same vision as Arcite. He sees the earth below, and the erratic and fixed stars above.

Troilus and Criseyde, Book V	*Book of Vices and Virtues*
"litel spot of erthe" (1815)	"litle" [earth]
"fully gan despise" (1816)	"despiseþ hernisfulliche"
"held al vanite" (1817)	"vanite, vanite, vanite"
"to respect of the pleyn felicite" (1818)	"to regard of þilk grete plente of ioye"

Although the first three extracts from *Troilus and Criseyde* may be paralleled in Boccaccio, the fourth, an exact counterpart of the Middle English translation, may not, and was considered by Root to be Chaucer's "own Boethian addition."[34] The reason for this sudden failure of parallels between *Troilus* and the *Teseida* can of course only be conjectured. However, assuming the earlier part of the present argument to be valid, a possible solution is that Boccaccio's manuscript of the *Somme* simply did not contain the final emptiness-plenitude comparison. Of the eighteen complete manuscripts of the *Somme* I have been able to consult, I find that seven lack the final "si vuide au resgart de cele grant plente [de ioye]."[35] On the other hand, the readings "greate blisse" (*Ayenbite*)[36] and "grete plente of ioye" (*Book*) show that the source manuscript or manuscripts of the two English works contained this final comparison with the addition of the bracketed phrase "de ioye." Hence the evidence, though slight, suggests that when Chaucer was considering models for Troilus's climactic vision of the little earth, he thought of the source of the *Teseida* stanzas as well as of the *Teseida* itself, and supplemented the Italian poem with a full French[37] or English version of the *Somme*. So was incorporated into the *Troilus* the "pleyn felicite" which the *Teseida* lacked.

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[33] Richard Morris in his introduction (n. p.) to the *Ayenbite of Inwit* (London, 1866), EETS OS 23; Wilhelm Eilers, "The *Parsons' Tale* and the *Somme de Vices et de Vertus* of Frère Lorens," *Chaucer Society Essays*, V (1884), 503-610.

[34] *Op. cit.* p. 562.

[35] The following manuscripts lack the comparison indicated: Mss FR 409 (14c), f. 104^{v}; 942 (1438), f. 66^{r}; 943 (early 14c), f. 82^{r}; 958 (1464), f. 83^{r}; 959 (15c), f. 74^{v}-75^{r}; 9628 (15c), f.42^{r}; Harvard College Library, Ms Fr 123 (15c), f. 111^{a}. The following manuscripts contain the comparison: Mss FR 938 (1294), f.81^{r}; 939 (1327), f. 51^{r}; 940 (15c), f. 54^{r}; 1134 (early 15c), f.83^{r}; 1767 (14c), f.100^{r}; 1895 (14c) f. 84^{r}; 17098 (15c), f. 68^{v}; 22932 (early 14c), f.62^{r}; 22934 (15c), f.120^{v}; 22935 (15c), f.104^{r}; 24780 (early 14c), f. 102^{r}. All are Bibliothèque Nationale manuscripts except the Harvard Library manuscript.

[36] "zuo emti. to þe ziȝþe of þo greate blisse" (*Ayenbite*, p. 143).

[37] On the basis of Chaucer's customary practice, one would suppose the source to have been French. If so, the use here suggested of a French work to supplement Boccaccio's *Teseida* would parallel Professor Pratt's contention that in *Troilus and Criseyde* Chaucer made use of a French translation to supplement the *Filostrato*. See "Chaucer and *Le Roman de Troyle et de Criseida*," *SP* LIII (1956), 509-539.

One other possible indebtedness to the *Somme* remains to be considered. At the conclusion of the first passage reproduced above (p. 206), Frère Lorens provides a kind of catalogue of worldly vanities to be despised: "richesses, honoure, fairenesse, noblesse." Chaucer sums up the consequences of "false worldes brotelnesse":[38]

Swich fyn hath, lo, this Troilus for love!
Swich fyn hath al his grete worthynesse!
Swich fyn that his estat real above,
Swich fyn his lust, swich fyn hath his noblesse! (V, 1828-31).

Allowing for Chaucer's necessary adaptation to *Troilus*'s particular moral character and social status, there is, I think, a fair correspondence between "richesse" and "estat real;" "honoure" and "worthynesse" "noblesse" and "noblesse."

It is hoped that the above discussion may cast some small additional light on the sources of both Boccaccio and Chaucer. It is also hoped that it may provide a kind of exemplum of the vitality which the Bible possessed for the mediaeval mind and of the manner in which the Biblical text penetrated into literature. Here one can, I think, see something of that process.

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[38] A single manuscript of the eighteen noted (Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms Fr 939 [1327], f.51^r) contains a fifth comparison: "si fausse au regard de celle tres grant loyauté de paradis ou tout le bien est."

L'authenticité bernardine du sermon "In celebratione adventus"

J. LECLERCQ

LES éditions des sermons de S. Bernard s'ouvrent sur une série de sept sermons sur l'Avent, lesquels sont également en tête de la série complète que transmettent beaucoup de manuscrits et qui fut constituée dans les dernières années de S. Bernard. Mais cette série achevée (*perfecta*, Pf) avait été précédée par trois séries partielles: une brève (B), une intermédiaire (*media*, M), et une plus longue (L): leurs succession permet d'assister aux accroissements successifs d'un ensemble dont S. Bernard, en le revisant, en l'ordonnant, en l'éditant définitivement, fit une sorte de traité sur l'Avent.[1]

Pourtant des mss anciens, et qui paraissent dignes de foi, conservent un huitième sermon, qui ne fit partie d'aucune des séries inachevées et qui ne fut pas davantage introduit dans la série achevée. Il commence par les mots *In celebratione adventus Domini*. Il était resté inédit jusqu'à nos jours. Les papiers de Mabillon révèlent qu'il en possédait une copie, accompagnée d'une note de Dom de Sainte-Beuve disant qu'il n'est point dans le "style de S. Bernard", pour deux raisons: tout d'abord son style est "plus éloquent et moins sacré" que celui de l'abbé de Clairvaux; de plus la "multitude des divisions" qu'on y rencontre n'est pas dans la manière de S. Bernard.[2] Ce sont là, à vrai dire, des critères bien vagues, d'après lesquels certains sermons dont l'authenticité ne fut pas mise en doute — spécialement parmi les *De diversis* — auraient dû être éliminés de même.[3] Aussi une édition anonyme du texte établi d'après un seul manuscrit, et tardif, a-t-elle pu être publiée voici quelques années, précédées d'une introduction où, à la lumière de découvertes, alors récentes, sur les textes de S. Bernard, son authenticité bernardine était défendue:[4] des arguments étaient présentés en sa faveur au nom de la critique interne; mais la tradition manuscrite était à peine interrogée, et la qualité du texte imprimé n'était pas de nature à inspirer grande confiance. Il convient donc d'examiner à nouveau tout le problème.

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[1] Sont ici résumées les conclusions d'un article où j'ai étudié "S. Bernard éditeur, d'après les sermons sur l'Avent," dans *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire publiés par l'École française de Rome*, LXXI (1959).

[2] Ms. Paris, B. N. lat. 12323, f. 2-5. Rien n'indique d'après quel ms. ce texte avait été copié; n'y manque pas, en tout cas, la sentence sur l'obéissance dont il sera question plus loin.

[3] Sur le peu de valeur du critère emprunté au "style de S. Bernard", j'ai donné des indications dans *Études sur S. Bernard et le texte de ses écrits* (*Analecta S. Ord. Cist.* IX, I-II) 1953, pp. 77-78.

Voici d'abord l'indication des mss anciens, ou dont le contenu offre de l'intérêt, dans lesquels se trouve le sermon:

Cava 55. xii^e^ s. Contient le *De colloquio Simonis et Iesu* sans titre ni attribution; le *De diligendo Deo*, le *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, le *De gradibus humilitatis*; trois fois, en tête de ces traités, on lit les mots *domni Bernardi abbatis Clareuallis* qui trahissent que le ms., ou le modèle sur lequel il fut copié, était contemporain de Bernard ou probablement antérieur à la date où il fut déclaré *sanctus* lors de sa canonisation en 1174. Ces textes authentiques sont suivis, sans titre ni attribution, du sermon qui nous occupe, et qui commence par *In celebratione*, et d'un recueil de sermons et de sentences authentiques, dont le premier texte est *Adv. III.*[5] Ce recueil ne coïncide avec aucune des séries BLM, mais contient des sermons qui se retrouvent en elles, surtout dans les deux plus anciennes, et dans le ms. Engelberg 34, dont le témoignage a tant de valeur.[6] Tous ces indices donnent à penser qu'on se trouve en présence d'un ms. que recommandent son ancienneté et son contenu.

Paris, B. N. lat 2914. xii^e^ s. Une série d'extraits du l. II des *Miscellanea* de Hugues de Saint-Victor est suivie d'une série d'extraits de sermons de S. Bernard, parmi lesquels se trouve (f. 60-61) le début du sermon *In* (l. 1-38); le tout sans titres ni attributions.

Oxford, Balliol College, 150. xii^e^-xiii^e^ s. Buildwas (O. Cist., filiation de Clairvaux; cf. C. R. Cheney, dans *Mélanges S. Bernard*, Dijon 1953, p. 377). Sous le titre de *Liber sermonum beati Bernardi abbatis*; témoin d'un "groupe anglais" de mss qui ne livre aucune des séries typiques, mais une collection de sermons de S. Bernard donnés généralement selon une rédaction ancienne.[7] On a la série *Adv.* I-III, *In*, VII, IV-VI.

Oxford, Christ Church College, Allstree Library, ms. sans cote. xii^e^-xiii^e^ s. Autre exemplaire de la collection de Buildwas, mais avec une différence dont il sera parlé plus loin.

Paris, B. N., N. acq. lat. 1563. xii-xiii^e^ s. Collection proche de celle de Balliol et Allstree, témoin par conséquent du groupe anglais. Au début série *Adv.* I-III, *In*, VI, VII, IV-V. Au début: *Sermo sancti Bernardi abbatis primi de Claravalle.*

Fribourg en Suisse, Univ. L 18, xii^e^ s. Hauterive (O. Cist., Clairvaux). Collection de sermons inspirés de S. Bernard et comprenant aussi, surtout vers la fin du recueil, des "sermons bernardins" qui ont été rédigés par d'autres que l'abbé de

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[4] "Un sermon inédit de S. Bernard pour l'Avent," dans *Collectanea Ord. Cist. Ref.* XIII (1951), 283-294.

[5] L'abréviation *Adv* suivie d'un chiffre romain désignera désormais ici les sermons *In adventu*; le mot *In* le sermon *In celebratione.*

[6] Sous le titre "Inédits bernardins dans un ms. d'Engelberg," dans *Rev. Mabillon*, XXXVII (1947), 1-16, j'ai étudié ce ms.

[7] En collaboration avec D. H. Rochais, dans une étude "Sur la tradition des sermons de S. Bernard," à paraître dans *Scriptorium* XIV (1960), j'ai caractérisé les témoins du groupe anglais qui vont être cités ici.

Clairvaux, mais d'après son enseignement.[8] Le sermon *In* est le troisième texte (f. 6v-9v).

Rouen 564 (A.559) xiie-xiiie s. De Saint-Ouen, O.S.B. Le *De gradibus humilitatis* est suivi d'une série de sermons commençant par le premier sermon pour Pâques, incomplet au début. La suite des textes, peu ordonnée, n'est pas celle du cycle liturgique. *In* est incomplet de la fin, après *instantiam et assiduitatem.*

Durham, Cathedral Library, B. IV. 21. xiiie s. *Sermones beati Bernardi abbatis de Claravalle.* Témoin du groupe anglais proche de Buildwas et Allstree. Série *Adv.* I, III, *In*, VII, VI, II, IV, V.

Aberdeen, Univ. 218. xiiie-xive s. Probablement de provenance cistercienne. Témoin tardif du groupe anglais, cette vaste collection semble avoir reçu des compléments successifs; elle réunit des sermons de Bernard, généralement selon leur rédaction première, et des sermons et sentences dont un prologue déclare qu'ils ont été prononcés par lui, rédigés par d'autres: *Sensus enim eius est in his, sed non stylus.*[9] Au début, série *Adv.* I-III, *In*, VI, VII, IV-V. En tête du sermon *In*: *Item sermo eiusdem de adventu Domini.*

Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 94. xive s. Collection semblable à la précédente, dont elle constitue un témoin encore plus tardif.

Dans les plus homogènes de ces dix manuscrits, ceux dont les textes constituent vraiment une collection de sermons de S. Bernard ordonnée selon le cycle liturgique, *In* fait partie de la série de ceux qui traitent de l'Avent: série complète dans Balliol, N. acq., Aberdeen et Cambridge, où *In* suit Adv. III, série partielle dans Durham, où *In* suit Adv. III, et surtout dans Cava, où *In* précède Adv. III. Le contexte, dans B. N. 2914 et Fribourg, est différent, mais non contradictoire. Cet examen de la tradition manuscrite laisse l'impression que *In* fait partie de sermons de Bernard selon une ancienne rédaction ou de sermons rédigés d'après sa prédication par ses notaires et ses disciples. La critique interne du texte confirme-t-elle ces données de la critique externe?

La question a déjà été posée, et résolue, par un copiste ancien, celui qui constitua le recueil du ms. Allstree. Au lieu de transcrire *In* parmi les autres sermons de Bernard pour l'Avent, il le plaça après toute la série, à la tête de quelques autres textes, et à la suite de cette rubrique:

> Hos sequentes sermones in quodam exemplari inter sermones superiores mixtim repperi, quorum nullus in pluribus exemplaribus quae inspexi reperitur, excepto primo, qui de triplici inferno inscribitur, qui tamen, sicut ceteri sequentes, a stilo beati Bernardi discordat, qua de causa separaui eos ab invicem.

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[8] Sous le titre "Sermons de l'école de S. Bernard dans un ms. d'Hauterive," dans *Analecta S. Ord. Cist.* XI (1955), 3-26, j'ai caractérisé ce recueil.

[9] Dans une étude sur "S. Bernard et ses secrétaires," dans *Rev. bénéd.* LXI (1951), 218-219, j'ai édité ce prologue d'après ce ms. et le ms. de Cambridge qui va être mentionné ci-dessous.

Dans cette note, le copiste fait état de deux constatations: d'une part, à la différence de plusieurs autres textes, ce sermon est attesté dans plusieurs *exemplaria* des sermons de S. Bernard, — ce que nous prouvent les mss où il a été retrouvé; d'autre part, son "style" est "discordant" par rapport à celui de Bernard. Que vaut cette dernière indication? Les critiques du moyen âge étaient-ils meilleurs juges, en ce domaine, que ceux du xvii^e^ siècle? Pas nécessairement: ainsi le copiste d'un ms. de Santes-Creus (O. Cist., Clairvaux), au xii^e^-xiii^e^ siècle (Tarragone 151) a déclaré inauthentiques deux sermons qui sont de S. Bernard.[10] Toutefois, il y a, dans la déclaration du copiste du ms. Allstree, une part de vérité, qu'il convient maintenant de mesurer.

Afin de pouvoir le faire, il importe d'abord d'établir du sermon un texte contrôlé d'après les meilleurs témoins anciens et d'après Aberdeen. Ce dernier est parfois fautif, moins cependant que ne permettait de le croire l'édition provisoire qui fut donnée d'après lui; ses leçons, d'ailleurs, sont souvent semblables à celles du ms. Allstree; de fait, lui et Cambridge donnent, pour l'ensemble, un texte plus proche de celui du groupe anglais que de celui de Fribourg. Ce dernier apparaît plus travaillé, plus précis, plus soucieux de citer exactement l'Ecriture; son vocabulaire est plus recherché, rendu plus vivant, pour ainsi dire plus dramatique, par le fait que certaines phrases y sont à la deuxième personne ou sous forme interrogative. Il omet telle formule non nécessaire au sens (l.249); surtout, il supprime la sentence *Oboedientia quinquepartita est...* que le développement n'exige pas. Bref, Fribourg semble donner du texte un état revisé, et même élaboré, par un rédacteur qui a inséré, en l'y adaptant, le sermon bernardin dans la collection de ceux dont il est lui-même, dans leur majeure partie, l'auteur. Le ms. de cette recension comporte d'ailleurs des fautes qui sont peut-être dues au copiste. Mais le témoignage, généralement concordant, des autres mss — sauf dans le cas de bévues propres à chacun d'eux ou à un groupe d'entre eux et facilement explicables — permet de reconstituer le texte de la façon suivante.[11]

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[10] Cf. *Études sur S. Bernard*, p. 33.

[11] Pour faciliter l'utilisation du texte, j'ai ajouté, en tête des paragraphes, des numéros comme il y en a dans les autres sermons depuis l'édition de Mabillon. Dans l'apparat critique, A = Aberdeen; B = Balliol; H = Fribourg; N = N. a. l. 1563; P = BN. 2914. — ac = ante correctionem; pc = post correctionem.

SERMO IN ADVENTU DOMINI

DE TRIPLICI INFERNO

1. In celebratione adventus Domini, sanctorum patrum desideria legendo et canendo ad memoriam reducimus, eorum videlicet, quibus per Spiritum Sanctum revelare Deus dignatus est redemptionem futuram per Filium eius incarnandum et moriturum pro salute hominum. Quidem enim eorum adhuc in carne positi, prophetico Spiritu praevidentes incarnationem Christi, gaudia introrsus concepta et suorum ardorem desideriorum nobis in suis reliquerunt tractatibus; qui et ipsi carne soluti, in inferno sedentes in tenebris et umbra mortis, quantis eum exspectarent desideriis, cui soli possibile erat solvere iugum captivitatis eorum, facile dici vel cogitari non potest. Ex quorum desideriis moraliter colligere debemus quantis suspiriis quantisve desideriis exspectare debeamus in corpore mortis huius, in inferno tenebrarum harum, adventum Redemptoris nostri, ut veniat frequenter ad consolandum nos in hoc carcere et, ad ultimum, ad educendum nos de hoc carcere. Sciendum enim est de sanctis patribus, immo de omnibus tam bonis quam malis, quia omnes ante adventum Christi ad infernum descendebant, pro diversitate tamen meritorum, loca longe diversa illic obtinentes, et hoc praevaricatione primi hominis, qui gustu pomi vetiti a paradiso meruit exsulari. Cuius peccato non solum ipse, sed et tota eius posteritas in hoc detrusa est exsilium, in quo, exigente illo originali peccato, sitimus, esurimus, algemus, infirmamur et tandem morimur.

2. In quo, fratres carissimi, diligentissime nobis pensandum est quam gravis lapsus nos maneat propter delicta nostra, quibus scienter et delectabiliter Deum offendimus, cum propter illud peccatum, cui numquam assensum praebuimus, tam miserabiliter corruimus. Si propter peccatum alterius de paradiso in terram exsulavimus, in qua tot et tantis miseriarum pungimur aculeis, ubi cadendum est propriis? In infernum utique, ubi profecto nulla est redemptio. Sicut enim in hunc carcerem non nostra, sed alterius culpa nos iniecit, ita et ab hoc carcere non nostra, sed alterius satisfactio nobis reditum praeparavit. Sicut enim per Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et per Christum omnes vivificabuntur.[12] Quod si per proprias iniquitates nostras in infernum detrudimur, nulla spes restat recu-

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[12] Cf. 1 *Cor.* XV, 22.

2 eorum : *om* ABN 3 Deus : *om* P eius : *om* B, suum H 6 ardorem desideriorum : desideriorum ardorem B nobis in suis : in suis nobis N reliquerunt : relinquere Nac, reliquere Npc 7 in tenebris : *om* P 11 harum : *om* B 12 consolandum : consolandos B 13 enim est : est enim B 16 diversa : divisa P 17 exsulari : exsulare B 18 detrusa : detursa A in quo : ubi H 19 sitimus, esurimus : esurimus, sitimus P 20 diligentissime : diligenter P 21 delicta : peccata H delectabiliter : dilectabitur A 22 propter : per B 23 corruimus : corrimus A 24 miseriarum pungimur : pungimur miseriarum P 26 carcerem : carnem A culpa nos : nos culpa B 28 Quod : Quid A 29 detrudimur : detruduntur B 29-30 recuperationis : recuperandis B

perationis, quia *Christus resurgens ex mortuis iam non moritur*,[13] ad infernum amplius nequaquam descensurus, ut eum spoliet. Notandum etiam quia quam cito Adam peccavit, non statim expulsus est; sed confessionem volens ab eo extorquere Dominus: *Adam*, inquit, *ubi es?*[14] Qui enim imperium dedit ne peccaremus, paenitentibus statuit remedium ut confiteremur. Excluditur itaque a regno Dei non omnis qui peccat, sed qui post peccatum labitur in contemptum. Denique non magnum fuit comedere pomum, sed quia Deus posuerat Adam in domo sua, in qua nullam volebat fieri inoboedientiam, ideo sive in parvo sive in magno inoboediens factus, nec compunctus meruit expelli. Ita et vos, dum eratis in saeculo, eratis extra domum Dei: *Regnum enim*, inquit, *meum non est de hoc mundo*;[15] et ibi tam in verbis quam in aliis multa licebant vobis, quae vobis in domo Dei positis hodie pro crimine reputarentur, si ea observare contemnitis vel contemptum per paenitentiae lamenta non diluatis.

3. Dictum est igitur quia propter originale peccatum omnes ad infernum descendebant ante adventum Christi. Sed similiter nec minus veraciter dici potest quia, et ante adventum et post adventum eius, non est homo qui ad infernum non descenderit, priusquam ascendat in caelum. Triplex siquidem est infernus. Alius enim est infernus consumptionis, ubi est vermis qui numquam moritur et ignis qui numquam exstinguitur, in quo nulla est redemptio. Alius est infernus expiationis, qui deputatus est animabus post mortem purgandis. Alius infernus afflictionis, paupertas videlicet voluntaria, in qua, abrenuntiantes saeculo, affligere debemus animas nostras ut sanemur, ne transeamus post mortem in iudicium, sed de morte ad vitam. In hoc inferno ponitur quisquis, abrenuntians propriis voluptatibus carnis, mortificat per condignam paenitentiam membra sua quae sunt super terram, magis eligens affligi cum populo Dei quam temporalis peccati habere iucunditatem. Qui ergo in hunc infernum descendere non curat adhuc in carne positus, in alterum duorum profecto descendet, vix aut numquam redemptionem inventurus. Primus infernus est exactorius, quia in eo exigitur usque ad novissimum quadrantem. Unde et poena eius interminabilis est: ubi quippe nihil remittitur, numquam finem inveniet exactio, quae iniuriam Dei ulciscitur. Adeo siquidem horribile est per inoboe-

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[13] *Rom.* VI, 9. [14] *Gen.* III, 9. [15] *Io.* XVIII, 36.

30 ex: a P 32 Adam peccavit: peccavit Adam B non: *om* A 32-33 volens... Dominus: ab eo Dom. volens ext. H, vol. ext. ab eo Dom. B, vol. ab eo Dom. ext. P 33 imperium dedit: dedit imperium HP 34 paenitentibus: paenitentiae P statuit remedium: rem. statuit N itaque: autem B 37 domo sua: domum suam AN volebat fieri: fieri volebat B in parvo sive in magno: in m. sive in p. H 38 nec compunctus: *om* B 39 enim: *om* B 41 vobis: *om.* P Dei: Domini B reputarentur: reputantur P, reputabuntur H 42 vel: et H 45 adventum: Christi *add* N ad infernum non: non ad infernum H 46 descenderit: descenderet Bac est infernus: inf. est H 47 enim: *om* Nac numquam: non BH 48 numquam: non BH 49 infernus: *om* H 51 affligere debemus: deb. affl. H 52 in: ad B 53 abrenuntians... carnis: volupt. carn. abr. H condignam: continentiam et AN 54 affligi... Dei: cum p. D. affl. HN 55 ergo: autem B 56 duorum profecto: profecto duorum N 57 redemptionem inventurus: inv. red. B 57-58 exactorius: exactionis B, exauctoris A 58 exigitur: exigit A 60horribile est: est horr. N

dientiam inferre Creatori contumeliam, ut nulla poena expiari queat, nisi ipse prius remittat. Quod in prima transgressione liquido apparet, pro qua etiam infantes, quibus in baptismo nihil remittitur, in aeternum damnantur. Secundus est purgatorius, tertius remissorius, in quo nimirum, quia voluntarius est, saepe et poena et culpa remittitur. In secundo vero, etsi quandoque poena, numquam tamen culpa remittitur, sed remissa purgatur. O beatus paupertatis infernus, in quo Christus natus est et nutritus et, dum fuit in carne, conversatus! In quo non semel descendit ut suos extrahat, sed qui dedit semetipsum ut nos eriperet de praesenti saeculo nequam, quos de massa perditorum segregat, ibi aggregat, donec extrahat. In hoc inferno sunt adolescentulae novae, videlicet et inchoantes animae, iuvenculae profecto tympanistriae, quas principes angeli praeveniunt in cimbalis bene sonantibus et subsequuntur in cimbalis iubilationis. In aliis siquidem infernis homines, sed in isto ad praesens cruciantur daemones. Ambulant enim per loca inaquosa et arida, quaerentes requiem, et non inveniunt.[16] Circumeuntes quippe mentes fidelium, sanctis meditationibus et orationibus circumquaque impelluntur. Unde merito clamant: *Iesu, quare venisti ante tempus torquere nos?*[17] Habent et ipsi voluptuosi homines morantes in saeculo et quantumlibet facientes curam carnis in desideriis, habent, inquam, et ipsi infernum suum, in quo etiam inter delicias cruciantur, licet non attendant, quia dormiunt et inebriati sunt vino, id est letali amore saeculi, veneno videlicet aspidum insanabili. Punctus siquidem ab aspide obdormit et inde moritur. Inebriati enim absinthio, id est misera et amara dulcedine mundi, obliviscuntur Dei et sui, gens sine consilio et sine scientia, non intelligentes ac novissima providentes. *Cum enim dixerint*: *Pax et securitas, tunc repentinus superveniet eis interitus et dolor quasi in utero habentis, et non effugient.*[18]

4. Benedictus Deus quia non sumus in tenebris, ut nos dies Domini tamquam imparatos comprehendat, quoniam non posuit nos Deus in invio, sicut eos qui in saeculo insaniunt, cumulantes peccata peccatis et thesaurizantes sibi iram in die revelationis iusti iudicii Dei, sed posuit nos Deus in acquisitione salutis, redimentes tempus nostrum per dignam paenitentiae satisfactionem. In ipsis ergo voluptatibus suis inveniunt carnales unde crucientur, quibus non sufficit quod habent, sed sitiunt quod non habent, fastidium siquidem saepius, sed

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[16] Cf. *Mt.* XII, 43 et *Lc.* XI, 24. [17] *Mt.* VIII, 29. [18] 1 *Thes.* V, 3.

61 inferre: inferri H inferre Creatori: Creatori inferre N Creatori contumeliam: cont. Cr. H 61-62 ipse prius: prius ipse ABN 62 in pr. transgr. liq. app.: liq. app. in pr. transgr. N liquido: liquide A etiam: et B 66 remissa: remissius H 67 est et nutritus: et nut. est H nutritus: est *add* N carne: mortali *add* B 68 quo: quem H semel: solum B qui: et B 69 quos: enim *add* B 71 inchoantes: initiantes H quas: *om* B angeli: angelici H 73-74 ad... daemones: daem. ad pr. cr. H 74 arida et inaquosa: inaq. et ar. H 75-76 et orationibus: *om* B 76 impelluntur: impellunt B, et expelluntur *add* H 78 et: in H 79 cruciantur: crucientur ABN, cremantur H 80 saeculi: sui H 81 siquidem: quidem B inde moritur: immoritur H 82 mundi: saeculi H 83 gens: gentes B sine^2: absque H scientia: prudentia BH 84 superveniet eis: eis sup. BH 84-85 eis interitus: int. eis N 85 quasi: tamquam H 86-87 tamquam imparatos: imparatos tamquam fur H 87 quoniam: quos B invio: vias B, iram suam Hac, iram Hpc 88 thesaurizantes: thesaurizant ANP 89 die: irae et *add* H Deus: *om* H acquisitione: acquisitionem BH 92 siquidem: quidem H

numquam satietatem inventuri, qui nesciunt gloriari nisi in foedis et in abominabilibus miseriis. Neque enim qui saeculum elongaverunt, qui castigant corpus et in servitutem redigunt, calicem passionis soli bibunt. Est enim *calix in manu Domini vini meri plenus misto*, cuius *faex non est exinanita*; *bibent* ex ea *omnes peccatores terrae*.[19] Per calicem passio designatur. Unde: *Potestis bibere calicem quem ego bibiturus sum?*[20] Qui in manu, id est in potestate Domini est, quia quibus vult, et quando vult, et de quo vult, propinat. De hoc calice bibunt quidam vinum merum, qui videlicet pure propter Dominum semetipsos abnegant et, tollentes crucem suam, sequuntur eum. Quidam vinum mixtum, qui videlicet viam paupertatis ingressi, non omnino abnegant semetipsos vel parentes suos, sed quodam animali affectu vel de parentibus sollicitudinem gerunt, vel carni curam plus iusto impendunt. De vino tamen, licet mixto, bibunt, quia, si imperfecti sunt, iugum tamen oboedientiae non abiciunt. Faecem vero potant qui, propter implenda carnis desideria, poenis et taediis, quibus mundus abundat, afficiuntur, diffusi in vanitates et insanias falsas. Omnis horum in faece et in turpitudine vita versatur, quod improperat Propheta dicens: *Bibe tu et consopire; circumdabit te calix dexterae Domini et vomitus ignominiae super gloriam tuam*.[21] Bibunt quidem et ipsi, patientes miserias longe graviores his quas videntur pati pauperes Christi, et omnis gloria eorum adeo ignominiosa est, ut quilibet sani capitis eam abiciat velut pannum vomitu respersum. Calicem pestiferum, et non salutarem, potant isti, quia non invocant nomen Domini. Discedat enim ab iniquitate omnis qui invocat nomen Domini. *Quicumque* nimirum *invocaverit nomen Domini salvus erit*.[22]

5. In inferno igitur paupertatis, ut de aliis omittamus, civitas Dei peregrinatur a Domino, quamdiu est in corpore, civitas utique sancta, civitas pulchra, etsi in loco afflictionis posita. Cuius pulchritudinem sponsus laudat in Canticis dicens: *Pulchra es, amica mea, suavis et decora sicut Ierusalem, terribilis ut castrorum acies ordinata*.[23] *Suavis* enim est hominibus, *decora* numinibus, *terribilis* daemonibus. Quare? Ambulat enim *ut castrorum acies*, non dissipata per invidiam, sed per caritatem constipata. *Acies* est per conventum, *castrorum* per procinctum, *ordinata* per consensum. Conventum facit paenitentia, procinctum ponit vigilantia, consensum praebet concordia. Sane parum timet diabolus ieiunantes

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[19] *Ps.* LXXIV, 9. [20] *Mt.* XX, 22. [21] *Hab.* II, 16. [22] *Act.* II, 21. [23] *Cant.* VI, 3.

93 inventuri: inveniunt H qui: *om* B in^{2}: *om* BHac 94 qui: a se *add* B corpus: suum *add* B 96-97 ex... terrae: omnes peccatores ex ea B 96 ea: eo H 99 quando: quantum BHN 100 merum: et *add* N 100-101 semetipsos abnegant: abn. sem. H 102 viam paupertatis: paupertatis semitam H omnino: ideo H 103 parentibus: suis *add* B sollicitudinem: in corde *add* H 104 vel: et B curam: *om* A licet mixto: mixto licet B bibunt: bibant B quia: et *add* BH 107 vanitates: saeculi *add* H horum: gloria *add* H 108 et... versatur: versatur et turpitudine H vita versatur: conversatur aetas AN quod: eis *add* B 109 tu: quoque *add* H 110 Bibunt: Bibent H quidem et ipsi: et ipsi q. B his: hiis B 111 et: *om* H 113 nomen Domini: Deum H 114 enim: *om* B 116 igitur: autem B 118 sponsus laudat: laud. sp. B 119 sicut: et *add* A 120 enim est: est enim B hominibus: et *add* N 121 castrorum: terribilis *add* A

vigilantes, continentes, quia tam de istis quam de illis multos traxit in laqueum ruinae. Sed concordes et unanimiter viventes in domo Domini, coniuncti Deo et sibi per vinculum caritatis, hi dolorem, hi timorem, hi livorem diabolo ingerunt. Haec unitas multitudinis non solum hostem excruciat, sed et sibi Deum conciliat, sicut ipse in Canticis testatur, *Vulnerasti*, inquiens, *cor meum, soror mea sponsa, in uno oculorum tuorum et in uno cincinno capitis tui*,[24] id est in unitate praelatorum et subditorum. Unde Paulus admonet dicens: *Solliciti servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis*.[25] Scit quippe malignus spiritus quia, de illis quos dat Pater Filio, non perdit quemquam: non enim est qui de manu eius possit eruere; quos autem concordes invenit, per hoc praecipue cognoscit quia in manu Dei sunt, et non tanget illos tormentum mortis. *In hoc enim*, inquit, *cognoscent omnes*, etiam daemones, *quia mei discipuli estis, si dilectionem habueritis ad invicem*.[26] Caritatem sane inter homines expavescit diabolus, quam in caelis cum Deo et angelis tenere non potuit: haec civitas firma est et inconcussa. Cuius *collum sicut turris David, quae aedificata est cum propugnaculis Mille clipei pendent ex ea, omnis armatura fortium*.[27] Collo caput corpori coniungitur. Quid ergo per collum melius accipi potest, quam propositum nostrum, quod dum integrum perseverat, quantiscumque tribulationibus afficiamur, numquam a capite nostro, id est Christo, separamur? *In omnibus* enim *tribulationem patimur, sed non angustiamur*.[28] *Quis* enim *separabit nos a caritate*[29] Dei, per quam corde dilatato curritur via mandatorum[30] Dei? Hoc ergo collum firmum esse debet et immobile, et supereminens sicut turris, cuius fundamentum debet esse humilitas.

6. Ipsa est enim quae virtutes congregat, congregatas conservat, conservatas consummat. Fundamentum in terra est, nec eius debilitas cognosci potest, donec parietes superaedificati vel fundantur vel corruant. Ita et humilitas in occulto cordis figit radicem, nec sciri potest eius absentia vel infirmatio, donec murus aedificii vel fundatur per exordinationem, vel omnino corruat per separationem. Hanc turrim possidet David, id est manu fortis. Si contemplativus

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[24] *Cant.* IV, 9. [25] *Eph.* IV, 3. [26] *Io.* XIII, 35. [27] *Cant.* IV, 4. [28] 2 *Cor.* IV, 8. [29] *Rom.* VIII, 35. [30] Cf. *Ps.* CXVIII, 32.

125 istis: illis H illis: istis H 126 Sed: Si H viventes: habitantes H Domini: Dei H 128 multitudinis: credentium *add* H 129 sicut... testatur: quod ipse testatur in Cant. H inquiens: inquit B inquiens cor meum: cor meum inquiens B 130 sponsa: vulnerasti cor meum. In quo *add* H uno: ictu B cincinno: cincinnio A oculorum tuorum: oculo A 131 Solliciti: Sollicite A 132 spiritus: fidei B spiritus^{2}: hostis B 133 dat Pater: Pater dat B perdit: Filius *add* H 135 mortis: malitiae H 136 etiam daemones: *om* B mei discipuli: disc. mei HN discipuli estis: estis disc. B 137 expavescit: pavescit B expavescit diabolus: diab. exp. H inter homines expavescit: exp. int. h. N 140 caput: collum *add* B caput corpori: corp. cap. H 142 integrum: iugiter B afficiamur: *om.* H 143-144 In... angustiamur: *om* B 144 Quis: Quid H separabit nos: nos sep. H Dei: Christi H, In... angustiamur *add* B 145 curritur: occurrit B 148 congregat: aggregat B, impetrat H congregatas: aggregatas B, impetratas H 149 in terra: in terram N, intra BHN 150 vel$^{1-2}$: aut N 151 figit radicem: radicem figit H 152 fundatur : findatur Npc, vel *add* H 153 turrim: turrem N

non es, noli desperare: esto activus, insiste bonis operibus, et, turrim propositi fortiter defendens, ad munditiam cordis quandoque pervenies. Tradidit enim Deus *semetipsum, ut nos redimeret ab omni iniquitate et mundaret sibi populum acceptabilem, sectatorem bonorum operum.*[31] Unde et iuravit David, id est fortiter operanti: *De fructu ventris tui*, id est sensualitatis, quae fragilior pars est hominis, *ponam super sedem tuam.*[32] Turris sive civitas ista murum habet oboedientiam, quae dispersos colligit et vagantes refrenat, ut non exeant nisi per portam, id est prioris imperium.

Oboedientia quinquepartita est. Prima opus rectum, quia non est oboedientia contra Deum. Secunda voluntarium, quia quod fit ex necessitate non est bonum. Tertia purum, ut intentio pura sit, quia *si oculus simplex est, totum corpus lucidum est.*[33] Quarta discretum, ne quid nimis; qui enim recte offert, si non recte dividit, peccat.[33a] Quinta firmum id est perseverans, quae omnia includit et tenet: nullum enim bonum sine perseverantia. Ut autem perseverantiam habeat murus oboedientiae, inhaerere sibi debent propugnacula patientiae. Sicut enim defendentibus murum necessaria sunt propugnacula ad cavenda iacula hostium, sic et oboedientiam tenere volentibus necessaria est patientia, quae munit hominem contra verborum acerbitates et operum fatigationes.

7. *Mille clipei pendent ex ea*, id est perfectio et assiduitas orationis, quae quandoque proximo subsidium ferat. Clipeus enim huc illucque circumferri potest. Pendet ex ea *omnis armatura fortium.*[34] Veniat Paulus exponens eam: *Propterea*, inquit, *accipite armaturam Dei, ut possitis resistere adversus insidias diaboli et in omnibus perfecti stare. State ergo succincti lumbos in veritate et induite vos lorica iustitiae, calceati pedes in praeparatione evangelii pacis, in omnibus sumentes scutum fidei*[35] et caetera. Succingere lumbos nihil aliud est quam a carnalibus abstinere desideriis. Sed continendum est in veritate. Quidam enim continent ex necessitate, non habentes loci aut temporis aut instrumentorum opportunitatem; quidam ex vanitate, propter favorem videlicet hominum vel aliquod temporale commodum; quidam ex veritate, soli Deo placere cupientes. Induenda est etiam lorica iustitiae. Lorica ante et retro, a dextris et a sinistris protegit hominem, cui merito comparatur iustitia, quae reddit unicuique quod suum est: habemus enim ante nos priores, post nos iuniores, a dextris amicos, a sinistris inimicos. Reddamus ergo singulis quod suum est, prioribus oboedientiam, iunioribus doctrinam, amicis laetitiam, inimicis patientiam.

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[31] *Tit.* II, 14.
[32] *Ps.* CXXXI, 11.
[33] *Mt.* VI, 22.
[33a] *Gen.* IV, 7, selon les LXX.
[34] *Cant.* IV, 4.
[35] *Eph.* VI, 13-16.

155 fortiter: firmiter H defendens: defendes H 156 mundaret: mundet H 157 et: *om* H 158 pars est: est p. B est: *om* N 159 civitas: unitas AN ista: *om* H 162-167 Oboedientia... perseverantia: *om* H 162 Prima: est *add* B 165 quid: quod A si: et B 166 quae: qui AN 167-168 perseverantiam: observantiam A Ut... oboedientiae: Cui muro H 168 inhaerere... debent: inhaerent H 169 defendentibus: defendentes B defendentibus murum: murum def. H necess. s. prop.: prop. necess. s. H 170 iacula hostium: host. iac. B sic: ita H 173 proximo: proximis A, proximos H illucque: et illuc H 174 Pendet: etiam *add* H fortium: Quae? *add* H Paulus: in medium *add* H 176 lumbos: vestros *add* H 178 nihil: quid H 180 habentes: aut *add* N 181 favorem: favores B 185 enim: *om* B 187 patientiam: penitentiam A

8. Calceandi sunt etiam pedes nostri in praeparatione evangelii pacis. Ut enim pacem aliis annuntiemus et servemus, calceare debemus pedes cogitationum nostrarum, quibus totum mundum peragramus memoria mortuorum operum nostrorum, ne spina pungamur superbiae, consideratis imbecillitatibus proximorum. Quibus ne superextendamus nos, dum nostram et illorum infirmitatem attendimus, peccata nostra non debent expelli a memoria, etsi mortua sint in conscientia, illud pensantes Apostoli: *Considerans teipsum, ne et tu tenteris.*[36] Supervenientibus igitur huiusmodi cogitationibus debet homo et se accusare, et excusare proximum, ut qui fecit iustitiam reddendo cuique quod suum est, faciat iam iudicium, ut anima eius, quae sedes debet esse Dei,[37] per iustitiam et iudicium corrigatur, *quia iustitia et iudicium correctio sedis eius.*[38] Iudicium triplex est: aliud in se, aliud in proximum, aliud in Deum. Iudicium hominis in se debet esse severum, in proximum pium, in Deum purum. Severe seipsum debet homo iudicare. *Si* enim *nosmetipsos iudicaremus, non utique iudicaremur.*[39] Pie proximum, ut sive misericorditer obsecres, sive ex zelo increpes, utrumque tamen facias *in spiritu lenitatis, considerans teipsum ne et tu tenteris.*[40] In puritate et simplicitate cordis iudicia Dei debes attendere, dicens in confessione: *Opera Domini universa bona valde.*[41] Sit ergo homo in se districtus iudex per intellectum veritatis; in proximum pius per affectum caritatis; purus in Deum per assensum voluntatis.

9. Postquam ergo fecerit homo iustitiam et iudicium, necessaria est ei vigilantia, ne relaxetur per teporem vel corruat per elationem. Expedit ergo ut sollicitus ambulet cum Deo suo, subditus et orans eum. Ne autem in oratione torpescat vel haesitet occultis et malignis suggestionibus diaboli, sumat in omnibus scutum fidei, sciens quia quemcumque locum calcaverit pes fidei suae suus erit,[42] id est quodcumque petierit ab eo vel in nomine eius fiet ei.[43] Sit ergo fides tua sicut granum sinapis,[44] quod quanto magis teritur, tanto magis redolet, ut videlicet quanto despici, quanto repelli videaris a Deo tuo, tanto fiducialius speres extorquere quod postulas, quia etsi non eo quod amicus sis eius, propter improbitatem tuam tamen surget et dabit tibi quotquot habes neces-

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[36] *Gal.* VI, 1. [37] Cf. *Prov.* XII, 13, selon les LXX ; voir plus loin, note 23.
[8] Ps. *XCVI*, 2. [39] 1 *Cor.* XI, 31. [40] *Gal.* VI, 1. [41] *Eccli.* XXXIX, 21.
[2] Cf. *Deut.* XI, 24. [43] Cf. *Io.* XIV, 13 et XV, 7. [44] Cf. *Lc.* XVII, 6.

189 in: ad H praeparatione: praeparationem BH 190 pacem aliis: aliis pacem B 191 peragramus: peragamus H mortuorum: animal *add* H 193-194 nostram... infirmitatem: nostrorum infirmitatem H, nostram in aliquo firmitatem A 194 attendimus: attendamus A debent: deberent H 197 cuique: unicuique H 202 seipsum debet: debet seipsum B, debet homo seipsum N iudicare: diiudicare HN nosmetipsos: nosmet H iudicaremus: diiudicaremus HN 203 Pie: in *add* N 204 facias: facies AN teipsum: temetipsum N 204-205 tenteris: et cetera *add* H 208 per: propter ANac 209 fecerit homo: homo fecerit H homo iust. et iud.: iust. et iud. h. B, h. iud. et iust. N. ei: *om* H 210 teporem: torporem B ergo: ei *add* H 212 torpescat: tepescat B 213-214 suae suus: tuae tuus H 214 quodcumque: quaecumque H petierit: petieris H vel: *om* B ei: tibi H Sit: Scit A 216 repelli... tuo: videaris a Deo tuo repelli N 217 amicus sis: sis amicus N 218 improbitatem tuam tamen: tamen tuam impr. A quotquot: quod B

sarios.[45] Unde et supplet Apostolus: *Orantes in Spiritu et vigilantes in ipso, in omni instantia et obsecratione.*[46] Non enim semel vel bis ad orationem est accedendum, sed frequenter et assidue, ad Deum extendentes desideria cordis et in tempore opportuno aperientes vocem oris. Unde et alibi dicit: *Petitiones vestrae innotescant apud Deum,*[47] quod fit per instantiam et assiduitatem orationis nunc procedentis ad eum, nunc ad gloriosam Matrem eius, nunc ad Sanctos, ut et ipsi cogantur dicere: *Dimitte eum, quia clamat post nos.*[48]

10. Civitatem ergo sanctam Ierusalem in inferno paupertatis adhuc peregrinantem consolatur Propheta dicens: *Noli flere, quia cito veniet salus tua.*[49] Etenim *super flumina Babylonis, illic sedimus et flevimus.*[50] Babylon est confusio. In Babylone sedent et flent cives Ierusalem, qui, etsi non sint in confusione operum, in confusione tamen sunt cogitationum, volentes, sed non valentes oculum mentis ad Deum dirigere; et licet inviti, per inania distrahuntur. Flumina ergo Babylonis sunt perversae consuetudines, quae dulces occurrunt memoriae nostrae; currunt tamen, et quos seducunt secum ducunt in mare saeculi. In his fluminibus oriuntur salices, id est debiles et infructuosae cogitationes, in quibus, dum per inania distendimur, suspendimus a laude Dei corda nostra, quae organa laudis ante conspectum Dei resonare deberent. *Deo autem gratias qui dedit nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum,*[51] quia si ingerant se malae consuetudines, non tamen insidemus, sed supersedemus fluminibus Babylonis, quia dulcedini vitae saecularis et alloquenti obmutuit anima nostra, et obsorduit revocanti blandientique induruit. His ergo vanitatibus impediti, non mirum si fleamus recordantes Sion, id est ad memoriam reducentes illam suavitatem illudque saporis oblectamentum quod praegustant speculatores illi, qui revelata facie merentur speculari gloriam Dei. *Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de iugo servitutis huius,*[52] ut quandoque insultare possim insultantibus modo mihi hostibus meis, quibus, exigentibus iniquitatibus meis, posuit me Deus subsannationem et derisum, humilians me in loco afflictionis, in quo cooperuit me umbra mortis. Si enim carnalibus distrahor desideriis et illis, quod absit, consentio, quantum possum in morte quidem sum, mortuus utique et consequenter sepeliendus in inferno. Si autem eorum assultus sentio,

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[45] Cf. *Lc.* XI, 8. [46] *Eph.* VI, 18. [47] *Philip.* IV, 6. [48] *Mt.* XV, 23.

[49] Centon constitué de deux formules empruntées à des répons liturgiques de l'Avent, eux-mêmes inspirés des Prophètes ; voir plus loin, note 59. [50] *Ps.* CXXXVI, 1.

[51] 1 *Cor.* XV, 57. [52] *Rom.* VII, 24.

219 ipso: Christo B 220 et: *om* AH 221 ad Deum extendentes: ext. ad Deum N 222 et: *om* H 223 per: ad Nac et assiduitatem orationis: orat. et assid. N 224 nunc: non H eum: Deum B Sanctos: eius *add* Hac, ipsius *add* N 228 est: *om* H 229 In... Ierusalem: *om* BH qui: quia enim B, quidam enim H sint: sunt B 229-230 confusione $^{1-2}$: confessione A 230 sunt cogitationum: cog. sunt B 231 mentis: semper *add* H 233 nostrae: vestrae N 234 his: hiis B debiles et infructuosae: infruct. et deb. N 235 laude: laudibus Hac 237 dedit nobis: nobis dedit H, nobis A Dominum nostrum: *om* H quia: et H 238 supersedemus: super debemus A 240 His: Hiis B. 242-243 speculatores illi: illi spec. H 243 facie: iam *add* H 244 liberabit: de corpore mortis id est *add* B insultare: in salutare A 246 Deus: meus *add* HN 247 cooperuit: operuit A enim: a *add* H 248 sum mortuus: mort. sum B 249 sepeliendus in inferno: in inf. sep. H inferno: infernum AN eorum... sentio: assultus sentio eorum N

sed non consentio, non in morte, sed in umbra mortis sum, dum inanium pulvere cogitationum caligant oculi mei et revocatur memoria mea a dulcedine Dei mei. *Si tamen ambulavero in medio umbrae mortis, non timebo mala*, si mecum es, immo utique *non timebo quia mecum es.*[53]

11. Et unde hoc sperare praesumo? Quia virga tuae correctionis et baculus tuae sustentationis ipsa me consolantur.[54] Etsi enim corrigas me et reprimas superbiam meam, reducendo me in pulverem mortis, foves tamen vitam meam, sustentans me ne corruam id lacum mortis. Non negligam disciplinam Domini neque indignabor, dum ab eo arguar. Scio enim quia *diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum.*[55] *Vanitati* siquidem *subiecta est creatura non volens,*[56] sed dolens. Ergo impatiens? Non, sed patienter ferens. Quare? *Propter eum qui subiecit eam in spe.*[57] Quare? Nam et *ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei.*[58] *Civitas* ergo *Ierusalem, noli flere*, quia *cito veniet salus tua. Si moram fecerit* quantum ad te, *non* tamen *tardabit*[59] quantum ad se, *quia mille anni ante oculos eius tamquam dies hesterna quae praeteriit.*[60]

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[53] *Ps.* XXII, 4. [54] Cf. *Ps.* XXII, 4. [55] *Rom.* VIII, 28. [56] *Rom.* VIII, 20.

[57] *Ibid.* [58] *Rom.* VIII, 21.

[59] Centon constitué de formules empruntées à des répons liturgiques de l'Avent, eux-mêmes inspirés des Prophètes : *Civitas Ierusalem, noli flere*: répons *Civitas*; *cito veniet salus tua*: répons *Ierusalem* (cf. *Hab.* II, 3; *Zach.* IX, 9; *Is.* XXXV, 4); *si moram fecerit*: répons *Ecce apparebit* (cf. *Hab.* II, 3); *non tardabit*: répons *Ecce veniet* (*Hab.* II, 3).

[60] *Ps.* LXXXIX, 4.

250 sed... consentio: *om* H 251 a: in H 252 mala: *om* H 253 quia: quoniam N, tu *add* A es: sis N 254 praesumo: nisi *add* B 255 tuae: *om* H Etsi enim: Etenim si B me: *om* H 257 sustentans: sustentas H me: *om* B 258 eo: ea H arguar: arguor B Deum: eum H 259 creatura: *om* A 261 Quare: Qua ABN 261-262 corruptionis: huius *add* H 263 Si: enim *add* H tamen: *om* B 264 eius: tuos HNac

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Pour peu qu'on soit habitué à lire, dans leur ensemble, les sermons de S. Bernard, on ne peut se défendre de l'impression que celui-ci présente avec eux des ressemblances. Peut-on confirmer, préciser cette impression? Il est difficile de comparer au "style de S. Bernard" un texte qui n'a pas reçu de lui sa rédaction définitive; S. Bernard, d'ailleurs, a plusieurs "styles", selon les genres littéraires qu'il pratique, et selon que ses notaires ont plus ou moins de part dans la rédaction de ses lettres et de ses sermons.[1] Du moins peut-on noter que le style de ce sermon est semblable à celui de plusieurs autres, en

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[1] A propos de *Deux épitres de S. Bernard et de son secrétaire,* dans *Studien und Mitteilungen zur Gesch. des Bened.-Ordens*, LXVIII (1957), p. 227-231, j'ai pu conjecturer la date de deux documents d'après l'identification du notaire — Nicolas de Clairvaux — qui est intervenu dans leur rédaction.

particulier de ceux qui sont intitulés *De diversis*. Mais il est deux points sur lesquels peut porter une comparaison plus minutieuse: d'une part les idées, d'autre part ce qu'on peut appeler, selon un terme que les érudits d'autrefois employaient volontiers, la "manière" de S. Bernard, celle-ci étant constituée par un ensemble de procédés utilisés dans le développement des idées.

Or dès le début, les idées de ce sermon rappellent celles que Bernard a exprimées ailleurs. L'ardent désir que les saints de l'Ancien Testament — les Pères — avaient de la venue du Christ, fait l'objet d'une grande partie du IIe des *Sermones super Cantica* (n. 1-2 et 4), lequel commence par une expression: *Ardorem desiderii patrum* qui est proche de deux formules de notre sermon: *sanctorum patrum desideria, ardorem desideriorum.* Ces saints, est-il ajouté aussitôt, attendaient en effet le seul qui pût les délivrer de la prison et de la captivité: cette idée est chère à Bernard, qui l'a exprimée plusieurs fois, au moyen des mêmes réminiscences bibliques.[2] Un autre sermon pour l'Avent, le VIe, commence d'ailleurs, lui aussi, par l'énoncé de cette idée que seule la mort rendra possible l'achèvement de cette rédemption à laquelle déjà nos âmes ont part dans le Christ.[3]

Dans le paragraphe 2, il est question du péché originel et de ses conséquences, en des termes conformes à ceux qu'emploie ailleurs Bernard pour en parler: distinction entre le péché d'un autre, qui nous atteint sans que nous y ayons consenti, et les péchés que nous commettons,[4] gravité plus grande du péché personnel que du péché originel.[5] Bernard a justifié l'efficacité du baptême donné aux enfants;[6] ici il est dit que, sans le baptême, les enfants sont damnés.[7] Dans sa lettre *De baptismo* à Hugues de Saint-Victor, Bernard s'exprime dans le même sens,[8] mais avec les nuances que comporte cette consultation doctrinale sur un point auquel il ne fait ici qu'une allusion. Les mots *de massa perditorum* (l.69) font penser à une autre formule d'origine augustinienne que Bernard utilise ailleurs: *intra massam miserae damnationis.*[9]

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[2] *In festo omn. sanctor.*, serm. IV, I, *PL* 183, 471-472, surtout 472B; *Epist.*, 198, 1 et 5, *PL* 182, 231B et 233A. *In Vigil. Nativ. Dom.*, serm. III, *PL* 183, 94-100; serm. II, 5, *PL* 183, 92-93; cf. B. de Vrégille, *L'attente des saints d'après S. Bernard*, dans *Nouv. revue théol.* LXX (1948), p. 225-244 et P. Delfgaauw, *La nature et les degrés de l'amour selon S. Bernard*, dans *S. Bernard théologien*, Rome (*Analecta S. Ord. Cist.* IX, I-II) 1953, p. 249-250.

[3] *PL* 183, 52A-B.

[4] *Dom. I p. oct. Epiph.*, serm. I, 3, *PL* 183, 156A.

[5] *In feria IV Hebd. Sanct.*, serm. 6-7, *PL* 183, 265D, 267C.

[6] Cf. J. Ch. Didier, *La question du baptême des enfants chez S. Bernard et ses contemporains*, dans *S. Bern. théol.* p. 195-197.

[7] Etiam infantes, quibus in baptismo nihil remittitur, in aeternum damnantur, n. 3, 1.

[8] Sane infantes... non possunt habere fidem..., consequenter nec salutem, si absque baptismi perceptione moriuntur, *De bapt.* 9, *PL* 182, 1037D.

[9] *Serm. sup. cant.*, 78, 4, éd. *S. Bernardi opera*, II, Rome 1958, p. 269, 7. On trouve aussi l'expression *de massa corruptionis* dans le sermon *In Nativ. Domini*, II, n. 4, *PL* 183, 121.

Au paragraphe 4 revient une distinction que Bernard emploie plusieurs fois: celle des différentes sortes de "vins" symbolisant diverses réalités d'ordre moral. Il en est question, comme ici, à propos du *Ps.* 74, 9, dans le sermon IX sur le *Ps. Qui habitat*[10] et dans la sentence *Tres sunt calices.*[11] Ce qui est dit ensuite (n. 5) de l'amitié et de la concorde est conforme à un enseignement qui est cher à S. Bernard: on le retrouve, en particulier, vers la fin de ce sermon *Quod Dominus* pour l'Assomption qu'une tradition manuscrite presqu'unanime, non contredite par la critique interne, a permis de restituer à S. Bernard, bien que le style n'en soit pas celui de ses textes les plus travaillés.[12] De même la comparaison qui suit (n. 5-6), dans laquelle les vertus sont assimilées aux éléments d'une forteresse — *fundamentum, turris, murus, propugnaculum* — est développée au début du même sermon[13] et dans deux sentences d'Orval:[14] partout apparaît comme ici l'importance de la patience comme du rempart qui protège les autres vertus.[15] Quant à l'idée qui ouvre tout ce développement et selon laquelle l'humilité doit être le fondement de l'édifice spirituel, c'est là un thème fréquent depuis S. Augustin[16] et que Bernard a repris, en particulier, dans le *Sermo* 36 *super Cantica*[17] et dans le *De consideratione.*[18] On pourrait signaler d'autres rapprochements avec l'armure évoquée ici (n. 7) et dans le *Sermo III in dedic. eccles.*[19] ou dans les sentences *Quatuor sunt arma*[20] et *Arma fidelium tres sunt;*[21] avec la comparaison des pieds aux pensées qui encombrent la mémoire, telle qu'elle est suggérée ici (n. 8) et ailleurs.[22]

Mais la manière même dont sont présentées ces idées communes à ce sermon et à d'autres écrits de Bernard incline à voir en celui-ci son œuvre. On retrouve dans ce texte les procédés qui caractérisent l'usage que Bernard fait de l'Écriture: abondance des citations et des réminiscences bibliques, empruntées spécialement, pour l'Ancien Testament, aux Prophètes, au Cantique des cantiques et, plus encore, aux Psaumes, et, pour le Nouveau, à l'Évangile et surtout à S. Paul, singulièrement à la première partie de l'Epître aux Romains; vocabulaire en grande partie biblique et, de préférence, paulinien; allusions annonçant et préparant des citations expresses; manière de relier les citations entre elles, de les mêler parfois les unes aux autres, et, pour ainsi dire, de jouer avec le texte sacré; citations faites d'après une version différente de la Vulgate.[23] Le vocabulaire, lui aussi, est bien celui de S. Bernard: on trouve ici, comme ailleurs dans Bernard, *contemplativus* (l. 153),[24] *propositum* (l. 141),[25] *sensualitas* (l. 158).[26] L'analyse de l'acte libre (l. 247-250) est semblable à celle que développe le *De gratia et libero arbitrio;* ici comme dans ce traité, Bernard se réfère à la doctrine, et au vocabulaire même, de l'Epître aux Romains.[26a] La sentence sur l'obéissance, au n. 6, est un exemple typique de ces sentences bernardines qui sont transmises, pour ainsi dire, à l'état brut, en plusieurs collections, ou de celles qui se trouvent, sous une forme plus ou moins élaborée, en tant de sermons tels que celui pour l'Assomption *Quod Dominus:* toute la partie finale de ce dernier n'est guère qu'une suite de sentences de ce genre. On trouve ici des réminiscences de la Règle de S. Benoît[27] comme il y en a dans toute l'œuvre de Bernard.[28] Mais ici les allusions monastiques, plus nombreuses que dans l'ensemble des grands sermons rédigés, sont dans la même proportion que dans les textes qui nous rapprochent davantage de la prédication orale et quotidienne de S. Bernard.[29] En bref, sans se répéter — ce qui n'est guère conforme à son génie —, S. Bernard a ici développé différemment, mais dans sa manière, des thèmes identiques à ceux qu'il a variés ailleurs. L'analyse interne du sermon *In celebratione* fait penser qu'il ressemble, à plus d'un égard, au sermon *Quod Dominus* au sujet duquel Mabillon avait eu les mêmes hésitations qu'à propos de celui-ci.

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[10] N. 3-4, *PL* 183, 217-218.

[11] *Sent.* II,80, *PL* 184, 1146. Autre distinction entre trois espèces de vin dans la sentence *Non uno eodemque, ibid.* 22, 1140.

[12] Sous le titre *Sermon pour l'Assomption restitué à S. Bernard,* dans *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale,* XX (1953), p. 5-12, j'ai démontré l'authenticité de ce sermon.

[13] N. 1-2, *PL* 184, 1001-1003.

[14] Parmi des *Inédits bernardins dans un ms. d'Orval,* dans *Analecta monastica,* I, Rome (*Studia Anselmiana,* 20) 1948, p. 149-150, n. XIV, et p. 158-159, n. LXII, j'ai édité ces sentences. Cf. *Sermon pour l'Assomption, loc. cit.*, p. 10, n. 10, où d'autres textes sont indiqués; cf. aussi *De mor. et off. episc.* 17, *PL* 182, 821A.

[15] De même dans le serm. *In dedic. eccl.* III, 1, *PL* 183, 524A.

[16] *Serm.* 69,2, *PL* 38, 441.

[17] N. 5, *éd. citée,* t. II, p. 7, 4.

[18] II, 14, *PL* 182, 750A-B; V, 32, 806D.

[19] N. 2, *PL* 183, 524.

[20] *Sent.* II, 152, *PL* 183, 1152.

[21] *Ibid.* 68, 1145.

[22] Par ex. dans le serm. XIII sur le Ps. *Qui habitat,* 2, *PL* 183, 236, ou dans le serm. *De div.* 32, 2, *PL* 183, 625.

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[23] C'est le cas pour la formule *anima... sedes debet esse Dei* (l. 198), qui dépend d'un verset non biblique, mais que Bernard, après d'autres, pouvait censer tel, ainsi que je l'ai montré dans une étude sur *S. Bernard et la tradition biblique d'après les Sermons sur les Cantiques*, dans *Sacris erudiri*, XI (1960), p. 236; c'est le cas aussi pour *Gen.* IV, 7, et pour *I Thess.* V, 3, cités de la même façon ici (l. 166 et l. 84) et dans les *Serm. sup. Cant.* Il n'y avait pas lieu ici d'indiquer toutes les réminiscences bibliques: elles sont, comme dans presque tous les sermons de S. Bernard, très nombreuses, dans la proportion d'une par ligne environ, ainsi que le montrera une étude de mon collaborateur Dom Figuet, de l'Abbaye Saint-Jérôme in Urbe, sur les procédés du style biblique de S. Bernard. Seules ont été identifiées ici les citations explicites.

[24] *Sent.* II, 167, *PL* 184, 1154.

[25] Cf. *Sermons de l'école de S. Bernard*, dans *Anal. S. Ord. Cist.* XI (1955), p. 10, n. 4.

[26] Cf. *In Septuag.*, serm. II, 2, *PL* 183, 167A. Dans le serm. *In Vigil. Nativ. Dom.* III, 8, circa initium, les meilleurs mss ont (*quinquepartita*) *sensualitate*, et non *sensificatione* comme l'éd. Mabillon, *PL* 183, 98C.

[26a] Cf. *De gr. et lib. arb.*, n. 1-6. Les réminiscences pauliniennes sont indiquées dans l'édition critique de ce traité, au t. III des *Opera omnia* qui est actuellement en cours d'impression.

[27] L. 146; cf. *Reg. S. Bened.*, Prolog.-L. 58-59, cf. *ibid.*

[28] Sous le titre *Recherches sur les Sermons sur les Cantiques, VI. Aux sources des Sermons sur les Cantiques*, dans *Rev. bénéd.*, LXIX (1959), 244-253, j'ai cité des exemples à ce sujet.

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De ce double examen de la tradition manuscrite et de la teneur du texte il ressort que celui-ci ne doit pas être écarté comme inauthentique d'après seulement des critères assez vagues au sujet de son style. Il est garanti par une attestation manuscrite moins abondante et moins universelle que celle dont jouit l'ensemble des sermons, y compris le *Quod Dominus*, mais qui, ancienne, est loin d'être isolée: le texte s'est répandu très tôt sous le nom de S. Bernard ou parmi ses écrits en Italie, en France, en Angleterre. A ces indices favorables ne contredit pas une comparaison des textes sûrs de S. Bernard avec celui-ci: tout concourt à le faire admettre comme authentique.

Encore faut-il s'entendre sur ce mot. Car il y a plusieurs degrés ou, pour mieux dire, plusieurs formes d'authenticité: divers textes qui, tous, sont de S. Bernard, ne le sont pas de la même façon, selon que, dans leur rédaction, sont intervenus Bernard seul, ou Bernard et un secrétaire, ou un secrétaire seul. Il a lui-même revu, une ou plusieurs fois, certains textes écrits sous sa dictée. Il en est d'autres dont il a ordonné le plan ou les idées au cours d'une conversation ou d'une prédication, mais dont il a laissé la rédaction à un notaire, dont il n'a pas toujours revisé le travail. Entre les grands sermons littéraires qu'il a édités après en avoir corrigé minutieusement une première et parfois une seconde rédaction, et les sentences brèves qui ne sont que des schémas, il y a toute une gamme de sermons comme certains *De diversis*, comme le *Quod Dominus*, les sermons synodaux et d'autres,[30] qui nous transmettent quelque chose de sa pensée, sinon de son style le plus parfait:[31] *Sensus*

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[29] Cf. *Études sur S. Bernard*, p. 80.

[30] Dans une étude sur *Les sermons synodaux attribués à S. Bernard*, dans *Rev. bénéd.* LXIII (1953), p. 292-306, j'ai examiné les problèmes que soulèvent plusieurs de ces textes. D'autres *Sermons bernardins inédits* seront étudiés ailleurs.

[31] Un autre cas du même genre a fait l'objet d'une magistrale démonstration lorsque Dom P. Verbraeken, *Le texte du Commentaire sur les Rois attribué à S. Grégoire* et *Le Commentaire de S. Grégoire sur le 1er livre des Rois*, dans *Rev. bénéd.* LXVI (1956), p. 63-91 et 159-217, a restitué à S. Grégoire un texte dans la rédaction finale duquel on discerne pourtant l'intervention de Claude de Ravenne. De même on avait pu montrer que S. Ambroise avait deux "styles": C. Mohrmann, *Le style oral du De sacramentis de S. Ambroise*, dans

enim eius in his est, sed non stylus, faut-il redire avec l'auteur du prologue de la collection où figure l'*In celebratione* dans deux de ses témoins manuscrits; et il poursuit en expliquant qu'ils nous livrent, sinon sa manière d'écrire, du moins son enseignement, sa "doctrine", et sa manière de dire, *dicendi caracterem.*[32] En ce sens, et dans la mesure où ils relèvent davantage de sa prédication réelle, ils sont d'une "authenticité" plus grande que des textes où son talent introduit entre lui et nous des artifices littéraires, fussent-ils maniés par un génie avec simplicité.

Ainsi, quitte à grouper les textes de ce genre à la suite des autres œuvres, peut-être à imprimer ces textes en un corps plus petit avec d'autres *Bernardina* comme la *Brevis commentatio*[33] ou les *Declamationes Gaufridi ex verbis Bernardi de colloquio Simonis et Iesu*,[34] il ne faut pas omettre de les recueillir dans l'édition critique des *Opera omnia* de S. Bernard. Les exclure serait la priver de quelque chose de lui-même; car ils sont légitimement placés sous son nom, *titulo nominis praesignati*, et ils sont réellement de lui: *Eius proinde sermones esse dicuntur et merito.*[35]

Vigiliae christianae, VI (1952), p. 168-177. Déjà Dom G. Morin avait dû montrer que les *Tractatus* et les *Commentarioli in Psalmos* étaient bien de S. Jérôme, bien qu'ils fussent écrits en un style fort différent de celui de ses autres écrits, *Anecdota Maredsolana*, III, III, Maredsous 1903, p. VI-IX.

[32] Prologue des mss d'Aberdeen et de Cambridge, cités plus haut, éd. dans *Rev. bénéd.* LXI (1951), p. 218.

[33] D. J. Hourlier, *Guillaume de Saint-Thierry et la "Brevis Commentatio in Cantica"* dans *Analecta S. Ord. Cist.* XII (1956), p. 105-115, a montré que ce texte est "pour le fond, et pour la forme une œuvre de S. Bernard. Pourtant Guillaume de Saint-Thierry n'en est pas absent."

[34] Cf. *S. Bernard et ses secrétaires*, dans *Rev. bénéd.* LXI (1951), p. 220-225.

[35] Prologue des mss d'Aberdeen et de Cambridge, *Rev. bénéd.* LXI (1951), p. 218. A mesure qu'elle se poursuiva, l'étude des autres "sermons bernardins" permettra sans doute de discerner en certains groupes d'entre eux l'intervention d'un même notaire ou d'un même rédacteur, par conséquent de préciser encore la notion "d'authenticité" qui vient d'être proposée ici, et en particulier de distinguer plus nettement les différentes "formes", les différents "modes" d'authenticité.

Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls *

MICHAEL E. MARMURA

I

ISLAMIC critics of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) argued that his doctrine that the soul retains its individuality after separation from the body led to contradiction. It led in his system, they maintained, to the conclusion that an actual infinity of souls exists. The actual infinite is impossible.[1] For Avicenna also upheld the Aristotelian doctrine of an eternal world, which meant for its adherents the eternity of the process of generation and corruption[2] and the eternity of man.[3] Men have always existed in the eternal past. It followed then that every moment in the present is necessarily preceded by an infinite number of men who have died, and consequently, by an infinite

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Aḥwāl: Ibn Sīnā, *Aḥwāl an-Nafs*, ed. F. Ahwani (Cairo, 1952).

Avicenna's De: Avicenna's De Anima, ed. F. Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

Ishārāt: Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa-t-Tanbīhāt*, ed. J. Forget (Leiden: Brill, 1892).

Najāt: Ibn Sīnā, *an-Najāt* (Cairo, 1938).

Risāla: Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla Aḍḥawiyya fī Amr al-Ma'ād*, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1949).

TF: Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1927).

TT: Averroes, *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut*, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930).

[1] The Islamic philosophers elaborated one of Aristotle's arguments for the impossibility of an infinite coexisting magnitude. *Physics*, iii, 5, 204a, 20-29. If the magnitude is infinite in one direction only, they argued, then it can be divided into two parts, a finite and an infinite part. In principle the infinite part can be applied to the infinite whole since both have a finite starting point. But, in as much as both are infinite, they must coextend. The part, then, would equal the whole and this is contradictory. A magnitude infinite in more than one direction can be divided into two infinites limited in one direction and the infinite limited from one direction has been shown to be impossible. See, for example, *Ishārāt*, pp. 94-95; *Najāt*, pp. 124-25; *TT*, pp. 27-28.

[2] Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, ii, 10, 336a, 15-25.

[3] This was accepted as the consequence of the theory of the eternity of the process of generation and corruption and it is more explicitly suggested by Aristotle: *Physics*, iii, 6, 206a, 25-26.

number of bodies that have been corrupted and an infinite number of souls that have become immortal. The infinite number of bodies — at least for the followers of Aristotle in this matter — provided no logical difficulty. Such an infinite was potential, not actual, and was deemed possible.[4] The bodies followed each other in succession, changed into something else, and did not accumulate to form a coexisting magnitude. Not so with the souls. These are immortal; hence they coexist. The infinite they form is an actual infinite; and the actual infinite is impossible.

That Avicenna is well aware of this difficulty, and of the quantitative aspects of the problems of immortality in general, is clear from his esoteric treatise on the afterlife, *Risāla Aḍḥawiyya fī Amr al-Maʿād.* To begin with, he uses a quantitative argument against the doctrine that bodies are resurrected to rejoin their already separated souls:[5] the finite quantity of matter in the world is insufficient to reproduce enough bodies for the purpose.[6] Then in discussing transmigration, he reports a major argument for transmigration and proceeds to attack it. The argument has two main parts and the first runs as follows:[7]

> In the case of souls, it is true that they are substances separable from matter, it is true that they separate from bodies after death, and it is true that the material bodies are infinite.[8] If the souls existing now, those that are separable from bodies, are infinite, then the actual infinite would exist and this is impossible. If they are finite and the bodies infinite, their transmigration and rotation over bodies becomes necessary.

The second part[9] can be summed up as follows: The soul must exist before the body. It cannot come into existence with the coming into existence of the body. For what comes into existence simultaneously with the body is a material form. The material form is inseparable.[10] The soul, on the other hand, is separable. Hence is cannot be a material form and must necessarily precede the body in existence. It follows, then, that the finite souls must rotate over the infinite bodies, and this in essence is transmigration.

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[4] Aristotle, *Physics*, iii, 6, 206a, 18, 25-35; 206b, 1-3.

[5] *Risāla*, pp. 52-53. Avicenna had just discussed and rejected the theory that resurrection is for body alone, a theory held by some Muslim theologians who regarded the soul as an accident of a living substance, the body.

[6] Against this view al-Ghazālī argues (*a*) that the world is not eternal and hence the souls are finite in number and (*b*) that should the number of souls, though finite, still exceed the possible number of bodies available from matter, God can resume the creation of bodies *ex nihilo*. *TF*, pp. 264-65.

[7] *Risāla*, p. 80.

[8] I.e. potentially infinite.

[9] *Ibid.* pp. 80-84.

[10] There follows an argument why this must be so (*Risāla*, pp. 82-83), an argument Avicenna accepts.

In refuting this argument Avicenna directs his attack on the second part which he holds makes the unwarranted assumption that whatever comes into existence simultaneously with the body is necessarily a material form. This is not self-evident nor a universally accepted opinion. The argument rests on this assumption, and hence is unsound. But, Avicenna continues, it is not merely unsound; it is false. The siumltaneous occurrence of soul and body is not merely possible, but necessary. To prove that, Aivicenna repeats a standard argument he uses elsewhere in his writings[11] against transmigration, the essentials of which are as follows:[12]

It is impossible for the soul to exist before the body. For then there will have to be either a plurality of souls or one soul. A plurality of souls is impossible. For in their prior existence these souls are immaterial and since matter is the individuating principle, these souls cannot be many. But the supposition of the existence of one soul is equally impossible. For then the soul of an individual like Zayd would be identical with the soul of an individual like ʻAmr. This is absurd. If, then, in the supposed prior existence there can be neither a plurality of souls nor one soul, the prior existence of soul to body is impossible. The soul cannot exist before the body but must exist with the body.[13] If transmigration is then supposed, then in each of us there must be two souls. The created soul and the transmigrated soul. This is not merely superfluous but false since we experience ourselves to be one person and not two.

But what about the problem of infinite souls? To see what has happened to it we must look into the relation of the first part of the argument to the second. The first part sets out certain premises operative in the second, premises Avicenna himself accepts.[14] It also states the problem of the infinity of souls. This problem, however, is relevant to the second part of the argument only if its major premise, i.e. the proof that the soul precedes the body in existence, is accepted. If this proof is rejected, the problem of the infinite number of souls does not arise. And indeed, in his refutation Avicenna simply disproves the premise and thereby renders the problem of infinite souls irrelevant. However, the first part of the argument is not merely a statement of premises for the second. In itself it constitutes an independent argument for transmigration[15] based on premises Avicenna accepts and on the argument that the actual infinity of souls is impossible. But the conclusion of this argument, that transmigration is necessary, Avicenna proves false in his criticism of the second part. It follows then that he must reject the impossibility of the actual infinite in the case of souls. Somehow, therefore, the actual infinity of souls is possible. But Avicenna does not tell us how in *Risāla* or directly in his other writings on the soul.

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[11] See, for example, *Aḥwāl*, pp. 106-107; *Avicenna's De.*, pp. 233-25, 233-34; *Ishārāt*, pp. 196-97; *Najāt*, pp. 183-84, 189.

[12] *Risāla*, pp. 88-91.

[13] Elsewhere he refutes a third alternative that the soul should exist after the body. *Avicenna's De.*, pp. 228.

[14] These are the following: the soul is a substance separable from matter; the soul separates from the body after death; that the number of bodies is potentially infinite.

However, a solution is offered elsewhere. It is a fundamental doctrine of Avicenna that the soul is immaterial and thus has no position in space. If no position in space, then no order in position. Moreover, he also maintains that souls in relation to each other have no natural order similar to that which exists between necessary essential causes. In the *Najāt*, in the section dealing with the problem of the infinite, Avicenna argues that entities that have no order in position or nature can form an actual infinite. For then one part of the infinite cannot in principle be applied to the whole with the contradictory consequences ensuing.[16] That which has no order is outside the category of part and application. Certain kinds of angels and devils, Avicenna then tells us, are such entities with no order, and their infinite coexistence is possible.[17] This, then, is his solution to the problem. We now turn to his critics, al-Ghazālī and Averroes (Ibn Rushd), on this issue.

II

Defending his theory that the world was created in time by an eternal will al-Ghazālī, in the first discussion of his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, argues that the philosophers cannot hold his theory self-evidently false when their own doctrine of an eternal world leads to self-evident contradictions. One of these contradictions is the conclusion that an infinite number of souls coexist.[18] Averroes, after pointing out a methodological error in al-Ghazālī's approach, proceeds in his *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut* to agree with al-Ghazālī as far as the impossibility of an infinite number of coexisting souls is concerned.[19] This contradiction, he maintains, is the consequence of the theory of individual immortality. This is not the theory of the ancients, he argues. It is Avicenna's theory and it is a false theory. It is false because, for one thing, it violates the principle of individuation. Matter is the individuating principle. These separated souls are immaterial. They cannot remain individuated. It is also false because it leads to the necessary conclusion that an actual infinity of souls exists. Then, anticipating Avicenna's argument from order in defense of his theory, Averroes insists that such an argument was never used by the ancients, and that the actual infinite is impossible regardless of whether or not this infinite has positional order. Perhaps, Averroes adds, in offering this solution, Avicenna was merely attempting to satisfy the public.

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[15] It has also been used as an argument against the world's eternity. See below part II. Both St. Thomas and Maimonides have discussed it as an argument against the doctrine of an eternal world. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 81, sec. 9; Maimonides, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, tr. M. Friedländer (2d. ed. revised; New York: Dover Publications, 1956), Ch. LXXIV, Seventh Argument, pp. 137-38.

[16] See above, note 1.

[17] *Najāt*, pp. 124-25. Good souls surviving the body were often regarded as angels and bad souls as devils. *Risāla*, pp. 117, 124.

[18] *TF*, pp. 33-34.

[19] *TT.*, pp. 26-28.

The issue is raised again by al-Ghazālī in the fourth discussion.[20] In this discussion al-Ghazālī attempts to show that the philosophers had not demonstrated the existence of God. Their proof, al-Ghazālī argues, rests on the impossibility of an actual infinity of essential causes. But they cannot deny the possibility of the actual infinity of essential causes when they allow the possibility of the actual infinite in the case of souls. Avicenna's solution to the problem of the infinite number of souls, the argument from order, al-Ghazālī maintains, is no solution. Night follows day in sequence. If we assign to each night the birth of at least one soul we will end up with an ordered sequence of souls, the impossibility of which is self-evident.[21] In his comments on this,[22] Averroes simply repeats what he had said before: this difficulty is the outcome of Avicenna's theory of individual immortality which is not the theory of the ancients. It does lead to the contradictory consequence of affirming the existence of an actual infinite. It is for this reason, he adds, that those who hold the doctrine of the individual immortality of the soul are committed to the doctrine of transmigration.

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[20] *TF.*, pp. 136-38. A third place where al-Ghazālī touches on the issue is in his defence of bodily resurrection. See note 6 above.

[21] This argument is related to his rejection of the potential infinite. The philosophers argued that the infinite succession of night and day is possible because the past instances no longer exist and there is no actual infinite. The question of existence or non-existence, al-Ghazālī argued, is irrelevant. A number of imagined horses that have no real existence must still conform to the logic of number. *TF.*, p. 38. Here he argues that even if we grant the possibility of an infinite number of past days and nights we cannot do so with the souls because these still exist. The argument from order is no help because positional and natural order are not the only kinds of order. There is also the order of temporal succession.

[22] *TT.*, pp. 274-75.

III

Averroes rejected Avicenna's argument from order. This argument is not found in the writings of the ancients.[23] But Averroes does not give us any philosophical reason of his own for such a rejection and we do not know whether or not he endorsed al-Ghazālī's criticism of the argument from order. He is simply convinced that Avicenna's theory of individual immortality is self-contradictory and on this basis makes the serious suggestion that perhaps this is not Avicenna's real view on the subject. Is there anything, apart from the purely logical considerations, that might give plausibility to Averroes' suggestion?

It should be made clear that this suggestion is directed at the argument from order, not at the doctrine of individual immortality as such. But since the acceptance of the argument from order in Avicenna's system is a necessary condition for the acceptance of his doctrine of individual immortality, Averroes' suggestion applies to the latter theory also. There is one circumstance which at first sight lends him support: the argument from order does not appear in *Risāla*, which is, an esoteric work, but is given in the *Najāt* which is exoteric. But this fact in reality proves nothing. The theory of individual immortality is spelled out unequivocally in *Risāla* and, as indicated previously, Avicenna can only accept this theory if he accepts the argument from order. This should suffice to show that Avicenna did accept this argument. But one could go further. Ultimately, the argument from order must be judged formally and in the terms in which Medieval philosophers treated the problem of the infinite. To demonstrate the impossibility of the actual infinite, one should in principle, or, as Avicenna puts it, "in the imagination", be able to apply part of the infinite on the whole.[24] Such application implies the existence of order in the infinites we are dealing with. If there is no order, then there is no application, and if there is no application, there is no contradictory consequence. This approach is not foreign to Averroes himself, who, in defending the possibility of the potential infinite, uses the traditional argument that, since the past instances of this infinite no longer exist, there can be no relationship and no comparison between the infinite part and the infinite whole. And an able philosopher like St. Thomas in one place reports Avicenna's argument from order sympathetically suggesting that it is a plausible solution to the problem of infinite souls, while in another place he goes as far as to say that those who use the argument from the infinity of souls against the theory of an eternal world have not demonstrated that God cannot produce actual infinities.[25] We have no reason to assume that Avicenna offered a solution — in which he did not actually believe — simply to appease the public.

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[23] *TT.*, p. 27. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*

[24] See note 1.

Moreover, at the basis of the problem of the infinite number of souls and the dispute between Averroes and Avicenna is the issue of individuation. Matter is the individuating principle and, according to Averroes, Avicenna had violated this principle when he held that the immaterial separated souls retain their individuality. Avicenna who had used a similar argument in disproving the possibility of the prior existence of soul to body[26] is aware of this difficulty and resolves it in his theory of the soul's individuation.[27] According to this theory, the soul once individuated becomes an individual essence (*dhātan munfarida*) and as such retains its individuality after separation from matter. Souls become essentially different from each other through the difference in the material composition of the bodies they are created with,[28] through the different times in which each is created, and through differences in the shapes and dispositions of their bodies. The separable causes play an important role in this individuating process, but this role, Avicenna tells us, is not fully known. The individual differences between the souls become articulate as each soul acquires its intellect in act and develops its own moral dispositions. This latter point is basic to Avicenna's ethics. In their management of the body, in their control of the sensuous, and in their pursuit of the intellectual life, souls attain varying degrees of perfection. This variance in perfectibility is retained after separation and each soul lives eternally a life of bliss or misery according to its performance in its earthly existence.[29]

This doctrine of the soul's individuality is deeply rooted in what one might call Avicenna's introspective empiricism. There are various passages in which he tells us that we are aware of our own individual selves.[30] This introspection is summed up in his concept of *anniyya*,[31] a term which he derives from the first personal singular pronoun *ana*, "I," and which might be literally rendered, "I-ness." This is one's own individual essence and although many think that when they refer to themselves as "I" they refer to their body, Avicenna continues, analysis would show that they refer to no other entity than their individual immaterial soul.

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[25] St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit*; "De Aeternitate Mundi Contra Murmurantes," *Opuscula Philosophica*, ed. R. M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti, 1954), n. 310, p. 108. However, in *Summa Theologica*, I, 7, 4 and I, 46, 2, ad 8, St. Thomas seems to deny the possibility of an actual infinity of souls.

[26] See above page 234.

[27] *Avicenna De.*, pp. 223-27.

[28] The composition of the body determines the character of the soul that is to be created with it. *Risāla*, p. 90.

[29] *Risāla*, pp. 112 ff.

[30] See for example, *Avicenna De.*, pp. 227, 238; *Risāla*, p. 91; *Ishārāt*, pp. 119-120. In this latter reference Avicenna gives the example of the man suspended in space who is totally aware of nothing except his own existence.

[31] *Avicenna De.*, pp. 225-57; *Ishārāt*, p. 119; *Risāla*, pp. 94-97. See also, M.-Th. d'Alverny, "Anniyya-Anitas," *Mél. offerts à E. Gilson* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1959), pp. 59-91.

To conclude, then, Averroes found Avicenna's doctrine of individual immortality contradictory on two related issues, individuation and the infinity of souls. On this basis Averroes made the serious suggestion that perhaps Avicenna's theory of immortality was an exoteric theory meant only to satisfy the public. We have attempted to show that Avicenna resolved, to his own satisfaction, these seeming contradictions. Indeed, his theory of individual immortality is so much part of his ethics and is so intrinsically related to his introspective empiricism that it would be absurd, in the absence of indications to the contrary, to suggest that this is not Avicenna's true view on the subject. And if this is his real view, then we must also conclude that his solution to the problem of the infinite number of souls, the argument from order, was also his real view. For without this argument, he could not hold his theory of the individual immortality of souls in the system to which he was committed. Moreover, the argument from order, when judged formally and in the terms in which Medieval philosophers looked at the infinite, shows itself to be a plausible solution to the problem of the infinite number of souls. Not that it was necessarily secure against serious criticism. One wonders how Avicenna would have met al-Ghazālī's criticism of it. But the important thing here is that we have no reason to suspect that Avicenna himself was not satisfied with this argument and that this was not his real view on the subject.

Coluccio Salutati on the Poet-Teacher[1]

J. REGINALD O'DONNELL C.S.B.

IN the year 1644, John Milton expressed the opinion that Spenser was a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas.[2] In other words, he was asserting the primacy of the poet over the philosopher and theologian as teacher. If such a position caused little surprise in the seventeenth century, it was, I think, because this view marked the culmination of a tradition which began in the fourteenth century with Coluccio Salutati.

In a letter of 1590, to Raleigh, Spenser had stated the purpose of the *Faerie Queene:* "The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline."[3] Spenser was surely following the spirit of the times, especially in the use of poetic allegory, in which were mingled both the use and misuse of classical, patristic and mediaeval sources.

It is true that one could point to Homer as a poet-teacher who had been acclaimed as the educator of Greece.[4] Likewise, Horace had assigned a civilising rôle to the poet.[5] Nonetheless, for centuries, poetry had carried on a losing battle with two powerful rivals, rhetoric and philosophy. For centuries, too, Cicero, as codified by Quintilian, St. Augustine, Cassiodorus and Martianus Capella, was the undisputed master. In the thirteenth century, Aristotle in Arabian armour began to win the day. So successful did the Aristotelians become, that a reaction set in, stirred up by a sort of underground organization recruited from the ranks of the humanists. They looked askance at these peripatetic parvenus and seekers after novelties, who, the humanists thought, were destroying the traditions of centuries. In fact, the humanist manifesto, as J. B. Bury has stated, was an obstacle to any idea of progress.[6]

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[1] Paper read to the Canadian Classical Association, Kingston, June 13, 1960.

Coluccio Salutati, Chancellor of Florence (1331-1406). For bibliography on life and works of Salutati, consult G. M. Sciacca, *La Visione della Vita Nell' Umanesimo E. Coluccio Salutati,* (Palumbo, 1954), pp. 207-9. On the chancellor's office, consult D. Marzi, *La Cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina,* (Rocca san Casciano, 1910). References by volume and page to the letters of Salutati are from F. Novati, *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati,* IV vol. (Roma, 1891-1905). See the corrections suggested by B. L. Ullman, *Studies in the Italian Renaissance,* (Rome, 1955), pp. 201-240. References to the *De Laboribus Herculis* are from B. L. Ullman, *Colucci Salutati De Laboribus Herculis,* (Zurich, 1947); cited as *Herc.* Other references are quoted in full.

[2] *Areopagitica,* ed. H. B. Cotterill, (London, 1949), p. 16. "Our sage and serious poet Spenser, whom I dare be known to think a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas."

[3] *The Works of Edmund Spenser,* A Variorum edition, I (Baltimore, 1958), p. 167.

[4] Plato, *Republic,* 606e.

[5] *Ars Poet.* 390 ff.

In politics as well as in culture, there had been, from the end of the ninth century, an ever-increasing notion of a *renovatio imperii*. P. E. Schramm, the great authority on this concept, puts it as follows.[7] "From ancient times, even far beyond the confines of Italy, men considered Rome as the capital of the world, and believed in the necessity, or at least in the possibility of a Roman *renovatio;* they made use of archaic trimmings, titles and tags taken from Roman administration, and these they copied even to points of detail." Roman ruins and Graeco-Roman literature had a very strong ally on the political front. The union of two concepts, Rome as the ancient seat of Empire and as centre of Christendom, served only to increase admiration for the great *Italian* city. An unknown tenth century poet of Verona wrote:

O Roma nobilis orbis et domina
Cunctarum urbium excellentissima.[8]

Roman ways became a focal point of a growing ideal which was a curious mixture of pagan and Christian elements; it was to this point that the men, of what has come to be called the Renaissance, turned their attention. The Fathers of the Church had somewhat hesitatingly endorsed pagan authors along with their adoption of Roman education. For them it was either pagan schools or no schools at all.

The first Italian humanists, however, were attracted to the style of the ancients. Petrarch tells us that he was, at the very outset, attracted by the *dulcedo* and *sonoritas verborum* of Cicero, to whom his teacher, Convenevole, had introduced him;[9] only in his twenty-ninth year, did he begin to see in St. Augustine his true master. The beauty of Ciceronian style was responsible for leading Petrarch to Augustine. The *Confessions* of St. Augustine played for Petrarch much the same rôle that the *Sermons* of St. Ambrose had played for St. Augustine. Petrarch described himself as placed on the border between two peoples; he was able to look simultaneously both forwards and backwards.[10] It is regrettable that Petrarch did not identify the two people, yet he did set a partial pattern for future Italian humanists. If the first humanism belonged to men of genius, it was soon to pass out of their hands and to become the common property of a great variety of less highly-endowed, but better trained and more practical types.[11]

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[6] J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, (New York, Dover Publ., 1955), p. 30.

[7] Percy Ernst Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio*, (Darmstadt, 1957), pp. 28-9.

[8] L. Traube, *Abhandlungen d. k. bayr. Akademie*, XIX (1891), Abt. II.

[9] *Rerum Sen.* XV, 1.

[10] *Rerum Mem.* I, 2.

It is to the second group that Coluccio Salutati belongs. He was a great admirer of Petrarch and a beneficiary of his literary legacy. There is, nonetheless, a rather important difference of orientation; Petrarch had gone from Cicero to Augustine; Salutati appeals to the Fathers to justify his defence of pagan literature.

In spite of the great success of Petrarch, there was still much to be done. Attacks against Graeco-Roman literature grew stronger because they were better organized. In addition, Petrarch had aimed chiefly at reviving Roman eloquence, and had done little to restore poetry to the exalted office of teacher. The latter, I think, was the great work of Coluccio Salutati. Throughout his vast correspondence, Coluccio was constantly concerned to elaborate the theme that poetry is not only the equal of, but actually superior to, all the other disciplines. It is this same theme that he attempted to cast into a system in the *De Laboribus Herculis.*

As far as I know, Coluccio Salutati was the first to make a serious effort to establish this tradition, a tradition which was to last for centuries, namely to make the poet the acknowledged legislator of the world. Of course, there were some slight beginnings to which Salutati could look for inspiration; for example Albertino Mussato (1261-1329)[12] had carried on a brief, but bitter skirmish with the Dominican theologian, Giovannino of Mantua, who objected to the paganism of the Graeco-Roman poets. Mussato's reply was that the very first theologians were poets; in fact poetry is merely a different way of teaching philosophy and theology, namely under the veil of allegory.

Boccaccio (1313-75) too, had written a defence of Poetry, for surely that is what books fourteen and fifteen of the *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium* are.[13] Yet Boccaccio was mainly concerned to exalt the poet as creative artist. His very description of poetry, I think, makes this clear: "This poetry, which ignorant triflers cast aside, is a sort of fervid and exquisite invention, with fervid expression, in speech or writing, of that which the mind has invented. It proceeds from the bosom of God, and few, I find, are the souls in whom this gift is born; indeed so wonderful a gift is it, that true poets have always been the rarest of men. This fervor of poesy is sublime in its effects; it impels the soul to a longing for utterance; it brings forth strange and unheard-of creations of the mind; it arranges these meditations in a fixed order, adorns the whole composition with unusual interweaving of words and thoughts; and thus it veils truth in a fair and fitting garment of fiction."

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[11] Ephraim Emerton, *Humanism and Tyranny*, (Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1925), p. 26.

[12] M. Minoia, *Delle vite e delle opere di Alb. Mussato*, (Rome, 1884); N. Sapegno, *Il Trecento*, (Milan, 1934), p. 153.

[13] Charles Osgood, *Boccaccio on Poetry*, (New York), pp. 39, 156.

Boccaccio's eloquence did not carry the day. Attacks, both doctrinaire and political, still continued. In 1397, the victorious Carlo Malatesta captured Mantua. After entering the city, he ordered the statue of Virgil to be cast into the Mincio. In a letter of April, 1398,[14] Salutati expressed his consternation at Maltesta's vandalism (*tanti facinoris*). Surely, Salutati exclaimed, Malatesta has the whole patristic tradition against him, not to mention Sacred Scripture. Coluccio marshals most of the arguments which were to become traditional in controversies between theologians and defenders of poetry.

In all of his letters, only once does Salutati show anything but patience and kindness towards his antagonists. In fact, he chides Poggio for the nastiness of some of his letters. What a pity, Salutati declared, because otherwise Poggio wrote so well.[15] The one exception is a letter to a young Camaldulese monk,[16] who had attacked the muses. Coluccio calls him an *adulescens*, *puer*, *lacteolus* who makes him laugh (*vix potui continere cachinnum*); for he does not know what he is talking about. Apart from these few sharp remarks, the rest of the letter is devoted to careful elucidation of the value of the poets.

First of all, Salutati maintained, the poets are sources of literacy and style; secondly, even though there are some ignorant enough to believe that poetry is outside the liberal arts, Aristotle, the *princeps philosophorum*, claimed that poetry is an art and wrote a whole treatise to prove it. Not only is poetry an art, but it also belongs to logic, and is therefore a part of philosophy; this much Alfarabi had taught.

Again, Aristotle, according to Averroes, had defined poetry as *sermones imaginativos vituperationis vel laudationis*, that is, poetry has, by definition, the role to praise virtue and to censure vice by a figurative treatment of both virtues and vices.

A still more lofty office belongs to poetry; this becomes clear once we realize its origins, namely the attempt to express suitably the praise and nature of the deity; figurative language is necessary to describe *illud summae deitatis arcanum*; the language of metric melody is more beautiful and more attractive than that of prose. We have only to examine the glorification of great kings and gods, who are but deified men (euhemeristic), and we shall find that the poets have, in the very best way, related historical truths, natural events, the character of our way of life and the loftiest of divine subjects, because they used verse and the cloak of suggestive speech (*adumbratae locutionis involu-*

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[14] III, 285.

[15] IV, 126 ff.

[16] III, 221 ff.

cro) and concealed much under the outer shell of the letter (*multa sub litterali cortice subtegendo*).

Again, a considerable background is required for a poet and for anyone who reads poetry. If the young monk cannot understand the poets, he should blame his own poor formation and not the poets.

Finally, when read correctly, Virgil taught Christian truths so clearly that it suggests a power beyond what is human: *Hic autem loquendi modus non humanum videtur inventum, sed divinum potius institutum.*[17] In fact, the Sacred Scriptures are poetry, very much after the fashion of Virgil and must be read in the same way as the *Aeneid.*

From the brief synopsis of this letter, several points emerge which Salutati discussed again and again, and systematised in the *De Laboribus Herculis.*

The Poets, Models of Literacy and Style

At first glance, it might seem strange to insist that the poets are models of style. After all, why not learn style from Cicero? The answer is to be found, I think, in Donatus and Priscian whose works had served as manuals of grammar for centuries. If we examine the authors quoted by Priscian, we shall find that Virgil outnumbers the others by about six to one. Using the poets to learn grammar and style was thought quite normal.

On this point[18] Salutati gives three reasons for reading the poets. First, the poets have a vocabulary all their own and, secondly, a style which abounds in an admirable beauty of sentences and words. Finally, the poets point out, allegorically of course, the kind of life we should lead.

Style was a constant preoccupation of Salutati. Wisdom and eloquence are the proper endowments of man, through which he surpasses the rest of the animal kingdom. It is, therefore, a splendid thing to excel amongst men because of the very gifts of nature by which men stand above the animals. This, of course, is what Cicero taught.[19]

In discussing the characteristics of good discourse, Salutati claimed the first place for the gifts of nature; invention is the starting point, and in this rules and precepts are of little help: *fons autem inventionis natura est, cujus bonitas si defuerit, nulla poterit eruditione parari.*[20] As to composition, a work well composed avoids all that is not to the point (*quod prosit*) and possesses clarity (*claritudo*). The contents, too, must be serious (*gravitas sententiarum*) so that nothing childish (*puerile*), nothing shocking to good morals (*absonum moribus*), nothing that is not upright and decent (*honestissimum*) should be written. Again, a discourse must be polished (*ornatus verborum*), which demands that orthography be heeded. Salutati upbraids the self-professed followers of Aristotle because they wrote *loyca* for *logica;*[21] *sisto* should not be used for *sum*, another current scholastic usage. If the matter allows, words should not be left plain and unqualified: *Curandum... ut fixa mobilibus ornes et adverbia verbis addas, si locus et materia patiatur.* Yet natural contraries should not be conjoined, e.g., *frigidus ignis*, unless perchance it means *ignis lentus, torpens;* otherwise the contrast is ridiculous. Care should be taken that an adjective be placed before a substantive or at least be joined closely to it, e.g., Ovid writes:[22] *Huc alacer missos terruit Hector equos.* How much more sonorous than *Huc Hector missos terruit alacer equos!* The good writer avoids exotic, obscure and unusual words as a sailor avoids the rocks.[23]

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[17] III, 231; cf. St. Justin, *Apol.* II, 8, 13. The poets of antiquity enjoyed some participation in the word of God, if and when they spoke the truth.

[18] III, 221 ff.

[19] *De Orat.* I, 8, 32-3; III, 599.

[20] III, 606.

In spite of Salutati's insistence on the ancients as models of style, he does, however, make it clear that antiquity of style alone is not good enough. Poggio had written that none of the moderns was comparable to the ancients in either wisdom or eloquence. Salutati replies in a long letter[24] which is, in fact, a defence of Petrarch. As far as Salutati was concerned no ancient compared favourably with either Augustine or Petrarch in wisdom. In fact, no pagan was on equal terms with any Christian in wisdom.[25] If eloquence depends on wisdom, as both Horace and Cicero[26] insisted, then surely, Petrarch surpassed the ancients, even in eloquence. Again, Aristotle did not bow down before antiquity; witness his treatment of the Presocratics. Certainly, Petrarch, the *sidus Italiae*[27], wrote better poetry than Cicero and better prose than Virgil: *In metrico dicendi cáractere Franciscus Ciceronem sine controversia, cunctis approbantibus, superavit.*[28] *Mantuanum puto nostrum Francisco non dices antecellere, praesertim in soluto sermone.*[29] Perhaps Salutati's admiration for Petrarch was somewhat too enthusiastic, especially when he was exalted above such names as Homer, Hesiod, Theocritus, Virgil (noster Theocritus),

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[21] IV, 40.

[22] *Heroides*, I, 36; III, 589 ff.

[23] IV, 234; Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* I, 10, 4.

[24] IV, 126 ff.

[25] IV, 134-8; 163-4. Were Aristotle and Pèato alive today, they would probably have been Christians (IV, 165). Cf. Nesca Robb, *Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance*, (London, 1935), p. 35.

[26] *Epist.* II, 3, 39; *De Orat.* I, 6, 20.

[27] I, 120.

[28] I, 342: IV, 166.

[29] I, 338. Note the use of *nostrum!*

Demosthenes, Cicero, Varro and Seneca.[30] No case needed to be made for the Greeks; Romans had always felt superior to the Greeks.[31] John of Salisbury had written *orbis nil habuit majus Cicerone latinus | cujus ad eloquium Graecia fuit muta.*[32]

Perhaps we can detect an inconsistency in Salutati's apologia. At one time, he seems to insist on the pagan authors as mere teachers of style, at another on their capacity to teach good morals. Yet, if forced to use the ancient authors for literacy and at the same time to impart some moral formation to the students, the humanists were almost obliged to adopt such a position.[33] Besides, there was a long tradition to support their point of view. Hildebert of Lavardin (1056-1133) had written that the wonderful statues of the gods in Rome *potius coluntur artificum studio quam deitate sua*[34], yet his treatise on moral philosophy has well over a hundred quotations from the pagan authors.[35]

Throughout his letters Salutati asks for copies of the works of a great number of authors, many of whom could scarcely be called stylists; for example, fourteenth century commentators on Aristotle, Grosseteste's translation of Eustratius, the works of Abelard, Hildebert of Lavardin, Ivo of Chartres[36] and others, and this despite the fact that the French, as Coluccio said, wrote bad Latin.[37] Ivo of Chartres, Abelard, Hildebert of Lavardin and John of Salisbury fancied themselves eloquent, yet they were further removed from the Fathers and Ancients in style than in time.[38] Salutati was interested in a good deal more than style; otherwise his constant use of Huguccio's (dft. 1210) *Liber Derivationum*[39] for etymologies would be rather surprising.

ORIGIN AND DEFINITION OF POETRY

Many of the attacks on the poets originated with the theologians, some of whom were professedly committed to a form of Aristotelianism; others came from the monasteries, and finally there was the general disinterest of the

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[30] I, 337.

[31] See Cicero *De Orat.* I, 11, 47; I, 6, 23. Juvenal, *Sat.* III.

[32] *Entheticus* 1215, PL 199, col. 991.

[33] W. H. Woodward, *Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance*, (Cambridge, 1924), p. 13.

[34] *De Roma*, PL 171, col. 1409C.

[35] PL 171, col. 1007-1064.

[36] Cf. III, 76-91 for an appraisal of the different authors.

[37] IV, 220.

[38] III, 83-4.

[39] A good manuscript of the *Liber Der.* is in Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, MS. 459/718, folios 1r-269v.

profanum vulgus.[40] This fact, I think, was very important in determining the character and form of Salutati's defence of poetry.

Salutati wrote to Giovanni Dominici, the author of the *Lucula Noctis*, that *poetria* was a detestable and sacrilegious word *apud religiosos*.[41] Given the source of opposition, it is not unreasonable to expect that Salutati would insist on the religious origin of poetry, its basic agreement with the principle of Aristotle, and its power to civilise.

Poetry had its origins in the attempt of eloquent men to restrain the savage character of peoples, to incite them to virtue and the cult of religion, as well as to accept the exigencies of society.[42] This could be best achieved by the use of the most attractive language possible, namely poetry. Besides, it is impossible to speak of the gods in language intended to express things specifically human, not divine. Consequently, certain allegorical substitutions had to be invented. That is why the poet uses *verba pro verbis*, *res pro rebus*, *orationes pro orationibus*, for in this way men can be lifted up from the mere sensible world to the contemplation of heavenly things.[43] In its origins poetry parallels closely those of the cult of images and idols. Although an abomination in itself, idol-worship served some good purpose in that it made easier the explanation of religious things and the inculcation of true notions of the divine.[44] If images can promote religious concepts, surely poetry can do as much, and this even more efficiently. In fact, nothing is more suitable than poetry to strengthen the minds of men in virtue;[45] even the *Amores* of Ovid can be used to show the horrible servitude of vice. Ovid, already early in the fourteenth century, had been moralised in the vernacular (Franco-Burgundian).[46] In short, a poem must instruct in virtue, otherwise it does not deserve the name of *poema*, but rather of *carmen* or *dictamen*.[47] In addition, every poem must possess elegance, majesty and gravity.[48]

The most general definition of poetry given by Salutati is an Averroistic adaptation of Aristotle: *Convenienter possumus cum Aristotele definire poesim*

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[40] *Herc.* p. 3.

[41] IV, 234.

[42] Cf. Horace, *Ars Poet.* 390 ff.; Cicero, *De Orat.* I, 8, 33 ff.

[43] *Herc.* p. 7.

[44] I, 324; *Herc.* p. 76.

[45] III, 289.

[46] *Ovid Moralisé*, ed. C. de Boer, (Amsterdam, 1915). The author, perhaps Crestien Legouais, O. F. M., expresses his aim.

> *Mes n'i a riens qui ne soit voir:*
> *Qui le sens en porrait savoir:*
> *La Veritez serait aperte:*
> *Qui souz les fables gist couverte.* l. 43-6.

[47] *Herc.* p. 69.

[48] I, 252.

esse potentiam considerantem laudationes et vituperationes prout metris et figurativis locutionibus concinnuntur.[49] Salutati's habit of exposition by means of exploiting definitions need cause no surprise. Such a system had long been in honour. Besides, Coluccio could have learned such a method from his beloved Cicero.[50] The definitions of poetry are partially commonplaces and partially statements of what Salutati thought the great poets had done.

From its very definition a poem must be in metre with an attractive melody.[51] The most perfect metre is the *versus heroicus* because it is the most melodious and most in conformity with the *harmonia caelestis*.[52] This was, I suspect, merely another way of saying that Virgil's poetry is the best. A great deal of Salutati's musical theory is borrowed from St. Augustine, Boethius and Macrobius.

Poetry is an art in which *studia*, *praecepta* and *doctrina* play a part, but in the final analysis, it is *natura* which destinguishes a great poet.[53]

Against the objection that poetry was merely a series of fables and crime, Coluccio declares that such an opinion is based on ignorance. On the contrary, *ipsa* (poetry) *sit sermocinalis quaedam ars atque facultas bilinguis, unum exterius exhibens, aliud autem intrinseca ratione significans; semper in figura loquens, ac saepenumero versibus alligans si quid refert.*[54] In other words, in addition to melody, poetry must be, by definition, allegorical. But that is exactly the method of Sacred Scripture. If Salutati could prove this, then he could silence the attacks of the monasteries, of the theologians, and at the same time have at hand a ready method to read the poets allegorically; for only in this way, it seemed, could the pagan poets be adequately defended. Salutati was quite certain that no other defence was really satisfactory. To read allegorically meant to seek more deeply beneath the bare meaning of the words (*in cortice*) a hidden and spiritual sense (*sub cortice*) which was often quite different from the external intention of the words.[55] He also speaks of *integumenta poetica*[56] and *velamina*.[57] Allegory becomes the chief characteristic of poetry.[58] Once such a thesis is etablished then Virgil can be interpretated, when allegorised, to teach truths which are identical with those of Sacred Scripture and thus the poets can be useful to elaborate Christian doctrine;[59] besides, the poets, when teaching error, are much less dangerous than the philosophers because of the greater cogency of philosophical demonstration.[60] In other words, the theologians and philosophers who were reading Aristotle and Plato every day could hardly complain about pagan poetry being dangerous; surely, Aristotle and Plato, being philosophers as well as pagans, would be more dangerous than the poets.

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[49] *Herc.* p. 14.

[50] Cicero claims that the ancients carried out discussions based on numbers and definitions, *Tusc. Disp.* I, 17. Cicero also blames Panaetius because he did not define *officium*, *De Off.* I, 2.

[51] *Herc.* p. 20. Cf. Origen against Celsus, in J. Daniélou, *Origen*, transl. by W. Mitchell, (New York and London, 1955), p. 93.

[52] *Herc.* pp. 20, 33, 53; III, 165-181. See especially St. Augustine, *De Musica* V, 10. PL 32, cols. 1157 ff. On the heavenly harmony see W. Förster, *Johann Kepler u. die Harmonie der Sphären*, (Berlin, 1862).

[53] *Herc.*, p. 17; III, 493.

[54] IV, 235.

[55] IV, 177; 183; 235-6.

[56] I, 226.

[57] *Herc.* p. 8.

Again, poetry closely resembles Sacred Scripture in its use of symbols, melody and ornament.[61] Poetry alone can speak of God because He escapes the extrinsic meaning of the words;[62] nothing can express the *divina eloquia* as well as poetry;[63] for surely God spoke to men in poetry.

In this appeal to allegory, Salutati was calling upon a long and noble tradition. From the time it was realised that Homer, the alleged teacher of Greece,[64] sometimes lied, it was not asked if he lied as he ought, but rather an attempt was made to introduce allegorical interpretations of him.

Philo the Jew (fl. A.D. 39), anxious to make use of philosophical speculation in Scriptural interpretation, made Scripture dependent on philosophy.[65] For Philo, everything in Scripture was subject to allegorical interpretation,[66] but in order to provide a safeguard for allegory, which could prove chaotic, he demanded as a background the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία[67] for those intending the study of Scripture.[68] It is interesting to note that several of the passages of Scripture cited by Salutati as reguiring allegorical interpretation are also found in Philo, with the same reasons given. To give but one example: *Genesis* vi, 6-7: And he repented of having made men on the earth at all. So, smitten with grief to the depths of his heart, he said, I will blot out mankind, my creature, from the face of the earth...[69] If, therefore, allegory is valid in Scripture, surely it is applicable to the poets.[70]

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[58] *Herc.* pp. 12 and 70.

[59] I, 324-5.

[60] IV, 183-4.

[61] III, 291.

[62] III, 320.

[63] III, 541.

[64] *See* Plato, Rep. I, 378D, where he seems to accept *ὑπόνοια* as a common occurrence. See also F. W. Hamblin, *The Development of Allegory in the Classical Pastoral*, (Menasha, Wisc., 1928) ; also W. Jaeger, *Paedeia*, transl. by G. Highet, I (New York, 1939), pp. 34 ff. also Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. *Allegorische Dichtungserklärung*, Suppl. IV, 16-20.

[65] Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, I (Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1947), pp. 132 ff.

[66] Wolfson, *op. cit.* p. 116. Pertinent references given in Wolfson.

[67] Cf. H. I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, (Paris, 1948), pp. 244 ff.

[68] Wolfson, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

The application of allegory to Scripture passed from Philo to Origen, for whom the Bible was a world of symbols; if the bare words of Scripture expressed something out of keeping with the Divine Nature, it had to be explained spiritually.[71] The influence of the Stoics was also present; they taught that Ulysses fleeing the sirens signified the soul fleeing carnal temptations.[72] Among the Latin Fathers influenced by Origen was St. Ambrose, who asserted that every sentence of Sacred Scripture, when allegorically interpreted, was rich in religious and moral instruction.[73] St. Augustine was much impressed by St. Ambrose, because he could draw aside the veil of mystery and lay open the meaning of Scripture, which, if taken literally, would appear to teach falsehood.[74] St. Jerome, too, did his part to foster spiritual exposition: *Totum quod legimus in divinis libris nitet quidem et fulget in cortice, sed dulcius in medulla est. Qui esse vult nucleum, frangit nucem.*[75]

The expressions *in cortice* and *sub cortice* continue; for example Alain de Lille in the *Anticlaudianus* writes: *in superficiali litterae cortice falsum resonat lyra poeta.*[76] Salutati's doctrine was hardly new.

The rise in importance of the literal interpretation seriously curtailed allegory; it still existed, but was closely controlled by the literal sense of the words. Nicholas of Lyra (dft. 1349) set about his commentary on *Genesis* with the express purpose of avoiding the multitude of traditional interpretations which seemed to depart from the literal sense.[77] He demanded the study of Greek and Hebrew as a necessary propaedeutic to the study of Scripture in order to grasp the literal meaning (*in cortice*). This the humanists could not permit. Giles of Viterbo spoke sightingly of the literalists whom he called *grammatistae.*[78]

In the *De Laboribus Herculis*, Salutati lists thirty-one *labores* gathered from several sources and traditions.[79] Each *labor* is subjected to an allegorical interpretation in the attempt to show what can be extracted allegorically from the poets. A few examples from the *Hydra*,[80] the fourth of the *labores*, will serve for illustration.

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[69] Wolfson, *op. cit.* 59-60; *Herc.* p. 9.

[70] IV, 178.

[71] J. Daniélou, *op. cit.*, pp. 143, 172, 179.

[72] Marrou, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

[73] F. H. Dudden, *Life and Times of St. Ambrose*, II (Oxford, 1935), p. 458.

[74] *Conf.* VI, 4.

[75] *Ep.* 58, 9; cf. Plautus, *Curculio*, 55.

[76] PL 210, col. 451C; 508D.

[77] P. C. Spicq, *Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen âge*, (Paris, 1944) pp. 336-7.

[78] *Grammatistae: sic voco litterae corticis expositores.* The *cortex* is the *nugae grammatistarum.* See Egidio da Viterbo (1469-1532), *Scechina e Libellus de Litteris Hebraicis*, ed. François Secret, II (Rome, 1959) pp. 8, 64.

[79] Here is the list: (1) Serpents, (2) Hind, (3) Lions, (4) Hydra, (5) The Crab, (6) Centaur,

Salutati begins by calling upon Servius and Lactantius to testify that the *Hydra* was killed by Hercules in the marsh of Lerne near Argos. Be this as it may, there are many versions of the event by poets, historians and philosophers. Some authors claim that the Hydra had a hundred heads, others fifty, still others nine or even seven.

In each case a long list of authors or *auctoritates* is assembled from classical, patristic, mediaeval and contemporary sources; this is very characteristic of mediaeval methodology, and somewhat akin to Minutius Felix' use of Cicero. Text after text from the great authors is adduced, frequently out of context, to prove a point; often enough the writer seemed to be concerned about a verbal agreement and to interpret in the kindest way possible, *exponere reverenter, pie interpretari*.[81] Salutati follows the same method; when referring to the well-known vice of which Virgil was accused by Suetonius, he states simply that it is better (*laudabilius*) not to believe the charge, and even if it was true, we must remember that pagan moral standards were not Christian standards.[82]

In spite of all the different versions of the *Hydra* myth, Virgil (*divinissimus poeta*) had no real scruple about the number of heads, being satisfied with a vague *turba capitum*.[83] It would be interesting to know what Salutati meant by *divinissimus*; perhaps that Virgil was an instrument of Providence, and/or taught *sub cortice* Christian truths and/or was a universal poet transcending the conditions of space and time, an ancient Graeco-Roman attribute of the divine.[84]

The *Hydra*, according to a tradition attributed to Plato, was a *callidissima Sophista*.[85] From the text quoted, I suspect Salutati remembered the words of *Genesis:*[86] *serpens erat callidior cunctis animantibus*, and located an *auctoritas*

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(7) Stymphalian Birds, (8) Harpies, (9) Zetes and Calaias, (10) Laomedon, (11) Sons of Neleus, (12) Erymanthian boar, (13) Cretan bull, (14) Busiris, (15) Diomedes, (16) Eryx, (17) Promethean eagle, (18) Apples of Hesperides, (19) Omphale, (20) Antaeus, (21) Oxen of Geryon, (22) Albion and Bergion, (23) Cacus, (24) Oceanus, (25) Calpe, (26) Syrtian sea, (27) Amazons, (28) Scythia, (29) Augean stables, (30) Marsh of Thessaly, (31) Giants.

[80] *Herc.* pp. 191-205.

[81] M. D. Chenu, "Authentica et Magistralia", *Divus Thomas*, 28 (Piacenza, 1925). E. Hill, *Nine Sermons of St. Augustine on the Psalms*, (London, 1958) pp. 29-30.

[82] *Herc.* pp. 64-5; Suetonius on Virgil, 9.

[83] *Aeneid*, VIII, 299.

[84] Theodor Haecker, *Virgile, père de l'occident*, trad. de Jean Chuzeville, (Paris, 1935).

[85] J. K. Fotheringham, *Eusebii Pamphili Chronici Canones latine vertit, adauxit ad sua tempora produxit S. Eusebius Hieronymus*, (London, 1923), p. 91.

[86] iii, 1.

from Plato. Another version of the myth was lifted from Bernard Silvestris' commentary on Virgil, to the effect that *Hydra* signified ignorance:[87] the great number of heads symbolises the many uncertainties and equivocations caused by ignorance. Again, the *Hydra* is *tortuosa* in its course; Hercules, whose name means *gloria litis*[88] (ἔρις(?) + κλέος), due to his lively intellect is able to twist ignorance hither and yon. When one head of the *Hydra* is cut off, that is when one doubt is settled, others spring up. Finally, Hercules *vivacissimo igne mentis* burns the serpent and thus dissolves the ignorance. Again, the sophist sets up his postulates in such a way that although one problem is solved, many others arise; Hercules, however, the true philosopher, aims at a sound philosophy by his use of valid and true arguments and so burns the Hydra.

The tortuous sophistic device is a *Hydra* with fifty heads; these symbolise the fifty commonplaces (*sedes argumenti*) or the fifty *fallaciae*. Salutati is indebted to Peter of Spain (fl. 1250) of most of his logical information.[89]

Perhaps, one more example will suffice to give us some idea of Salutati's method! It is from his *divinissimus poeta*, Virgil.[90] If the *bis* modifies *patet*, the ascent from Tartarus is as easy as descent to the region of the Shades. How like a man torn midway between virtue and vice! If transferred to the supernatural, the *bis patet* symbolises man saved by grace or cast into hell as just punishment for his sins. Or again, *bis patet* can signify man's condition before the Fall, when man could not sin, or after the Fall, when man could not avoid sin. All of this from Virgil!

Restoration of the Poet as Teacher

So far Salutati has been concerned to answer objections to the poets in a rather negative sort of apologetics. The stage is now set for the main feature, the restoration of the poet as teacher. For centuries the schools of rhetoric, philosophy, theology, together with a curious mixture of legalised piety had usurped to themselves the right and privilege to teach mankind. Rhetoric was powerful enough to invade some ancient Latin poetry.[91] Poetry was reduced to an ancillary rôle at best.

It is this that Salutati sets out resolutely to remedy. His tactics were to identify, by means of definition, the Ciceronian *doctus orator*, and the Platonic sage, with the poet. Given Coluccio's sources, this is not very surprising. Originally, says Cicero,[92] teachers did not divide up the fields of their endeavours. Teachers of speech also taught morals. Likewise, Horace had claimed for the poet a civilising role[93] in much the same terms as Cicero had used of the *orator*.[94] Moreover, classical poets applied the term *doctus* to Catullus;[95] therefore, *doctus orator*, why not *doctus poeta?* Besides, Cicero had already invited the identification: *poeta finitimus oratori*, and in some ways *certe prope idem*. Dr. Solmsen has, I think, proved that Cicero considered the gods less suitable models for education than the *exempla majorum*[96] (*Romanorum*, of course).

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[87] *Herc.* pp. 193 ff.

[88] Also *Heros* and *cleos* vir fortis et gloriosus, and several other etymologies. *Herc.* p. 593.

[89] *Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales*, ed. I. M. Bochenski, (Vatican, 1949) s. v. *loci* and *fallaciae*.

[90] Quinquaginta atris immanis hiatibus hydra/Saevior intus habet sedem; tum tartarus ipse/Bis patet in praeceps tantum tenditque sub umbra. *Aeneid*, VI, 576-8.

[91] H. E. Butler, *Post Augustan Poetry*, (Oxford, 1909) pp. 14-17.

If such is the case, the same intellectual formation will be required of both *orator* and *poeta*.[97] Poetry is merely a melodious form of prose which can more easily attract to virtue.[98] It is, perhaps, worth noting that the poet's office to delight has become, for Salutati, quite pragmatic.

Since the function of poetry is to make men virtuous, the poet must be a good man, a quality long associated with the *orator*.[99] Teaching virtue is much more effectively done by a good man. On this point Salutati insists on Christian values.[100]

Salutati knew exactly what he was doing: *Putasne quemquam hoc mereri nomen sive vocabulum* (sc. poeta), *nisi sit tam philosophiae quam omnium rerum divinarum scientiarumque et liberalium artium eruditus? In qua quidem re possum verba Ciceronis ad poetam de Oratore transferre et cum illo dicere: mea quidem sententia nemo potest esse omni laude cumulatus* POETA, *nisi erit omnium magnarum rerum atque artium scientiam consecutus.*[101]

The poet is identified not only with the *orator*, whose place is in public service,[102] but also with the wise man.[103] Cicero had defined wisdom: *sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam.*[104] Therefore the wise man also needs prudence.[105] Salutati did not have to go beyond Cicero to find the philosopher and orator, and therefore the poet, treated as one. Cicero had blamed Socrates for separating the science of wise thinking and ornate speaking, when really, they belong together.[106] In addition, according to Cicero, philosophy fills the same rôle as rhetoric.[107] Cicero intended to reunite the two disciplines by a sort of *reductio artium ad eloquentiam.*[108] There is one difficulty with Cicero's position which is the despair of the philosophers. Cicero had said that actually it did not matter *quae sit philosophia verissima, sed quae oratori conjuncta maxime.*[109] No wonder Cicero thought a discipline could either be learned quickly or scarcely at all![110] This form of scepticism Salutati could not accept. Certainly, says Salutati, we should question our knowledge; nonetheless St. Augustine was correct in his refutation of the Academy to whom he ascribed the *pertinax firmaque sententia nihil penitus sciri posse.*[111]

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[92] *De Orat.* III, 15, 57.

[93] *Ars Poet.* 390 ff.

[94] *De Orat.* I, 8, 33. *Herc.* pp. 7-15.

[95] e. g. Tibullus, III, 7, 9.

[96] *De Orat.* I, 16, 70. *Herc.* p. 75; III, 493. See F. Solmsen, "Neglected Evidence for Cicero's *De Re Publica*", *Museum Helveticum*, XIII (1956), 42, 43, 45, 46, 48.

[97] III, 493.

[98] *Herc.* p. 10.

[99] *Herc.* p. 67. See Cicero, *De Orat.* III, 15, 55. *Probitas* and *summa prudentia* are required of the *Orator.* Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* I, 9-10.

[100] *Herc.* p. 5, 424. See E. F. Rice, *The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom*, (Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1958) pp. 30 ff.

[101] IV, 202. Cf. Cicero, *de Orat.* I, 4, 20.

[102] II, 454-5.

[103] III, 489 ff.

[104] *Tusc. Disp.* IV, 26, 57; *de Off.* II, 2, 5; III, 604; IV, 165.

Although in Cicero the *orator* is *facile princeps*, in Salutati he is replaced by the poet. *Quod quidem adeo peculiare est hujus facultatis quam poesim dicimus quod merito super alias singulari promineat dignitate.*[112] In fact, philosophy is made ancillary to poetry: *ad poetae perfectionem philosophiae scientia requiratur.* Philosophers exist by the dozen, but there are few poets.[113] We should, perhaps, recall that Cicero said practically the same thing about orators.[114]

A great preparation is, therefore, demanded of both writers[115] and students[116] of poetry. Imagine what Virgil had to know to write his divine poetry.[117] In their own right, however, the liberal arts serve a religious purpose as well as mere background for poetry.[118] From grammar we learn to read the Scriptures;[119] dialectic is an instrument for the discovery of truth and is necessary for Christians *ad Christianae veritatis terminum pervenire;*[120] rhetoric furnishes the arms *si de fide vel sacris litteris decertatur.*[121] The quadrivium is also necessary, since we cannot discuss the Trinity without arithmetic; music and astronomy lead us to praise God.[122]

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[105] Coluccio Salutati, *De Nobilitate Legum et Medicinae*, ed. E. Garin, (Florence, 1947), p. 178: si prudentiam abstuleris, nusquam sapientem aut sapientiam assignabis.

[106] *De Orat.* III, 16, 60.

[107] *Tusc. Disp.* I, 7.

[108] *De Orat.* I, 17, 75.

[109] *De Orat.* III, 17, 64.

[110] *De Orat.* III, 23, 89.

[111] III, 603-4.

[112] *Herc.* p. 19.

[113] IV, 201 ff.

[114] *De Orat.* I, 2, 8.

[115] All the arts, philosophy, metaphysics, logic, theology etc. *Herc.* pps. 18-9, 501; III, 454, 489, 598, IV, 217. Physics is required only of physicians, III, 597.

[116] There can be no *plenus poematum intellector* without a knowledge of affairs both human and divine... III, 227.

[117] III, 494 ff. III, 265; I, 303. Cf. also Pierre de Nolhac, *Pétrarque et l'humanisme*, (Paris, 1907), pps. 129 ff.

[118] IV, 215 ff.

[119] IV, 188-195.

As Philo had demanded the *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία* for the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, Coluccio also demanded the best formation possible in his day for poetry. The constant association of Scripture and poetry leaves us little doubt about the origin of Salutati's theory of reading poetry! So, with a good background of the liberal arts, philosophy and theology, Coluccio feels that he could have the same safeguards against the chaos of mere allegory as those demanded by Philo.

Finally, great poetry is the occasion of discovery and learning. Coluccio tells us that he learned more by being asked than from study: *longe plura me didicisse rogatum quam studio vel doctrina.*[123]

There is one notable example of this. A young law student of Bologna had complained that Dante had placed Brutus and Cassius in the innermost circle of hell. After all, they had but performed a republican duty in assassinating a tyrant who had usurped power. Salutati answered this charge with a whole treatise, the *De Tyranno,* in which he asserts that Dante was correct. Caesar was a tyrant, yet he had come to power with the consent of the people. Some authors have seen in this the beginnings of the so-called *Social Contract.*[124]

Some scholars have had difficulty in putting a label on Coluccio Salutati. Dr. Ullman in the preface to his edition of *De Saeculo et Religione*[125] says: "In the treatise in question Coluccio Salutati is, so to speak, not a modern, but a medieval man... and the treatise proves his facility to dispute and a knowledge of the Scriptures. If the occasion had demanded, he could just as well have disputed against monastic life." Coluccio Salutati was scarcely different from any other early Italian humanist, all of whom had something new to say, but also a great deal that was old. We need only recall that one very early title of Petrarch's *Secretum* was *de Contemptu Mundi.*[126]

In any case, as so often happens with great men, Salutati fits badly into any given category. We may see in him a classical *Hydra* to be burned by the

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[120] IV, 222-3.

[121] IV, 225.

[122] IV, 227 ff.

[123] III, 545.

[124] Mario d'Addio, *L'idea del contratto sociale dai Sofisti alla reforma et il "de Principatu" di Mario Salamonio,* (Milan, 1954) pp. 345-56.

[125] *Colucii Salutati de Saeculo et Religione,* (Florence, 1957), p. v.

[126] E. H. R. Tatham, *Francesco Petrarca, The First Modern Man of Letters,* II (London, 1926), p. 233 n.

Hercules of exact scholarship. But he did begin a movement to dislodge the age-old rhetorical and posterior analytical tradition in favour of the poet. This was, in turn, overthrown by insistence on the literal interpretation with a new meaning. Pope's statement was not very kind to the proponents of the new approach:

> There, thy good scholiasts with unwearying pains
> Made Horace flat and humbled Maro's strains.[127]

If Coluccio Salutati was right, then we can end where we began — with our sage and serious poet Spenser, whom Milton dared be known to think a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas.

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[127] *Dunciad*, A. Book I, 159-60. To be aware of Salutati's influence on later writers, we have only to read Vernon Hall Jr., *Renaissance Literary Criticism, A Study of its Social Content* (New York, 1945). The essentially aristocratic outlook of later humanists is not evident in Coluccio Salutati's writings. Cf. the closing sentence of Percy Bysshe Shelley's *Defence of Poetry:* The poet is the unacknowledged legislator of the world, in W. J. Bate, *Criticism: the major texts*, (New York, 1952), p. 435.

Diversity and Community of Being in St Thomas Aquinas

J. OWENS, C.SS.R.

I

ACCORDING to numerous texts in the writings of St Thomas Aquinas, being is different, or more properly diverse, in its manifold instances. While a specific or generic nature remains identical as a nature in all its particular occurrences, being varies radically in every individual case. That doctrine was formulated definitely in the earliest period of St Thomas' literary activity: "...omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem preter esse suum, cum quiditas uel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem nature in illis quorum est genus uel species, set esse diuersum est in diuersis."[1] The quidditative nature expressed in the species or genera, according to this text, remains the same nature in all its instances. It is a common nature in which the different species or the many individuals coincide. Whether generic or specific, it is always other than the being (*preter esse*) of anything that belongs to a class. In sharp contrast to this communizing function of any quidditative nature, being is represented as everywhere diverse (*diuersum in diuersis*). No two things, apparently, can ever coincide in their being, as they do in their specific and generic natures. Two men, to supply an example, coincide in their human nature, and a man and an ape coincide in their animality; but they never coincide in their being. The one never *is* the other. In their being they remain diverse. Being seems regarded as an inevitably diversifying principle. In groups of things, abstraction leaves out of consideration the differentiating traits and retains only the common. In this way it sets up the specific and generic natures. The higher the genus the more common is its range, extension increasing as content lessens. But the reciprocally inverse ratio of content and extension does not seem to hold for the highest grouping of all, that of things under being.[2] Something new happens when the quidditative order is left and the thing's being is considered. Rather than communication in any one common nature, according to the *prima facie* meaning of the above text, there appears a diversity of being in every individual instance. The one thing simply *is* not the other.

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[1] *De Ente et Essentia*, ed. Roland-Gosselin (reprint, Paris, 1948), c. V; p. 37.17-21. Cf.: "Ratio enim entis, cum sit diversificata in diversis, non est sufficiens ad specialem rerum cognitionem;..." *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), I, 10. "... in diversis rebus est diversum esse, quo formaliter res est;..." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, Solut.; I, 492. Similarly: "... ratio enim formae in diversis materiis est una, licet secundum esse sit diversa." *De Prin. Individ.*, ed. Mandonnet, *Opuscula Omnia* (Paris, 1927), V, 196.

Strictly speaking, "diverse" is wider than "different": "... prima non sunt diversa nisi per seipsa: sed ea quae sunt ex primis, differunt per diversitatem primorum; sicut homo et asinus differunt istis differentiis diversis, rationale et irrationale, quae non diversificantur aliis differentiis, sed seipsis: ita etiam Deus et esse creatum non differunt aliquibus differentiis utrique superadditis, sed seipsis: unde nec proprie dicuntur differre, sed diversa esse: diversum enim est absolutum, sed differens est relatum, secundum Philosophum, X *Metaph.*, text 13. Omne enim differens, aliquo differt; sed non omne diversum, aliquo diversum est." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3m; I, 198. So: "Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, non proprie dicuntur *differre*, sed *diversa esse*: ..." *ST*, I, 3, 8, ad 3m (ed. Leonine). "Sed secundum hoc licet omne differens sit diversum, non tamen omne *diversum* est differens;..." *ST*, I, 90, 1, ad 3m. "Diverse," therefore, may always be used where one would expect "different," e.g.: "Sicut animal quod est diversificatum in diversas species, scilicet in hominem et equum:..." *In X Metaph.*, lect. 10, nº 2112; ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Turin & Rome), 1950. According to the strict rule, "different" should not be used unless the things share a common genus: "In his autem, quae in nullo conveniunt, non est quarendum quo differant, sed seipsis diversa sunt. Sic enim et oppositae differentiae ab invicem distinguuntur: non enim participant genus quasi partem suae essentiae;..." *CG*, I, 17; ed. Leonine, XIII, 47b4-9. Nevertheless, St Thomas frequently uses "different" to signify diversity in being, as will be seen in subsequently quoted texts. The distinction between the two terms is a nicety that can hardly be observed regularly in English idiom.

Against the same background of the distinction between being and essence, the community in nature with difference in being continues into the subsequent years of St. Thomas' work.The *Contra Gentiles* states the same doctrine: "Quicquid est in genere secundum esse differt ab aliis quae in eodem genere sunt: alias genus de pluribus non predicaretur. Oportet autem omnia quae sunt in eodem genere, in quidditate generis convenire:..." (*CG*, I, 25; ed. Leonine, XIII, 76a19-b2). Things that coincide in a genus differ from one another in being. By differing in being they provide the necessary condition for predication. If the inferiors of the genus were not given each its own being, they would not constitute a plurality of subjects with which the genus could be contrasted and of which it could be predicated. Rather, they would merge indiscernibly in a single quiddity. They seem to require difference in being in order to protect them from complete absorption in the generic nature. Each of the many different inferiors has to *be* the common nature[3] in its own diverse way. Without difference in being they could not retain their own identity when they communicate in a species or genus. They are described, therefore, as differing in being (*secundum esse*), quite apparently in the same sense as the diversity of being that was noted in the *De Ente et Essentia.* Being continues to be regarded as the diversifying principle. According to this doctrine, it remains immune to all generic unification. No matter how much things may be united generically, they will always differ from one another in being. The unifying elements seem exhausted when one has completed the analysis of the thing's nature. When one passes over to its being, which is other than its nature, one finds a diversifying rather than a unifying principle, according to the obvious sense of this text from the *Contra Gentiles.*

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[2] "Ainsi, par exemple, la loi du rapport inverse entre l'extension et la compréhension d'un terme vaut parfaitement lorsqu'il s'agit d'un concept univoque; mais que faut-il penser quand il est question d'un concept analogue ? Est-il vrai sans nuances que le concept d'être a le minimum de compréhension parce qu'il a le maximum d'extension ?" J. Pétrin, "Univocité et analogie dans les lois de la logique," *Angelicum*, XXVI (1949), 248. "Instead of being the emptiest and most abstract of all notions, it is the richest, for everything which *is* — either material or immaterial — is implicitly included in its content, and nothing real is excluded from its extension." L. J. Eslick, "What is the Starting Point of Metaphysics ?", *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXIV (1957), 259.

Likewise, the contrast between community in genus and species on the one hand, and difference in being on the other hand, is carried over into the *Summa Theologiae.* If anything, it is expressed even more pointedly: "Tertio, quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in quidditate vel essentia generis,... Differunt autem secundum esse: non enim idem est esse hominis et esse equi, nec huius hominis et illius hominis" (*ST*, I, 3, 5c; ed. Leonine). The context is still the distinction between being and essence in creatures though not in God. The generic essence or quiddity unites things. It is a common feature in which differing things communicate. It is contrasted in clearcut fashion with the principle in which things differ, namely being. Things that coincide in essence differ in being (*secundum esse*). The reasoning is applied to both species and individuals. Each species has its own being. This is cognitional being, for the species as such exist only in intellectual cognition.[4] The

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[3] "...particulare dicitur eo quod particulatur in ipso natura communis, cujus partem accipit secundum virtutem qua potest esse in pluribus, quamvis accipiat totam rationem ejus." *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4m; I,560. On the identity in being of common nature and the subject of which it is predicated, see J. Owens, "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics," *Mediaeval Studies*, XIX (1957), 6.

[4] "...ratio speciei accidat humane nature secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu. Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus indiuiduantibus; ... est de accidentibus que consecuntur eam secundum esse quod habet in intellectu,..." *De Ente*, c. III; pp. 28.1-29.6. As part of a real cognitional operation, however, the species is individuated according to the individuality of the intellectual activity in which the nature has cognitional being: "...tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu uel in illo est quedam species intellecta particularis." *De Ente*, c. III; p. 28.14-15. Cf. c. III, p. 25.9-10-

In the terminology of abstraction versus separation (see infra, n. 70), being is not "abstract." In the above text from *De Ente* it is called "abstract" quite apparently in the sense of abstract versus concrete as described in the *In de Hebd.*, c. II, (ed. Mandonnet) *Opusc.*, I, 171; cf.: "... ipsum esse significatur ut quiddam abstractum," p. 172 ; " ... ipsum esse species "man," accordingly, differs in being from the species "horse," though the two species coincide in the genus "animal." The nature of man has its own cognitional being as a species. In that being it does not coincide with "horse," though "man" and "horse" coincide in the generic "animal." In the real world, of course, only individuals exist;[5] and every individual, even though it coincides in specific and generic nature with other things, remains radically different from them all in being.

According to these texts, then, St Thomas from the earliest through the mature periods of his writing maintained that being is always a diversifying principle of things. He speaks as though in the ascent of the Porphyrian tree with its ever widening branches the unifying features end with the highest genus, in which the thing is located according to its essence. When the thing's being is reached, it appears as other than the essence[6] and so as not subject to the norms that govern generic and specific characteristics. In opposite fashion it is an aspect that diversifies things. In contrast to quidditative features, the act that lies outside the quidditative natures does not make things coalesce in any new genus. By its touch, rather, it renders them diverse or different from one another.

Being, accordingly, is diverse in every case. It does not function in the fashion of a genus or common nature. Nor is there anything very surprising in this teaching of St Thomas. No matter how much one shares one's human nature and animal nature with others of the same species or genus, one's being remains inalienably one's own. No matter how much one communicates in activities or purposes or specific similarities with others, one's being stays proper[7]

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significatur ut abstractum," p. 174. "Sic igitur probat auctor quod aeternitas participat esse; ipsum autem esse abstractum est Causa prima, cujus substantia est suum esse." *In Lib. de Causis*, lect. II, (ed. Pera, Turin & Rome, 1955) n°. 55. "Sic igitur si *esse* causatum primum esset esse abstractum, ut Platonici posuerunt, tale esse non posset multiplicari sed esset unum tantum." Lect. IV, n°. 105.

[5] "Est etiam quaedam creatura quae non habet esse in se, sed tantum in alio, sicut materia prima, sicut forma quaelibet, sicut universale; non enim est esse alicujus, nisi particularis subsistentis in natura,..." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1, Solut.; I, 227. "...esse simpliciter non est nisi individuorum;..." *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, q. 1, ad 2m; I, 557. "... in Socrate non inuenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid in eo est est indiuiduatum". *De Ente*, c. III; p. 27.4-6 "Universalia enim non habent esse in rerum natura ut universalia sunt, sed solum secundum quod sunt individuata." *Q. de An.*, a. 1, ad 2m; ed. Calcaterra-Centi (Turin & Rome, 1953), II, 284b.

[6] In St. Thomas, accordingly, there is no immediately facile solution of this problem through distinction of an *esse essentiae* that would coincide in reality with the essence and an *esse existentiae* that is other than it. The whole question is concerned only with being that is other than finite essence.

[7] "...esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei; sed ratio substantiae potest esse communis: ..." *De Pot.*, VII, 3c; ed. Pession, II, 193b.

to one's self. Others may resemble you, see you, know you, help you, harm you, but none of them *is* yourself. You alone *are* yourself. In your being you differ radically from all others. Your being is diverse from all other instances of being. This seems nothing more than an example of the first principle of demonstration, the principle of contradiction. A thing *is* itself and is not what is other than itself, as long as the "is" retains the same sense. In its being it is restricted to itself and is diverse from all other things. It differs from all else in its being (*secundum esse*). Being, consequently, has to be diverse in every instance. A little reflection on the first principle of demonstration seems to bear out amply the significance of these texts in St Thomas regarding the inescapable diversity of being.

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In the contexts from which the above statements of St Thomas are taken, however, there occur assertions that are of apparently opposite meaning. In the same passage in which the lines quoted from *De Ente et Essentia* are found, the being of creatures is regarded as universal being (*esse universale* — c. V; p. 38.1) and as common. It is described almost as though it were abstracted without precision, after the fashion of a genus, even though the term "abstraction" is not used: "Esse autem commune sicut in intellectu suo non includit additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo aliquam precisionem additionis, quia si hoc esset, nichil posset intelligi esse in quo super esse aliquid adderetur."[8] In this continuation of the discussion in which, on the basis

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"Sicut etiam unicuique est proprium esse, ita et propria operatio." *CG*, I, 52; ed. Leonine, XIII, 148b30-31.

[8] *De Ente*, c. V; p. 38.8-12. The modeling of the notion *esse commune* on the abstraction of generic natures without precision, may also be seen from the following texts: "...aliquid esse sine additione dicitur dupliciter. Aut de cujus ratione est ut nihil sibi addatur: et sic dicitur de Deo: hoc enim oportet perfectum esse in se ex quo additionem non recipit; nec potest esse commune, quia omne commune salvatur in proprio, ubi sibi fit additio. Aut ita quod non sit de ratione ejus quod fiat sibi additio, neque quod non fiat, et hoc modo ens commune est sine additione. ... et ideo commune est, quia in sui ratione non dicit aliquam additionem, sed potest sibi fieri additio ut determinetur ad proprium; sicut etiam animal commune dicitur esse sine ratione, quia de intellectu ejus non est habere rationem, neque non habere; ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1 ad 1m; I, 219. "... ens commune est cui non fit additio, de cuius tamen ratione non est ut ei additio fieri non possit; sed esse divinum est esse cui non fit additio, et de eius ratione est ut ei additio fieri non possit; unde divinum esse non est esse commune. Sicut et animali communi non fit additio, in sua ratione, rationalis differentiae; non tamen est de ratione eius quod ei additio fieri non possit; ..." *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 6m; II, 192a. "Quia enim id quod commune est per additionem specificatur vel individuatur, aestimaverunt divinum esse, cui nulla fit additio, non esse aliquod esse proprium, sed esse commune omnium; non considerantes quod id quod commune est vel universale sine additione esse non potest, sed sine additione consideratur: non enim *animal* potest esse

of its diversifying character, it was so sharply distinguished from specific or generic nature, being is now described as "common." The community is at least modeled on generic and specific community, for the description is based upon the way in which specific and generic concepts abstract from without prescinding from their inferiors. In isolating the "universal being by which everything formally is,"[9] it would seem as though one ascended the Porphyrian tree in an ever widening series of universals, abstracting successively without precision from individuals, man, animal, living thing, body, and then somehow rising from "substance" to the notion of "common being" (*esse commune*), a notion that does not prescind from the addition of restricting traits. The description seems to parallel closely enough the account given by St Thomas of the way in which specific and generic notions are abstracted without precision.[10] The species does not explicitly include the addition of individual designations, but it does not exclude them. The genus does not expressly include the addition of specific differentiae, yet it does not exclude them when it is abstracted without precision. So in the notion (*intellectus*) of common being, the text states, no addition of further characteristics is included, but the addition of such traits is not at all excluded. Being (*esse*) seems regarded in this text as the most basic of all notions in a thing, open to the ever narrowing addition of the generic and specific divisions. Being appears conceived as the most common and most fundamental aspect of things, upon which the restrictive generic and specific aspects may be imposed. Yet the being that is under consideration in the context is expressly regarded as other than the nature of anything that belongs to a genus.

Similarly in the chapter immediately following that of the text quoted above from the *Contra Gentiles* on things coinciding (*convenire*) in generic nature though differing in being, the apparently opposite doctrine in regard to being is clearly stated: "Res ad invicem non distinguuntur secundum quod habent esse: quia in hoc omnia conveniunt" (*CG*, I, 26; ed. Leonine, XIII, 81a9-11). According to these lines, being is not a distinguishing characteristic. It does

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absque *rationali* vel *irrationali* differentia, quamvis absque his differentiis cogitetur. ...Unde ...concludi potest quod Deus non sit esse commune,..." *CG*, I, 26; ed. Leonine, XIII, 82 b13-32. "...non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione. Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum: secundo modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune." *ST*, I, 3, 4, ad 1m.

This use of "addition" in St. Thomas has been discussed and traced to its historical origins by Edmund W. Morton, S. J., in an unpublished University of Toronto doctoral thesis (1953), "The Doctrine of *ens commune* in St. Thomas Aquinas," pp. 66-85; 105-121; 184-215; 271-277.

[9] *De Ente*, c. V; p. 38.1. On the meaning of "formally" in this context, see infra, n. 23.

[10] See *De Ente*, c. II; pp. 12.5-23.7.

not render anything distinct from anything else. It is the trait, rather, in which all things coincide. The term that was used to state how things coincide in a genus is here used to describe how all things coincide in being.

Likewise in the *Summa Theologiae*, in the same context of the distinction of being from essence in creatures but not in God, being is regarded as common because it does not exclude the addition of further determinations, just as the generic nature "animal" does not exclude them:

> Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia non est de ratione eius quod sibi fiat additio: sicut animal commune est sine ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius ut careat ratione.... secundo modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune (*ST*, I, 3, 4, ad 1m).

The being that is caused efficiently by the first principle of all being (*esse*), in a context in which the essence of creatures is distinguished from their being (arg. 3), is described as common to all: "... non ... secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus" (*ST*, I, 4, 3c).

Being, then, though not a specific nor generic characteristic, is nevertheless common according to the type of community that in the Aristotelian classifications is still wider than the generic, namely the analogous.[11] It is not a genus, but appears rather as a sort of super-genus, embracing everything whatsoever. One seems to mount through the species and the intermediate and highest genera, and continue on to the widest aspect of all, being. This, in fact, is exactly the way St Thomas describes the process in *De Substantiis Separatis*, an unfinished work that is accordingly dated in the closing years of his life. It states:

> Nihil enim per se subsistens, quod sit ipsum esse, poterit inveniri nisi unum solum; sicut nec aliqua forma, si separata consideretur, potest esse nisi una. Inde est enim quod ea quae sunt diversa numero sunt unum specie, quia natura speciei secundum se considerata est una. Sicut igitur est una secundum considerationem dum per se consideratur, ita esset una secundum esse si per se existeret. Eademque ratio est de genere per comparationem ad species, quousque perveniatur ad ipsum esse quod est communissimum. Ipsum igitur esse secundum se subsistens est unum tantum.[12]

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[11] Aristotle, *Metaph.*, *Δ* 6, 1016b31-1017a3; cf. 9,1018a13.

[12] *De Subst. Sep.*, c. VI, (ed. Perrier, Paris, 1949) no.43. Cf.: "Patet enim quod esse, commune quoddam est,... Inde patet quod 'esse' dicit id quod est commune omnibus generibus; ..." *In I Sent.*, d.23, q.1, a.1, Solut.; I, 555. "...esse commune ad substantiam et ad accidens, ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 581. "...omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi,..." *In de Div. Nom.*, c. V, lect. 2, (ed. Pera, Turin & Rome, 1950), n°. 660. "Esse vero quod in sui natura unaquaeque res habet, est substantiale. Et ideo, cum dicitur, So-

Just as individuals coincide in the one species, and the species coincide in the one genus, so finally do the genera coincide in the most common feature of all, which is being.

Again, there seems to be nothing very surprising in this view, taken by itself. "Being" is predicated of everything that is. It is therefore the widest predicate of all. It is a transcendent[13] characteristic of things. It functions quite readily as a sort of super-genus, extending over all the categories as the most common of predicates. It is the most common aspect that can be found. Everything has the aspect of being, just as every individual man has human nature. All things without exception, therefore, should easily coincide in the notion of being, just as all individual men coincide in the notion of man.

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crates est, si ille Est primo modo accipiatur, est de praedicato substantiali. Nam ens est superius ad unumquodque entium, sicut animal ad hominem." *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, n°. 896.

[13] H. Renard, "What is St. Thomas' Approach to Metaphysics," *The New Scholasticism*, XXX (1956), 81-83, distinguishes *ens transcendentale* from *ens commune*, on the ground "*that ens commune* is attributable only to being whose essence is not *esse*" (p. 79). Yet St. Thomas' arguments that God is the cause of *ens commune* and is not contained under *ens commune* would apply equally well to *ens transcendentale*; e.g.: "...*ipsum esse* commune *est* ex primo Ente, quod est Deus, et ex hoc sequitur quod esse commune aliter se habeat ad Deum quam alia existentia, quantum ad tria; primo quidem, quantum ad hoc quod alia existentia dependent ab esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune dependet a Deo; ... Secundo, quantum ad hoc quod omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub ejus virtute, quia virtus divina plus extenditur quam ipsum esse creatum; ... Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod omnia alia existentia participant eo quod est esse, non autem Deus,..." *In de Div. Nom.*, lect. II; (ed. Pera) n°. 660. These arguments are that there is no common *ratio* upon which both God and creatures would be dependent, a *ratio* that would contain them both under itself, and which both would participate. Rather, God is the nature of being; and all other instances of being are dependent upon Him and are contained under the scope of His power. There is no transcendentally common nature of being, which God and creatures would participate in the order of prior and subsequent. God is not a part of *ens transcendentale*. He is the whole of being. All other being *descends*, and in that sense transcends, from Him. To the extent that its essence allows, it imitates His being. In this way a *community* of analogy (of which God is cause and not part) is established between Creator and creatures. Cf.: "...Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse duplex. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; ..." *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2m; I, 10. These considerations help focus interest on the way in which the notion of being is acquired and in which it is known as common. Cf. infra, n. 78. On *ens commune* as essence, see *De Ver.*, X, 11, ad 10m; ed. Spiazzi, I, 218a.

II

Both viewpoints, then, are explicit in the texts of St. Thomas. Both appear to be in accord with ordinary linguistic usage. Each thing's being is radically different from any other's being, and in that way is *diverse.* Yet being is the most *common* of all predicates. No discrepancy seems felt by St Thomas in sponsoring each of these views, even in the same context. No difficulty is experienced today in using either apart from the other in everyday language. Yet each of the two views seems in definite contradiction to the other. If being is a characteristic common to all things, how can it conceivably be diverse in every individual instance? If it is radically diverse in each new case, how can it be a trait in which all things coincide?

Can any help be given by the fairly well-known statement of St Thomas that being is not diverse in itself, but is diversified by the different subjects that share it? The statement is: "Esse autem, inquantum est esse, non potest esse diversum: potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis."[14] Being, considered just as being, cannot be diverse. It can be diversified, however, by things other than itself. The being in a stone, for instance, is quite apparently not the same as the being in a man, for to be a stone is certainly not to be a man. Inanimate being seems decidedly different from human being. The being of one individual is not the being of another. Being is multiplied in the subjects that partake of it. Just in itself, according to this text, being exhibits no ground for diversification. But it can be shared by different subjects, each having its own being, and in this way it becomes diversified.

But could not the same be said, in a proportional way, of any common nature? No common nature varies in itself. It is pluralized only by the species or the subjects that share it. From that viewpoint, being and quidditative common nature stand on identical footing. The following paragraph, from the same chapter of the *Contra Gentiles* as the text just quoted, does in fact compare them exactly on the basis of multiplication through the things that share them:

> Natura communis, si separata intelligatur, non potest esse nisi una: quamvis habentes naturam illam plures possint inveniri. Si enim natura *animalis* per se subsisteret, non haberet ea quae sunt hominis vel quae sunt bovis: iam enim non esset *animal* tantum, sed homo vel bos. ... Sic igitur, si hoc ipsum quod est esse sit commune sicut genus, esse separatum per se subsistens non potest esse nisi unum. Si vero non dividatur differentiis, sicut genus, sed per hoc quod est huius vel illius esse, ut veritas habet; magis est manifestum quod non potest esse per se existens nisi unum (*CG*, II, 52; XIII, 387a31-43).

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[14] *CG*, II, 52; ed. Leonine, XIII, 387a21-24. Cf. *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 5m; ed. Pession, II, 192a.

If a common generic nature, like the nature "animal," could subsist as a nature in itself and not just in singulars, it would have to be unique as subsistent animality. There could be no more than one such subsistent animal nature. There might still be many individuals possessing the nature, but as subsisting in itself it would have one instance only. It can be divided and multiplied, therefore, only by the species and individuals that share it. This is the same argument that had been advanced for the diversification of being, and here it is straightway applied from the common nature to the case of being. Taken just in itself, being, like a quidditative common nature, could furnish no ground for diversity. It could be pluralized, however, in becoming the being of this or that individual. The consideration that being cannot be divided by specific differentiae like a genus merely adds to the force of the argument. A genus, in so far as it is predicable, that is, in so far as it is abstracted without precision, implicitly contains its differentiae,[15] and of its nature is meant to be divided by them. When actually differentiated it is no longer the generic nature alone, but is a specific nature like man or ox. From that viewpoint, it is differentiated by what is implicitly contained in it. An act that is received into a subject other than itself, however, does not contain that subject, any more than a form contains its matter before being joined to it by an efficient cause.

All the more manifest, then, is the argument when applied to being. It has the same weight as it had when it was seen in the case of a quidditative common nature, and makes itself felt all the more through the elimination of a possible distraction from the way in which a genus implicitly contains its differentiae. The generic nature coalesces in reality with its differentiae, yet it is divided by them. It can of course be prescinded from them in such a way that they lie outside its own proper nature.[16] Much more obviously. however, do the divisors of being lie outside the nature of being, for being can be pluralized only by subjects that are other than its own nature, in reality,

The argument, therefore, is fundamentally the same when applied to a quidditative common nature and when applied to being. Accordingly, it

[15] "...non precidit designationem materie set implicite continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam;..." *De Ente*, c. II; p. 22.21-23. "... implicite et indistincte continet totum quod in indiuiduo est." *De Ente*, c. III; p. 23.28. Cf. "... non quidem ita quod sit in homine alia res quae sit penitus extra essentiam animalis,... quia id quod determinate et actualiter continetur in ratione hominis, implicite et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis." *De Ver.*, XXI, 1c; ed. Spiazzi, I, 376a.

[16] See *De Ente*, c. II (pp. 13.5-15.3); *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Solut. (I, 555-556); d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m (I, 602-603). Cf. "... unde in nomine humanitatis, non includitur nec actu nec potentia aliquod individuale principium;..." *In de Div. Nom.*, c. V, lect. 1, (ed. Pera) n°. 626.

does not show how being is itself a diversifying principle. It establishes only that all things communicate in being as all species communicate in their genera and all singular things communicate in their species. It *allows* the diversification of their being by things that are other than being; but it does not show that they differ through their being. Yet the texts of St Thomas quoted above state clearly: "secundum esse differt ab aliis" (CG, I, 25); "differunt autem secundum esse."[17] The question is not merely of a common aspect becoming diversified by individuals that remain the same according to the common trait in which they participate, as all individual men remain specifically the same in their common humanity. It is a question *also* of their diversification by that common trait in which they share. One cannot say that men differ according to their animality or are diverse according to their humanity. Yet they are diverse according to their being, the being that they share in common. Being functions not only in the manner of a super-genus that is most common to all things, but at the same time parallels somehow the thing's individuation: "... unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuationem."[18] Being, in fact, is not placed in a common definition any more than are the individuating notes. Why is being not placed in the definition of any finite thing? At least one reason is the non-identity of the individuals in being even though they are united in species and genera:

> Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum Avicennam in sua *Metaph.*, esse non potest poni in definitione alicuius generis et speciei, quia omnia particularia uniuntur in definitione generis vel speciei, cum tamen genus vel species non sint secundum unum *esse* in omnibus (*Quodl.*, IX, 3, 1, ad 2m; ed. Spiazzi, 183b).

To urge that being is not diversified in itself but only through its recipients, consequently, explains merely the super-generic role of being. It does not at all explain how being has a diversifying function in its own right, and how being is most proper to everything as well as most common to all. Rather, it accentuates the seeming contradiction instead of solving it.

But is not the reception of being by a subject other than itself considerably different not only from the specification of a genus by differentiae but also from the reception of a common nature by an individual or even of a form by matter? Genus, species, and form are all involved in a thing's nature. But being does not at all enter into the nature of any finite thing. The nature remains the same whether the thing has real or cognitional being.[19] The thing can acquire or lose either real being or cognitional being without undergoing any change whatsoever in nature. A tree has the nature of a tree whether it exists in reality or in some one's thought. In the example used by St Thomas one can know what a man is or what a phoenix is, without knowing whether, either exists in reality.[20]

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[17] *ST*, I, 3, 5c. "Item, plura individua sub una specie contenta differunt secundum esse, et tamen conveniunt in una essentia." *Comp. Theol.*, c. XIV; ed. Mandonnet, *Opusc.*, II, 8. Cf. supra, nn. 6-7.

[18] *Q. de An.*, a. 1, ad 2m; ed. Calcaterra-Centi, II, 284b. Cf. supra, nn. 4-5.

[19] See *De Ente*, c. III; pp. 25.9-29.30.

This difference between the way quidditative predicates belong to a thing and the way being belongs to it is brought out clearly enough in the logical structure of predication. That a thing has being, is expressed when the verb that otherwise functions as the copula is used alone. "A tree is" or "there is a tree", means that the tree has being. It does not say anything about *what* the tree is, either substantially or accidentally. It asserts only that the tree exists.[21] Quidditative predicates, on the other hand, have to be expressed by some notion added to the copula, as in "a man is an animal." Even when other verbs are used to express predicamental accidents, they can also be construed with the copula and the participial form. "A man is running" can stand for "a man runs." But one cannot say, without repeating the meaning, that "a tree is being" with the same force as "a tree is growing." The English idiom prefers "exists" for "is" in the simple assertion of being. But even when one says " a thing is existing," no further notion of the essential order, either of substance or of accident, is signified. "A thing is existing" has the same meaning as "a thing is." Both mean that being is enjoyed by the thing. When any other characteristic is shared, a further notion has to be added to the copula. But the being that is both common and proper is expressed by the verb "is" used alone. It does not tell anything about what the thing is, but simply asserts that the thing exists.

What is the reason for this difference between the predication of being and the predication of quidditative characteristics? The difference seems to lie in the way in which a comon nature is received by a subject and the way in which being is received by it. A common nature is received as the thing's essence and is expressed by a notion, therefore, that declares *what* the thing is — body, living thing, animal, man. It is absorbed in reality into the individual thing's nature. Being, on the other hand, is received as an actuality that remains other than the essence in reality, and cannot be expressed by any notion that helps show what the thing is. It is expressed by the verb "is" used alone, for what the verb "is" signifies does not pertain to the nature of the thing. Being is not received as a generic or even as an accidental nature. It is not received as a nature at all, for it in no way adds to what the thing is. It is not received, therefore, as a form is received by matter or as a generic or specific nature is received by an individual.

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[20] *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 34.12-14. Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; II, 87.

[21] "... hoc verbum *est* quandoque in enunciatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur, *Socrates est*: per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur *per se*, quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi coniunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, *Socrates est albus*, non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo, *est*;..." *In II Periherm.*, lect. 2, n°. 2 (ed. Leonine).

The difference is emphasized through a consideration of the types of causality by which being and common natures or forms are participated. A specific or generic nature is shared by way of formal causality. It is as it were a set knowable form in which different subjects participate, as for instance humanity is shared by all men, whiteness by all things white, baldness by all heads without hair. An efficient cause may be required to join the form to the subject, as a painter is required to paint a house white. But the joining of the form to the subject is by no means the whiteness of the house. Its whiteness consists in its sharing in the color white in an abiding way, as matter in general partakes of form. This is formal causality, even though a prior efficient cause is required to join form to subject.

Being, however, when it is participated, does not add any new formal characteristic to the thing. It leaves the thing's formal nature, both substantial and accidental, entirely unchanged as nature. There is no participation in any new form. No new formal causality is exercized. The thing is merely made to be. The only causality by which being is shared is efficient causality. The being of a man or the being of tree does not add any new formal note or trait. Even when forms are predicated of their subject, the verb "is" does not at all increase the formal content of the predication, as in the example "a tree is green." The "is" merely signifies the union of form and subject in being. This total failure to manifest any new formal effect in the thing's nature has occasioned the denial that being is a predicate at all.[22] It is obviously not a predicate of the essential or quidditative order. It does not make the thing participate in any new form. But it does make the thing be, and that is more important than any formal effect, for without being the thing would be simply nothing. From that viewpoint, being may be regarded as exercising the most formal role of all in the thing, in the sense in which "formal" is equated with actual.[23] But this does not mean that being exercises any formal causality in the thing, in the sense in which formal is contrasted with efficient causality. Being is participated as a result of the efficient causality of an agent without thereby exercising any formal causality in the thing. It may make a form be in the thing, but all the formal causality involved is exercised by that form and not in any way by the being.

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[22] "'*Being*' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves." Kant, *KRV*, B 626; tr. N. K. Smith.

[23] "...esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: ... Oporter igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam." *ST*, I, 3, 4c. "...ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. ...Cum enim dico *esse* hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum: ..." *ST*, I, 4, 1, ad 3m. "Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ..." *ST*, I, 7, 1c. "Esse autem... cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt,..." *ST*, I, 8, 1c. Cf. *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9m.

This means that being in its highest instance is an efficient cause and not a formal cause of things. To exercise efficient causality, being has to subsist in its primary instance. The real subsistence of being is in fact shown by tracing to its source the being found in observable things and participated by them through efficient causality. If being did not subsist, there could be no efficient causality and so no participation of being. On the other hand, a common nature, which shares itself with subjects through formal causality, cannot subsist in itself. In the case of a generic or specific characteristic, there is no subsistent nature. There is no really existent primary instance. The really existent instances are only the individuals that partake of the nature. From them the nature is abstracted. It can exist as a specific or generic nature only in the abstraction of the intellect. The common nature itself is just reached as the result of a consideration that abstracts and compares the nature existent in different instances and sees thereby that it is common to all the instances. There is no really existent *common* nature to be participated.[24] It is only an abstraction, and when it is abstracted without precision it does not exclude the addition of further perfections. When it is explicitly determined to those perfections, it absorbs them into its nature, as when animal nature for instance is human and individual in the one man Socrates. It includes them in the one real nature, and thereby renders them identical in reality with itself and with one another.

When things participate being, on the other hand, they are participating a nature that is found as such in reality. They are sharing in a nature that cannot itself become identical with any specific nature, as "animal" becomes "man" by making one of its differentiae explicit. If the nature of being were set up as an essential predicate of any individual or of any finite nature, it would at once absorb that individual or nature into itself.[25] The conclusions of Parmenides would inevitably follow. Being, therefore, cannot be participated in the status of a nature or a form. It can be shared only by making things be, without adding any feature whatsoever within their natures. Unlike a genus, it cannot be regarded as forming part of the thing's nature. It cannot be absorbed into that nature. As a nature, being subsists. That is the only way it can be found as a nature. When it is participated by way of efficient causality, it can no longer have the status of a nature. It cannot be part of anything's nature. It can just actuate a nature into which it itself does not enter. In this way it is predicated of things without requiring that the things be identical with itself, as things are identical in reality with their generic natures. The Parmenidean consequences, accordingly, do not follow upon the predication of being.

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[24] See *Quodl.*, VIII, 1c. This doctrine of the common nature is radically different from that of Duns Scotus, for whom the common nature exists in individuals as formally distinct from their individual differentiae; see *Op. Ox.*, II, d. 3, q. 5 & 6, nº. 15; ed. Quaracchi, II, 269-270 (nº. 289).

[25] "Sed sciendum est, quod aliquid participatur *dupliciter.* Uno modo quasi existens de substantia participantis, sicut genus participatur a specie. Hoc autem modo esse non participatur a creatura. Id enim est de substantia rei quod cadit in eius definitione." *Quodl.*, II, 2, 1c; ed. Spiazzi (Turin, 1956), p. 24b. "Unde genus est hoc ipsum quod est species, et non solum aliquid eius." *In X Metaph.*, lect. 10, nº. 2114. Cf.: "Si igitur esse divinum esset formale esse omnium, oporteret omnia simpliciter esse unum." *CG*, I, 26; XIII, 81b3-5.

However, if subsistent being is the efficient cause of all things, it must somehow contain all things within itself. The nature of being has to contain all perfections within itself, as even the Parmenidean reasoning shows. Far from a so-called "Eleatic monotone," being necessarily involves all other perfections: "Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi:..."[26] There is a sense in which they all may be predicated of subsistent being, though with the necessary reservation that subsistent being does not become anything pertaining to them, but remains above them all.[27] In this sense being is the richest of notions. All other perfections may be predicated of it and are contained within it. It has the greatest content of all notions, as well as the widest extension. But this means that it contains within itself its own diversifying principles. Generic and specific determinations are perfections, and all perfections are contained in the nature of being. There can be no perfection, no actuality outside being that might determine it.

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[26] *ST*, I, 4, 2c. Cf.: "Similiter eciam quamuis sit esse tantum non oportet quod deficiant perfectiones relique et nobilitates. Imo habet Deus perfectiones que sunt in omnibus generibus,... set habet eas modo excellentiori ceteris rebus, quia in eo unum sunt sed in aliis diuersitatem habent. Et hoc est quia omnes ille perfectiones conueniunt sibi secundum suum esse simplex; ..." *De Ente*, c. V; p. 38.12-20. "...quidquid est entitatis et bonitatis in creaturis, totum est a Creatore: ... Unde oportet quod omnes nobilitates omnium creaturarum inveniantur in Deo nobilissimo modo..." *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, Solut.; I, 62."... cum enim formae rerum sive sint divisim per se stantes, sive uniantur in uno Primo habente esse universalissimum et divinum, manifestum est quod quanto magis appropinquantur ad hoc universalissimum esse formarum, tanto formae sunt universaliores." *In Lib de Causis*. lect. IV, n°. 125 (ed. Pera). "Oportet autem illud quod est causa entis in quantum est ens, esse causam omnium differentiarum entis,..." *De Pot.*, III, 16, ad 4m; ed. Pession, II, 89b. "Igitur si aliquid est cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitatum deesse potest quae alicui rei conveniat. Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem:..." *CG*, I, 28; XIII, 86b6-87al.

[27] "... omne esse in se praehabet et in Ipso comprehenduntur et praehabentur *principia omnium entium* et fines; non tamen eodem modo sicut in ipsis rebus, sed Ipse *est super omnia, sicut ante omnia* supereminenter existens. Et quia in Ipso, quodammodo, sunt omnia, quasi in se omnia comprehendente, *simul* de Ipso *omnia praedicantur* et simul ab Ipso omnia removentur, quia *nihil est omnium*, sed super omnia; ..." *In de Div. Nom.*, c. V, lect. 2, no. 661; ed. Pera (Turin & Rome, 1950), p. 245b.

But will this hold for the individual determinations of things? Why cannot being be diversified by reception into purely potential subjects, as form is individuated by reception into matter? Cannot an act be diversified by something that functions merely as potency, without the introduction of any actual determining characteristic at all?

There is indeed a sense in which matter individuates form and essences diversify being. But that is hardly the whole story. Matter and essence are subsequent to being, absolutely speaking. The being of the thing is simply prior to either. Where things are individuated through reception in matter, they inevitably require matter for their diversification; nevertheless they have in their being a prior cause of the diversification:

> ...causa diversitatis in rebus non est materiae diversitas. Ostensum est enim, quod materia non praesupponitur actioni divinae, qua res in esse producit. Causa autem diversitatis rerum non est ex materia nisi secundum quod materia ad rerum productionem praeexigitur, ut scilicet secundum diversitatem materiae diversae inducantur formae.[28]

Unity and plurality, in fact, follow upon being. The unity by which the individual is a unit in itself and diverse from all other individuals in a multitude will therefore follow upon the thing's being.[29] Any being that is participated thereby involves its own determination.[30] Otherwise it would not be participated, but would be subsistent being. In this way it determines itself by its essence, and in the case of material things by its matter. But the actuality of all such determination comes from the being. The subjects that lie outside being and receive being can play the role only of potency in diversifying being. Of themselves they are not, and so cannot provide any of the actual determinations of being. Prior to any individuating role of essence or matter is the actual diversifying function of being as it is participated. No determination can be added to it from outside its own nature:

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[28] *Comp. Theol.*, c. LXXI. This theme is frequent enough in St. Thomas; e. g.: *De Pot.*, III, 16; *In Lib. de Causis*, lect. 24, n^os^ 395-399; *CG*, II, 39-45; *ST*, I, 47, 1c; *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 2, n°. 2440.

[29] "Si autem hoc modo se habeant res ad unitatem et multitudinem, sicut se habent ad esse: totum autem esse rerum dependet a Deo, ut ostensum est, pluralitatis rerum causam ex Deo esse oportet." *Comp. Theol.*, c. LXXII.

[30] "Chaque essence est posée par un acte d'exister qu'elle n'est pas et qui l'inclut comme son autodétermination. ...c'est donc la hiérarchie des actes d'exister qui fonde et règle celle des essences, chacune d'elles n'exprimant que l'intensité propre d'un certain acte d'exister." E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 5th ed. (Paris, 1944), pp. 54-55. "Autodétermination" is an exceptionally apt term for this notion, but is difficult to translate into English. "Self-determination," a political and psychological term in English, could perhaps carry its meaning.

> Nihil autem potest addi ad *esse* quod sit extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi *non-ens*, quod non potest esse nec forma nec materia. Unde non sic determinatur *esse* per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. Nam et in definitione formarum ponuntur propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Et per hunc modum, hoc *esse* ab illo *esse* distinguitur, in quantum est talis et talis naturae (*De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9m; ed. Pession, II, 192b).

The actuality of the determination by which one individual is not another, then, will have to have its origin in the thing's being. Being has to provide its own differences, even though it requires a potency other than itself in which to actualize them.

From a logical viewpoint, this difference between being and any generic nature may be expressed in the traditional Aristotelian dictum that being is predicated of all differentiae while no genus can be predicated of its own differentiae. In regard to the subject constituted by being (*to on*), Aristotle formulates this principle very clearly:

> But it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being (*einai*) and be one, but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species.... to be predicated of its proper differentiae; so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will either have being or be one.[31]

The differentia, to function as a differentia, just has to be. If it did not have being, it would be nothing and could not exercise any differentiating function. It could not make itself felt in any way in the constitution of the thing. It would be simply nothing.

The reasons why a genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae are given by Aristotle in the *Topics:*

> For if "animal" is predicated of each of its differentiae, then "animal" would be predicated of the species several times over; for the differentiae are predicates of the species. Moreover, the differentiae will be all either species or individuals, if they are animals; for every animal is either a species or an individual (*Top.*, VI 6, 144a36-b3; Oxford tr.).

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[31] *Metaph.*, B 3, 998b22-27; Oxford tr. Cf. H 6,1045bl-7. "There is, in any event, nothing univocally and generically common to all beings, and the differences between beings are themselves *beings*. But these specifically and materially different modes of being cannot be actually included in *ens commune* in an explicit way without transforming common being into proper being." L. J. Eslick, "What is the Starting Point of Metaphysics?" *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXIV (1957), 258.

If the genus were predicated of its differentiae, it would be contained in each differentia and so would be predicated of the species separately with the predication of the differentiae. For example, if "animal" were predicated of "two-footed," then "two-footed" would be animal or an animal, in its very nature as a differentia. So when you say "Man is two-footed," you would be saying that man is an animal, since "two-footed" includes "animal" as one of its predicates. You would be repeating the predication of the genus, namely "man is an animal."

Such is the first Aristotelian argument why a genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae. But how can the Aristotle who argues in this way be the same man who maintains that the ultimate differentia includes the first genus and all the intermediate differentiae?[32] From the logical viewpoint of the *Topics*, the differentia does not include the genus, since the genus cannot be predicated of it. The differentia does not partake of the genus, nor does the genus partake of its differentiae.[33] Yet from the viewpoint of the function of form in the *Metaphysics*, the ultimate differentia, expressing as it does the form, does include the genus. Why are the results so different when the topic is approached from these two different standpoints? The Aristotelian text does not give any express answer. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle is concerned with safeguarding the unity of substances in spite of the plurality of generic and specific forms to which they give rise in human cognition. He allows a sense in which the genus does participate its differences: "And even if the genus does share in them" (*Metaph.*, Z 12, 1037b21; Oxford tr.). But even in this case the same difficulty holds. Genus and differentia still set up a plurality. The solution offered is the way in which the Aristotelian form is a principle of unity for all that it actuates; and in this case the ultimate differentia functions as form in regard to the basic genus and intermediate differentiae. The metaphysical unity of a nature is thereby safeguarded, in spite of its logical divisions.

All this, however, does not explain very thoroughly why the genus in one sense contains its differentiae and in another sense does not. St Thomas is much more explicit. In one and the same passage he repeats the Aristotelian doctrine that the ultimate differentia signifies the whole subject: "...differentia significat totum; set non significat tantum formam,"[34] and yet goes on to say that the differentia in its primary concept does not determine what its genus is: "Differentia uero e contra, sicut quedam determinatio a forma determinate sumpta, propter hoc quod de primo intellectu eius sit determinata materia, ut patet cum dicitur animatum, sive illud quod habet animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum sit corpus uel aliquid aliud" (*De Ente*, c. II; p. 17.7-11). Genus and differentia are but determinations of the thing. The genus gives a determination that is material in regard to the differentia: "...genus significat totum ut quedam determinatio determinans id quod est materiale in re" (p. 17.1-2). The differentia is a further determination; but in its primary notion, according to this doctrine of St Thomas, it expresses merely a determination of something, leaving that "something" in its vague and indefinite transcendental sense. The genus consists in a determination and that determination does not belong to the primary notion of the differentia. How, then, can the genus signify the whole, and not just its own determination?

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[32] *Metaph.*, Z 12, 1037b29-1038a30.

[33] *Top.*, IV 2, 122b20-24; *Metaph.*, Z 12, 1037b18-21. The viewpoint in this passage from the *Metaphysics* is still logical, in accordance with the introduction at 1037b8-9.

[34] *De Ente*, c. II; p. 16.3-4. Cf.: "...nec differentia forma, set a forma sumpta ut significans totum." Ibid., p. 18.10-11.

Moreover, the whole essence of the definition is somehow contained in the differentia, and correspondingly, the differentia is contained in the genus:

> ...ita quod tota essentia definitionis, in differentia quodammodo comprehenditur. Ex hoc enim animal, quod est genus, non potest esse absque speciebus, quia formae specierum quae sunt differentiae, non sunt aliae formae a forma generis, sed sunt formae generis cum determinatione. ... Unde cum differentia additur generi, non additur quasi aliqua diversa essentia a genere, sed quasi in genere implicite contenta, sicut determinatum continetur in indeterminato, ut album in colorato.[35]

The differentia, accordingly, includes the whole essence of the definition. It includes all the parts of the definition. It includes the genus. The differentia is not an essence apart from the essence of the genus. Yet St Thomas can also say that the genus is not a part of the essence of the differentia, but is something outside its essence: "Vnde dicit Auicenna quod genus non intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentie, set solum sicut ens extra essentiam" (*De Ente*, c. II; p. 17.11-13). He states frequently that the genus does not enter the definition of the differentia, nor does the differentia enter the definition of the genus.[36] The genus, therefore, is not predicated in strict identity of its differentiae.[37] Nevertheless, in so far as the differentia signifies the whole essence, the genus can be predicated of it.[38]

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[35] *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 12, n°. 1549. Cf.: "...non hoc modo advenit differentia generi, ut diversa essentia ab eo existens, sicut advenit album homini." Ibid., n°. 1550. "...ultima differentia erit tota substantia rei, et tota definitio. Includit enim in se omnes praecedentes particulas" (n°. 1555). "Quod enim in differentia includatur genus, ostensum est, ex hoc quod genus non est sine differentiis. Sed quod ultima includat omnes praecedentes, palam est ex hoc quod nisi hoc dicatur, sequitur quod oporteat 'in terminis,' idest definitionibus, multoties eadem dicere" (n°. 1556). "... una erit ultima, ... quae substantiam et speciem definiti comprehendet,..." (n°. 1559). "... genus non est praeter differentias, ..." (n°. 1561). "... differentia nullam formam dicit, quae implicite in natura generis non contineatur,... genus enim non significat partem essentiae rei, sed totum." *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 6; II, 105. See also *De Subst. Sep.*, c. VI, (ed. Perrier) n° 41.

Can these two conflicting sides of the question be reconciled? One side makes the genus so coincide with the differentia in essence as to be predicable of it. The other side places the genus outside the essence of the differentia in a way that prevents such predication through identity. The difficulty seems to lie in the twofold character of the differentia. It is both qualitative and substantive, as Aristotle had noted: "...for the general view is that the differentia always expresses a quality"; yet "the differentia is never an accidental attribute, any more than the genus is:..."[39] It is a *quale quid*, a substantial quality:

> ...secundum quod qualitas dicitur "differentia substantiae," idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, quae intrat in definitionem substantiae. Et propter hoc dicitur, quod differentia praedicatur in quale quid. ... ac si ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas sit. Uno igitur modo ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas dicitur.[40]

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[36] E.g.: "... differentia non intrat definitionem generis." *CG*, I, 24; XIII, 74b20-21. "Non enim genus ponitur in definitione differentiae, ... Nec etiam differentia ponitur in definitione generis:..." *In III Metaph.*, lect. 8, nº. 433. "... omne enim genus habet differentias quae sunt extra essentiam generis; ..." *ST*, I, 3, 5c.

[37] *De Ente*, c. II; pp. 17.14-18.2.

[38] "... genus praedicatur de differentiis secundum quod sunt in speciebus." *In III Metaph.*, lect. 8, nº. 433. The problem is neatly presented, in terms of the expression and the signification of the differentia, by J. Bobik, "Further Remarks upon 'Is Being a Genus,'" *Philosophical Studies* (Maynooth), IX (1959), 73-78. However, in regard to relating genus to differentia, the conclusion "There is no possibility here of relating genus to difference in terms of signification, in addition to expression" (p. 76) should not be understood in a way that would exclude the above sense in which genus may be predicated of differentia. "Anything rational is an animal" predicates the genus of the differentia understood as a whole. The differentia here seems taken just as clearly in its proper sense of differentia as it is in the *De Ente* where it is understood as a part and so not able to be identified with the genus in predication: "... cum dicitur animatum, siue illud quod habet animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum sit corpus uel aliquid aliud." *De Ente*, c. II; p. 17.9-11.

[39] *Top.* VI 6, 144a21-22; 24-25; Oxford tr. Cf. *Cat.*, 5, 3a21-25.

[40] *In V Metaph.*, lect. 16, nº. 987. Cf.: "Nam differentia praedicatur in eo quod quale. Et propter hoc, sicut cum dicitur animal rationale significatur tale animal, ita cum dicitur superficies quadrata, significatur talis superficies" (lect. 22, nº. 1121). "... differentiae sunt eius qualitates. Sicut in definitione hominis primo ponitur animal, et bipes sive rationale, quod est quaedam substantialis qualitas hominis" (nº. 1122). "... quale invenitur in genere substantiae, secundum quod differentia substantialis dicitur praedicari in *eo quod quale*: ..." *In V Phys.*, lect. 4, nº. 2. "... qualitatem, inquam, essentialem, secundum quod differentia significat *quale quid*." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 10, nº. 10. "... qualitas quae est differentia substantiae;..." *ST*, I-II, 49, 2c.

Because of this twofold character, the genus is both a predicate and a subject. As a predicate, it is the substance of the thing and so is a whole that contains the differentia implicitly. Correspondingly, the differentia is the substance of the thing and so is a whole that contains the basic genus and all the intermediate differentiae. When it is added to the genus it is added not as a part to a part, but as a whole to a whole: "Differentia vero additur generi non quasi pars parti, sed quasi totum toti" (*In X Metaph.*, lect. 10, no. 2114). It is the one and the same substance as the genus. But even though it is a whole, and identical as such with the genus, it nevertheless qualifies or determines the genus. As a quality or determination *of* the genus, it enters into a new relation with it. It sets off the genus as the subject that is qualified:

> Hoc enim modo se habet genus ad differentiam, sicut subiectum ad qualitatem. Et ideo patet quod genus praedicabile, et genus subiectum, quasi sub uno modo comprehenduntur, et utrumque se habet per modum materiae. Licet enim genus praedicabile non sit materia, sumitur tamen a materia, sicut differentia a forma. Dicitur enim aliquid animal ex eo quod habet naturam sensitivam. Rationalem vero ex eo, quod habet rationalem naturam, quae se habet ad sensitivam sicut forma ad materiam.[41]

In this new relation, however, the genus and the differentia are related to each other as *parts* of the species, just as any matter and form are parts of their composite: "... unde quodammodo et genus et differentia dicuntur esse in specie, sicut partes in toto."[42] Considered as qualitative or determining, the differentia functions as form, and so as only a part of the specific nature. Viewed in this way, it lies outside the essence of the genus. So regarded, it is taken according to its primary notion, for its primary function is to qualify. It is primarily a quality, even though a substantial quality. Distinguished from the genus as formal part of the species from material part, it does not show the identity necessary to receive the predication of the genus, since part is not identical with part in the way required by predication. Considered as substantial, however, it comprises the whole specific nature. It is added to the genus not as part to part, but as whole to whole. It contains the generic nature within itself, and is contained implicitly in the genus. It is the same in essence as the genus. Regarded in this way it has all the identity with the genus that is necessary for predication.[43]

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[41] *In V Metaph.*, lect. 22, nº. 1123. Cf.: "Genus enim, licet non sit materia, quia non praedicaretur de specie, cum materia sit pars, tamen ratio generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re; sicut ratio differentiae ab eo quod est formale" (lect. 7, nº 862). "Sicut enim in genere substantiae, differentia, quae praedicatur de genere, et advenit ei ad constitutionem speciei, comparatur ad ipsum ut actus et forma, ita etiam in aliis definitionibus." *In VIII. Metaph.*, lect. 2, nº. 1697. "Nam genus sumitur a materia, et differentia a forma, ..." (lect. 3, nº. 1721). "Et quidem nomen, quo aliquid totum denominatur ab eo quod est materiale in ipso, est nomen generis. Nomen autem, quo denominatur a principio formali, est nomen differentiae. Sicut homo nominatur animal a natura sensibili, rationale vero a natura intellectiva." *In X Metaph.*, lect. 10, nº. 2115. "... differentia advenit generi non *per accidens* sed *per se*, tanquam determinativa ipsius, per modum quo materia determinatur per formam." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8, nº. 10.

[42] *In IV Phys.*, lect. 4, nº. 2. Cf.: "... sive sint partes rationis, sicut sunt genus et differentia, quae sunt partes definitionis: sive sint partes integrales alicuius compositi, sicut ex lapidibus et lignis fit domus." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 12, nº. 8.

How can that be? Genus and differentia, of course, are merely notions formed by the human intellect of the one real thing, say a man. In reality they are the one human nature. In their status of genus and differentia they exist only in the mind.[44] In a particular man the individuating traits are left out of consideration by the intellect, and only those in which he coincides with all other men are retained. In this way the man is conceived according to his specific nature, and the notion of the species "man" is set up. The same man can be conceived according to the aspects that he has in common with all sensitive beings, with the traits that distinguish him from brute animals left out of consideration. In that way the same individual man is conceived according to his generic nature "animal," and the genus is set up. In each of these cases the same thing, the same individual nature is being conceived, but in different ways. Both specific and generic notions signify the same whole. Moreover, what determines the generic nature to the specific is likewise the same whole. It is the human nature that is found in the individual man, now conceived as determining "animal" to "man." It is the same human nature that was represented as a whole in the species and in the genus, and now represented as a whole under its qualifying aspect in the differentia.

Since the function under which the whole nature is conceived in the differentia is that of qualifying or determining, it makes the differentia in its primary notion a quality, even though in the category of substance. The natural differentiae of substances remain unknown to the human intellect. But they can be represented through accidental differences, and so "rational" from the activity of reasoning, or "two-footed" from the number of feet, have been used to stand for the substantial differentia of man. Whatever term is used, it signifies the whole substance of man as determining him to a definite species and not leaving him merely in the generic consideration of "animal." But in conceiving that whole substance first as genus and then as differentia, the intellect has set up two separate notions, each of which has its own separate being in the mind. It has to represent those two notions as combining to constitute a third notion, that of the species. It represents them as the two *parts* of the whole specific nature, the one as the material and the other as the formal or determining part, even though it is conceiving the same whole nature in all three cases:

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[43] See supra, nn. 15 and 38. Cf. the way in which differentia is predicated of genus at *In VIII Metaph.*, lect. 2, n°. 1697 — (supra, n. 41).

[44] "Similiter eciam non potest dici quod ratio generis uel speciei accidat nature humane secundum esse quod habet in indiuiduis, quia non inuenitur in indiuiduis natura humana secundum unitatem ut sit unum quid omnibus conueniens, quod ratio uniuersalis exigit. Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat humane nature secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu." *De Ente*, c. III; pp. 27.6-28.2. "Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine: sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitati secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non individualium principiorum." *ST*, I, 85, 2, ad 2m. Cf. supra, n. 4.

> ...neque genus est materia, set a materia sumptum ut significans totum; nec differentia forma, set a forma sumpta ut significans totum. Vnde dicimus hominem animal rationale, non ex animali et rationali, sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore; ex anima enim et corpore dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus tercia uero res constituta, que nulla illarum est; homo enim neque est anima neque corpus; set si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, non est sicut res tercia ex duabus rebus, set sicut intellectus tercius ex duobus intellectibus; intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione specialis forme exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod est materiale respectu ultime perfectionis; intellectus autem huius differentie rationalis consistit in determinatione forme specialis; ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei uel diffinitionis (*De Ente*, c. II; p. 18. 9-19.9).

A third thing constituted out of two other things is neither of them, as for instance man is neither body nor soul. It is identified with neither of them, and so neither can be predicated of it; nor can either be predicated of the other, on account of their lack of identity as different parts of the same whole. When differentia and genus are set up as separate notions combining to form a third notion, the species, neither can be predicated of the other, according to this reasoning. The notion "rational" is not the notion "animal," and together they constitute the notion "man." The notion "animal" expresses the nature of man, it signifies the whole nature, but from the viewpoint of his sensitive life. It does not express the special determination contained in the form of man, that of human sensitivity. As sensitivity can be either human or non-human, it is left undetermined in its generic notion and as the subject or the matter for qualification by "rational" or "irrational." The notion "rational" consists in the special determination that the form of man contains. The *raison d'être* for its abstraction as a distinct notion is to express that special determination. In its primary notion, therefore, it expresses only that determination, and not the generically determined type of matter that it qualifies. "Rational" as a differentia means "rational something" and so signifies the whole nature, and can be predicated of the species and individuals. But in its primary notion it does not determine that the "something" it qualifies is "animal." In its primary notion, accordingly, even though it signifies the whole nature, it leaves the genus out of what it expresses, and from that viewpoint leaves the genus out of its essence and definition. As qualifying the genus it is set up by the intellect as something outside the content of the genus, something of which the genus is the subject and to which that genus is related as matter to form. As denoting the whole substance, however, it signifies the same thing as the genus. The genus is identical with it as a whole, though distinct from it as a part:

> Si ergo consideretur in genere et differentia id a quo utrumque sumitur, hoc modo genus se habet ad differentias sicut materia ad formas. Si autem consideretur secundum quod nominant totum, sic aliter se habent. ...Sed hoc utrobique distat, quia materia est in utroque divisorum, non tamen est utrumque eorum; genus autem utrumque eorum est: quia materia nominat partem, genus autem totum.[45]

The genus when considered as a whole is each of its divisors, each of its differentiae. It is predicable of them. A "rational something" is an animal. In so far as it is a substance, the differentia signifies the whole, and the genus may be predicated of it.[46] In so far as it is a quality, however, the differentia in its primary notion sets off the genus as a subject distinct from itself and outside its essence, and so does away with the identity necessary for predication: "Et ideo eciam genus non predicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit Philosophus in tertio *Metaphysice* et in quarto *Topicorum*, nisi forte sicut subiectum de passione predicatur" (*De Ente*, c. II; p. 17.14-18.2). As a quality, even though a substantial quality, "rational" is not "animal." As substance, then, the differentia is identical with the genus in the same essence as whole with whole. As quality, it determines the genus as subject, and so is distinct from the genus in essence, as part from part in the species; for the genus in its role of subject is not qualitative. The twofold character of the differentia as a *quale quid* places it respectively in relation to its genus as whole to whole and as part to part. Correspondingly, the *genus praedicabile* functions as the whole, the *genus subiectum* as a part.

The intellect's way of abstracting without precision, consequently, allows the natures of things to be considered in specific and generic fashions in such a manner that while expressing only the specific or generic traits they exclude none of the other determinations. As common natures they have no being of their own that would set the one up in exclusion of the other, according to the principle that follows upon being, the principle of contradiction. The one can be the other, whole can coincide completely with whole, predication through identity is possible. There is here no "Platonic Fallacy" that would establish the generic and specific natures as separate beings, for in their consideration as common or absolute natures they abstract from all being and have no being whatsoever of their own. But genus and species receive each its own being in the intellect, and the thing's nature can likewise be conceived as determining its generic aspect to the specific, that is, the nature can be conceived as the differentia. In this way the differentia has its own cognitional being apart from that of species and genus, and when considered as qualitative can be viewed as combining with the genus in the role of a part to form a third notion, the species. The Thomistic doctrine of abstraction without precision, accordingly, shows how Aristotle's metaphysical teaching that the ultimate difference includes the genus is actually in full accord with his apparently opposite logical statement: "Nor is the differentia generally thought to partake of the genus; for what partakes of the genus is always either a species or an individual, whereas the differentia is neither a species nor an individual. Clearly, therefore, the differentia does not partake of the genus" (*Top.*, IV 2, 122b20-23; Oxford tr.).

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[45] *In X Metaph.*, lect. 10, n°. 2116. Cf.: "Materia enim est pars integralis rei, et ideo de re praedicari non potest." *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 12, n°. 1546. "Si enim in intellectu corporis intelligatur substantia completa ultima forma, habens in se tres dimensiones, sic corpus est genus, ... Si vero in intellectu corporis non accipiatur nisi hoc, quod est habens tres dimensiones cum aptitudine ad formam ultimam, sic corpus est materia" (n°. 1547).

[46] See supra, n. 38.

As qualitative, however, the differentia has to have its own being. As a determination of the genus it is set apart from the genus in the being that is given it in the intellect. In order to have that separate status as a differentia it has to *be* in this way. It can be placed outside the essence of its genus and still remain a differentia, but it cannot be placed outside being without ceasing to be a differentia. A common nature implicitly contains all its determinations as substantive, but does not include them as qualitative. Being, on the other hand, includes all its determinations as qualitative. Where it is subsistent, in God, being as a substance includes in its own unity all the perfections of things. As a predicate, being extends in analogous ways to all things, even to all differentiae in their qualitative function. Its all-embracing extension does not allow it to taper off into the undiluted sameness of a genus. Because it extends to all possible differences, even as differences, it has to include them all in their differentiating function. Paradoxically, because it is most common it has to be all its own differences. The logic of predication shows that being has to be most diverse because it is most common. Community, when pushed here to the furthest extreme, involves the greatest diversity. Being is so common that it has to be diverse in every instance. It requires reception in a subject other than itself in order to be diversified. But that subject is nothing in itself apart from being, and of itself can provide no actual diversification. It can function only as potency.[47] All the actuality of the diversification has to come from the new being that it participates.

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[47] *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9m; ed. Pession, II, 192b.

As a predicate, then, being is at the same time the most common and the most diverse. But how is this possible from a metaphysical standpoint? Will it not make being a self-contradictory notion, like the notion of a square circle? Will it not give being the status of a meaningless frame of reference, to which nothing can conceivably correspond in reality? Could not this be an excellent case of a problem rising from the necessary use of language, and not from any distinct feature in reality?[48] Does it not make being rather an ultra-equivocal word that can be used indiscriminately for anything and everything, but has no meaning that could spark any legitimate metaphysical investigation? Or is there something peculiar about the way in which the notion "being" is obtained? It does not pertain to the natures of sensible things. It cannot be grasped, therefore, through a consideration of any of those natures in abstraction, in the way specific and generic notions are isolated. How, then, is the notion of being obtained by the human intellect? What is the doctrine of St Thomas in this regard?

III

From his earliest writings on, St Thomas makes very clear the location of being in sensible things, the things in which all human cognition takes its origin. Their being, he emphasizes, is not the being of form nor of matter, but of the composite. This holds true even though, according to the traditional Aristotelian dictum, the form is in its own way the cause of the thing's being:

> ...esse substantie composite non est tantum esse forme nec tantum esse materiae sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Vnde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia sed utrumque, quamuis huius esse suo modo forma sit causa (*De Ente*, c. II; p. 10.2-7).

However, the *De Ente et Essentia* does not develop the theme that being pertains to the composite. It shows that being is other than the thing's nature, is received by the thing as into a potency (c. IV; pp. 34.4-36.3), and is diverse in its various instances, while a specific or generic nature does not vary as nature in its different subjects (c. V; p. 37.18-21). The being that is always diverse is nevertheless regarded as universal — "illud esse uniuersale quo quelibet res formaliter est" (p. 38.1) — and as common (*esse commune*), though without any further explanation.

In the human soul, this being is sufficiently diverse to ensure individuation even after the soul is separated from matter:

> Et licet indiuiduatio eius ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse indiuiduatum nisi in

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[48] For the history of the gradual development of the linguistic view of metaphysical problems, see Maxwell John Charlesworth, *Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis* (Louvain, 1959).

> corpore cuius est actus, non tamen oportet quod, subtracto corpore, indiuiduatio pereat quia cum habeat esse absolutum ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse indiuiduatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet indiuiduatum: et ideo dicit Auicenna quod indiuiduatio animarum et multitudo dependet ex corpore quantum ad sui principium set non quantum ad sui finem (c. V; p.39.17-40.2).

The human soul enters into immediate composition with its being, though in the case of all other corporeal forms the being pertains not immediately to the form but to the composite.[49] The human soul's absolute being is such that it guarantees individuality even when the principle that is said to individuate the form, namely designated matter, has gone. In its inception that being may depend upon the occasion of the body, but it survives the union with matter and in surviving remains individual. Its individuality and so its diversity must therefore come principally from itself, rather than from the composite nature that receives it. But no further explanation is given in the *De Ente et Essentia* of the role played by the composite as such in accounting for the diversity of being.

In his commentary on the *Sentences*, however, the explanation is quite detailed. The aspect of being (*ratio entis*)[50] constitutes the subject of a single science, metaphysics, yet it is diversified in diverse things:

> ...in communi, sicut metaphysica, quae considerat omnia inquantum sunt entia, non descendens ad propriam cognitionem moralium, vel naturalium. Ratio enim entis, cum sit diversificata in diversis, non est sufficiens ad specialem rerum cognitionem (*In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a.2, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 10).

As in the *De Ente et Essentia*, the community and the diversity of being are stated side by side without any embarrassment. The doctrine is likewise firmly set in the distinction between essence and being:

> ...cum enim in omni creatura differat essentia et esse, non potest essentia communicari alteri supposito, nisi secundum aliud esse, quod est actus essentiae, et ideo oportet essentiam creatam communicatione dividi (*In I Sent.*, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m; I, 132).

When the essence or common nature is shared by several supposits, it has to participated according to other and other being. Because it has different being in every case, it is divided as often as it is participated. The difference or otherness of being in every instance becomes the reason for the division of the common essence among different supposits. Essence is regarded as the principle of unity, being is viewed as the principle of otherness or division.[51] The unifying principle, essence, and the diversifying principle, being, are known through two different intellectual operations. What is (*ens*) is grasped in the manner of a picture (*imaginatio intellectus*). As such it may well be complex in the way of a still life painting that consists of different and related elements; but it is not complex in the sense of exercising any engagement or variation in motion and time. It is regarded as though it were something steadily looked at, fixed in itself before the mind's eye as somehow a still and permanent unit. What is known through the other operation of the intellect however, is attained in the complex and dynamic fashion of a proposition in which something is declared to be or not to be, to be what it is or not to be what it is not:

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[49] "Unde in anima invenitur compositio 'esse' et 'quod est,' et non in aliis formis: quia ipsum esse non est formarum corporalium absolute, sicut eorum quae sunt, sed compositi." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1m; I,230.

[50] The aspect of being arises from the existential act that is other than the thing's essence: "... cum dicitur: *Diversum est esse, et quod est*, distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit. Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi, ..." *De Ver.*, I, 1, ad 3m in contr.; ed. Spiazzi, I, 4a.

> Primum enim quod cadit in imaginatione intellectus, est ens, sine quo nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu; sicut primum quod cadit in credulitate intellectus, sunt dignitates, et praecipue ista, contradictoria non esse simul vera: unde omnia alia includuntur quodammodo in ente unite et distincte, sicut in principio (*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 200).

The notion of "what is" (*ens*)[52] includes all things. It is therefore a unifying notion. Yet in it, to judge from the above reading of the text, all things remain distinct from one another. Each of them, according to what is attained in the other operation of the intellect, is what it is and is not what it is not.

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[51] "...quidditas generis vel speciei non communicatur secundum unum esse omnibus, sed solum secundum unam rationem communem." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, Solut.; I, 222. Cf. supra, n. 17.

[52] *Ens* is used equivocally by St. Thomas for both the act of being and the subject of being. On this topic see J. Owens "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas" *Mediaeval Studies* XX (1958) 2-10. Cf.: "... essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse." *De Ente* c. I; p. 4.15-16. "... esse est actus existentis, inquantum ens est." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 470. "... cum nomen entis imponatur ab esse, ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 2; I, 611. In texts like these, *ens* is used clearly enough in the sense of that which has being — "what is." It includes both being and essence, and in it, because of that being, the first principle of demonstration is grasped.: "... cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquod primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, ... ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nec aliquis potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellecto." *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 6, nº. 605.

In its being each is diverse from all others. In so far as they participate being, things are set apart from one another, even though in another way they are united through that participation.

The twofold operation of the intellect in attaining things is described in greater detail later in the same work:

> ...cum sit duplex operatio intellectus: una quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam Philosophus, III *De anima*, text. 21, nominat intelligentiam indivisibilium, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius (*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7 m; I, 489).

What is attained through the first-mentioned operation of the intellect (*imaginatio intellectus*) is now determined as the quiddity. This is obviously what was expressed by the term *ens* in the previous text. It continues to be regarded as something simple in the manner of a picture or intelligible form, something as it were flat and self-contained. It appears all together as a unit. It remains steady before the intellect's gaze. In that way it is considered indivisible, and so not as something complex. The thing's being, on the other hand, is grasped in more active fashion. It is not something presented in itself as a picture or form before the mind's eye. It is grasped rather by the actual joining or separating that is expressed by a proposition. From this viewpoint the quiddity as such is not something complex, but presents all its elements in the unity of a single stabilized picture or form. Yet the being that it enjoys can be known only by way of a complexity: "... quaelibet res incomplexa habet esse suum, quod non accipitur ab intellectu nisi per modum complexionis" (*ibid.*, p. 490). The thing's being, accordingly, presents itself to the intellect in the manner of a complexity.

In fact, as had been mentioned in the *De Ente et Essentia* (c. II; p. 10.2-4), a thing's being, at least in the sensible things from which human cognition takes its rise, is the being of a composite. It follows upon the composition of the matter and the form: "... esse consequitur compositionem materiae et formae."[53] "Composition" here seems meant in a rather dynamic sense. The essence with its various elements may be regarded as forming the one flat picture and from this viewpoint may be considered as incomplex in a way that allows it to be grasped by the first operation of the intellect; but the being that arises from the very composing of these elements cannot be grasped in that way. The being can be attained only as a complexity. It is not the finished product of the composition, the already accomplished union of matter and form, or of subject and specific and generic natures. That relation between them would be something fixed and settled. It would be attained by the first operation of the intellect. Rather, the second operation of the intellect grasps the existential uniting of the matter and form, or subject and nature, into the one single unit. The uniting lies in the being of the thing. In that sense it is dynamic, not flat like an image or picture. The radically different character of the two components of a thing, essence and being, requires accordingly the twofold operation of the intellect for knowledge of it:

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[53] *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; I, 555. Cf. *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 11, n°. 1900.

> Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in *III De anima*, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum.[54]

The compositions of matter and form, substance and accident, take place in being. So much is this so, that the being of these things, according to the above text, *consists* in such compositions, at least when the compositions are understood in a certain way. That way, as can be gathered from the text lies in the active uniting that corresponds in the thing to the dynamic composing in the intellect's act of affirmation. Such is the only type of being originally attained by the human intellect, and even the simplicity of the divine being has to be understood by it in the manner of a complexity: "Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo" (*In I Sent.*, d. 38, q.1, a.3, ad 2m; I, 904).

Since in the real world the composition of matter and form always takes place in designated dimensions,[55] the composition of the two in reality will always be that of an individual. The being that follows upon that composition and consists in that composition will likewise have to be individual. The real being of sensible things, therefore, will be individual because it is a composition that is individual. It will have to be new in every separate case. As a finished product, as a set and established relation of union between the components, the completed composition of essential elements may be regarded as a state in the essential order and so may be conceptualized after the fashion of an essence. But the actual joining or composing of the two elements is not an essence at all. It is something that takes place in being. In the real order this is obvious enough. If the death of an animal is understood as substantial change, it means that the matter in the animal acquires a new substantial form. Of itself, that matter was not determined to either form, the one lost or the one newly acquired. The composition of this particular form with this particular matter does not follow from the nature of either, but is in the order of being. In fact, the presence of primary matter is known through the requirement of an enduring subject for the change from one substantial form to another. The very way in which primary matter is attained by the intellect shows that of its nature it is not determined to the form it actually possesses; and reciprocally, the form is not of its nature determined to that matter, else it could never lose that particular matter. Moreover, the same form acquires new matter in the phenomena of nutrition and growth.

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[54] *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 903. Cf.: "... duplex est operatio intellectus: una quae dicitur intelligentia indivisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque quid est; alia vero, qua componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam formando, et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus, respondet. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, ... Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis, ..." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 3c; ed. Wyser (Fribourg & Louvain, 1948), p. 38.4-12.

[55] "Illi autem quidditati non debetur esse nisi per hoc quod suscepta est in hoc vel in illo." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, Solut.; I, 222. "Sed ista natura sic considerata, quamvis dicat compositum ex materia et forma, non tamen ex hac materia demonstrata determinatis accidentibus substante, in qua individuatur forma; ... *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; I, 555. See texts supra, n. 5. On the designation of matter, cf.: "Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est indiuiduationis principium, sed solum materia signata; et dico materiam signatam que sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur." *De Ente*, c. II; pp. 10.20-11.3.

The composition between matter and form in the real world, accordingly, is in the order of being. It is always between form and designated matter, and so is always individual — "unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuationem" (*Q. de An.*, I, 1, ad 2m; ed. Calcaterra-Centi, II, 284a). As a universal in the mind, human nature still consists of matter and form but not of designated matter. There it will have the being that follows upon this composition, the being of a universal, that is, cognitional being. Such universal matter can be joined to any specific form – man, horse, tree, stone and so on. Of itself it is determined to none of them specifically. It is composed with any one of them in the cognitional being it acquires in the intellect. Similarly the specific nature is not composed of itself with any particular individual, nor the genus with any definite species. That composing takes place in the intellect when it grasps the being of the thing.

Since the being of each thing follows upon and consists in the composition of its elements, the being of a man will be different from the being of a horse, and the being of this individual man will differ from the being of that individual man, as St. Thomas has stated in the *Summa Theologiae* (I, 3, 5c). The being in each case is diversified according to the composition. Where the composition is individual, as in the case of the sensible things in which human cognition begins, the being is individual. Each new composing of the elements is not the other, and so no one individual is the other. Being is diverse in every individual instance.

Besides the terms already seen in the texts from the commentary on *Sentences* describing the second operation of the intellect, namely *credulitas intellectus* and *fides*, the word "judgment" is also used in this context to denote the intellect's grasp of the thing's being.[56] The use of the term "judgment" and the frequent occurrence of "enuntiatio" and "enuntiabile" in these passages, show clearly enough that the problem in being discussed against the background of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione.* There "truth and falsity imply combination and separation" (*Int.*, 1, 16a12-13; Oxford tr.); but "there is no truth or falsity... unless 'is' or 'is not' is added, either in the present or in some other tense" (a17-18). This attaining of truth or falsity by the affirmation or denial of being is still expressed in English translation by the term "judgment": "spoken affirmations and denials are judgements expressed in words" (*Int.*, 14, 24b1-2; Oxford tr.). *Judicium* was the Latin translation used by St Thomas. It was understood by him explicitly in the sense of an act of cognition, an intellective act of apprehension by which the being of a thing was known.[57] For Aristotle, such judgments were wrapped in the

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[56] "... de re judicat, ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, Solut.; I, 491. "... judicium de veritate sequitur judicium de esse rei et de intellectu." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, Solut.; I, 495.

[57] "Cognoscere autem praedictam conformitatis habitudinem nihil est aliud quam iudicare ita esse in re vel non esse: quod est componere et dividere; et ideo intellectus non cognoscit veritatem, nisi componendo vel dividendo per suum iudicium." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 3, nº. 9. It is likewise called *apprehension*, though an apprehension that consists in a composition instead of an incomplex cognition: "*Compositio* quidem quando intellectus comparat unum conceptum alteri, quasi apprehendens *coniunctionem* aut *identitatem* rerum, quarum sunt conceptiones; *divisio* autem, quando sic comparat unum conceptum alteri, ut apprehendat res esse diversas." Ibid., nº. 4. "... ratio veritatis in duobus consisit: in esse rei, et in apprehensione virtutis cognoscitivae proportionata ad esse rei... . quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum, quo formaliter est, et unusquisque intellectus participat lumen per quod recte de re judicat, ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, Solut.; I, 491. "Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo;..." *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2m; I, 904. Cf. "... Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, ..." Ibid., Solut.; p. 903. "... secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere,..." *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 6, nº. 605 (supra, n. 52).

L. M. Régis, *Epistemology* (New York, 1959), p. 321, maintains that the judgment is "an act in no way resembling apprehension." Fr. Régis is approaching the problem from the epistemological viewpoint, in which loom large the questions of error, where the intellect judges affirmatively of being that is not there to be grasped, and of demonstrated conclusions and of faith where the intellect correctly judges being that it does not immediately apprehend. In apprehending the being of things through its composing, the intellect plays an active role — "anima vero in quantum de rebus iudicat, non patitur a rebus, sed magis quodammodo agit" (*De Ver.*, I, 10c; ed. Spiazzi, I, 20a), as Fr. Régis (p. 317, n. 11) aptly notes, and is able to push its activity further than its immediate apprehension. But the notion of time. They involved a verb, and a verb by definition (*Int.*, 3, 16b6) carried the connotation of time: "There can be no affirmation or denial without a verb; for the expressions 'is', 'will be,' 'was,' 'is coming to be' and the like are verbs according to our definition, since besides their specific meaning they convey the notion of time" (*Int.*, 10, 19b12-14; Oxford tr.). It need hardly be surprising, then, to find that time enters deeply into St. Thomas' discussion of the composition of a thing's elements in being.

In the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, the being of sensible things, in spite of its unity,[58] is described as intimately involving the divisive consequences of time: "Esse autem nostrum habet aliquid sui extra se: deest enim aliquid quod jam de ipso praeteriit, et quod futurum est" (*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; I, 195). Being as encountered in the sensible world, even though it is one, never brings itself together in time. At any given moment throughout the main part of its course, some of itself has already perished in the past, while more of itself is yet to be in the future. Some of it is definitely outside itself. It may in fact be called imperfect if it does not complete its full course in time: "... et sic dicitur esse imperfectum cui deest aliquid de spatio durationis debitae; sicut dicimus vitam hominis qui moritur in pueritia, imperfectam vitam" (ibid., q. 2, a.1, ad 5m; p. 203).

In strict speech, of course, it is not the being of the thing that endures or is imperfect, but rather the thing itself on account of its being. Being in sensible things is never a subject, yet to be spoken about it has to be represented as subject. Continual therapy is necessary to prevent deception by the necessities of language and of logic. With the regular practice of such therapy, however, metaphysical discussion can be carried on, and being can be thought

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immediate apprehension of being is fundamental to it and is the starting point for its further activities. Though "action, passion, and *existere* are always *acts* whose perfective elements, concept verbs, are always predicates par excellence" (Régis, p. 320), action and passion are predicamental acts that are posterior as accidents to the thing's substance, while existence is an act that is prior to the thing's substance, and is grasped by the intellect in that priority. From the viewpoint of time, the intellect knows the thing simultaneously according to its essence by simple apprehension and according to its existence by judgment. Metaphysically, the judgment is prior, just as the being to which it corresponds is prior in the thing. From the logical viewpoint of a "whole constructed by the intellect" (Régis, p. 319), subject and predicate, even the predicate "being," are prior as the materials for a logical synthesis in the judgment. But these logical and epistemological considerations to not at all preclude basic agreement with the assertion "to say that the thing's *existere* is the direct object of judgment is to say that judgment is the act of apprehending this existence" (Régis, p. 322). On the problems involved, see E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1952), Appendix, pp. 221-227.

[58] "Sed omne esse in se consideratum indivisibile est, ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, arg. 4; I, 466.

about and spoken about. Logic requires that being, when reasoned about or discussed, receive the status of a subject. So regarded, the being of material things may be said to be measured by time:

> Illud enim quod habet potentiam non recipientem actum totum simul, mensuratur tempore: hujusmodi enim habet esse terminatum et quantum ad modum participandi, quia esse recipitur in aliqua potentia, et non est absolutum quantum ad partes durationis, quia habet prius et posterius (*In I Sent.*, d. 8., q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 205).

Such being has durational parts before and after any given moment. It is not absolutely in itself as regards duration. It has parts spread out before and after its actuality, an actuality that occurs only in the present moment. It is far from all together, but rather is spread out according to the measure of time. As a result, all of it except the present is non-existent, is not. The being of material things is only in the present instance of time. Not only is it restricted to an individual composing of matter and form, but also it is doing that composing in a particular moment of time.

Indivisible in itself, then, a thing's being is spread out according to the measure of time. But what does this mean? Upon what is the spread in time really founded? The spread and the measure are based on cosmic motion. To the argument that the indivisibility of being requires an indivisible measure like eternity,[59] St. Thomas answers that the spread arises not from the nature of being but rather from the cosmic motion to which the being of material things is subject:

> ... esse rerum temporalium non mensuratur tempore nisi prout subjacet variationi ex motu caeli. ... Et inde est quod omnia quae ordinatur ad motum caeli sicut ad causam, cujus primo mensura est tempus, mensurantur tempore (*In 1 Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4; I, 469).

The being of temporal things, accordingly, is subject to continual change (*variatio*) along with the regular motion of the heavens. The substance of a sensible thing remains the same throughout all this motion, but its being is continually changing. Its being is continually perishing in successive parts. It remains only in the present, which in turn is giving way for the immediately future part:

> Unde sicut est idem mobile secundum substantiam in toto motu, variatur tamen secundum esse, sicut dicitur quod Socrates in foro est alter a seipso in domo; ita nunc est etiam idem secundum substantiam in tota successione temporis, variatum tantum secundum esse, scilicet secundum rationem quam accepit prioris et posterioris. Sicut autem motus est actus

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[59] "Cum igitur esse temporalium mensuretur tempore, videtur quod tempus sit mensura indivisibilis et permanens, et sic non differat ab aeternitate." Ibid.

> ipsius mobilis inquantum mobile est; ita esse est actus existentis, inquantum ens est. Unde quacumque mensura mensuretur esse alicujus rei, ipsi rei existenti respondet nunc ipsius durationis, quasi mensura (*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 470-471).

The thing remains the same in substance throughout all the motion, but continually changes in being. In being it varies from instant to instant, while remaining all the while the same thing. A man like Socrates stays the same individual, though he changes in being during the time he moves from place to place. His being is continually changing with the motion in which it is involved. In the constitution of time, of course, the motion is what is real. The formal character of time comes only from the work of the intellect: "... et similiter est de tempore, quod habet fundamentum in motu, scilicet prius et posterius ipsius motus; sed quantum ad id quod est formale in tempore, scilicet numeratio, completur per operationem intellectus numerantis."[60]

Sensible things, then, including men, have their being dependent upon continued motion. Matter is the principle of mobility as well as of individuality — "omne quod habet materiam mobile est" (*In I Phys.*, lect. 1, no. 3). The being that you had one minute ago is gone, though you remain the same person. The being that you will have an hour from now has not yet come, does not yet exist, if one may speak subject to the required therapy. As a result of this inevitable commitment to time, to know any individual thing properly as individual is to know its being in time:

> ... secundum opinionem Avicennae et ex dictis Algazelis, videtur sequi quod Deus enuntiabilia nesciat, et praecipue in rebus singularibus; quia ponunt quod scit singularia tantum universaliter, id est secundum quod sunt in causis universalibus, et non particulariter, id est in natura particularitatis suae. Unde concedunt quod scit hoc individuum et illud; sed non scit hoc individuum nunc esse et postmodum non esse; sicut si aliquis sciret eclipsim quae futura est cras in suis causis universalibus, non tamen sciret an modo esset vel non esset, nisi sensibiliter videret (*In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 903).

To know any singular thing properly as singular (*in natura particularitatis suae*) you have to know its being in time (*nunc esse et postmodum non esse*). If you did not grasp its being in time, through sensation, you might know this or that individual, but only according to universal knowledge. Its being at any given moment is conditioned by time, and to know it as properly individual is to know it as existing in that particular time. Time so enters the individuality of every sensible thing that to grasp it as individual is to grasp it as in a definite instant of time. The divine mind knows all individuals not just in a causality that abstracts from time, but in their temporal conditions here and now. In consequence the divine intelligence knows all the conditions that pertain to the thing through both matter and form:

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[60] *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Solut.; I, 486. Cf. "Quorumdam enim esse subiectum est mutationi; et horum duratio tempore mensuratur,..." *In de Div. Nom.*, c. V, lect. 1, n°. 627 (ed. Pera).

> ... forma quae est in mente artificis non est causa totius quod est in artificiato, sed tantum formae; et ideo esse hanc domum, et caetera quae consequuntur naturam per formam artis, nescit artifex nisi sensibiliter accipiat: sed idea quae est in mente divina, est causa omnis ejus quod in re est; und per ideam non tantum cognoscit naturam rei, sed etiam hanc rem esse in tali tempore, et omnes conditiones quae consequuntur rem vel ex parte materiae vel ex parte formae (*In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1m; I, 904).

The being of a thing, therefore, has to be grasped in all the complexity of its present circumstances. In a sensible thing it is strictly limited to the here and now,[61] as far as its actuality is concerned. It is limited to the "here," because it consists in the existential uniting of individuated components. It is restricted to the "now," because that uniting is taking place in thepresent instant of time; as it was in the past it no longer is, and as it will be in the future it does not yet exist.

The same doctrine regarding the being of sensible things continues through the later period of St Thomas' writings. In the commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the being that is other than the essence of a thing is as it were constituted by the principles of the essence — "quasi constituitur per principia essentiae" (*In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, no. 558). This being is known by way of an intellectual composition that is conditioned by time, for it is being that occurs in a determined time:

> Nam ens quod significat compositionem propositionis est praedicatum accidentale, quia compositio fit per intellectum secundum determinatum tempus. Esse autem in hoc tempore vel in illo, est accidentale praedicatum (*In X Metaph.*,, lect. 3, no. 1982).

The being that is expressed in a proposition is seen as occurring in a definite instant of time. From this occurrence in a particular point of time, the accidental character of that being is established.

The composition in which the being itself consists had already been emphasized: "Esse autem, in quo consistit compositio intellectus, ut affirmatio, compositionem quamdam et unionem indicat" (*In IX Metaph.*, lect. 11, no. 1900).

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[61] In the *De Principio Individuationis*, this is expressed as follows: "Aliud est in quo salvatur ratio individui apud nos, determinatio scilicet ejus ad certas particulas temporis et loci, quia proprium est esse sibi hic et nunc, et haec determinatio debetur sibi ratione quantitatis determinatae." *Opusc.*, V, 196 (ed. Mandonnet).

As had been mentioned in the commentary on the *Sentences*, being consists in a composition of a certain kind. Since being is other than essence, the composition in which it consists will have to be outside the essential order and so will not be a predicamental relation of union or anything else in the manner of essence. In sensible things, which are composites of matter and form, the being arises from the composing parts: "Sed esse compositorum surgit ex componentibus" (ibid., no. 1903). This was explained as holding for both substantial and accidental being (n^os^. 1896-1902). In the substance of sensible things there is the physical composition of form with matter, and a logical composition that resembles it, the composition of nature with individual:

> Cum autem intellectus compositionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius: unde accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenentur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam, aut eius quod se habet per modum formae et materiae vel etiam compositio accidentis ad subiectum, respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis, compositioni, quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce. Sicut cum dico, Socrates est homo, veritas huius enunciationis causatur ex compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hic homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa veritatis est compositio albedinis ad subiectum: et similiter in aliis (*In IX Metaph.*, lect. 11, n°. 1898).

This means that the composition of the substantial as well as of the accidental components of a thing takes place in being. With regard to accidents, it is not hard to see. There is no reason in a man's nature as human nature why he should be white. Human nature also allows the colors yellow, black, brown, and red. That human nature and whiteness be actually joined together, is a fact of being, not of essence. But the same holds for substantial composition. That a particular substantial form should be joined to its matter, is a question of being. Its matter can be joined to another substantial form successively, for matter functions as the subject that changes from one form to another. The union between matter and form is in being. From the composition of the two the being arises, viewed from this standpoint. Neither the form is, nor the matter is, properly speaking, but the composite of both. It is the actual composition of the parts that corresponds to and causes the truth in the proposition, for that composition in the thing is composition in being. It is not a still life picture that lies all spread out at once before the mind, but the dynamic existential uniting that is the being of the thing, grasped by the act of judgment. To accept the actual composition is to accept the one as *being* in the other — *in alio existens.*

Likewise in the commentary on the *Perihermeneias*, the being that is expressed in the proposition intimately involves time. The operation by which the intellect composes and divides is distinguished as in the other works from the operation by which it grasps the essence in itself and as an indivisible.[62] The proposition signifies being.[63] But this being, in which the judgment of the intellect is expressed, is added to the subject in a definite time. Simply taken, it is restricted to the present time:

> ... quando additur *esse* vel *non esse*, per quae exprimitur iudicium intellectus. Potest autem addi *esse* vel *non esse*, vel secundum praesens tempus, quod est esse vel non esse in *actu*, et ideo hoc dicitur esse *simpliciter*; vel secundum tempus praeteritum aut futurum, quod non est esse simpliciter, sed *secundum quid*; ut cum dicitur aliquid fuisse vel futurum esse (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 3, no. 13).

The being of things in the past is only in the memory, and the being of things in the future is known only in their causes. What actually exists is in the present and is perceptible through the senses:

> ...anima in componendo et dividendo necesse habet adiungere tempus, ut dicitur in III *De anima*; consequens est quod sub eius cognitione cadant res sub ratione praesentis, praeteriti et futuri. Et ideo praesentia cognoscit tanquam actu existentia et sensu aliqualiter perceptibilia; praeterita autem cognoscit ut memorata; futura autem non cognoscit in seipsis, quia nondum sunt, sed cognoscere ea potest in causis suis (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 14, no. 19).

The being that is attained in the second operation of the intellect, accordingly, has to be grasped under the aspect of time, whether present, past or future. Actual being, or being as it is simply understood, occurs only in the present time.

Just as in the other works, being involves the composition of form and subject, whether that composition be substantial or accidental. To signify that a form is present in a subject, the verb "is" is used. It signifies according to time, as outlined in the text just quoted. Aristotle is interpreted in the sense that being is in this way the actuality of every form:

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[62] "Sicut dicit Philosophus in III *De Anima*, duplex est operatio intellectus: Una quidem quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essentiam uniuscuiusque in seipsa; alia est operatio intellectus scilicet componentis et dividentis." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 1, nº. 1. "Ubi oportet intelligere quod una duarum operationum intellectus est indivisibilium *intelligentia*: in quantum scilicet intellectus intelligit absolute cuiusque rei *quidditatem* sive *essentiam* per seipsam, puta *quid* est homo vel *quid* album vel *quid* aliud huiusmodi. Alia vero operatio intellectus est, secundum quod huiusmodi simplicia concepta simul *componit* et *dividit*." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 3, nº. 3.

[63] "... virtus affirmationis et negationis, scilicet significatum eius, quod est esse vel non esse, quod est naturaliter prius enunciatione. ... Cum igitur significare *esse* sit proprium affirmationis, ... *affirmatio est enunciatio alicuius de aliquo*, per quod significatur *esse*; ..." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 8, nº. 21.

> Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum EST consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam EST, simpliciter dictum, significat *in actu esse*; et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum EST, vel *simpliciter* vel *secundum quid*: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum EST significat compositionem (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, no. 22).

This text states explicitly that the actuality signified by the verb "being" is more than just a formal union that would pertain to the essential order, whether substantial or accidental. The composing is a further actuality, over and above the whole order of form. Though the verb "is" signifies the actual composition of form with subject, the notion of "composition" is not uppermost in what it signifies, but rather accompanies the aspect that it principally signifies. What it signifies first and foremost is the most basic of all actualities in the thing. That is the being of the thing, and in sensible things it consists in an existential composition. In expressing the being of the thing, the verb "is" signifies that "composition" aspect concomitantly, and so in Aristotelian phraseology may be said to "consignify" it.

In a word, the two aspects, composition and being, are both present in any such uniting of essential components, either in reality or in cognition. They are two aspects of the same actuality in sensible things. But of the two, the priority is held by being. There is composition because there is being. The composition is existential because "being" is its absolutely prior characteristic. Without the composing, of course, there could be no sensible being, for there the being consists in the composing. In one sense, indeed, the being may be said to follow upon the composing and to arise from the composition, in correspondence with the Thomistic technique that allows being to follow upon form in one order of causality even though being is absolutely prior to form.[64] But from the viewpoint of actuality pure and simple, the being comes first.[65] The being as it proceeds from its efficient cause results thereby in its own determination, or better, if one may be permitted to use the expression, its self-determination,[66] to conditions of here and now. If it did not result in this self-determination, which is an essence other than itself, it could not proceed from an efficient cause; it would be something in its own right, it would be that which is, and so subsistent, uncaused being. Where the self-determination is the essence of a material thing, this self-determination is conditioned by matter, the principle both of individuation and of mobility. The being, in absolute priority as act, unites the matter and form in existential composition according to these conditions of place and time, and thereby is its own diversification not only in the individuality of designated matter, but also in the durational particularity of each successive and ever fleeting moment of time.

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[64] See J. Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, XX (1958), 37-39.

[65] See supra, n. 23.

From the viewpoint of logical construction, subject and predicate are regarded as the prior elements in a proposition. They are regarded as already had by the mind through simple apprehension, and then as joined or separated through the act of judgment. In logical analysis, consequently, the incomplex notions of the subject and of the predicate are given the more basic role, and their composition or separation becomes a subsequent function. Since the two operations of the intellect have been traditionally described in logical setting of the *Perihermeneias* (1-5), with its concern for truth and falsity, they have been named according to the order in which they are viewed by the logician. The apprehension of incomplex objects or of things according to their essence is called the first operation of the intellect, and the apprehension of things in the complexity of their being is called the second operation of the intellect. From the logician's standpoint that order is correct, but in metaphysics it can be the occasion of a far-reaching illusion. In a finite thing there is no possibility of having an essence without existence or an existence without essence. The two have to go together. The acts of the intellect by which they are grasped correspond to them and likewise have to go together. There is no possibility of grasping a thing according to its essence in simple apprehension without simultaneously grasping it according to its being, either real or cognitional as the case may be. Simple apprehension and judgment, consequently, always accompany each other. But just as in the thing it is being that enjoys the absolute priority, so in the activity of the intellect it is judgment that has the priority, in its sense of the knowldege of the thing according to the thing's being. When the logician gives priority to the incomplex nature as conceived in his mind, he is not at all concerned with the cognitional being enjoyed by that nature at the moment, being that he simultaneously grasps as he regards it in his mind, or with its real being if he regards it in the outside world —

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[66] See supra, n. 30.

"Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei."[67] He takes for granted that the subject and predicate already have being, and devotes himself to examining the function they have in his constructions. But the metaphysician, in St. Thomas' view, is primarily concerned with that being in its priority to the essence. For the metaphysician the judgment that a thing exists means that the thing has been attained according to its being and according to its essence, in their respective priorities of act and formal determination. It does not mean, for him, that he has taken two incomplex notions, namely thing and being, and then joined them together in a complex construct. In this doctrine the priority of synthesis to conceptualization is as operative as in Kant; though it corresponds to, and for truth has to be dependent upon, the synthetizing priority of being in the thing. Likewise the stability of essences is firmly placed in reality itself, not just in separate snapshots taken by the intellect; while the deepest reality in sensible things, their being, is immersed just as thoroughly as with Bergson in the ever changing flux of time.

On account of its absolute priority, then, being provides its own diversification when it actuates a mobile substance in time and place. As it has to provide its own self-determination in its particular essence, so in material things it diversifies itself in each new existential composition and at each successive moment. The matter and form that it joins together in making them be, the specific and generic natures that it unites with the individual, and even the fixed relations of one to the other, may as essences have their own universality and eternity;[68] but the actual composing takes place in a definite designation of matter and at the present moment of time. The being is diverse in every instance. The only being that is directly known by the human intellect is the being of material things. From them the intellect has to reason to the proportional diversification of being in immaterial substances through specific natures and eviternity, and to the unicity and eternity of subsistent being through its pure simplicity. But from the being that it directly knows, the intellect has sufficient data to show how any act of being that proceeds from an efficient cause thereby diversifies itself from any and every other act of being.

IV

If being, though, is so radically diverse in its every instance, how can it be the most common of all predicates? "Being" is a predicate that can be applied to all things without exception, just as "corporeal" can be predicated of all sensible things. It is conceptualized after the fashion of an incomplex essence, like animality or corporeity. In this guise it is made the subject of assertions, as has been done throughout the course of this paper. It has to be so conceptualized if one is to reason about it or speak about it. How is this possible?

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[67] *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 17, n. 1658. Cf. supra, nn. 44 and 4.

[68] On the eternity of the nature in its absolute consideration, as grounded in its being in the divine intellect, see *Quodl.*, VIII, 1, 1; ed. Spiazzi, pp. 158-159.

There are, accordingly, two parts to the problem. The more basic is that of the way in which being, attained originally through the judgment and not through simple conceptualization, can be subsequently conceptualized on the model of an incomplex nature. The second concerns how it becomes, when so conceptualized, the most common of all concepts even though it is radically diverse in every instance. The first part of the problem has to be seen against the general background of all human thought. The intellect resolves all its conceptions into "that which is," the composite in which all its cognition originates — *ens*. To understand anything, to reason about anything, to speak about anything, the intellect has to represent it as something that is. It has to represent it as a nature that has being. Even the two entitative principles of what is (*ens*), namely being and essence, have to be represented each as "something that is," as an *ens*. Each is simpler than the composite to which together they give rise, but each has to be represented in terms of that composite and *never* in terms of itself. The essence just in itself has no being, it is actually nothing. Yet to think of it in contrast to its being, the intellect has to represent it as a being. Its being (*esse*), likewise, is not something. Only in the unique case of subsistent being, is being a thing. Yet the intellect has to represent created being as something, as an existent, as a being, if it is to reason about it or speak about it.

Represented in this way, being is conceived as something that exists. It is represented, therefore, as an existent nature or essence. If the term "concept" may be used today to denote the grasping of a thing according to its essence,[69] one may say that being is represented in such a concept. But unlike the concept of a nature, the concept of being cannot be originally obtained through abstraction. The intellect may abstract successively from individuating notes, and from specific and generic traits up to the highest genus, but after that nothing more can be abstracted. Being, if so abstracted, would be the equivalent of nothing. As being is grasped by way of dynamic composition, any attempt to "abstract" here would actually be to separate, and so would result in a judgment of not-being instead of being.[70] The two would become confused in each other. But the judgment is an act of knowing. Through it the intellect knows the thing's being, in entitative union with the thing. To separate the two, and to represent the being, so known, in contrast to the thing, it has to represent that being as a further nature. To understand accidents in contrast to their substances, it has to represent those accidents themselves as substances. It has to think of "walking" and "talking" as though they were things in themselves, just as it represents the color "white" as "whiteness." It knows "being" as an act through judgment, and so can represent it under the general concept of act, even though it did not originally attain it through a concept.[71] It can conceive it as the act of all acts. In analyzing for logical purposes its knowledge that Socrates exists, it can represent being as *something* that is said of or predicated of the subject Socrates, and of any other subject whatsoever, even of that act itself[72] when standing as the subject of a proposition.

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[69] On St. Thomas' own use of "concept" or "conception" in regard to the judgment, see E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2nd, ed. (Toronto, 1952), Appendix, pp. 222-223.

[70] See *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 3c; ed. Wyser, pp. 38.13-39.10. Cf.: "Neither the concept of being as a *noun* nor that of being as a *verb* can be the result of an abstraction: for 'being'

The other part of the problem is less difficult. No matter how individual or restricted anything is, when it is represented in a concept by the simple apprehension of the intellect it is represented as universal. Even the concept "individual" is universal, and can be predicated of any singular thing.[73]

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as a noun implies essentially *habens esse* or *quod est*, and 'being' as a verb implies necessarily the subject of existence whose act it is." L.-M. Régis, "Gilson's *Being and Some Philosophers*," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVIII (1951), 125.

[71] "Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab aliquo est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum in eo est est actus eius." *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 35.19-21. "Sed quia non habet esse a seipso angelus, ideo se habet in potentia ad esse quod accipit a Deo, et sic esse a Deo acceptum comparatur ad essentiam eius simplicem ut actus ad potentiam." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 4, ad 4m; ed. Wyser, m. 51. 4-7.

[72] "... sicut esse rei dicitur ens: non quia eius sit aliquid aliud esse; sed quia per hoc esse res esse dicitur, ... eius esse non dicitur ens per aliquod esse aliud ab ipso: ..." *De Ver.*, XXI, 5, ad 8m.; ed. Spiazzi, I, 386a. So, for purposes of logic, the subject and its being are represented in separate concepts, and judgment is regarded as a *subsequent* synthesis of them both: "... an act of judgment, whose soul is neither the subject nor quiddity, nor even the verb or the act of existing but the *synthesis* of the two, ..." L.-M. Régis, *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVIII (1951), 125.

[73] "Sed individuum dupliciter potest significari vel per nomen secundae intentionis, sicut hoc nomen 'individuum' vel 'singulare,' quod non significat rem singularem, sed intentionem singularitatis; vel per nomen primae intentionis, quod significat rem, cui convenit intentio particularitatis; ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 563. "... hoc nomen *persona* est commune communitate rationis, non sicut genus vel species, sed sicut *individuum vagum*. Nomina enim generum vel specierum, ut *homo* vel *animal*, sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas naturas communes; non autem intentiones naturarum communium, quae significantur his nominibus *genus* vel *species*. Sed individuum vagum, ut *aliquis homo*, significat naturam communem cum determinato modo existendi qui competit singularibus, ut scilicet sit per se existens distinctum ab alii. Sed in nomine *singularis designati*, significatur determinatum distinguens; sicut in nomine Socratis haec caro et hoc os." *ST*, I, 30, 4c. So the

As a universal it is a concept of the second intention, while in the first intention an individual is signified by terms like "Paul." "Being," as originally known in the judgment, antecedes all such concepts of itself, and so when represented in a concept of the first intention can be common even though what was originally known is restricted to the here and now. As common, however, it can exist only in the intellect, just as "animal" in its universal status can exist only in the intellect.[74] Hence the being that is isolated and represented by way of an incomplex concept is not the *esse tantum*[75] that is reached by tracing the finite act of being to its source in subsistent being. In that demonstration the starting point is the being that is actually known by judgment in a particular existent thing and that is caused efficiently by some other thing and ultimately by a cause that is *esse tantum.* Hence St. Thomas repeatedly insists that *esse commune* is not *esse divinum.* Divine being excludes all possibility of addition, but common being allows the restrictive addition of limiting essences. Even though each new act of being is diverse in itself, it is the effect of the one common cause. Moreover, it is the participation, through efficient though not through formal causality, of the one nature of being.[76] This is amply sufficient to render being analogously common to all things. Yet in its conceptualization after the fashion of an incomplex nature, being inevitably loses the complexity in which its actual force consists. The *esse tantum* that is demonstrated as the first efficient cause of the being which is actually judged in things, literally *is* existence, subsistent in itself; but the *esse commune* that is the incomplex conceptualization of all being, merely *has* existence through an act of cognitional being that is other than

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Aristotelian categories "where" and "when," though denoting a highly particularized circumstance, can be universalized as place and time, and in this way can be defined. Epicurus (*First Letter*, in Diogenes Laertius, X, 72) was aware of the difficulty involved in representing time in a universal concept, and would not allow it to be investigated by reference to any *prolepsis,* as were the other accidents. Kant's stand that space and time are not universal concepts but pure intuitions is well-known.

[74] "Multo igitur minus et ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res existentes nisi in intellectu solum." *CG*, I, 26; XIII, 82a4-6.

[75] *De Ente*, c. IV, p. 34.24-26; p. 35.14-18; c. V, p. 37.22.

[76] "Invenitur enim in omnibus rebus natura entitatis, ... Ergo oportet quod ab aliquo esse habeant, et oportet devenire ad aliquid cujus natura sit ipsum suum esse; alias in infinitum procederetur, et hoc est quod dat esse omnibus, nec potest esse nisi unum, cum natura entitatis sit unius rationis in omnibus secundum analogiam; unitas enim causati requirit unitatem in causa per se; ..." *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a . 1, Solut.; II, 12-13. Cf. "The metaphysical notion of being, therefore, is analogously common to all beings, in all of whom existence is found properly proportioned to, and as the actuality of, their natures, ... It is a notion which is not reached by abstraction of any quiddity or nature, and which is not knowable, therefore, by any simple apprehension of essence." L. J. Eslick, *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXIV (1957), 256.

itself. A common nature like "animal," because originally attained as a nature through conceptualization, can retain the same force as a nature both in cognitional and in real existence. "Being," on the other hand, because grasped originally as an act other than the sensible thing's nature, cannot retain its original force of giving being when it is conceptualized after the fashion of an incomplex nature.[77] Even though it is explicitly represented as infinite in content, it cannot furnish any ground in this conceptualization for reasoning to the real existence of being as a nature in God. The ontological argument for the existence of God is not possible in the doctrine of St. Thomas.

V

The fundamental teachings of St. Thomas on being, then, amply justify the twofold series of assertions on its diversity and community. Being is diverse in every instance, yet is most common to all things. All things are diverse in being, yet they coincide in being. Being as a nature cannot be diverse. As subsistent in God, it is unique.[78] But it can be participated by other things, and diversified in them.[79] As a nature, being contains all perfections and all actual determinations in its own ineffable unity. When participated, it provides the actuality of each determination and each diversification through the particular essence that is its own self-determination. In sensible things it is the existential composing of the essential parts according to designated dimensions and at the present moment of time. It thereby diversifies itself under the conditions of here and now. Known originally through the active engagement of the judgment, it is subsequently conceptualized as the first and basic actuality of things. So conceptualized it extends analogously to all things, even to its own determinations in their very role of determining it. It is therefore of unlimited content as well as extent. But the price paid is drastic. When represented as transcendentally common in the manner of an incomplex notion, it does not convey the complexity in which the being of a thing actually consists. To signify the actual existing, it has to be referred back in every separate instance to a judgment in which being is grasped in its actual diversity. Where it cannot be referred back to such an immediate apprehension of being, for example in the case of the divine existence, being, in its simple and common conceptualization, is detached from its actual meaning. As common it presents only a pale and infecund shadow of the unfathomable act of all acts and perfection of all perfections, the act that subsists as a nature in God and is participated as an act other than a nature in everything else.

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[77] "... scilicet ipsum verbum quod est *esse*, et verbum infinitum quod est *non esse*; quorum neutrum per se dictum est significativum veritatis vel falsitatis in re; unde multo minus alia. Vel potest intelligi hoc generaliter dici de omnibus verbis. Quia enim dixerat quod verbum non significat si *est* res vel *non est*, hoc consequenter manifestat, quia nullum verbum est significativum *esse* rei vel *non esse*, idest quod res sit vel non sit. Quamvis enim omne verbum finitum implicet *esse*, quia currere est currentem esse, ..." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, n°. 18. "... verbum EST, quod secundum se dictum, non significat *aliquid* esse, licet significet *esse*. ... illa compositio, quam significat hoc verbum EST, non potest intelligi sine componentibus ..." Ibid., n°. 21.

[78] Unlike a common nature, being is its own primary instance. No common nature can in any way be an instance of itself. Cf.: "Proper universals are not instantiations of themselves, perfect or otherwise." R. E. Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues," *The Philosophical Review*, LXIX (1960), 147.

[79] "Quamvis autem creaturis omnibus communiter det esse, tamen cuilibet creaturae dat proprium modum essendi; et sic... invenitur esse diversimode in diversis, et in unoquoque secundum proprium modum eius." *De Ver.*, X, 11, ad 8m; ed. Spiazzi, I, 218a.

The Problemata Determinata XLIII ascribed to Albertus Magnus (1271)*

JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, O.P.

IN 1930 Father M.-D. Chenu, O. P., made an important discovery in the public library at Bordeaux.[1] In codex 131 of the library he discovered the reply of Robert Kilwardby[2] to forty-three diverse questions. These questions were readily identified, for an identical list was sent to St. Thomas by John of Vercelli, Master General of the Dominican Order. The questions, as we know, reached St. Thomas during the celebration of the solemn Mass at Saint Jacques on April 1, 1271; they were answered (*respondere curavi*) on the following day, which happened to be Holy Thursday.[3] The realization that Robert Kilwardby, then Provincial of England, had been consulted by the Master General concerning the same questions did much to raise his prestige among historians. The designation of Kilwardby as *magnus magister in theologia* appended to the acts of the General Chapter of Milan, 1270,[4] "contrairement à toutes les habitudes,"[5] seemed to take on greater significance.

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* Since the writing of this introductory study there has appeared the masterful announcement of the new manuscript by Father Daniel A. Callus, O. P., "Une œuvre récemment découverte de S. Albert le Grand: *De XLIII problematibus ad Magistrum Ordinis* (*1271*)," in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, XLIV (1960), 243-261. Although it was not possible for me to utilize this excellent study, I am pleased to note that on all major points Father Callus and I are in complete agreement. Discussion of minor differences of opinion will have to await a future opportunity.

[1] M.-D. Chenu, O. P., "Les Réponses de s. Thomas et de Kilwardby à la consultation de Jean de Verceil (1271)," in *Mélanges Mandonnet* (Bibl. Thomiste, XIII), Paris 1930, vol. I, pp. 191-222. See also his study and emended text, "Aux origines de la 'Science Moderne'," in *Revue des Sc. Phil. et Théol.*, XXIX (1940), 206-217.

[2] "Ista que sequuntur fecit frater robertus de anglia, ordine predicatorum, archiepiscopus Cantab. <*sic*> postmodum cardinalis." Bordeaux MS 131, fol. 256^{rb}; quoted by Chenu, *loc. cit.*, p. 193.

[3] St. Thomas, *Responsio ad fr. Ioannem Vercellensem de articulis XLII*, in *Opuscula Theologica*, ed. R. A. Verardo, O. P. (Turin: Marietti, 1954), I, 211-218. On the date and occasion of this work, see J. Destrez, "La Lettre de saint Thomas d'Aquin dite Lettre au Lecteur de Venise d'après la tradition manuscrite," in *Mélanges Mandonnet, ed. cit.*, I, 117-126.

[4] *Acta Capitulorum Generalium* (MOP, III), ed. B. M. Reichert, O.P., Rome 1898, I, 156 note.

[5] P. Mandonnet, O. P., *Bulletin Thomiste*, III (1930), 136 note 1. Mandonnet, following Chenu (*op. cit.*, I, 192 note 1), implies that this designation was used by the General Chapter

The reply of Kilwardby should have led historians to expect a third master in theology consulted in the same matter. Medieval custom surely required that an uneven number of examiners be consulted in any grave matter. There are too many examples of examinations, commissions and committees composed of three, five or seven consultors to doubt that this was a universal as well as a reasonable practice. However, in a review of Chenu's work Father Mandonnet diverted the attention of historians from this expectation.[6] He suggested that St. Thomas' reply was destined for the General Chapter meeting at Montpellier on Pentecost, 1271, at which Kilwardby was present. Mandonnet, convinced that Kilwardby "combat les vues de saint Thomas avec acharnement dans ses réponses,"[7] maintained that the English Provincial wrote his replies at this Chapter after examining the letter of St. Thomas. Mandonnet's ingenious theory has been widely accepted. Today with the discovery of a third set of replies we are in a better position to evaluate the questionnaire of the Master General and to reconstruct the events which took place.[8]

A third reply to these same questions has been discovered in St. Paul's Cathedral Library, London. The reply of St. Albert the Great is preserved in codex 9 (40 B. 14), fol. 17-21ᵛ. My attention was first called to it about five years ago by Mr. Neil Ker of Magdalen College, Oxford, who was then examining the manuscript collection of St. Paul's. After consulting me on the unknown work, he graciously arranged for the transfer of the manuscript to the Bodleian Library where I was working. Careful examination of the treatise left no doubt in my mind that the letter is the reply of Albertus Magnus to the questionnaire of the Master General, John of Vercelli. My examination and views were fully corroborated by Father Daniel A. Callus, O. P., then Regent of Studies at Blackfriars, Oxford. The importance of this new work required that it be published in full, and I agreed to prepare a paleographical edition.

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in its official acts. In reality this list of 'viri praeclari' present at the Chapter is a scribal note appended to the acts at a later date. This note was written after Peter of Tarantaise became Pope Innocent V (July 11, 1276) and after Kilwardby was appointed cardinal (March, 12, 1278). At this late date the fame of Kilwardby was well established.

[6] P. Mandonnet, *loc. cit.*, 129-139. Destrez, however, had previously suggested the possibility of a third consultor in the person of Latino Malabranca, who was also among the 'viri praeclari' present at the Chapter of 1270 and who died in 1294. Cf. Destrez, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

[7] Mandonnet, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

[8] It is not at all evident to me that Kilwardby's reply is a direct answer to St. Thomas' *Responsio*. The fact that Kilwardby knew the opinion of *quidam* (in q.2; cf. Chenu, p. 197; Mandonnet, p. 139), including St. Thomas, is to be expected. But in rejecting it he merely says "nec est philosophica, nec memini eam esse ab aliquo sanctorum approbatam tanquam veram et certam" (*ibid.*). At the end of this question Kilwardby even admits that this position can be tolerated "absque errore". One can hardly say that it is rejected "avec acharnement".

PLATE I



St. Paul's Cath. MS. 40 B. 14, fol. 17r.

PLATE II



Lower margin of St. Paul's Cath. MS. 40 B. 14, fol. 17r.

I. THE MANUSCRIPT

Manuscript 40 B. 14 of St. Paul's Cathedral, number 9 in the new enumeration soon to be adopted, is a late thirteenth century volume of twenty-six leaves. It is a parchment codex, 332 × 225 mm., written in two columns of 54 lines each in an expert small hand, probably in England. The written space measures 242 × 165 mm. Initial letters are colored red or blue with ornamentation of the other color (Plate I). The manuscript was acquired by St. Paul's, it would seem, in the nineteenth century, possibly as part of the acquisition by W. Sparrow Simpson. Apart from the fact that it was written in an English hand, we can say nothing about its provenance.

The manuscript contains four items, two by St. Albert and two by St. Thomas.[9]

1. Fol. 1-16^{v} <Alberti Magni> In Threnos. "Ecce uidentes clamabunt angeli pacis amare flebunt etc. ys.xxxiii. Uidentes dicuntur dupliciter ... iniquitatis nostre." (Ed. Borgnet, XVIII, 243-338. Cf. F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi*, n. 976, Madrid 1950, t. II, p. 34).
2. Fol. 17-21^{v} Problemata determinata per fratrem albertum predicatorum, quondam episcopum Ratis. (*title pencilled in lower margin of fol. 17*). "De questionibus quas mihi paternitas uestra destinauit... reducat ad primam consciencie et religionis puritatem." (Preceded by a list of 43 questions, the first of which is "An deus moueat aliquod corpus immediate".)
3. Fol. 22-23^{v} Determinaciones earundem per fratrem Thomam de aquino eiusdem ordinis (*title pencilled in lower margin of fol. 22*). "Lectis litteris uestris in eis inueni... suffragia rependatis." (This is the *Responsio ad Lectorem Venetum de articulis XXXVI*, or B text. Ed J. Destrez in *Mélanges Mandonnet*, I, 162-172; Parma [*Opusculum X*], XVI, 169-174).
4. Fol. 23^{v}-26^{v} <Thomae Aquinatis> Exposicio libri de ebdomadibus boecii secundum [.....] (*title pencilled in lower margin of fol.* 23^{v}). "Precurre prior in domum tuam... <Prol.> Habet hoc priuilegium. sapiencie studium... et in hoc terminatur exposicio huius libri." (Ed. Parma [*Opusculum LXII*], XVII, 339-348).

In reality the third item, despite the pencilled inscription, is not St. Thomas' *determinaciones earundem*, but his second set of replies to fr. Baxianus (Bassiano) of Lodi, the Lector of Venice. The scribe who wrote *earundem* was misled by the fact that most of the thirty-six questions of the B text are incorporated in the Master General's list of forty-three questions. The same scribe pencilled the three titles found in the lower margin of folios 17, 22 and 23^{v}. It is not certain that he is the one who wrote the four items in the manuscript.

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[9] I am indebted to Mr. Neil Ker for sending me his description of the manuscript and for allowing me to incorporate it into my own description.

The scribe, although neat and expert, did not always understand the text he was copying. In St. Albert's *Problemata*, for example, there are appalling scribal blunders: 'reverti' for 'revereri', 'hunc' for 'habet', 'intelligibile' for 'intelligencie', 'mobilis' for 'nobilis', 'moverentur' for 'morerentur', 'obiciunt' for 'exierunt', 'noctis' for 'Martis', and 'Marte' for 'Mercurio', and others even less explicable. There can be no doubt that the scribe had difficulty in reading his exemplar. There are, in fact, four passages where the scribe could not read his exemplar at all and left a blank space. The longest of these blanks, the only one for which I am not able to suggest a reading, is found in q.34 (fol. 20^{vb}). The scribe was able to read only the first three letters of a word beginning with 'ass...'. Three times when the scribe was uncertain of the reading, he put down both alternatives: 'qui uel quia' (fol. 18^{va}), 'plus quam Sol uel quantum Sol' (fol. 21^{rb}) and 'esset uel est' (fol. 21^{va}). Because of these difficulties it has been suggested to me that our scribe had the autograph of St. Albert's reply before him. Albert's hand, as is well known, is not the best example of medieval calligraphy. However, we cannot be certain that Albert, "caecutiens prae senectute", wrote to the Master General in his own hand. It seems to me more probable that Albert dictated his reply, and that our scribe had at best a proximate copy of this before him. How the exemplar got to England, however, is unknown.

Finally, it may be suggested that our scribe was not a Dominican. St. Albert concluded his letter by asking God to hear his prayers for the Master General "ut ordinem nostrum Uestra sollicitudo reducat ad primam consciencie et religionis puritatem." Our scribe, however, wrote clearly "ordinem uestrum", as though St. Albert no longer considered himself a member of the Order. No Dominican aware of what he was copying could have made such mistake. It would seem, therefore, that our scribe was a professional English copyist, careful, but not particularly learned, who produced this copy at an unknown date in the last third of the thirteenth century.

II. Date and Authenticity

Father Destrez has already shown that St. Thomas wrote his reply to John of Vercelli on April 2, 1271.[10] Bordeaux MS 131 and Paris, Nat. lat. 14546, both explicitly declare, "Hanc epistolam misit frater Thomas de Aquino fratri johanni magistro ordinis anno ab incarnatione domini millesimo CCLXXIº."[11] St. Thomas himself tells us that the General's letter arrived on "feria quarta ante Pascha", during the celebration of solemn Mass. Immediately on the following day (*statim sequenti die*) he gave his response according to the form determined by the Master General. Fortunately, this *forma* has been preserved by St. Thomas in his letter. The reply was to be given according to three criteria: (i) Do the *Sancti* maintain the doctrine or opinion contained in the articles listed? (ii) Whether or not the *Sancti* support the doctrine or opinion contained in the articles, does the consultor maintain the aforesaid doctrine or opinion? (iii) If the consultor does not personally hold the view, could such a doctrine or opinion be tolerated without prejudice to the faith?[12] It is in this spirit that S. Thomas, Kilwardby and St. Albert reply to John of Vercelli. This *forma* must be kept carefully in mind when interpreting the replies of all three consultors.

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[10] J. Destrez, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[11] Listed by Destrez (*op. cit.*, pp. 143 and 148) as numbers 2 and 17 respectively.

It is clear from St. Thomas' letter that a prompt reply was expected by the Master General: "statim... praetermissis aliis occupationibus secundum quod mihi occurrit, respondere curavi."[13] Something of this same haste is implied in Albert's reply: "De quaestionibus quas mihi Paternitas Vestra destinavit secundum scientiae et ingenii mei tenuitatem respondere intendens, dico..."[14] He shows irritation at the stupidity of a number of questions, e. g. "de fantasia fatuitatis procedit" (q. 17), "hoc autem dicere insani hominis est" (q. 26), "videtur mihi esse deliramentum" (q. 30), "haec igitur quaestio fatua est" (q. 33), "est vanum et curiosum, nil vel parum habens utilitatis" (q. 39), "est penitus ignorantis et nescientis quid dicat" (q. 40). In closing his letter Albert notes that he has replied to these questions out of love and reverence of His Paternity, but that he would rather devote his time to prayer than to answering "quaestionibus curiosis". On the other hand, the published portion of Kilwardby's letter gives no indication of haste or irritation.

There is no reason to doubt that the questionnaire was sent to the three consultants at the same time. St. Thomas was in Paris when the questionnaire arrived on April 1, 1271. Therefore we may presume that the questionnaire reached Albert in Cologne and Kilwardby in England shortly after April 1, 1271. If the questionnaires were dispatched by the Master General on the same day, and if a prompt reply was in fact expected, then the replies of St. Albert, St. Thomas and Kilwardby were written within the first two weeks of April 1271.

Concerning the authenticity of our text there can be no doubt whatever. The certainty of St. Albert's authorship is based on three clear proofs: trustworthy ascription, internal evidence and the early catalogues of Albert's writings.

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[12] St. Thomas, *Responsio, ed. cit.*, p. 211, Prooemium.

[13] *Ibid.* If the letter was destined for the General Chapter of Montpellier, as Mandonnet suggested, such haste would have been unnecessary. Pentecost, after all, was more than fifty days away and the solemnities of Holy Thursday, one would have thought, should have taken precedence.

[14] St. Albert, *Problemata determinata, MS cit.*, fol. 17^{rb}.

In the lower margin of fol. 17 one can read with some difficulty, *Problemata determinata per fratrem Albertum predicatorum quondam episcopum Ratis.* The title is pencilled and partly faded. Dr. Richard Hunt, Keeper of Western Manuscripts at the Bodleian Library, has graciously provided for this edition a photograph of the ascription, taken under ultraviolet light (Plate II). The scribe of this notation may or may not have written the body of the text. In any case, it is in a hand contemporary with St. Albert and there is no reason to doubt his testimony.

The authenticity of the text is further proved by internal evidence. The author refers three times to his own paraphrase of *Liber de causis*, once to his commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian *De causis proprietatum elementorum*, and once to his own writings in general, among which must be included *De animalibus*, Book XVI:

q. 1. De hoc rationibus demonstrativis dissertum est a nobis in nostro libro *De causis*. (fol. 17^{va}).
q. 3. Haec autem omnia probata sunt in philosophia, et diligenter a nobis in libro *De causis* sunt explanatae probationes philosophorum. (fol. 18^{rb}).
q. 19. De hoc autem a nobis tractatum est in libro *De causis proprietatum elementorum et planetarum*. (fol. 19^{va}).
q. 22. Propter quod nos in libro *De causis*, ubi tractavimus de ordine generationis elementorum et motus recti qui causatur ex circulari motu, aliam ad hoc posuimus viam subtiliorem quam longum esset hic ponere, sed ibi qui vult potest invenire. (fol. 19^{vb}).
q. 34. Haec quaestio provenit ex ignorantia philosophiae, et nos quidem in aliis locis de hiis cum studio disseruimus. (fol. 20^{vb}).

All of these cross references are easily identifiable in the works of St. Albert. There are indeed numerous parallels between our text and St. Albert's *De causis* and *De animalibus*, even where there are no explicit references. Further, the astronomical doctrines expressed in our text, particularly when discussing Ptolemy and Al-Biṭrûgî, are identical with the known views of Albert. Finally, our author defends vehemently the peculiar view that angels are not to be identified with separated substances, or intelligences. A total distinction between angels revealed in the Scriptures and intelligences discovered by philosophers was always maintained by St. Albert.[15] According to Giles of Lessines, a disciple of St. Albert, "Haec est positio multorum magnorum et praecise domini Alberti quondam Ratisponensis episcopi, ob cuius reverentiam rationes praedictam positionem confirmantes addidimus."[16] I have been unable, however, to find any of the "multorum magnorum" besides St. Albert who held this view. Thus from the internal evidence alone one may say that no one but St. Albert could have written this text.

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[15] Cf. Albert, *Summa de creaturis*, tr. IV, q. 29 (Borgnet, t. XXXIV, p. 496); *Summa theologiae*, P. II, tr. II, q. 8 (Borgnet, XXXII, 136); *Liber de causis*, I, tr. IV, c. 8 (Borgnet, X, 431) and II, tr. V, c. 24 (*ibid.*, p. 619). See *Problemata determinata*, qq. 2-4.

[16] Giles de Lessines, *De unitate formae*, P. II, c. 5, ed. M. de Wulf (Les Philosophes Belges, I [Louvain 1902]), p. 38.

Father Chenu was somewhat perturbed that Kilwardby's reply to the Master General was nowhere listed in the early catalogues of Dominican writers. He solved this problem by appealing to the "caractère privé de la consultation".[17] The consultation, as the existence of a third reply shows, was official for all three masters, and not a private opinion elicited from Kilwardby at the General Chapter concerning St. Thomas' communiqué. There must be some other reason for the omission. We must likewise face the question with regard to our text. We must determine whether or not our *Problemata determinata* was listed by the ancient bibliographers of St. Albert. A careful examination of the ancient catalogues convinces me that the work is actually listed, but hitherto unsuspected because of faulty punctuation.

After Mandonnet discovered and published St. Albert's *De quindecim problematibus*,[18] one passage in the Stams catalogue became clear; at the same time many difficulties with regard to the whole passage have arisen. It is not certain how many writings are involved. The Stams catalogue published by H. Denifle reads in part:

> n. 85 ...Contra librum nigromanticorum. Problemata contra Averroistas XV questiones. Determinationes quarumdam questionum ad clerum Parisiensem. Super speram.[19]

The grammatical construction of 'Problemata contra Averroistas XV questiones' is extremely awkward, if not impossible. Is there any other medieval authority for 'problemata contra questiones'? By the punctuation, however, Denifle intended to list two distinct works, *Problemata contra Averroistas XV questiones* and *Determinationes quarumdam questionum ad clerum Parisiensem.* In 1936 Meersseman re-edited the Stams catalogue and emended the passage to read:

> n. 7 ...contra libros nigromanticorum, problemata contra averroistas, [id est:] XV quaestiones [et] determinationes earumdem quaestionum ad cler[ic]um Parisiensem, super speram.[20]

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[17] Chenu, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

[18] Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, P. II, 2nd ed. (Les Philosophes Belges, VII [Louvain, 1908]), pp. 29-52. Emendations to this edition have been suggested by F. Van Steenberghen, "Le *De quindecim problematibus* d'Albert le Grand," in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, Louvain 1947, pp. 415-439.

[19] H. Denifle, O. P., "Quellen zur Gelehrtengeschichte des Predigerordens im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert," in *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, II (1886), 236.

[20] *Laurentii Pignon Catalogi et Chronica. Accedunt Catalogi Stamsensis et Upsalensis Scriptorum O. P.*, ed. G. Meersseman, O. P. (MOPH, XVIII), Rome 1936, p. 58.

Meersseman likewise emended the catalogue of Laurence Pignon (c.1412) which he published:

> n.8 ...contra libros [n]egromanticorum, problemata contra averroistas, [id est: 15] quaestiones et determinationes earundem quaestionum ad cler[ic]um Parisiensem, super speram.[21]

In both passages, edited by Meersseman, the alternate reading for 'earumdem' is 'quarundam'. In Meersseman's rendering of the passage, which is also accepted by B. Geyer,[22] *Problemata contra averroistas XV quaestiones, determinationes quarundam* [i.e. *earumdem*] *quaestionum ad clerum Parisiensem* is taken to be the title of a single work, namely that published by Mandonnet. The longest title listed in Stams turns out to be a very short and insignificant work! The same situation obtains in Prof. Geyer's interpretation of Legenda I, n. 45: *Problematum contra Averroistas XV quaestiones et determinationes earundem quaestionum ad Aegidium, clericum Parisiensem.*[23] This is a most improbable title for any work.

This is not the proper place to discuss *De XV problematibus* and the exegesis of Pignon, Stams or Legenda I. However, if *Problemata* in these catalogues is taken to be a separate title, it would cover our text and simplify the remaining exegetical problem. That the title *Problemata* ought to be considered distinct can be established from the other catalogues. In the catalogue of Henry of Herford, for example, the *Problemata* is separated from *De XV problematibus* by eleven works. In Geyer's version[24] the parallel passage reads as follows:

> (38) super problemata,... (49) contra libros nigromanticorum, (50) contra averroistas XV questiones, determinationes quarundam questionum ad clerum Parisiensem, (51) super speram.

The *Problemata* is likewise separated in the catalogue published by P. Auer, O. S. B., from Prague University Library MS XL C. 1, the parallel passage being edited[25] as follows:

> 47. Contra libros nigromanticorum. 48. Contra Averroistas XV questiones. 49. Determinaciones quarundam questionum ad clerum Parisiensem. 50. Problemata. 51. Super speram.

Whatever may be said of Dom Auer's enumeration, it is clear that *Problemata* is grammatically distinct from the other titles. Finally, it should be noted that the titles given by Louis of Valladolid,[26] Rudolph of Nijmegen[27] and *Legenda Coloniensis*[28] are somewhat different from those found in the other catalogues. There is here mention of a work "item problemata Aristotelis" listed with other Aristotelian commentaries. Our work, however, seems to be listed as "item librum multarum quaestionum determinatarum". The other works in question are described in a separate chapter as "Item librum contra Averroistas. Item de unitate intellectus libros tres. Quaestiones contra Averroistas. Item librum de unitate formae. Item librum unum quindecim quaestionum."

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[21] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[22] B. Geyer, "Der alte Katalog der Werke des hl. Albertus Magnus," in *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, t. II (Studi e Testi 122), Vatican 1946, estratto p. 2.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

[25] P. Auer, O. S. B., *Ein neuaufgefundener Katalog der Dominikanerschriftsteller* (S. Sabinae Diss. Hist. II), Paris 1933, p. 89.

This examination of the early catalogues of Albert's writings leads to two conclusions. First, our text is indeed listed by the early bibliographers of St. Albert as a known work. Second, it is variously entitled *Problemata* (Stams, Pignon, Legenda I, Prague), *Super problemata* (Henry of Herford), *Liber multarum quaestionum determinatarum* (Louis of Valladolid, Rudolph of Nijmegen, Legenda Colon.). In St. Paul's Cathedral MS 40 B. 14 the work is simply entitled *Problemata determinata.*

Thus there can be no doubt as to the authenticity of the new work. It is proved by explicit contemporary ascription in the manuscript; it is confirmed by clear internal evidence of Albertinian authorship, and by the external testimony of all the early catalogues. There is scarcely need to add to this incontrovertible evidence the fact that in 1271 Albertus Magnus would have been the most likely consultor of John of Vercelli in matters doctrinal.

III. Content and Importance

When Kilwardby's reply was discovered, Father Mandonnet emphasized the historical importance of a second set of replies parallel to those of St. Thomas.[29] The reply not only revealed certain views of Kilwardby previously unknown, but it brought into sharper focus differences of philosophical thought between Kilwardby and St. Thomas. Mandonnet, considering the reply to be an attack on St. Thomas, viewed it in the light of 1277.

The discovery of a third set composed by the great St. Albert himself is of even greater significance. First, the fact that St. Thomas had to reply twice to the Lector of Venice concerning relatively insignificant and oftentimes frivolous questions (*Responsio de articulis XXX*, *Responsio de articulis XXXVI*) shows some preoccupation of the Friars at Venice. But since the preoccupation went so far as to involve the Master General and a formal consultation of three eminent theologians, we can be certain that the doctrinal situation in the Order was more complex than hitherto suspected. Albert's reply, then, is an important contribution to the study of a strange controversy, a Venetian concern, it would seem, around 1270. It is interesting to note that none of the questions proposed springs from the disturbing Averroist movement then developing at Paris, or from a specifically Augustinian position.

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[26] *Chronica Fratris Ludovici de Valleoleti,* ed. in *Analecta S.O.P.,* XX (1931-2), 758-761. The *Historia de Alberto Magno* of this chronicle was completed at Paris in 1414.

[27] *Legenda Beati Alberti Magni,* auctore Rudolpho de Novimagio, ed. H. C. Scheeben, Cologne 1928, pp. 62 and 65. This Legenda was written about 1488.

[28] *Vita brevis et compendiosa domini Alberti Magni,* ed. in part by Paulus de Loë, O.P. in *Analecta Bollandiana,* XIX (1900), 272-284. Composed at Cologne about 1483, this is generally called *Legenda Coloniensis.*

[29] Mandonnet, *op. cit.,* pp. 129-130.

Second, with regard to the consultors themselves we can now compare their views question by question. If it is admitted that Kilwardby's reply was not written as an answer to St. Thomas, but rather that there are three distinct decisions given to the Master General, then a unique occasion is offered the historian of thought. It is a pity that so many questions are themselves insignificant, trivial or inane. One important problem, however, does stand out as a fortunate exception. That is the question of the celestial movers. Mandonnet was quick to appreciate the significance of Kilwardby's reply for the history of science.[30] Inspired by the thesis of Duhem's *Études sur Léonard de Vinci* (3^{me} série), Mandonnet pointed out the modernity of Kilwardby's universal mechanics: "sicut corpora gravia et levia moventur a propriis inclinationibus et ponderibus ad loca ubi quiescant, sic corpora celestia sibi naturalibus inclinationibus quasi ponderibus moveantur in loco circulariter." This line of thought was continued by Chenu in a special study entitled "Aux origines de la 'Science Moderne'."[31] The view of St. Thomas, of course, is essentially different from that of Kilwardby. One cannot, however, conclude from this that Kilwardby had seen St. Thomas' reply. The view defended by Kilwardby, dispensing with the need of celestial movers, had a long Oxford history prior to him, as has been pointed out by Father Callus.[32] A third view of celestial motions, differing greatly from St. Thomas and Kilwardby, is strongly defended by St. Albert in his reply to the Master General. In the near future I hope to publish a comparative study of these three views concerning the celestial movers in the context of medieval science. There is no need, therefore, to say more about this point now.

The extremely interesting question concerning embryology and the animation of the foetus (q. 34) elicited from St. Albert a clear summary of his view detailed in *De animalibus*, Book XVI, and assumed throughout *De causis*.

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[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 137-139.

[31] M.-D. Chenu, *ed. cit.* in note 1 above.

[32] D. A. Callus, O. P., "The treatise of John Blund On the Soul," in *Autour d'Aristote* (Recueil d'Études de Phil. anc. et méd. offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion), Louvain 1955, pp. 486-489. See also my *Nature and Gravitation*, River Forest 1955, pp. 57-60.

For St. Albert this question is intimately related to his general theory of celestial motion and intelligences. Discussion of this point can likewise be relegated to a later study.

Third, the reply of St. Albert is particularly important for establishing the chronology of his writings. This problem, as is well known, is most exasperating.[33] At one extreme there is the view of Mandonnet who dated all of Albert's Aristotelian commentaries between 1245 and 1256.[34] At the other extreme Franz Pelster maintained that all of them were written between 1256 and 1275.[35] More moderate views tend to date his writings on the Aristotelian corpus approximately between 1247 and 1267.

We know that St. Albert died on Friday, November 15, 1280, being, in the words of Ptolemy of Lucca and Bernard Gui, "octogenarius et amplius".[36] The meaning of 'amplius' has been strongly debated. The older tradition going back at least to Louis of Valladolid gives the date of his birth as 1193, thus making Albert 87 years old at the time of his death.[37] A more recent tradition established by Mandonnet insists that Albert was born in 1206 or 1207, completely disregarding the testimony of Ptolemy of Lucca and of Bernard Gui, two contemporaries of Albert.[38] When Albert made out his will in January, 1279, he testified that he was in sound condition, "sanus et incolumis".[39] Nevertheless, writing to John of Vercelli in April 1271, Albert tells us that he is "caecutiens prae senectute" and more intent on prayer than on answering curious questions.

It is hazardous, I think, to construct any sound argument on the expression 'prae senectute'. Albert, following Avicenna, considered 50 to be the beginning of 'aetas senilis' and 'senectus'.[40] For St. Augustine 'senectus' begins at 60; for Isidore of Seville it begins at 70 and 'senium' begins at 77.[41] All Albert is saying, I suspect, is that he is having trouble with his eyes before feeling old enough to be useless.

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[33] Cf. A. Dondaine, O. P., *Secrétaires de saint Thomas*, Rome 1956, pp. 185-198.

[34] Mandonnet, "Polémique Averroïste de Siger de Brabant," in *Revue Thomiste*, V (1897), 95-105.

[35] F. Pelster, S. J., *Kritische Studien zum Leben und zu den Schriften Alberts des Grossen*, Freiburg i. B. 1920, pp. 156-161, and "Zur Datierung der Aristotelesparaphrase des hl. Albert des Grossen," in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, LVI (1932), 423-436.

[36] Tholomeo da Lucca, *Hist. eccl.*, lib. 23, c. 36, ed. Muratori, XI, 1184; Bernard Gui, *Mag. in theologia Parisius*, n. 8, ed. H. Denifle, *Archiv.* II (1886), 205. Cf. Pelster, *Kritische Studien, ed. cit.*, pp. 34-52.

[37] *Chronica Fratris Ludovici de Valleoleti, ed. cit.*, p. 755: "anno Domini M°CC°LXXX° consummatis vite sue annis circiter lxxxvij inter fratrum et filiorum suorum manus in conventu coloniensi obdormivit in Domino." Composed in 1414, this seems to be the earliest statement giving Albert's age as 87 at the time of death. Cf. P. de Loë, "De Vita et Scriptis B. Alberti Magni," in *Analecta Bollandiana*, XX (1901), 276.

[38] Mandonnet, "La date de naissance d'Albert le Grand," in *Revue Thomiste*, XXXVI (1931), 233-256; also art. in *Dict. d'hist. et de géog. ecclés.*, Paris 1912, t. I, col. 1515.

[39] Cf. H. C. Scheeben, *Albert der Grosse, Zur Chronologie seines Lebens*, in *Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland*, 27, Vechta 1931, p. 123.

We know that Albert wrote a number of works after this date. He composed his commentary on Job in 1272 (Casanatense MS 445) or in 1274 (Munich, Univ. MS 50) and he prepared a definitive edition of his commentary on Matthew, Mark and Luke between 1270 and 1275.[42] Strong arguments remain, despite controversy, to show that *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* and *De XV problematibus* are to be dated around 1271. It is generally admitted that *De sacrificio missae* and *De sacramento* are very late compositions, perhaps his last. Therefore, the expression 'caecutiens prae senectute' should not be interpreted to mean that Albert was ready to call a halt to his literary output.

From the reply the date *ante quem* can be determined for Albert's very important commentary on *Liber de causis*. Three times in the reply Albert refers to this work. Further, from this commentary we can be certain that it is posterior to his *Metaphysics* and *Ethics*:

> [1] ...et quia multa talia in *Prima Philosophia* a nobis contra Stoicos dicta sunt.... (*De Causis*, lib. I, tr. I, c. 4. ed. Borgnet X, 369a)
> [2] Probatum est autem a nobis in VI *Philosophiae Primae*. (*ibid.*, lib. I, tr. I, c. 9. *ed. cit.*, 379a).
> [3] ...sicut in secundo *Primae Philosophiae* meminimus nos dixisse. (*ibid.*, lib. II, tr. III, c. 10. *ed. cit.*, 559b).
> [4] De hac autem propositione plurima nos dixisse meminimus in principio decimi nostrorum *Ethicorum*. (*ibid.*, lib. I, tr. IV, c. 2. *ed. cit.*, 413b)
> [5] ... sicut iam a nobis in X *Ethicorum* determinatum est. (*ibid.*, lib. II, tr. II, c. 39. *ed. cit.*, 537b).

Albert's commentary on *De causis* also implies previous composition of his *Physics* and *De animalibus*, but these works can be established as early from other sources. The important point under consideration is the dating of St. Albert's *Metaphysics* and *De causis*. Father Pelster, dating the *De animalibus* after 1268, argued that Albert's *Metaphysics* and *De causis* must have been written between 1270 and 1274.[43] Pelster's thesis concerning *De animalibus* has been carefully rejected by Father Antoine Dondaine.[44] From the reply to John of Vercelli we can now establish definitively that both Albert's *Metaphysics* and his *De causis* were completed before 1271. Since the *De causis* is the last of Albert's commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus, we can say that all of the philosophical commentaries were completed before 1271. Writing to Pope Clement IV in 1267, Roger Bacon complained against the universal acceptance of Albert's rewritten philosophy: "iam data sit Latinis, et *completa* et composita in lingua Latina, et est facta in tempore meo et vulgata Parisius et pro auctore allegatur compositor eius."[45] Whatever Bacon may have meant, we can be certain that much of Albert's philosophy was completed during Bacon's "time" at Paris, 1242-1257; all of it must have been completed by 1267, or at the very latest by 1271.

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[40] Avicenna, *De animalibus*, lib. XII, c. 4, ed. Lyon 1522, fol. 26^r, and *Canones totius medicinae*, I, 1, 3, 3. Cf. Albert, *De animal.*, XII, tr. I, c. 5, ed. Stadler, n. 67; and *Liber de iuventute et senectute*, tr. I, c. 2, ed. Borgnet, IX, 307a.

[41] See J. de Ghellinck, S. J., "Iuventus, gravitas, senectus," in *Studia Mediaevalia* (in honorem R. J. Martin, O. P.), Bruges 1948, pp. 39-59.

[42] Cf. F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi*, II, nn. 972, 995-999.

[43] Pelster, "Zur Datierung der Aristotelesparaphrase," *ed.cit.*, pp. 433-435; also *Kritische Studien, ed. cit.*, p. 147.

IV. The Edition

The edition presented here does not pretend to be a definitive one; such is impossible, since the unique manuscript is faulty and one cannot be certain that the reconstruction of the text is correct. It is hoped that before the *Problemata determinata* is ready for publication in the definitive Cologne edition of Albertus Magnus, at least one more manuscript will have been found. In the meantime there is room for a paleographical edition of this significant work as found in MS 40. B.14 of St. Paul's Cathedral Library.

In this edition I have retained the orthography of the manuscript entirely, except in cases of obvious scribal misspelling; these have been relegated to footnotes. Corrections of the text have been kept to a reasonable minimum, and the *sigla* are sufficiently standard to indicate all changes and suggestions I have made for intelligibility. The complete letter of the manuscript, therefore, is printed here either in the edited text or in the footnotes.

Regrettably, a number of sources alleged by St. Albert have not been located. It is obvious that Albert is quoting from memory, and that he often quotes what he himself has read into his source, as I hope to show in a future study. This habit of later years makes the identification of sources extremely difficult. Where I have been unsuccessful in identifying a source, I have noted this in the footnote or given a parallel passage from the works of St. Albert. Other scholars will certainly succeed where I have failed.

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[44] Dondaine, *loc. cit.* Father Dondaine, however, argues (*ibid.*, p. 188, note 9) that Books XII and XIII of Albert's commentary on the *Metaphysics* (M and N in the Greek) were written after *De causis*, because Albert considered *De causis* to be complementary to Book Lambda: "Et haec quidem quando adiuncta fuerint undecimo primae philosophiae opus perfectum erit" (lib. II, tr. V, c. 24). But Albert himself seems to have meant this only in a doctrinal sense, for he says, "determinatur hic de eis [separatis substantiis] secundum plenam veritatem, de quibus in undecimo [*leg.*: duodecimo] et decimo tertio philosophiae primae non nisi secundum opinionem determinavit Aristoteles; propter quod iste liber primae philosophiae coniungendus est, ut finalem ex isto recipiat perfectionem" (lib. II, tr. I, c. 1, ed. Borgnet X, 434 a). One cannot, therefore, argue from this that Albert's *De causis* was actually written before the last two Books of the *Metaphysics*.

[45] Bacon, *Opus Tertium*, c. 9, ed. Brewer (R. S.), London 1859, p. 30.

I am indebted to the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, for their gracious permission to study and publish the text from MS 40. B.14 of the Library, and to Mr A. R. B. Fuller, Sub-Librarian of St. Paul's, for supplying me with needed information. A deep debt of gratitude is due to my dear friends, Daniel A. Callus, O. P., J. Reginald O'Donnell, C. S. B., Clement Vansteenkiste, O. P., Antoine Dondaine, O. P. and Leonard Boyle, O. P., who have made valuable suggestions for the edition of this text. Needless to say, the inevitable deficiencies and errors are due entirely to myself or to the manuscript.

SIGLA

< >	supplendum.
[ ]	delendum fortasse.
( )	parenthetice dictum in codice.
cod.	codex 40 B. 14 Bibl. S. Pauli, Londinii.
Vulg.	Biblia sacra Vulgatae editionis Clementinae.
Arist.	Aristotelis, *Opera Omnia*, ed. I. Bekker, t. I-II, Berolini 1831.
AL	Aristoteles Latinus (Corpus Philosophorum medii aevi). *Codices* t. I, Roma 1939; t. II, Cantab. 1955.
B.	Alberti Magni, *Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, voll. 38, Parisiis 1890-99.
PL	J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*
AHDLMA	*Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, Paris 1926 ff.
BGPMA	*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie (und Theologie) des Mittelalters*, Münster (Westf.) 1891 ff.
DTC	*Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, voll. 15, Paris 1902-1950.

PROBLEMATA DETERMINATA <XLIII> PER FRATREM ALBERTUM PREDICATORUM, QUONDAM EPISCOPUM RATIS.[1]

<Series Questionum>

1. An Deus moueat aliquod corpus immediate.
2. An omnia que mouentur naturaliter, moueantur ministerio angelorum mouente corpora celestia.
3. An angeli sint motores corporum celestium.
4. An infallibiliter sit probatum angelos esse motores corporum celestium apud aliquos.

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[1] Titulus in margine inferiore folii graphico inscribitur.

5. An infallibiliter sit probatum angelos esse motores corporum celestium, supposito Deum non esse immediatum motore<m> illorum corporum.
6. An omnia inferiora naturaliter in esse deducta per uiam motus regantur per angelos mediantibus motibus corporum celestium.
7. An omnia inferiora que naturaliter in esse ducuntur, fiant per angelos mediantibus motibus corporum celestium secundum quod facere attribuitur causis naturalibus, i. e. educantur de potencia ad actum.
8. An ordine nature faber posset mouere manum ad malleum sine angelico ministerio mouente corpora celestia.
9. An ordine nature faber posset mouere manum ad aliquid operandum sine angelico ministerio mouente corpora celestia.
10. An omnia beneficia exteriora naturaliter de potencia in actum deducta habeamus per angelos mouentes corpora celestia.
11. An propter dicta beneficia que habemus per angelos, eos reuereri[2] debeamus.
12. An angeli mouentes corpora celestia mediantibus motibus corporum celestium sint factores omnium corporum humanorum naturaliter in esse productorum, secundum quod facere attribuitur causis naturalibus, i.e. sint de potencia in actum eductores.
13. An angeli mouentes corpora celestia mediantibus motibus corporum sint factores omnium animalium irracionalium que mouentur uel uiuunt tam in mari quam in terra naturaliter in esse productorum, secundum quod facere attribuitur causis naturalibus, i.e. sint de potencia in actum eductores.
14. An angeli mouentes corpora celestia mediantibus motibus corporum celestium sint factores omnium terre nascencium naturaliter in esse productorum, secundum quod facere attribuitur causis naturalibus, i.e. sint de potencia in actum eductores.
15. An angeli mouentes corpora celestia mediantibus motibus corporum celestium sint productores omnium metallorum naturaliter in esse productorum, i.e. sint de potencia in actum eductores.
16. An angelus habeat uirtutem infinitam inferius.
17. An angelus possit mouere totam molem terre usque ad globum lune, licet nunquam mouerit nec moturus sit.
18. An angeli mouentes corpora celestia sint de ordine uirtutum.
19. An illud *Ecclesiastis* primo <6>, *In circuitu pergit spiritus*, sic possit exponi: spiritus, puta angelicus, pergit in circuitu celi, i.e. pergere seu moueri facit celum in circuitu.

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[2] reuerti *cod.* Cf. M.-D. Chenu, "La Réponse de Kilwardby à Jean de Verceil," in *Mélanges Mandonnet* (Paris: Vrin 1930), I, 201, q. 11; S. Thomae, *Responsio ad Ioannem Vercellensem* (Taurini: Marietti 1954), a. 10.

20. An, si motus celi cessaret, ordine nature omne ferrum in elementa statim resolueretur.
21. An, si motus celi cessaret, ordine nature omne corpus inferius elementatum corruptibile in elementa in instanti resolueretur.
22. An, si motus celi cessaret, ordine nature mundus totus quantum ad omnia elementa corruptibilia in elementa et in instanti destrueretur seu resolueretur.[3]
23. An, si non esset lux stellarum, ordine nature in instanti omnes homines corruptibiles morerentur.
24. An, si non esset lux stellarum, ordine nature omnia animalia irracionalia corruptibilia in instanti morerentur.
25. An post diem iudicii omnia corpora bonorum sint incorruptibilia per naturam seu naturaliter, quia cessabit motus celi qui[4] est causa corrupcionis.
26. An post diem iudicii corpora malorum sint incorruptibilia per naturam seu naturaliter, quia cessabit motus celi qui est causa corrupcionis.
27. An dampnati in inferno in suis corporibus senciant[5] penas ignis per apprehensionem et recepcionem speciei eiusdem ignis per modum afflictiui uel lesiui. (fol. 17rb).
28. An sentencia quam Christus dicet in iudicio, *Uenite benedicti, etc.*, sit corporalis uel spiritualis.
29. An Christus non uenerit nisi tollere peccatum originale principaliter seu principalius inter omnia peccata que tollere uenit.
30. An nomina sanctorum digito Dei scripta sint in celis materialibus ad honorem sanctorum.
31. An nomina impiorum in inferno existencium digito Dei scripta sint in terra ad uituperium impiorum.
32. An infernus sit in centro uel circa centrum terre.
33. An liceat disputari, an anima Christi sit ex traduce, determinando quod est uerum.
34. An illud uerbum Philosophi *De animalibus*, lib. 16,[6] 'Corpus spermatis, cum quo exit spiritus, qui est uirtus principii anime, est separatum a corpore, et est res diuina, et talis dicitur intellectus,' sic possit uel debeat exponi, id est: ille spiritus siue uirtus formatiua dicitur intellectus per similitudinem, quia sicut intellectus operatur sine organo, ita et illa uirtus.
35. An aliquid de substantia celi intret ad composicionem corporis naturaliter compositi ex quatuor elementis per effectum sue uirtutis.

[3] destruerentur seu resoluerentur *cod.* Cf. Chenu, *op. cit.*, q. 22.
[4] que *cod.* Cf. Chenu, *op. cit.*, q. 25; S. Thomae, *Responsio ad Ioan. Vercel.*, a. 24.
[5] sencient *cod.* Cf. Chenu, *op. cit.*, q. 27; S. Thomae, *Responsio ad Ioan. Vercel.*, a. 26.
[6] Arist., *De gen. animal.*, II, 3. 737 a 7-10.

36. An aliquid de substancia celi intret ad composicionem corporis naturaliter compositi ex quatuor elementis, et maxime uiui et animati per effectum sue uirtutis.
37. An corpora sanctorum glorificata lucebunt plus quam sol, et an tunc luna luceat <plus> quam <lucet nunc> sol, et sol in septuplum quam modo luceat, et corpora sanctorum sepcies magis sole.
38. An angeli quos uidit Magdalena circa sepulcrum Domini post eius resurreccionem lacrimabili uoce consolati sint eam.
39. An homo posset uidere oculo mentis omnia que aguntur in corde hominis habencia impressionem exterius in corpore, si haberet uisum ita acutum sicut habet dyabolus.
40. An, licet ascendendo immediate Mars sit supra Solem quantum ad situm, tamen descendendo immediate sit supra Lunam quantum ad dominium in prima hora Martis.
41. An in inferno erit fletus corporalis quantum ad lacrimarum resolucionem.
42. An in inferno erit uermis corporalis.
43. An possit sciri distancia a superficie terre usque ad centrum eius.

<Determinationes Fratris Alberti>

De questionibus quas mihi Paternitas Uestra destinauit secundum sciencie et ingenii mei tenuitatem respondere intendens, dico quod primum, que de Deo est, ordine singulari et per se determinare oportet. Est autem hec questio, An Deus moueat aliquod corpus immediate. Hanc autem secundum philosophiam uultis nobis[7] determinari, quia secundum fidem catholicam dubitare non licet quin Deus Filius corpus quod assumpsit et immediate et corporaliter et distincte impleat et moueat, cum scriptum sit Col. II, <9>, *Quoniam in ipso Christo habundat*; alia littera, *Habitat omnis plenitudo diuinitatis corporaliter*. Constat autem quod habitat in ipso sicut mouens et influens sibi motum bonitatis, gracie et uirtutis, et omnem motum quo illud corpus ministrat deitati in gracie motibus et operibus. — Si obicitur illud Augustini,[8] quod Filius Deus per intellectum assumpsit animam et per animam corpus, ab antiquo responsum <est>, et responsio ab omnibus sapientibus est acceptata et approbata,[9] quod intellectus ad deitatem et anima ad intellectum non sunt nisi media per maiorem similitudinem congruencia, et non talia que sint distanciam interposicionis essentialem faciencia inter corpus et deitatem. Aliter enim in triduo quo Christus in sepulcro iacuit, deitas corpori non fuisset unita (fol. 17va) et sic falsum esset euangelium Joannis X, <18>, *Potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam,*[10] *et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam.* Hanc enim potestatem caro habuit, ut ibidem in Glossa dicit Augustinus,[11] uirtute in se latentis diuinitatis. Et propter[12] hanc inhabitacionem dixit Dauid,[13] *Non dabis sanctum tuum uidere corrupcionem,* et Petrus Actuum primo,[14] *Quem Deus suscitauit, solutis doloribus inferni, iuxta quod impossibile erat teneri illum,* hoc est Christum, *ab illo* inferno, scilicet quia infernus deitatem tenere non poterat in anima, et mors deitatem tenere non poterat in corpore; et sic non poterat uidere per experimentum et dominium inferni uel mortis corrupcionem. De hoc ergo dubitare non licet.

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[7] uobis *cod.*

[8] Augustini, *De agone Christiano*, c. 18 (PL 40, 300). Cf. P. Lombardi, *Lib. III Sent.*, d. 2, c. 2 (Ad Claras Aquas 1916, pp. 555-6); Alberti, *In III Sent.*, dist. 2, B. art. 9-10 (B. XXVIII, 33-35).

[9] Cf. A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik.* Zweiter Teil: *Die Lehre von Christus.* Bd. I (Regensburg 1953), c. 8. De axioma 'Verbum assumpsit carnem mediante anima', vide *ibid.*, pp. 150-171; vide etiam *Abbreviationem Sent.* (in *Analecta Upsaliensia*, I (1953), 7-8), Alexandrum de Hales (*Glossa in Sent.*, III, d. 2, num. 8), Hannibaldum de

Si autem questio illa talis < sit >, An Deus secundum ordinem nature moueat aliquod corpus immediate ita quod, sicut probat Aristoteles in principio septimi *Phisicorum,*[15] motor et motum immediatam habeant unionem, dico ad hoc quod illa questio ualde generalis est et dupliciter intelligi[16] potest. Si enim intelligatur de tali motore ex quo et suo mobili fit unum per naturam sicut ex[17] corpore et anima uel motore celi et celo ut dicit Aristoteles,[18] constat quod, 'cum primum regat res omnes ita quod non commiscetur cum eis,' ut dicit Aristoteles in *Libro de causis,*[19] [quod] Deus hoc modo nullum corpus mouet immediate; Deus enim hoc modo nulli penitus inest mobili. Si enim hoc daretur, sequeretur quod Deus aliquo modo esset actus corporis et propor-

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Hannibaldis (*In III Sent.*, d. 2, a. 3), Petrum de Tarantasia (*In III Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1). Similis distinctio cum usu 'congruere' et 'convenire' invenitur iam apud P. Lombardum (lib. III, dist. 2, c. 2, n. 8), Stephanum Langton (lib. III, d. 2), Hugonem a S. Caro (*ibid.*), Bonaventuram (*ibid.* et dist. 21, a. 1, q. 2 ad 1), et Summam Alexandrinam (lib. III, tr. I, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 2, c. 3).

[10] eam *Vulg.*

[11] *Glossa Ord.* super Ioan. x, 18 (PL 114, 397): "non tamen sua potestate caro, sed potestate inhabitantis carnem." Aug. *In Ioan.* c. 10, tr. 47, n. 11 (PL 35, 1739). Cf. Alb., *De XV problematibus*, a. 14 (ed. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, II [Louvain 1908], p. 51).

[12] per *cod.*

[13] *Ps.* xv, 10.

[14] *Act. Apost.* ii, 24.

[15] Arist., *Phys.*, VII, 2. 243a 3 - 245b 3.

[16] intellegi *cod.*

[17] in *cod.*

[18] Arist., *Phys.*, VIII, 5. 258a 20. Cf. Alb., *Phys.*, VIII, tr. II, c. 8 (B. IV, 583b-586a); S. Thomae, *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 70, a. 3.

[19] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, prop. 20: "Causa prima regit omnes res creatas praeter quod commisceatur cum eis" (ed. H. Saffrey [*S. Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de Causis Expositio*, Fribourg, 1954], p. 108; O. Bardenhewer [*Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift Ueber das reine Gute*, Freiburg, i. B. 1882] § 19, p. 181).

cionatam uirtutem haberet ad mouendum illud, quod ualde est absurdum, quia tunc non posset mouere aliud nec posset mouere maius,[20] et sequeretur quod motus eius esset in tempore ex parte sue uirtutis mouentis,[21] sicut est motus omnium motorum naturalium qui corpus mouent; sequeretur eciam quod Deus non esset causa prima, quia nil per naturam unibile alii potest esse primum;[22] et quod plus est, hoc non potest intelligi. De hoc racionibus demonstratiuis dissertum est a nobis in nostro *Libro de causis*.[23]

Si autem de motu obediencie intelligatur questio illa, tunc longe ante nos est determinata, quoniam dicit Aristoteles[24] quod causa prima mouet celum primum ad cuius motum omnes celestium corporum motus referentur sicut omnes membrorum motus referuntur ad motum cordis. Et in 2° *De celo et mundo*,[25] ubi Aristoteles tractat de primo motore et primo motu secundum quod ut causa comparatur ad alios, querit Aristoteles: Cum primi motoris immediato mobili sit motus unus et simplex, et secundum nature ordinem ita uideatur esse debere quod id quod plus accedit debeat habere motus pauciores et quod plus recedit ab ipso debeat habere plures, quare non est in celestibus corporibus? Spera enim stellarum fixarum, que plus omnibus accedit, tres inuenitur habere motus super circulos paralellos diuersos et super polos diuersos. Habet enim motum regularem diurnum super paralellos equinoccionales et super polos equinoccionales; et hunc motum Eudoxus (sicut ipse Aristoteles dicit in XI° *Prime Philosophie* sue)[26] uocauit 'motum aplanes'; hoc est sine errore. Habet[27] autem eciam motum stellarum fixarum qui in centum annis est gradus unius, qui est super polos Zodiaci[28] et super circulos paralellos siue equidistantes zodiaci.[29] Habet[30] eciam motum capitis Arietis et Libre, qui appellatur motus octaui, et est octo graduum in Aquilonem; et cum sit octauum celum supremum et proximum primo motori, ubi per obedienciam refertur ad Deum mouentem omnia, nulla esset questio Aristotelis.[31] Si enim omnes illi tres motus essent a motore coniuncto per naturam, cum diuersi sint specie circulacionis, sequeretur quod motus diuersi specie essent ab uno motore speciei eiusdem, quod penitus est impossibile.

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[20] Cf. Arist., *De anima*, I, 3. 407b 13 sqq.

[21] Cf. Arist., *De caelo et mundo*, I, 7. 274b 33 sqq.

[22] Cf. S. Thomae, *Summa contra gentiles*, I, c. 27; *Compend. theol.*, I, c. 17.

[23] Alb., *Liber de causis*, I, tr. I, cc. 2 & 10 (B. IX, 363-5 & 380), ac praesertim I, tr. IV, c. 7 (B. IX, 423-7).

[24] Arist., *De caelo et mundo*, II, 2. 284b 6 - 286a 2).

[25] Arist., *De caelo et mundo*, II, 12. 291b 24 - 292a 18. Cf. Alb., *ibid.*, tr. III, cc. 13-14 (B. IV, 200-206).

[26] Arist., *Metaph.*, XII, 8. 1073b 18 sqq.

[27] hunc *cod.*

[29] codiaci *cod.*

[28] codiaci *cod.*

[30] hunc *cod.*

[31] "De tribus enim his motibus sphaerae stellarum fixarum mentionem facit Aristoteles in fine primi *De causis elementorum proprietatum et planetarum*." Alb., *De caelo et mundo*, II, tr. III, c. 11 (B. IV, 195b). Doctrina haec de tribus motibus stellarum fixarum revera non

Si autem diceretur quod Deus qui est primus motor nullo modo nec per uoluntatem imperii nec per ordinem nature moueret, falsum in sua questione supponeret Aristoteles, qui supponit quod omnes inferiores motus referuntur ad primum motorem ut ad causam motus. Propter quod Philosophus qui uocatur Alpetragyus suam super hoc fundauit astrologiam supponens quod omnia superiora mouentur uno solo motore primo, cuius tamen uirtus in immediato mobili fortior est, et debilior in eo quod mediate ref[f]ertur ad ipsum.[32] Ita eciam quod ignem circumfert, set ibi amittit motus uniformitatem; et aerem circumfert, et amittit perfectam circulacionem quia pars aeris una mouetur super aliam; et mouet mare et non attingit nisi quartam circuli, et ideo ad quadraturam lune mouetur in effluxu et refluxu; et in terra non apparet (fol. 17vb) per motum localem, set per uirtutem generacionis et nutrimenti. Et hoc modo per obedienciam Deus omnia mouet corpora. Nec[33] sibi in hoc motu medium quo moueat poni potest, quia hoc, cum creatum sit, infinitum motum secundum naturam mouere non possit, ut probat Aristoteles in VIII° *Phisicorum*[34] et in 1° *De celo et mundo*.[35] Mouet autem sic omnia que sunt, immobilis ipse et impartibilis, non habens magnitudinem penitus; et causa est motus sicut dans formam motus sicut generans. Set in hoc est dissimile, quod non dat formam motus per generacionem, set per influenciam sue causalitatis prime. Et regulariter uerum est in philosophia quod omne quod dat formam aliquam, dat eo ipso omnia que secuntur ad formam illam, que sunt motus et locus; et hoc de necessitate probatum est in VIII° *Phisicorum*.[36] Hoc igitur motu mouet Deus omne quod est et corpus et anima immediate; aliis autem modis non mouet. Propter quod refert Augustinus in libro *De ciuitate Dei*,[37] quod primus philosophus Hermes Trismegistus quem secutus

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est Aristotelis (vide *De caelo et mundo*, II, 12), sed magis quorundam Arabum. Rogerius Bacon, *Opus Tertium* (P. Duhem, *Un fragment inédit de l'Opus Tertium de Roger Bacon*, Quaracchi 1909, pp. 107-8) nominat Thebit et Azarchel. De doctrina Abu Isac Azarkel vide etiam Al-Biṭrûjî [Alpetragius], *De motibus celorum* (ed. F. J. Carmody, Berkeley, Calif. 1952, pp. 94-102), ix, 3-x, 20.

[32] Al-Biṭrûjî, *op. cit.*, III, 10-14 (*ed. cit.*, pp. 79-80); IV, 1-8 (pp. 80-81). Cf. R. Bacon, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109; Alb., *Liber de causis*, I, tr. IV, c. 7 (B. X, 426b-427b); II, tr. II, c. 1 (B. X, 479b-480a).

[33] Nisi *cod.*

[34] Arist., *Phys.*, VIII, 10. 266a-b.

[35] Arist., *De caelo et mundo*, I, 5-7.

[36] Arist., *Phys.*, VIII, 4. 254b 33 - 256a 2.

[37] Augustinus loquitur de Trismegisto et de Apuleio in *De civitate Dei*, VIII, c. 23 (PL 41, 247 sqq.). Albertus videtur hunc locum confundere cum lib. IV, c. 31: "Dicit etiam idem auctor <Varro> acutissimus atque doctissimus, quod hi soli ei videantur animadvertisse

est Apulegius dixit quod Deus <est> anima motu et racione mundum gubernans; et corrigit errorem quod animam uocauit, quia anima est intrinsecum principium uite in corpore, quod Deo non conuenit. Quod autem motu et racione mundum gubernat, dicit esse bene dictum.

Hic igitur quantum ad presentem intencionem sufficit sit determinacio questionis prime.

<Questio Secunda>

Decem et octo numero questiones que secuntur omnes sunt de angelis. Ad quarum determinacionem prenotare oportet qualiter et qui philosophi dicant angelos esse, quia in hiis plus disputatur ad posicionem quamdam quam ad rem. Sciendum ergo quod non inueniuntur antiqui perypatetici aliquid de angelis tradidisse, set noui quidam, et tantum quidam Arabes et quidam Iudei: Arabes sicut Auicenna[1] et Algazel,[2] Iudei autem sicut Ysaac[3] et Moyses Egypcius, quem Rabimoysen (hoc est Magistrum Moysen) uocant.[4] Concorditer autem isti dicunt quod intelligencie sunt substancie quas uulgus angelos uocat et dicunt. Dicunt autem isti concorditer quod intelligencia est ubique et semper; et ideo nec supra nec infra est, et nullum penitus habet motum secundum locum, nec mittitur nec uenit nec recedit — que omnia de angelis prout nos de angelis loquimur scriptura sacra non admittit. Quia si dicitur quod angelus aliquando missus ad Abraham uenit, dicit Rabimoyses[5] quod fuit propheta uel bonus homo, quia intelligencia nec uenit nec recedit. Et si aliquando hoc non est, dicunt quod est uirtus quedam celi mouens homines instinctu nature ad aliquid; et ideo dicit quod, cum Judas Thamar nurum suam ad coitum inuitauit, [quod] tetigit cum angelis concupiscencie. Et Phylo dicit in libro *De factis Patriarcharum*,[6] quod cum Dauid Golyath prosterneret, misit

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quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem" (PL 41, 138); sumitur quidem a Cicerone, *De natura deorum*, lib. I, c. 2. Vide autem Albertum *Lib. de causis*, I, tr. III, c. 3 (B. X, 405 a); I, tr. IV, c. 6 (B. X, 421-2); *Metaph.*, XI, tr. II, c. 12 (B. VI, 632a-b).

[1] Avicennae, *Metaph.*, IX, cc. 2-4 (ed. Venetiis 1508, fol. 103 sqq.), et X, c. 1.

[2] Algazelis, *Metaphysica*, tr. IV, c. 1 (ed. J. T. Muckle, Toronto 1933, p. 90. 15-17); tr. IV, c. 3 (p. 105. 2-5); tr. V. *passim* (p. 121. 7 sqq.).

[3] Isaac, *Liber de definitionibus* (ed. J. T. Muckle, in AHDLMA, 1937-8, pp. 315-318).

[4] Moysis Maimonidis, *Dux neutrorum*, P. II, cc. 5-8 et 41. Cf. Alb., *Lib. de causis*, I, tr. IV, c. 8 (B. X, 431b); II, tr. V, c. 24 (B. X, 619b); *In II Sent.*, d. III, A. a. 3 (B. XXVII, 64b-66a).

[5] Maimonidis, *loc. cit.*, c. 6.

[6] Ps.-Philo, *Liber antiquitatum Biblicarum*, LXI, 5: "Et misit Deus Zervihel angelum prepositum super virtutem" (ed. G. Kisch, Notre Dame 1949, p. 263). De usu huius operis ab ipso Alberto, sub aliis autem titulis, vide Leopold Cohn, "Pseudo-Philo und Jerachmeel," in *Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage Jakob Guttmanns* (Leipzig: Gustav Fock 1915), pp. 175-6.

ad eum Deus angelum nomine Ceruiel, et hoc est quod uirtute eum confortauit. Ex hoc ergo patet quod de angelis non locuntur quemadmodum Scriptura loquitur, set quidam aliam descindunt posicionem, dicentes uirtutem intelligencie alicuius orbis seu celi influxam inferioribus uocari angelum.

Intelligencia enim secundum philosophos omnes qui perypatetici uocantur uno modo et immobilis est,[7] et ponunt eam intellectum uniuersaliter agentem ea que <sunt> sui orbis.[8] Et quia orbes decem sunt,[9] scilicet uerbi gracia: orbis qui primus est secundum motum aplanes unus; orbis qui primus est secundum motum planes secundus, qui est celum stellarum; orbis qui primus sequitur motum planes tercius, et est orbis Saturni; et eum qui uno modo coniungitur motui planes tercium qui est orbis Iouis (et propter hoc Iupiter Saturni filius esse dicitur[10]); et eum qui per duo media coniungitur qui est orbis Martis (propter quod maximi epycicli dicitur esse Mars[11]); et eum qui per tria media coniungitur motui planes et est orbis Solis; et eum qui per quatuor media refertur ad motum planes et est orbis Ueneris (propter humidum naturale et complexionale mouendum datur Ueneri[12]); et eum qui per quinque coniungitur et est orbis Mercurii (propter quod inuolutum ualde et multis comm scibilem habet motum[13]); et eum qui per sex coniungitur et est orbis Lune (propter quod terrestris dicitur esse Luna et mouens humidum elementale quod est aqua[14]); et hiis coniungunt speram actiuorum et passiuorum et est orbis quatuor essenciarum simplicium que dicuntur esse elementa (fol. 18ra)

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[7] Cf. Algazelis, *Metaphysica*, P. I, tr. IV, c. 3 (*ed. cit.*, p. 114.4) cum usu 'inpermutablis'.

[8] Cf. Alb., *De nat. et orig. animae*, tr. I, cc. 1-2 (ed. Colon., t. XII, 3-6); *Liber de causis*, II, tr. I, c. 13 (B. X., 456a) et c. 14 (B. X, 456b-458).

[9] Aristoteles et omnes antiqui usque ad tempus Ptolemaei, Pythagoricis exceptis (cf. *Metaph.*, I, 5. 986a 10), consensisse videntur quod sphaerae fuerunt octo. Alpetragius autem et quidam alii pronuntiaverunt novem esse sphaeras (cf. *De motibus caelorum*, V, 8, *ed. cit.* p. 83). Doctrina tamen de decem sphaeris censetur introduci ab Arabis, secundum C. A. Nallino (*Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti*, A cura di M. Nallino. t. V. Astrologia, Astronomia, Geografia. Roma 1944, p. 65). Ipse Albertus autem agnoscit Ptolemaeum tanquam auctorem: "Ptolemai sententia autem secundum quod eum possum intelligere, est quod decem sunt orbes caelorum, et ratio sua physica et non mathematica est" (*De caelo et mundo*, II, tr. III, c. 9 [B. IV, 196a]). De hac sententia sunt etiam Avicenna (*Metaph.*, tr. IX, cc. 2-3), Algazel (*Metaph.*, P. I, tr. V, *ed. cit.*, p. 121) et Maimonides (*Dux neutrorum*, P. II, c. 5).

[10] Cf. Rogerum Bacon, *Opus Maius*, P. IV, §. *Mathematicae in divinis utilitas* (ed. Bridges, Oxonii, 1897, I, p. 256): "Saturnus pater planetarum". Vide Ciceronem, *De natura deorum*, II, 24, 63: "Saturnum... a filio Jove".

[11] Cf. Alb., *Metaph.*, XI, tr. II, c. 25 (B. VI, 653a).

[12] *Ibid.*: "humidum autem complexionale habet movere sphaera Veneris."

[13] *Ibid.*: "unus solus est qui commiscibilem et applicabilem habet virtutem, qui est Mercurius, et ideo habet motus involutos multos." Vide R. Bacon, *Opus Maius*, P. IV, §. *Mathematiciae in divinis utilitas* (ed. Bridges, I, p. 257); Alfraganus, *Liber de aggregationibus* (ed. R. Campani, Città di Castello 1910), p. 122.

[14] Cf. Alb., *Metaph.*, XI, tr. II, c. 25 (B. VI, 652b-653a).

— secundum has decem speras decem ponunt esse ordines intelligenciarum, que sunt intellectus agentes omnes formas que motibus decem orbium explicantur. Oportet enim quod instrumentaliter mouens habeat formaliter mouens ipsum ad cuius formam mouet instrumentum, eo quod instrumentum nec a se mouetur nec ad finem dirigitur nisi per mouens ipsum, sicut manifestum est in omni arte. Nec de hoc est aliquod dubium apud aliquem philosophorum.

Adhuc autem probatum est et demonstratum quod nullum corpus mouetur a seipso; et hoc quidem probat Aristoteles in VIII° *Phisicorum.*[15] Eorum autem que mouentur localiter, ut probauit ibidem, quedam mouentur a generante uel remouente prohibens motum, quedam autem mouentur ab anima, ut animalia.

Adhuc autem probatum est[16] quod motus a natura corporis non est ab eodem mouente nisi ad hoc, et non ab eodem in aliud sicut in omni generacione et corrupcione, et augmento et diminucione, et alteracione. Motus autem localis nunquam est a natura secundum quod natura est 'principium motus et quietis in quo est per se et non secundum accidens,' ut dicit Aristoteles in 2° *Phisicorum;*[17] propter quod, ut diximus, oportet motum localem esse aut a generante aut impediens remouente aut ab anima.[18]

Adhuc autem probatum est[19] quod in motu locali motor proximus, inter quem et mobile motum nichil est, non potest esse intelligencia, eo quod motor immediatus corporis actus est corporis, qui non potest mouere secundum naturam nisi sit actus corporis quod mouet. Illud autem quod secundum sui substanciam et esse et racionem idem est non potest esse actus alicuius corporis, set est separata intelligencia nulli nichil habens commune, ut optime dixit Anaxagoras, quod dictum cum[20] magna laude extollit Aristoteles in 3° *De anima;*[21] propter quod eciam hoc eius dictum ab omnibus philosophis tam Stoycis et Epycuris et ipsis Perypateticis quasi sacrum susceptum est.

Istis sic prescitis, non est difficile determinare ea que in decem et octo questionibus queruntur. Quod enim queritur, an omnia que mouentur naturaliter moueantur ministerio angelorum mouente corpora celestia, non est dubium quod corpora celestia non mouent angeli. Angeli enim <habent> aliam distinccionem ad actus uirtutis as<s>istricis et ministratiue, sicut tradunt Dyonisius[22] et Gregorius.[23] Si autem <aliquis> dicat quod angeli intelligencie sunt, dicendum quod intelligencia secundum suum nomen et racionem non dicit nisi intelligenciam seipsa et suo lumine agentem et nil per modum passionis recipientem. Dico autem per modum passionis ut recipiat formam intelligibilem ab agente aliquo, sicut possibilis intellectus. Hoc enim iam probauit Aristoteles in XIº *Prime Philosophie*,[24] quod talis intelligencia per omnem intelligenciarum ordinem nil hoc modo recipit; et si reciperet, haberet alium agentem sui ordinis intellectum qui[25] de potencia educeret eum ad actum — quod friuolum est et impossibile, cum intelligencie omnes in suis ordinibus omnes sint prime ita quod quelibet earum in suo ordine agendo prima est et uniuersalis, qua est omnia facere que sunt illius ordinis. In quolibet autem ordine impossibile est aliquid esse prius primo. Angeli igitur secundum hunc modum non sunt intelligencie, set sicut dicit Dyonisius sunt celestes animi et diuini intellectus theophaniis et theoriis a Deo in ipsos descendentibus illuminati et purgati et perfecti per conuersionem ad fontem illuminacionis prime, qui recipiendo per modum passionis perficiuntur.[26] Non purgatur a dissimilitudinis habitu aliquid nisi quod recipit per modum passionis. Hoc autem contra naturam est intelligencie,[27] que secundum seipsam tota actiua est sicut dicunt philosophi. Set intelligencia inferior influenciam luminis ad sui constitucionem in esse et uirtute actiua recipit a superiori, sicut unum lumen fluit super aliud per quod constitutitur in esse luminis et in uirtute illuminatiua. Et ille non est modus passionis, set modus quo forma super formam fluens perficit ipsam in uirtute formali. Propter quod probatum est in prohemio[28] libri *De causis*,[29] quod superius nunquam applicatur inferiori, set semper inferius superiori, quia superius non formatur ab inferiori, set potius (fol. 18rb) econtrario inferius a superiori; set superius determinatur non ab inferiori, set in inferiori. Et ideo eciam in astris, ut dicunt Ptholomeus et Geber et Albategni et Albumaxar et omnes auctores,[30] Saturnus nulli applicatur planetarum, set omnes applicantur sibi.

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[15] Arist., *Phys.*, VIII, 4. 255a 12-18, et b 5-31.

[16] Arist., *Phys.*, VIII, 4 per totum.

[17] Arist., *Phys.*, II, 1. 192b 21-23.

[18] Cf. Alb., *ibid.* et *Phys.*, VIII, tr. II, c. 4 (B. III, 569b-574 a).

[19] Cf. Alb., *Phys.*, VIII, tr. II, c. 7 (B. III, 582); c. 8 (*ibid.*, 584b-585a); *De causis*, lib. I, tr. IV, c. 7 (B. X, 423b-427b).

[20] est *cod.*

[21] Arist., *De anima*, III, 4. 429a 18-20, vel potius *De anima*, I, 2. 405b 20-23; cf. Aver., *In I de anima*, comm. 34, et *In III de anima*, comm. 4-5; Alb., *Phys.*, lib. VIII, tr. II, c. 6 (B. III, 578).

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[22] Dionysii, *De caelesti hierarchia*, cc. 7, 9, 13 (PG 3, 205-212; 257-261 et 299-308).

[23] Gregorii, *Homilia in Evang.*, XXXIV (PL 76, 1254-5).

[24] Arist., *Metaph.*, XII, 7.1072b 17-29, et c. 9. 1074b 15-29.

[25] quod *cod.*

[26] Dionysii, *De caelesti hierarchia*, c. 9 (PG 3, 257-260).

[27] intelligibile *cod.*

[28] prohemia *cod.*

[29] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, comm. 1 (ed. Saffrey, p. 4; Bardenhewer § 1, p. 163-4). Cf. Alb., *De causis*, lib. I, tr. IV per totum; etiam *Metaph.*, lib. XI, tr. II, c. 32 (B. VI, 663-4).

[30] Vide etiam Albertum, *Liber de causis*, lib. II, tr. II c. 35 (B. X, 531a). De Ptolemaeo, cf. *Tetrabiblos*, I, 24 (ed. F. E. Robbins, Loeb Lib., Cambridge, Mass. 1940) cum notis 3-4 ibidem, et R. Bacon, *Opus Maius*, P. IV, §. *Mathematicae in divinis utilitas* (ed. Bridges, I, p. 256): "Saturno omnes planetae complectuntur et ipse nulli." Circa Albumasar, vide R.

Hiis igitur sic notatis, patet quod intelligencia non mouet nisi immobilis, hoc modo quo desideratum mouet desiderium. Cum enim intelligencia suo lumine agat omnes sue spere et ordinis formas, et forme ille sint lumen eius, et hoc lumen desiderans ad esse deducere, motor sui orbis proximus mouet orbem, et mouendo ad esse ducit formam. Hec autem omnia probata sunt in philosophia; et diligenter a nobis in libro *De causis*[31] sunt explanate probaciones philosophorum. Patet igitur quod intelligencia nec angelus est; et si esset, non adhuc esset motor proximus alicuius spere celestis. Et si sic est, quod certissime probatum est, tunc angeli per ministerium non mouent corpora celestia, et sic ulterius sequitur quod nec alia inferiora corpora mouentur ab ipsis.

Si quis autem dicat quod Deo imperante mouet speras celestes, ille motus erit motus obediencie et non naturalis. Et de hoc nil secundum philosophiam determinari potest, quia principia philosophie que sunt dignitates per se note non sufficiunt ad hoc. Et ideo sic dicens, quia non est tenens principia philosophie, nichil debet loqui cum philosopho; dicit enim Aristoteles[32] quod non est sermo ge<o>metre cum non geometra.

Sic patet determinacio tercie questionis, quia angeli secundum philosophiam non sunt motores celestium corporum, ut iam de necessitate monstratum est.

Questio[33] Quarta

Ex hiis eciam patet determinacio questionis quarte. Apud nullos enim infallibiliter probatum est angelos esse motores corporum celestium. Set quidam arabes et quidam iudei,[34] quod apud uulgus angeli intelligencie, nec illi probauerunt hoc esse uerum nec dictum uulgi approbauerunt. Quinimmo sicut diuina scriptura loquitur de angelis et philosophia de intelligenciis, intelligencie non sunt angeli. Philosophia enim cogitur ponere intelligencias, eo quod in quolibet ordine explicante formas necesse est ponere primum quod seipso et suo substanciali lumine sit causa formarum. Et hoc non potest esse nisi intelligencia agens omnes formas illas, sicut in arte primum est intelligencia agens omnes formas quas ars explicat motu instrumentorum, ut in fabrili intellectus agens fabrilium formarum primus factor et ministrator est omnium formarum que motu mallei et incudis et forcipis et lime et molari

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Bacon, *ibid.* (p. 262 cum nota Bridges). Albetegni citatur a R. Bacon *ibid.* (p. 257); vide etiam Nallino, *Raccolta di scritti*, t. V, pp. 334-6. Geber, *De astronomia libri novem*, Nurimburgae 1534.

[31] Alb., *De causis*, lib. I, tr. IV, c. 8 (B. X, 428-431).

[32] Arist., *Post. Anal.*, II, 12. 77b 12.

[33] Questio *om. cod. hic et in seqq.*

[34] Vide supra q. 2 cum notis 1-4.

lapsante figurantur. Et hoc apud philosophos infallibiliter est probatum, et hic posuimus breuiter racionem qua hoc[35] philosophi probauerunt.

Questio Quinta

Idem quod dictum est determinat questionem quintam. Supposito enim Deum non esse immediatum motorem naturalem, sicut et uerum est sicut superius probauimus, non est infallibiliter probatum angelos esse motores corporum celestium apud aliquos qui sciant philosophiam; et qui nesciunt. cum hoc probare non potuerunt, et sic apud nullos hoc probatum. Set pocius contradictorium huius est probatum apud philosophos, nisi aliquis loquatur de motu obediencie quo omnia Deo obediunt, qui si angelo committeretur et uirtute diuini precepti, in hoc et in aliis possit facere fieri que Deus uellet. Set effugit sermonem philosophicum et pertinet determinare ad spiritum prophetarum, qui innititur non racioni set reuelacioni.

Questio Sexta

Per hoc eciam patet ad sextam responsio. Inferiora enim in esse deducta motibus actiuorum et passiuorum in esse deducta sunt, quorum motus causa prima in genere est celi motus seu celorum. Et cum angeli non sint [motus uel] motores celestium, constat quod per angelos naturali ordine non reguntur, nisi particulariter quando a Deo committitur angelis regere et facere aliquid in inferioribus, que uia per illuminacionem[36] theophaniarum et theoriarum est, ut diximus,[37] et excedit philosophiam. (fol. 18va).

Questio Septima

Idem soluit ad questionem septimam, quod[38] inferiora que naturaliter in esse deducuntur non fiunt per angelos mediante motu superiorum. Quinimmo eciam qui ponunt intelligencias primos esse motores orbium dicunt[39] quod intelligencia mouens celestia non irradiat super inferiora per se, set illa sola irradiat per se super inferiora que decimi ordinis est intelligencia. Alie autem omnes intelligencie irradiant super inferiora per mediam illam. Dicunt eciam quod sola decimi ordinis intelligencia immediate irradiat super animas hominum, quod angelis non competit, quia[40] multi irradiant et superiores et inferiores. Philosophia enim ponit in ordine nature semper superius esse causam inferioris, et causalitatem primi ad ultimum non deuenire nisi per media quibus approximatur et contrahitur et determinatur lumen primi ut proporcionetur ultimo, cum expresse probatum sit in libro *De causis*[41] ultimum non esse perceptibile bonitatum primi prout sunt in primo nisi per media determinentur, quod in ordine angelorum nemo nisi insanus dicere audet.

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[35] hic *cod.*

[36] illuminacionis *cod.*

[37] Supra in q. 4.

[38] que *cod.*

[39] Cf. Algazelis, *Metaphysica*, P. I, tr. V (ed. Muckle pp. 121-3). Vide Alb., *Metaph.*, lib. XI, tr. II, c. 26 (B. VI, 654a-b); *De causis*, lib. I, tr. IV, c. 8.

[40] qui uel quia *cod.*

Questio Octaua

Ex dictis eciam soluitur questio octaua. Ordine enim nature faber potest mouere manum ad malleum, et cotidie mouet quando fabricat, sine angelico ministerio mouente corpora celestia. Quinimmo si unus solus est celestium, ut dicit Alpetragius,[42] cuius uirtus potencior immediate sibi coniuncto quam in eo quod coniungitur per medium, tunc eciam si nullus dicatur esse angelus nec in celo nec in terra, adhuc naturaliter mouebit et manum et malleum et omnia fabrilia instrumenta. Et forte hec opinio est uera, quia innuit Aristoteles in 2º *Celi et Mundi*[43] et in 3º *De anima* in capitulo de mouente,[44] quod unus est motus uniuersalis in celis sicut in homine, et quod motores particulares in orbibus ad illum se habent sicut in homine uirtutes affixe membris ut cordi et epati et cerebro se habent ad intellectum et animam racionalem hominis. Et hoc *concentum celi* uocat Dominus (Job XXXVIII, <27>). Et ut melius hoc intelligatur, sciendum est quod secundum Alpetragyum[45] nullus motus est stellarum ab Occidente in Orientem. Et dixit Alpetragyus quod hoc natura abhorret; quod enim eiusdem nature corporis sint duo motus naturales specie differentes est impossibile. Specie autem circulacionis differunt motus qui sunt super diuersos polos et super diuersos paralellos circulos, et diuersa habentes dextra et diuersa sinistra. Propter quod dicit quod motus stellarum secundum ordinem signorum (qui ordo <est> ab Occidente in Oriens) non est motus, set retardacio, ex hoc quod mediatum celum non percipit uirtutem motoris primi in uirtute quam percipit ipsum primum. Quando ergo celum quod uocatur 'aplanes' a philosophis perficitur in circulum uno die, orbis signorum in stellis fixis diminuitur a circuli perfeccione, eo quod, sicut dicit Aristoteles in VIº *Phisicorum*,[46] tardum diuidit magnitudinem. Et ideo tanto minus perficit circulum omni die, quod singulis diebus computata retardacio in centum annis est unus gradus, et in tribus milibus annorum efficitur unum signum, et in nouem milibus efficitur quarta circuli, et in XVIII milibus semicirculus, et in XXXVI milibus annorum perficitur retardacio ad unius circuli perfeccionem. In Saturno autem plus deficit uirtus primi motoris; et ideo in ipso retardacio est ad maiorem circuli porcionem, et est in triginta annis tota simul collecta retardacio circulus completus. In circulo autem Iouis iterum plus deficit uirtus mouentis et fit retardacio maior, ita quod collectis simul diurnis retardacionibus in duodecim annis perficitur circulus. Similiter minus percipitur uirtus mouentis in Marte; et ideo cicius completus circulus retardacione[m], et fit in tribus annis. Motus enim (fol. 18vb) Martis in tribus annis est circulus. In Sole iterum propter defectum uirtutis mouentis maioris spacii fit retardacio, et est in die quinquaginta duo minuta; in mense autem signum, et in anno circulus. Et quia iterum uirtus mouentis minor est in Uenere, fit retardacio maior, et in minus quam anno perficitur circulus. Et similiter est in Mercurio maior defectus uirtutis motiue, et perficitur circulus circa nouem menses. In Luna autem maxime deficit, et dimittit a complecione circuli in motu diurno tredecim gradus, quos non complet de circulo, ita quod in mense completur circulus irradiacionum secundum ordinem signorum ab Occidente in Orientem; et in spera actiuorum et passiuorum mouet quidem ad circulum, set nunquam perfecte complet ipsum. Exaltaciones et depressiones et status et direcciones et retrogradaciones secundum hanc posicionem oriuntur ex distancia polorum istorum orbium. Ex quibus satis patet quod dictum est de octaue questionis determinacione.

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[41] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, prop. 19 (ed. Saffrey, p. 104; Bardenhewer § 18, p. 180). Cf. Alb., *De causis*, lib. I, tr. III, c. 5 (B. X., 407-8).

[42] Al-Biṭrûjî, *De motibus caelorum*, passim, v. g., III, 10 (ed. Carmody pp. 79-80), IV, 1 (pp. 80-81), V, 1-3 (p. 82), VII, 25 (p. 91), VIII, 1-3 (p. 91) etc.

[43] Arist., *De caelo et mundo*, II, 4. 287a 1 sqq.; II, 6. 289a 8; II, 12. 292b 22-23. Cf. Alb., *De caelo*, lib. II, tr. III, c. 5 (B. IV, 180b); tr. III, c. 15 (B. IV, 208b); *De causis*, lib. II, tr. II, c. 37 (B. X, 534b).

[44] Arist., *De anima*, III, 11. 434a 14 sqq. Cf. Alb., *De causis*, lib. II, tr. II, c. 16 (B. X, 502-3); *De nat. et orig. an.*, tr. I, c. 3 (ed. Colon. t. XII, p. 7. 41-49).

[45] Al-Biṭrûjî, *De motibus caelorum*, V (ed. Carmody pp. 82-85), continet summarium huius doctrinae; quantum autem ad motum seu retardationem stellarum secundum ordinem signorum, vide ibidem VI. Cf. Alb., *De causis*, lib. II, tr. II, c. 1 (B. X, 479b-480a).

Questio Nona

Nona autem fere eadem <est> cum octaua, et ideo per idem determinatur. Potest enim faber mouere manum sine angelico ministerio secundum naturam ad quicquid uult operandum, eo quod angelicum ministerium non est in motibus celorum secundum naturam, et nullus hoc penitus probauit philosophorum. Quod si eciam daretur quod per ministerium angelorum corpora celestia mouerentur, non sequeretur quin sine ministerio eorum mouere possit manum. Postquam enim uirtus celestis ad esse et uirtutem et operacionem percepta est a fabro, non sequitur quod statim destruatur in fabro, nil operante angelo uel celesti corpore. Propter quod dicit Ptholomeus in *Centilogia*[47] et in libro qui *Alarba* seu *Quadripartitum* uocatur,[48] quod si corpora inferiora ad contrarium celestis motus disposita sint, impeditur in eis celestis effectus. Mouens enim circulus ad melancolie motum in quartana, ut dicit Aly in commento ibidem,[49] si medicus ad sanguinem disponit corpus, celestis circulus quartanam inducere non potest. Cuius racionem dicit Ptholomeus in *Alarba*[50] esse quia effectus celestis circuli ad inferiora non deuenit nisi per aliud et per accidens: per aliud, quia per qualitates elementales, per accidens autem, quia per proximas inferiorum corporum disposiciones. Propter quod eciam dicit Aristoteles in 2º *De generacione et corrupcione*,[51] quod peryodi generacionis et corrupcionis quamuis secundum motum solis in decliui circulo equales sint, non tamen semper sunt equales in generatis et corruptis propter materie inequalitatem, quia materia non equaliter est disposita. Et dat exemplum de hoc Aristoteles in 2º *De sompno et uigilia*,[52] quod sicut consilia sapientum sunt uno rata secundum sapiencie racionem, tamen frequenter mutantur sapientibus, eo quod consilia illorum secundum loca et tempora et negocia aliquando magis sunt oportuna.

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[46] Arist., *Phys.*, VI, 2. 233a8: "Dividet enim id quod est velocius tempus, tardius autem longitudinem."

[47] Ptolemaei, *Centiloquium cum commento Haly* (Venetiis: E. Ratdolt 1484), nn. 5-8.

Questio Decima

Iam satis patet decime questionis determinacio: non enim omnia beneficia exteriora naturaliter de potencia in actum deducta ab angelis habemus, ut patet per antedicta. Quinimmo si dicemus motores esse angelos, quod tamen non est uerum, angelus non esset nisi instrumentaliter mouens ad ea, quia probatum est quod eleuare et deducere ad esse per se non est[53] nisi eius quod est causa uniuersi esse, et hoc non est non nisi causa prima; et hoc probatum est et in libro *De causis*[54] et in epistola Aristotelis que est *De principio uniuersi esse*.[55]

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[48] Ptolemaei, *Quadripartitum* (seu *Tetrabiblos*), I, 2 (ed. cit., p. 19) et I, 3 (pp. 29-35). Cf. Alb., *In I Sent.*, d. 38 B, a. 1 (B. XXVI, 282a); *In II Sent.*, d. 15 B. a. 4 (B. XXVII, 276b); *Ethic.*, lib. I, tr. VII, c. 9 (B. VII, 121b).

[49] Haly [ʻAlî ibn Riḍwân], *Liber Ptholomei quattuor tractatum cum Centiloquio eiusdem Ptholomei et commento Haly* (Venetiis: Erhard Ratdolt 1484), n. 60. Vide R. Bacon in *Opere Maiori*, P. IV, §. *Astrologia* (ed. Bridges, I, p. 397).

[50] Ptolemaei, *Tetrabiblos* (*Quadripartitum* seu *Alarba*), I, 3. Vide etiam Alb., *De XV problematibus*, q. 3 (ed. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant* II [Louvain 1908], p. 37); *Phys.*, lib. II, tr. II, c. 20 (B. III, 156a-b); *Ethic.*, lib. I, tr. VII, c. 6 (B. VII, 116a-b); *De sompno et vigilia*, lib. III, tr. I, c. 11 (B. IX, 194a). De hoc conferri potest Josephus Goergen, *Des hl. Albertus Magnus Lehre von der gottlichen Vorsehung und dem Fatum*, Vechta i. Oldbg. 1932, p. 126, nota 124.

[51] Arist., *De gen. et corrup.*, II, 10. 336b 20-24. Cf. Alb., *De gen.*, lib. II, tr. III, c. 5.

[52] Arist., *De divinitione per somnum*, c. 2. 463b26-28. Cf. Alb., *Phys.*, lib. II, tr. II, c. 20 (B. III, 156b).

[53] *insertum in cod.*

[54] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, prop. 1 (ed. Saffrey, p. 4; Bardenhewer § 1, p. 163-4).

[55] Haec epistola non videtur esse liber pseudo-Aristotelis *De principiis* "translatus de greco in latinum a magistro Bartholomeo de Messana in curia illustrissimi Maynfredi sere-

Questio Undecima

Per hoc iterum soluitur undecima: quia nullo modo sunt actores nec esse possunt, non debetur eis propter hoc quod non habent quod hic honor diuinus. Et exhibere eis honorem diuinum est ydolatria, sicut antiqui ydolatrabant honorem diuinum diis attribuentes propter uirtutes naturales quas deprehenderunt in eis,[56] ut in Cere uirtutem frugis, in Aesculapio[57] uirtutem germinis in terra, in Uulcano uirtutem inferni et infernalis caloris (quem infernalem uocabant, quia de uir (fol. 19ra) tute centri procedit, in quo congregantur solo et in puncto uno conueniunt omnes uirtutes orbium, et de ipso procedunt ad terre superficiem) et sic uenerabantur in uirtute humidi aquei [et] Neptunum[58], et Dyanam sic colebant in aere, et sic de aliis. Et in idem genus peccati incidit propter similia similem ueneracionem angelis impendens.

Questio Duodecima

Ex eodem soluitur duodecima questio: quod angeli, quia non mouent corpora celestia, non sunt factores corporum humanorum nec aliorum naturaliter in esse productorum secundum quod facere causis naturalibus est attributum; nec sunt de potencia in actum productores, quia (sicut dicit Aristoteles in XVI° *Animalium*[59]) quod non tangit non agit, et actum suum non sequitur alteracio. Angelus autem cum corpori nulli uniatur, non tangit. Et si dicas quod tangit iubendo quod fiat, erit agens extrinsecum et erit accio uiolenta et non naturalis. Accio autem uiolenta causam naturalem esse non potest, ut probat Aristoteles in 3° *Celi et mundi*.[60]

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nissimi regis Sicilie... de mandato suo" (cod. Patav. Anton. XVII, 370, fol. 62^r seqq., de quo vide AL, I, 88). Sed videtur esse quaedam epistola citata ab Avicenna (*Metaph.*, tr. IX, c. 2: "dicit in sua epistola quae est de principiis omnium") et ab Alpharabio, ut narrat Albertus (*Sum. theol.*, P. II, tr. I, q. 4, a. 5, par. 1). De hoc vide Albertum, *De causis*, lib. I, tr. I, c. 6 (B. X, 372b); lib. II, tr. I, c. 1 (*ibid.*, p. 435b); *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. I, tr. I, c. 2 (B. IX, 479b): "Haec autem disputatio tota trahitur ex epistola quadam Aristotelis quam scripsit de universitatis principio, cuius mentionem in *Metaphysica* facit Avicenna. Dicit autem Eustratius super VI *Ethicorum* Aristotelis, omnem cognitionem animalium fluere a prima causa cognitiva."

[56] Cf. Augustini, *De civ. Dei*, VII, 16; Isidori, *Etymologiarum Lib.*, VIII, xi.

[57] Esculabio *cod.*

[58] Neptinium *cod.*

[59] Arist., *De gen. anim.*, I, 22. 730b 5-9; cf. II, 1. 734a 3-4. Vide Alb., *De caelo*, lib. II, tr. III, c. 2 (B. IV, 170b-171b); *Metaph.*, lib. I, tr. II, c. 8 (B. VI, 100a).

[60] Arist., *De caelo et mundo*, III, 2. 300a 20-301a 22.

Questio Decima Tercia

Per hec eadem patet solucio questionis tercie decime: angeli enim non mouent corpora celestia, et ideo mediantibus celestibus corporibus non sunt factores omnium animalium irracionalium que mouentur uel uiuunt tam in mari quam in terra naturaliter in esse productorum secundum quod facere attribuitur causis naturalibus ita quod sint de potentia in actum producentes, quia si eciam concederetur quod angeli essent intelligencie et motores sperarum hoc modo quo dictum est (quod intelligencia[61] motor est ut desideratum <mouet> desiderium), non sequeretur adhuc quod essent cause, quia regulariter uerum est in omni ordine causarum naturalium quod causa secunda habet a prima quod causa est, et ablata causalitate secunde cause, adhuc causalitatem suam <habet> causa prima.[62] Et ideo totum esse causarum debetur cause prime, sicut in demonstracionibus quamuis quedam probentur non per prima, set per ea que ex primis fidem acceperunt, tamen omnes sunt ex primis et immediatis, quia eciam proxima que ex aliis sunt non probant nisi per prima que actu et intellectu et esse et uirtute sunt in ipsis, sicut probat Aristoteles in 1° *Posteriorum*,[63] et ideo totum debetur primis; et hoc expresse probatur in libro *De causis*,[64] et ideo dicit quod prima causa est diues in se et diues in omnibus aliis causis.

Questio Decima Quarta

Idem autem soluit ad questionem quartam decimam: secundum hunc enim modum eciam si detur quod angeli mouent corpora celestia (quod tamen secundum philosophiam impossibile est) non propter hoc sequitur quod sint causa terre nascencium naturaliter in esse productorum secundum quod facere attribuitur causis naturalibus ita quod sint de potencia in actum productores. Hoc enim de suo non facerent, set de hoc quod uirtute prime cause esset in ipsis, ut patet per predicta. Et ideo ipsi erunt sicut aptatores ad recipiendam causalitatem primi. Aliter enim sequeretur quod esse non esset causatum primum in omnibus, et sequeretur <quod> non esset proprius effectus cause prime, cuius contrarium efficacissime probatum est in libro *De causis*.[65]

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[61] intelligencie *cod.*

[62] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, prop. 1 (ed. Saffrey p. 4; Bardenhewer § 1, p. 163-4).

[63] Arist., *Post. Anal.*, I, 2 et passim.

[64] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, prop. 21 (ed. Saffrey, p. 112; Bardenhewer § 20, pp. 182-3).

[65] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, prop. 4 (ed. Saffrey p. 26; Bardenhewer § 4, pp. 166-7).

Questio Decima Quinta

Ad quintum decimum fere eadem est solucio, set in hoc differt quod metalla facilius generantur quam terre nascencia uel animalia. Generantur enim coagulacione frigidi[66] et humidi, ut dicit Aristoteles in IIII° *Methereorum;*[67] et non multum facit ad hoc motus celestium, eo quod coagulatorum generacio materialis est et non perfecta generacio. Et ideo ista questio non multum ualet, quia non multum referetur ad actum alicuius intelligencie uel alicuius spiritualis et incorporee substancie; set eo modo quo ad motum celestium referetur, eo modo eandem cum precedentibus habet solucionem. Corporalibus enim uirtutibus talia fiunt, quia essenciam speciei, que supra materiam multum eleuata sit, non attingunt. Propter quod eciam alchimicis ista operacionibus producuntur, quod fieri non posset si hec perfectam attingerent intelligencie speciem. Fiunt enim commixtione non equaliter elementorum, set aque et terre uirtute minerali que in aqua et terra est talia coagulante. Propter quod dissoluto[68] calido humido, iterum constant coagulata in eandem quam prius habuerunt speciem — quod in nullo est eorum que perfectam secundum naturam attingunt speciem. Hec enim dissoluta ad eandem in numero nunquam re (fol. 19rb) ducuntur speciem, quia quecunque habent substanciam corruptibilem motam non reiterantur eadem in numero, ut dicit Aristoteles in 2° *De generacione et corrupcione.*[69] Propter quod cum idem numero sit metallum <subiectum> liquefaccioni et iterum coagulatum, sicut eadem materia subiecta liquefaccioni et coagulacioni, patet quod talia non habent nisi species materiales; propter quod eciam operacione alchimica unum in aliud transmutatur, quod in nullo naturalium est que perfectas habent species. Propter hoc miror eciam quare ad operaciones angelicas referatur.

Questio Decima Sexta

Sextumdecimum quod queritur, an angeli habeant uirtutem infinitam inferius, aliquid habet philosophie plus quam alia. Hoc enim ideo dictum est, quia motores orbium sub primo motore dicuntur inferius esse uirtutis infinite a philosophis.[70] Set hoc sic intelligitur: quia motores inferiores a primo motore siue prima causa et sunt et motores sunt, et cum constituantur in esse finito et uirtute finita a primo motore, non possunt esse infinita ad superius. Finitur enim eorum uirtus ad finitatem sui mobilis, quod est celum finitum; quod si maius esset, motor ipsum mouere non posset, et si aliud esset, ab eodem motore non moueretur, ut dicit Auerroes super secundum *Celi et mundi*,[71] sicut non contingit 'tecthonica tibycines indui', ut in 1° *De anima* dicit Aristoteles.[72] Ad inferius autem infiniti sunt per accidens, quia motus quem mouent per accidens est infinitus, scilicet quia talis mobilis circularis et incorruptibilis est motus, quia nil habet contrarium nec ex parte mouentis nec ex parte mobilis nec ex parte motus. Quod autem sic infinitum est non est simpliciter et actu[m] infinitum, set potencia solum, sicut continuum diuisibile est in infinitum. Et hec est uera determinacio sextidecimi. Et ideo dicit Auerroes[73] quod in infinitate motus motores non comparantur ad inuicem secundum primum et secundum et sic deinceps, quia omnes in hoc conueniunt quod quilibet mouet motum infinitum, set comparantur in uigore mouendi, quod unus maius celum mouet quam alius, et ueloციori motu. Hoc igitur modo quod habet uirtutem infinitam non habet uirtutem infinitam nisi per accidens et secundum quod. Set hoc falsum est quod angeli sint motores, nec apud philosophos est probatum, ut patet per antedicta.

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[66] frigida *cod.*

[67] Arist., *Meteor.*, IV, 8. Cf. Alb., *Meteor.*, lib. IV, tr. I, c. 4 (B. IV, 711b-713b); tr. III, c. 5 (*ibid.*, 800a-802a).

[68] dissoluta *cod.*

[69] Arist., *De gen. et corr.*, II, 11. 338b 14-17.

[70] Cf. *Liber de causis*, prop. 16 (ed. Saffrey, pp. 92-3; Bardenhewer § 15, pp. 177-8).

Questio Decima Septima

Decima septima questio de fantasia fatuitatis procedit. Si enim angelos ponat aliquis motores qui naturaliter moueant, cum hoc cogitur ponere quod angelus nullum corpus aliud nisi sibi per naturam determinatum potest mouere, sicut nec corpus capre ab anima hominis moueri potest nec econtrario, quia sicut in artibus instrumenta textricis artis non sunt instrumenta artis tybicine, et qui texere deberet fistulis texere non posset, nec fistulare posset tybicen instrumentis textoris, que sunt liciatorium et nauicula inducens, ita nec anima capre posset facere operaciones vite in membris leonis, nec econtrario; nec homo in organis leonis, nec econtrario; nec motor Solis in orbe Lune, nec econtrario. Et hec est racio Aristotelis contra Pyctagoram hoc ponentem, sicut patet in 1° *De anima*,[74] quod dictum est Stoycorum[75] ponencium animarum transcorporacionem. Motores enim celestes ad sua corpora mota, que sunt orbes celestes, habent comparacionem sicut anime animalium ad sua corpora. Et si ita est, tunc mirabilis est ista questio et non philosophica, quia si angelus est motor naturalis corporis celestis, nullum corpus aliud mouere potest per naturam, nec celum nec terram, nec pennam nec lignum. Si autem ponitur angelus separatus, tunc hoc mouere potest ad imperium, quod mouendi a Deo accipit uirtutem, et nil aliud siue hoc sit terra siue lapis, et tantum mouet quantum precipit Deus; set hec dicta non sunt philosophica. Set quod terram possit mouere de ordinata potencia non credo, quia hoc cederet in nature uniuersalis confusionem. De naturali autem potencia constat quod hoc angelus non potest, sicut nec faber potest textilia, quia non habet potencias naturales ad hoc ordinatas, set ad uirtutes assistrices et contemplatiuas[76]; nec aliquid secundum ordinem nature positum potest (fol. 19va) in id quod est extra ordinem illum.

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[71] Aver., *In II de caelo et mundo*, comm. 71.

[72] Arist., *De anima*, I, 3. 407b 24.

[73] Aver., *In II de caelo et mundo*, comm. 71.

[74] Arist., *De anima*, I, 3. 407b 20-24.

[75] Stoici quidem secundum Albertum sunt Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras eorumque sequaces, ut ipse pluries declarat, v. g. *De nat. et orig. an.*, tr. II, c. 11 (ed. Colon. t. XII, p. 36. 47-50).

Questio Decima Octaua

Ex simili fantasia procedit questio decima octaua, et supponitur in ea quod facere miracula et magna sit substancialis actus illius ordinis angelorum qui dicuntur uirtutes. Et ideo supponitur questio, an tam magna que maxima esse uidentur in mundo sicut mouere orbes sit mouere uirtutum. Et est fantasia erroris, quia Dyonisius dicit[77] quod cum uirtus actiua sit ultimum in maximo de re, et uirtus passiua sit ultimum in minimo quod potest in paciens (sicut dicit Aristoteles in 2º *De celo et mundo*[78]) dicit Dyonisius quod uirtutes celestes actiuam potenciam habent in maximo, set non in maximo secundum ordinem causarum naturalium (hoc enim est impossibile, quia singulis illorum sunt motus deputati) set ultimum in quo stat potencia actiua angelorum qui dicuntur uirtutes stat in maximo uoluntatis diuine secundum ordinem ministrandi et dispensandi mundi gubernacionem. Et quia in talibus maxima sunt miracula, ideo secundario actu uirtutibus attribuuntur facere miracula. Questio autem supponit ac si maxima in ordine causarum naturalium facere sit attributum uirtutibus — et hoc nec secundum philosophiam nec theologiam est uerum.

Questio Decima Nona

Decimum nonum penitus fatuum est, quia cum Ecclesiastes[79] <I, 6> dicitur *lustrans uniuersa per circuitum*[80] *pergit spiritus, et in circulos suos reuertitur*, constat quod loquitur de spiritu a circulis suis separabili, quia aliter non lustraret uniuersa pergens in circuitu, nec reuerteretur ad id unde discessit.[81] Si autem angelus naturalis et ordine nature ordinatus est mouere orbes, ergo a circulo non recedit.[82] Adhuc autem dum motus exercetur actu motu corporis, constat quod motor ab eo quod mouetur non recedit. Motus autem corporum celestium continuus et semper est, ergo nunquam distat ab eis motor. Qualiter igitur uadit et reuertitur, et qualiter pergit in circuitu lustrans uniuersa? Et ideo hoc uerbum de uento litteraliter omnes exponunt sancti doctores et Hebrei,[83] cuius motus duplex est: flatus scilicet suus qui lustrat uniuersa, et naturalis motus sue gyracionis qui, ut dicit Aristoteles in 3º *Methereorum*,[84] est ad porcionem circuli non completi circa terram. Et quod dicitur in circulos suos reuertitur, intelligitur de circulis sue generacionis, qui circuli, sicut in antehabitis diximus,[85] ad quartam porcionem circuli precipue Lune generantur: sicut enim mare mouetur ad quartam circuli, sic et uentus, qui<a> mare non effluit nisi per uaporem uenti qui de fundo maris eleuatur, mare tumescere facit et extrudit ut ultra litus inundet. De hoc autem a nobis tractatum est in libro *De causis proprietatum elementorum et planetarum*.[86] Allegorice[87] autem hoc de Spiritu Sancto exponit Ambrosius,[88] uolens per hoc probare Spiritum Sanctum esse Deum quia omnia lustrans ubique est sicut Deus, et in circulos Trinitatis Patris et Filii semper reuertitur ut ad fontem et originem et principium sue processionis. Nullo igitur modo uerum est de angelis.

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[76] Cf. notas 22 et 23 supra.

[77] Dionysii, *De cael. hier.*, c. 8, § 2; cf. Alb., *De cael. hier.*, c. 8, § 2, dub. 2 (B. XIV, 102b-104a).

[78] Arist., *De caelo et mundo*, I, 11. 281a 7-17; cf. Alb., *De caelo*, lib. I, tr. IV, c. 5 (B. IV, 102b-104a).

[79] Ecclesiastis *cod.*

[80] in circuitu *Vulg.*

Questio Uigesima

Sequentes tres questiones sunt de motu, et supponitur in eis quod motus celi causa sit omnium generatorum et corruptorum sicut uidetur dicere Aristoteles in principio VIII *Phisicorum*,[89] quod est hoc tanquam 'uita quedam existentibus omnibus'. Et ideo queritur an si motus celi cessaret, ordine nature aurum, ferrum et metalla que proximam iuxta elementa habent generacionem in elementa soluerentur. Ad quod puto esse dicendum quod metalla ad mixtionem et coagulacionem dum adhuc potencia sunt in elementali materia accipiunt a motu celi, set postquam iam sunt, non est necesse quod cessante motu statim resoluantur. Sicut enim dicit Auicenna in *Sufficiencia* sua libro secundo,[90] causa agens duplex est, una coniuncta et effectui intrinseca, alia autem separata; et dat exemplum de causa domus cuius causa efficiens non coniuncta est architectus, forte Policlytus uel alius; causa autem (fol. 19vb) coniuncta efficiens illius figure artificialis que dicitur domus est contiguacio et continuacio continens et componens figuram. Nil autem prohibet quod causa non coniuncta cessante adhuc remaneat effectus ; set causa coniuncta cessante, non remanet effectus. Et ita glos<s>at dictum Aristotelis in 2° *Phisicorum*,[91] dicentis quod destructa causa destruitur effectus. Ex hoc igitur elicitur quod cum causa metallorum non coniuncta (coagulacio autem talis et mixtio sit causa coniuncta) non est necesse quod cessante motu celi statim resoluantur metalla in elementa. Et hec est Auicenne solucio.

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[81] dissessit *cod.*

[82] Cf. q. 2 supra.

[83] Hieronymus (PL 23, 1069) citat Symmachum dicentem: "Vadit ad meridiem et circumit ad boream; perambulans vadit ventus, et per quae circumierat, revertitur ventus." Hieronymus et Symmachus citantur a Glossa hoc loco. De variis interpretationibus huius textus, vide Cornelium a Lapide, *Comm. in Scripturam Sacram*, t. VII, ed. nova *In Ecclesiasten*, Parisiis 1875, pp. 35-46.

[84] Arist., *Meteor.*, III, 1. 370b.

[85] Ad quaestionem 1 supra.

[86] Alb., *De causis et prop. element.*, lib. I, tr. II, c. 5 (B. IX, 608).

[87] Anagoryce *cod.*

[88] Non potui invenire illud apud opera Ambrosii; neque talis interpretatio invenitur apud Cornelium a Lapide (*loc. cit.*).

[89] Arist., *Phys.*, VIII, 1. 250b 13-14. Vide Alb., *Phys.*, lib. VIII, tr. I, c. 2 (B. III, 524b); *De caelo*, lib. II, tr. III, c. 3 (B. IV, 173b-174a).

Questio Uicesima Prima

Uicesima prima [pª][92] que sequitur fere eadem est cum illa, nisi quod queritur hic an cessante motu celi resoluerentur corpora generata et corrupta generaliter, cum in antehabita questione non queratur nisi de ferro et metallis; et ideo penitus eandem habet solucionem. Set bene puto quod cessante motu celi cessaret in omnibus corruptibilibus uita, quia uita est actus continuus ab ente quieto fluens, et ordinatur ad primum uite principium, quod secundum Aristotelem[93] est anima primi mobilis a quo fluit per motum. Et ideo cessante motu secundum naturam in talibus cessaret uita. Anima enim nobilis[94] propria et per se est causa uite et motus, ut subtiliter in libro *De causis* est probatum.[95] Hoc tamen non est consequens in homine, quia illi non influitur uita intellectualis per motum celi, set per causam primam.

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[90] Avic., *Sufficientia*, P. II, i.e. *Phys.*, lib. I, cap. 12 (ed. Venetiis 1508, fol. 20^{rb-va}). Vide etiam Avicennam, *Metaphysica*, tr. I, c. 2.

[91] Arist., *Phys.*, II, 3. 195b 17-19. Cf. Avicenna, *ibid.*

[92] Forte accidentalis repetitio praecedentis 'prima'.

[93] Arist., *Phys.*, VIII, 1. 250b 14-15; *Liber de causis*, prop. 5. Vide Alb., *Phys.*, lib. VIII, tr. I, c. 2 (B. III, 524b).

[94] mobilis *cod.*

[95] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, prop. 3 (ed. Saffrey p. 17; Bardenhewer § 3, pp. 165-6).

Questio Uicesima Secunda

Uicesima secunda, que querit si cessante motu celi ordine nature mundus totus quantum ad omnia elementata in elementa continue resolueretur, quantum ad eius ultimam partem eandem cum uicesima habet solucionem; set quantum ad partem primam imperiti hominis est questio, quia cum proxima motui celi sint elementa, ut probat Aristoteles in 1º *Methereorum*,[96] cessante motu celi, prius cessarent elementa quam elementata, quia generans ea ex materia prima non esset. Set tamen hec racio Aristotelis, licet uera sit, rudis est et non demonstratiua. Propter quod nos in libro *De causis*,[97] ubi tractauimus de ordine generacionis elementorum et motus recti qui causatur ex circulari motu, aliam ad hoc posuimus uiam subtiliorem quam longum esset hic ponere, set ibi qui uult potest inuenire.

Questio Uicesima Tercia

Uicesima tercia et que sequitur sunt de luce stellarum, et sunt fundate super hoc quod stelle per se luceant et lumen fundant, quod negant Aristoteles et Auicenna et Ptholomeus et omnes magni philosophi,[98] qui dicunt quod per se sint non lucencia,[99] set peruia; et ideo lucem a sole recipiencia recipuunt eam in sui profundum, et ideo ad omnem partem fundunt lumen sicut luminaria. Ex puritate enim substancie <sunt> luminis receptiua, et ex spissitudine et constancia parcium sunt luminis retentiua, et ex calcacione multi luminis, ut dicit Auicenna,[100] sunt luminis fusiua. Et quamuis lumen sit non substancia, set forma que est qualitas, tamen est forma per quam superiora corpora in inferiora suas fundunt causalitates et uirtutes; et est lumen sicut instrumentum cause efficientis non coniuncte. Et sicut causa efficiente cessante que non coniuncta est, non continue cessat effectus, ita eciam cessante instrumento eius, non sequitur quod statim resolueretur effectus. Lux enim non est uehiculum uite a superioribus in inferiora, set est instrumentum dissoluens materiam ad forme generabilis suscepcionem.

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[96] Arist., *Meteor.*, I, 3.

[97] Alb., *De causis*, lib. I, tr. IV, c. 6 (B. X, 422b-423a).

[98] Ipse Albertus in *De caelo et mundo*, lib. II, tr. II, c. 5 (B. IV, 179a) citat "Aristoteles in secundo libro *De causis proprietatum elementorum et planetarum...* Ptolemaeus in *Almagesto*, et suus commentator similiter, et Avicenna et Messalach in libro *De sphaera mota*." Vide etiam ibidem, tr. III, c. 6 (B. IV, 181b).

[99] lucenda *cod.*

[100] Avicenna, *Liber sextus naturalium* (*De anima*), P. III, c. 7 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, fol. 15vb).

Questio Uicesima Quarta

Uicesima quarta questio cum iam inducta eadem est, nisi quod illa querit generaliter, ista ponit in partem. Et ideo dico si non esset lux stellarum, non propter hoc sequeretur quod continue omnia irracionabilia in instanti morerentur.[1] Adhuc enim aereum ex humido calore <irracionabilia?>[2] resolutum habent spiritum, qui uector uite esset a corde in eorum corpore. Set hoc uerum est quod paulatim uiua corruptibilia destruerentur.[3]

Questio Uicesima Quinta

Octo que secuntur sunt de theologya. Quod igitur XXV° queritur an post diem iudicii propter hoc quod cessabit motus celi, omnia corpora bonorum sint incorruptibilia; ideo uidetur (fol. 20ra) dici quod Aristoteles dicit in IIII° *Phisicorum*[4] quod motus et tempus plus sunt causa corrupcionis. Set hoc ridiculum est, quia hoc de motu celi non dixit Aristoteles, nec eciam de motu locali, set de motu qui facit distare a principio, ut Aristoteles dicit ibidem. Et ideo motus non est causa corrupcionis per se, set per accidens. Propter hoc, cessante motu, non sequitur corrupcio per naturam. Et sic arguatur: 'motus est causa corrupcionis; cessante causa, cessat effectus, ergo cessante motu cessabit naturalis corrupcio' erit fallacia accidentis propter extraneum quod assumitur. Ad questionem autem absque dubitacione dicendum quod corpora bonorum erunt incorruptibilia, non ex cessacione motus, set ex forma glorificacionis assumpta que sic tenet mixta et complexionata in medio, quod agere et pati ad dissolucionem mixtionis et complexionis et composicionis non possunt, cum tamen ex natura miscibilium et complexionatorum et compositorum essent corruptibilia, si non essent glorificata.

Questio Uicesima Sexta

Uicesimum sextum est an post diem iudicii corpora malorum sint incorruptibilia per naturam siue naturaliter, quia cessabit motus celi qui est causa corrupcionis. Hoc autem dicere insani hominis est, quia iam probatum est quod motus celi non est causa corrupcionis alicuius rei, set pocius est causa esse et uite et conseruacionis. Et motus eciam qui facit distare a principio composicionis et esse non est causa corrupcionis nisi per accidens, et ideo cessante motu[s] corrupcionis alicuius. Set dupliciter dicitur aliquid corruptibile: quoad compositum et quoad complexionem. Quoad compositum corruptibile <dicitur> in quo componencia quorum unum est continens et alterum contentum possunt separari, sicut anima continens et sicut corpus contentum; et hoc modo dampnati post diem iudicii corrumpi non possunt. Similiter dicitur corruptibile quoad mixtionem cuius miscibilia agere possunt ad mixtionis dissolucionem, sicut uidemus in corporibus post mortem quod per putrefaccionem resoluuntur calido humidum continuans extrahente, quo extracto dissoluitur in cinerem siccum terreum. Et neutro istorum modorum corruptibilia erunt corpora malorum; set hoc non facit cessacio motus celi, set pocius ordo iusticie iudicis iudicantis, qui in eternum uindicare non posset nisi in quod uindicat conseruaretur in esse. Unde per naturam corruptibilia isto ordine iusticie continentur, composicio et commixtio et complexio ne dissoluantur. Et non fit hoc propter cessacionem motus celi.

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[1] mouerentur *cod.* Vide elenchum quaestionum supra, q. 24.

[2] Hic relinquitur spatium unius vel duorum verborum a scriptore codicis.

[3] destituerentur *cod.*

[4] Arist., *Phys.*, IV, 13. 222b 19-22; etiam cap. 12. 221b 1-2. Cf. Alb., *Phys.*, lib. IV, tr. III, c. 14 (B. III, 336a-7a).

Et si adhuc hoc non esset, cessacio motus celi nulla esset causa corrupcionis, quia quamuis 'incorrupcio' secundum nomen sit priuacio, tamen res significata per nomen <non> est priuacio, set nobilis et nobilis forme habitus et potentissime uirtutis operacio et effectus. Et ideo priuacio[nem] motus que simpliciter priuacio est, causam habere non potest secundum rem ipsam; propter quod eciam philosophi causam corrupcionis secundum naturam ponentes, non nisi duas posuisse inueniuntur. Dicitur enim in libro *De causis*[5] quod omne corruptibile aut est ex contrariis aut est super contrarium delatum. Si est[6] compositum ex contrariis, contraria in se inuicem agencia causabunt corrupcionem, ut dicit Aristoteles in IIII° *Celi et mundi*,[7] nisi adueniat aliunde conseruans quod impediat, ne contraria agere ad dissolucionem possint,[8] sicut diximus de forma glorificacionis et ordine iusticie uindicantis. Si autem non est compositum set forma simplex, est ideo corruptibile quia est delatum aliquo agente super corruptibile, quo corrupto perit; et corrumpitur forma que esse non habet nisi quia super illud delata est et in esse fundata. Propter quod patet animam racionalem corruptibilem nullo modo esse, cum nec ex contrariis composita sit nec fundata super corruptibile, eo quod non est alicuius entelechia[9] corporis que esse habeat ex hoc quod in (fol. 20rb) tali fundatur corpore, et ab illo esse habeat et non aliter. Corpora igitur dampnatorum non ex cessacione motus celi incorruptibilia sunt, set propter causam que dicta est et secundum modum qui dictus est.

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[5] Ps.-Arist., *Liber de causis*, prop. 27 (ed. Saffrey, p. 129; Bardenhewer § 26, p. 186).

[6] enim *cod.*

[7] Non potui invenire textum apud quartum librum *De caelo et mundo*, neque apud commentum Alberti. Doctrina autem talis exponitur ab Aristotele in *De gen. et corrup.*, I, 7, ubi dicit "contraria nata sunt agere et pati ad invicem" (342a 2).

[8] non possint *cod.*

[9] endelechia *cod.*

Questio Uicesima Septima

Uicesima septima est an dampnati in suis corporibus penas ignis sencient per apprehensionem et recepcionem speciei eiusdem ignis per modum afflictiui uel lesiui. Hoc ideo dubitatum esse uidetur quia ubi agit ignis per ustiuam caliditatem, ibi abicit a substancia passiui et destruit ipsum; ignis autem inferni non abicit a substancia corporum dampnatorum. Set absque dubio dicendum quod ignis inferni agit in animas per speciem instrumenti iusticie uindicantis, ut dictum est. Et ideo, cum equaliter calidus sit, inequaliter proxima sibi inequaliter agit et unum plus cremat quam alium, eo quod ordo iusticie est quod magis peccans magis puniatur.

Questio Uicesima Octaua

Uicesima octaua est an sentencia quam Christus dicet in iudicio sit uocalis uel spiritualis. Ad hoc respondent beatus Bernardus[10] et Richardus[11] et Hugo de Sancto Uictore,[12] quod liber cordium Christi et Beate Uirginis et Apostolorum et omnium perfectorum qui raciones iusticie diuine per contemplacionem in cordibus suis scripserunt et depi<n>xerunt, et illis apertis unusquisque in eis leget quare dampnetur et quare saluetur; et hanc leccionem dicunt esse sentenciam, et hoc satis probabile est. Tamen non est inconueniens quod dicatur uocaliter pronuncianda, et ita credo ego.[13] Et si queritur qualiter ab omnibus audiri possit, dico quod sicut uoci sue qua dicet 'Surgite' mortui et 'Uenite ad iudicium' dabit uocem uirtutis ut ab omnibus audiatur, ita prolacioni uni simplici dabit uocem uirtutis ut ab omnibus audiri possit. Et hec est sentencia beatorum Geronimi[14] et Gregorii.[15]

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[10] Ps.-Bernardi, *Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis*, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 184, 488 A). Cf. Alb., *De resurrectione*, tr. II, q. 10, a. 10 (ed. Colon, t. XXVI, p. 299. 22).

[11] Richardi de S. Victore, *Tractatus de iudicaria potestate in finali et universali iudicio* (PL 196, 1181 D-4 A). Cf. Alb., *In IV Sent.*, dist. 47, B. art. 2-3 (B. XXX, 640-42).

[12] Hugonis de S. Victore, *Epistola ad Bernardum de ordine iudicii*, citatum ab Alberto, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 43, C. art. 10 (B. XXX, 519b-20b). Illa autem epistola non notatur a Rogero Baron, "Hugues de Saint Victor: contribution à un nouvel examen de son œuvre," *Traditio* XV (1959), 223-297.

[13] Contrarium autem tenebat Albertus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 47, A. art. 1 (B, XXX, 639).

[14] Hieronymi, *Comm. in Isaiam*, lib. VI, c. 13 (PL 24, 209-10).

[15] Gregorii, *Moralium*, XXIV, c. 8, n. 16 (PL 76, 295 BC): "Libri etiam aperti referuntur, quia iustorum tunc vita conspicitur, in quibus mandata caelestia opere impressa cernuntur. Et iudicati sunt mortui ex his quae scripta erant in libris, quia in ostensa vita iustorum quasi in expansione librorum legunt bonum, quod agere ipsi noluerunt, atque ex eorum qui fecerunt, comparatione damnantur." Cf. Alb., *De resurrectione*, tr. II, q. 10, a. 9 (ed. Colon, t. XXVI, p. 298. 12).

Questio Uicesima Nona

Uicesimum nonum quod queritur est an Christus principaliter uenerit tollere <peccatum> originale uel principalius actuale.[16] Ad hoc quidem auctoritas requirenda esset si inueniretur, quia racio in talibus inutilis est nisi fundetur super auctoritatem. Sine preiudicio tamen uidetur dicendum quod Christus, instaurans omnia que in celo sunt et in terra, uenit tollere peccatum non ut hoc uel illud, set secundum quod est a Deo separatiuum. Et ideo uenit tollere peccatum inquantum peccatum est; et ex hoc sequitur quod uenit tollere omne peccatum, et ideo ad ipsum peccatum tollendum uenit Christus. Et hoc dicitur prima Johannis IIIº quod Christus uenit ut destruat opera diaboli,[17] cuius opus peccatum est inquantum[18] peccatum, et non hoc uel illud nisi inquantum peccatum est. Et talem modum dicit Aristoteles in libro *Posteriorum*[19] conuenire uniuersaliter et secundum ipsum, sicut triangulo habere tres equales[20] duobus rectis, quod non conuenit figure per se nec ysoceli. Et sic ad peccatum secundum se dico esse referendum aduentum Christi, ad peccatum dico quod simpliciter et absolute peccatum est, et a Deo separatiuum; hoc autem est mortale, siue sit originale morte dignum siue actuale.

Tricesimum

Tricesimum, quo queritur an nomina sanctorum ad honorem sanctorum digito Dei inscripta sint celis materialibus, uidetur mihi esse deliramentum. Si enim inscripta essent, aut littere profundate essent per exaracionem in celi profundum, quod fieri absurdum est, aut quasi arte exclusoria eleuate essent super celi superficiem, quod adhuc absurdius est, aut aliquo humido colorante essent depicte, quod iterum stultum est. Nec est utilitas aliqua in tali scriptura, set ut dicit Apostolus, *scripta sunt non attramento, set spiritu Dei uiui, non in tabulis celi, set in tabulis cordis* et eterni luminis.[21] Et quia tunc, ut dicit Gregorius,[22] uniuscuiusque mentem ab alterius oculis corpulencia non abscondet; ideo taliter inscripta ab omnibus publice legentur pleno lumine beatitudinis illustrata. (fol. 20va).

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[16] aliis *cod.*

[17] "In hoc apparuit Filius Dei, ut dissolvat opera diaboli." Vulg. *Joan.* iii, 8.

[18] est inquantum *repetuntur in cod.*

[19] Arist., *Post. Anal.*, I, 5.

[20] equos *cod.*

[21] "Scripta non atramento, sed spiritu Dei vivi: non in tabulis lapideis, sed in tabulis cordis carnalibus." Vulg. II *Cor.*, iii, 3.

[22] Gregorii, *Moralium*, lib. XVIII, c. 48, n. 78 (PL 76, 84): "Ibi quippe uniuscuiusque mentem ab alterius oculis membrorum corpulentia non abscondet."

Tricesimum Primum

Tricesimum primum est an nomina impiorum in inferno existencium digito Dei scripta sint in terra ad uituperium impiorum. Ad hoc autem eodem modo sine preiudicio est respondendum quod quidem, ut dicit Glos<s>a super primum capitulum *Ad Romanos:*[23] Note peccatorum sunt in animabus dampnatorum, et in corporibus corporalium peccatorum signa per cruciatum membrorum quibus commissa sunt peccata, ut patet Luce XVI° <24> in diuite punito in lingua; et has notas publicas omnibus fieri in inferno, quia licet ignis inferni tenebrosus sit et fumosus, tamen, ut dicit Gregorius in *Moralibus*,[24] lucet ad cauenda ea que dampnati horrent, et ad ea uidenda ex quibus crescit eis tristicia et pena. Et hunc modum scripture puto esse in inferno et non aliud, quia si in terra scriberentur in fundamento uel in parietibus inferni uel tabulato, ridiculum esset et inutile. Nec facile racio assignaretur qualiter talis scriptura perfecta esset, quod dicitur Ieremie XVII <13>: *recedentes a te in terra scribentur.* Et quod Dominus digito scripsit in terram (Johannis VIII° <6-8>) ad hoc referri non poterit. Set quod dicit propheta, dicit propter citissimam delebilitatem qua delebuntur qui in terra scribuntur. Et quod scripsit Dominus, ut dicit Ambrosius,[25] ad hoc scripsit ut quilibet ibi legeret; unde nec iudex nec testis esse possit contra adulteram, et sic nec innocentem redderet nec peccatricem condempnaret iniustus iudex uel testis infamis.

Tricesimum Secundum

Tricesimum secundum est an infernus sit in centro terre uel circa centrum. Ad hoc breuiter dico quod in centro esse non potest, quia centrum est indiuisibile. Set puto per ea que dicuntur Ysaias XIII quod centrum inferni et centrum terre idem sit, quia ibi longissime dampnati a Deo sunt repulsi. Hoc tamen dico sine preiudicio et de hoc uellem habere auctoritatem; quod enim patet et quidam philosophi de hoc dicunt, ut Socrates in libro *Phed*[*r*]*onis*[26] et Ysaac in libro *Diffinicionum*,[27] non satis concordat cum catholica fide.

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[23] Non videtur esse in *Glossa Ordinaria* (PL 114), nec in *Collectaneis* P. Lombardi (PL 191), nec apud Hugonem de S. Charo.

[24] Gregorii, *Moralium*, lib. IX, c. 66, n. 102 (PL 75, 915-6).

[25] Ambrosii, *De Spiritu Sancto*, lib. III, c. 3 (PL 16, 813). Vide etiam *Ep.* XXVI [Clas. I], n. 11-17 (PL 16, 1088-90).

[26] Cf. *Plato Latinus II: Phaedo,* interprete Henrico Aristippo (Londinii 1950), p. 19. 3 sqq., p. 21. 2 sqq., p. 38. 1 sqq.

[27] Isaac Israeli, *Liber de definitionibus* (ed. Muckle in AHDLMA, 1937-8), p. 305. 19 sqq.

Tricesimum Tercium

Tricesimum tercium est an liceat disputare utrum anima Christi sit ex traduce. Ad hoc dico quod disputare opponendo et maxime temptatiue et sophistice ualde longas habet alas; set disputare doctrinaliter et determinare[28] non licet quod 'anima Christi unita diuinitati sit ex traduce', quia nulla penitus anima nec pars anime nec pars partis anime est ex traduce. Tradux enim (cuius est genitiuus 'traducis') non est in usu, set tamen gracia disputacionis utamur ipso. Tunc dicitur tradux traductum lege concupiscencie a parentibus. Quod ergo <est> uel substancia, uel qualitas substancie, uel forma armonie cuius est, uel consequens armoniam, illud est ex traduce. Et si ex traduce est tale aliquid, ergo a destruccione consequentis quod nil tale est, non est ex traduce. Dicit autem Aristoteles in 1° *De anima*[29] quod nulla anima nec pars anime, quia pars anime est ad partem sicut tota anima ad totam ut dicit in 2° *De anima*[30] Aristoteles, et ideo dicit quod nec anima nec aliquid anime est armonia uel armoniam consequens. Nil ergo anime est ex traduce. Set qualiter dentur anime, nos quidem et uere dicimus per prime cause creacionem; philosophi autem dicunt quod intelligencie <per> illuminacionem immissam in seminis spiritum semen formantem.[31] Hec igitur questio fatua est.

Tricesimum Quartum

Tricesimum quartum est an illud uerbum Philosophi[32] *De animalibus*, libro XVI°, 'Corpus spermatis cum quo exit spiritus qui est uirtus principii anime est separatum a corpore, et est res diuina, et talis dicitur intellectus', <sic possit uel debeat exponi, i. e. ille spiritus siue uirtus formatiua dicitur intellectus>[33] per similitudinem, quia sicut intellectus operatur sine organo, ita (fol. 20vb) illa uirtus. Hec questio prouenit ex ignorancia philosophie, et nos quidem in aliis locis de hiis cum studio[34] disseruimus.[35] Nunc autem dicimus que ad hanc sufficiunt intencionem. Dicimus igitur quod Auicenna in suo libro *De animalibus* XVI° dicta Aristotelis uerba exponens dicit[36] quod corpus spermatis dicitur totum congregatum ex gutta femine et ex gutta maris. Hiis autem guttis duabus in matrice congregatis, gutta maris ingreditur in guttam femine sicut anima, hoc est sicut spiritus animalis, hoc est uirtutem anime habens in corpus ingreditur ad perficiendas anime operaciones. Et tunc gutta femine efficitur tota plena spiritu, quia gutta uiri resoluta in spiritum inspirat guttam femine, propter quod primo digerit et depurgat eam ut sit materia operacionibus suis conueniens; et distinguendo distendit eam in ampullam plenam spiritu, et ex hac ampulla producit duas ampullas: una a dextris et alteram a sinistris. Deinde ex media ampulla extendit per modum fili uel corde sursum; et aliam, minorem tamen set longiorem, extendit inferius. Et ex media quidem ampulla facit cor; ex duabus autem lateralibus ampullis producit latera et brachia. Et hoc autem quod ex medio sursum dirigit, et ipse spiritus efficitur spiritus animalis in cerebro. Ex hoc autem quod ex media ampulla deorsum dirigit (quod est ad modum figure pyramidalis, cuius basis est apud ampullam cordis) et continue minuitur descendendo facit interiora et uentrem et pectus et pulmonem et epar et dorsum et renes et coxas; et ex eo quod subtilius est facit crura et pedes. Iste igitur intra uiscositates seminis sic intra semen retentas in semine est sicut artifex in artificiato, ordinans et formans artificiatum in omnibus partibus eius; et ideo uocatur 'intellectus' ad similitudinem actiui uniuersaliter intellectus, qui est in artifice quando per artem ingreditur formando et ordinando et distinguendo artificiatum.[37] Et patet quod nil penitus operatur sine organo, set intus in potentiali organo existens et contentus omnia operatur. In hoc enim, sicut dicit Auicenna in prima sua philosophia,[38] differt intellectus actiuus siue practicus a contemplatiuo, quod actiuus utitur membris corporis mouendo et operando ut in materiam inducat formam quam in se habet conceptam, et quam non accipit a corpore, set ex se inducit eam in spiritum et ex spiritu in manum, que, sicut dicit Aristoteles[39] in libro *Animalium* XII°, proprium instrumentum actiui et operatiui intellectus est; ex manu uero ducit in instrumentum artis, sicut in securim et dolabrum, et per motus illorum inducit in iapides et ligna. Et sic operatur ergo spiritus contentus in semine uirtute anime patris cuius uirtus est in ipso, et uirtute caloris elementaris qui est non in ipso set in humore seminis, et uirtute celesti que ex duodecim circulis conficitur ass< >[40] eius et undecim aliorum, et ex uirtute intelligencie decimi ordinis que irradiat super generabilia in tota actiuorum et passiuorum spera; operatur inquam ut intellectus artificis. Et ideo dicit ibidem[41] Aristoteles quod anima est in semine sicut artifex, et non sicut anima uel actus corporis. Et ideo reprehendit Platonem,[42] qui propter dictas uirtutes et operaciones spiritus, spiritum illum animam esse putauit, et sperma dixit esse paruum et indistinctum animal. Ex quibus omnibus patet quod non habet similitudinem ad intellectum contemplatiuum qui quamuis a corpore accipiat abstrahendo uniuersale a sensibili accepto, tamen in operando et pertractando circa formam acceptam nullo utitur corpore,[43] (fol. 21ra) quinimmo auertitur a corpore et adhipiscitur lumen intelligencie et in illo pertractat speculando formam acceptam. Si quis ergo dicit quod ille spiritus dicitur 'intellectus' quia non utitur corpore sicut intellectus, falsum dicit; et Aristotelis uerba non intelligit, quia uocat eum 'intellectum' propter intellectum actiuum, et non propter contemplatiuum, qui corpore non utitur. Et dicitur

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[28] De his expressionibus, scil. temptative, sophistice et doctrinaliter, vide Albertum *Elench.*, lib. I, tr. I, c. 4 (B. II, 531b-532b). De opinione autem antiqua sic dicta "traducianista" vide Albertum, *De nat. et orig. animae*, tr. I, c. 3 (ed. Colon. t. XII, p. 9. 5-14); cf. etiam Thomae, *Sum. cont. Gent.*, II, c. 86; *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 1; DTC, art. "Péché originel" (XII, 450 et passim).

[29] Arist., *De anima*, I, 4. 407b 27-408a 34. Vide Alb., *De anima*, lib. I, tr. II, c. 8.

[30] Arist., *De anima*, II, 1. 412b 23-24.

[31] Cf. Avic., *Liber sextus naturalium* (*De anima*), P. V, c. 4 (ed. Venetiis 1508, fol. 25^{ra-b}); et c. 6 (ed. cit., fol. 26^{ra-vb}); etiam *Metaph.*, tr. IX, c. 4 (ed. Venetiis 1508, fol. 104^{vb}); Algazelis, *Metaph.*, P. II, tr. IV, c. 5, § *Diccio de anima humana* (ed. Muckle, pp. 181-2); *Liber de causis*, § 3 (ed. Saffrey p. 17); Dominici Gundissalini, *De anima*, c. 5 (ed. Muckle in *Med. Stud.* 1940, p. 51. 10). Cf. Alb., *De nat. et orig. animae*, tr. I, c. 5; *De animal.*, XVI, tr. I, cc. 11-12; *Summa de creaturis*, P. II, q. 5, a. 4 (B. XXXV, 82).

[32] Arist., *De gen. anim.*, II, 3. 737a 7-10.

[33] Homoeoteleuton in codice, ut patet ex elencho quaestionum supraposito, scilicet q. 34.

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[34] Vide Albertum, *De animalibus*, lib. XVI, tr. I, c. 13 (ed. H. Stadler in BGPMA t. XVI, pp. 1097-9); et lib. XX, tr. II, c. 3 (*ibid.*, pp. 1311-14); etiam *De causis*, lib. I, tr. II, c. 8 (B. X, 399a); lib. II, tr. II, c. 12 (*ibid.*, pp. 496-7); lib. II, tr. II, c. 40 (*ibid.*, pp. 538b-539b).

[35] deseruimus *cod.*

[36] Avic., *De animalibus*, lib. XVI, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis 1515, fol. 61rb).

[37] Cf. Alb., *De animalibus*, lib. XVI, tr. I, c. 11, n. 60 et c. 13, n. 70.

[38] Avic., *Metaph.*, tr. VI, c. 5. Vide etiam Avic., *Liber sextus naturalium* (*De anima*), P. V, c. 1 (*ed. cit.*, fol. 22vb). "Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod haec est differentia practici et speculativi intellectus in homine, quia practicus corpore non indiget, speculativus autem a corpore accipit et corpore indiget." Alb., *De causis*, lib. I, tr. II, c. 20 (B. X, 508b). Vide etiam Albertum ibidem, lib. II, tr. II, c. 36 per totum.

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[39] Rationem huius doctrinae exponit Aristoteles praesertim in *De gen. anim.*, II, 1. 734b 28-735a 26, et II, 3. 736a 24-737a 34 (cf. Alb., *De animalibus* XVI, tr. I, cc. 6-7 et c. 13); implicite autem eamdem doctrinam proponit in *De part. anim.*, IV, 10. 687a 2-23 (cf. Alb., *De animalibus* XIV, tr. II, c. 2, ed Stadler nn. 31-33; *De nat. et orig. anim.*, tr. I, c. 5, ed. Colon. t. XII, p. 13. 71-2; *Quaestiones de anim.*, XIV, q. 11, ed. Colon. t. XII, pp. 257-8). Incertum est an Albertus hic apud codicem referre voluit libro XIV vel XVI, vel potius libro XII *Animalium* (scil. *De part. anim.*, II, 1) ubi tractatur de distinctione ac diversitate membrorum (v. Alb., *De anim.*, XII, tr. I, c. 1, nn. 8-9). Huic posteriori textui advertit ipse Albertus suo *De unitate intellectus*, c. 5, obj. 18: "probatum est in XII *Animalium*, quod id quod organum habet proprium in corpore, coniunctum est, et non habet esse separatum ab anima. Intellectus autem habet organum in corpore, sicut ibidem probatur, quod manus est organum intellectus. Igitur, etc." (B. IX, 457b). Attamen paululum infra hac quaestione 34 Albertus subiunxit 'ibidem', qui certe est liber XVI *Animalium* (cf. notam 41).

[40] Spatium trium vel quattuor verborum relinquitur vacuum in codice a scriptore. De sensu autem huius, vide Albertum, *De nat. et orig. anim.*, tr. II, c. 7 (ed. Colon. t. XII, p. 31. 21 sqq.).

[41] Arist., *De gen. anim.*, II, 3. 737a 11-17. Cf. Alb., *De animalibus*, XVI, tr. I, c. 13, n. 71.

[42] Platonis, *Tim.* 19 A. Reprobatio opinionis de "parvo animali" invenitur in libro *De gen. anim.*, I, 18. 722b 4, absque nomine Platonis. Vide Albertum, *De nat. et orig. anim.*, tr. II, c. 7 (ed. Colon. t. XII, p. 30. 50 sqq.); *De animalibus*, XVI, tr. I, c. 5, n. 31.

[43] Haec sententia Alberti contrariatur doctrinae Thomae, *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 7, et multis aliis locis.

'intellectus' (sicut dicit Auerroes,[44] quod totum 'opus nature est opus intelligencie') quia nunquam consideraret ea per que ad finem intentum deuenit nisi uirtus intelligencie prime in ipso existens dirigeret ad finem. Unde dicit Aristoteles,[45] quod simile est in uirtutibus spermatis et in uirtutibus moralibus et intellectiuis. Morales enim quamuis ex se tendant in fines suos ut natura quedam, tamen ad fines suos non deueniunt sine intellectuali uirtute que est prudencia; non enim deuenitur ad finem nisi per multa que sunt ad finem adminiculancia et <ad>iuuancia. Et illa moralis uirtus non considerat, cum sit ut natura quedam mouens ad unum; et ideo intellectualis uirtus est necessaria morali ut dirigat in hiis que utilia sunt ad finis consecucionem. Sic in spiritu illo uirtus celestis est et elementalis[46] ut natura nil ordinantes eorum que sunt ad finem, set in finem tendentes simpliciter; et est ibi uirtus anime ut informans et mouens uirtutem celestem et elementalem ut ad formam animalis et ad potenciam uite habentis corpus moueat; et uirtus intelligencie uniuersaliter agentis est in ea ut ea que sunt ad finem adhibeat, et sic certissime sine errore finem contingat. Et dat exemplum Philosophus[47] in arcu et sagittario et sagitta tangente directe metam:[48] in illo enim corda percutit, arcus uirtutem percuciendi tribuit, manus tendit, set radius oculi per modum linee a sagitta in nuram directus, sagittam directe <in metam?>[49] dirigit. Sic calor materiam dirigit, calor celi spiritum et figuram ex signis et figuris radiorum prefigit, uirtus anime patris metam ponit animati ad patris similitudinem, uirtus autem intelligencie uniuersaliter agentis fit direccio ut finis omnibus hiis directe tangatur sine errore; et quia omnia alia instrumentalia sunt ad hanc uirtutem,[50] ideo dicitur[51], 'totum opus nature opus intelligencie', et spiritus sic operans[52] dicitur 'intellectus', eo quod in uirtute et forma actiui intellectus ista perficit. Iste est uerus intellectus Aristotelis. Et qui dicit quod ideo dicitur 'intellectus' quia non utitur organo ut intellectus, hunc intellectum ad intellectum contemplatiuum assimilat, et errat in philosophia, qui error subtiliter consideratus in errorem redundat qui est contra fidem, quia sequetur quod possibilis et contemplatiuus intellectus per uirtutem suam sit in semine; et quia uirtus sua acceptiua est, ut Aristoteles dicit,[53] sequetur quod intellectus acceptiuus, quo homo homo est, sit in semine. Et hic fuit error Platonis quod semen esset paruum animal et semen hominis esset paruus homo.[54]

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[44] In tractatu *De bono*, tr. I, a. 1 (ed. Colon, t. XXVIII, p. 2. 36) Albertus hoc tribuit Aristoteli. Non autem invenitur ad verbum apud Aristotelem, ut animadvertent editores ibidem inspiciendo *Phys.*, VIII, 1 (252a 11 sqq.), *Metaph.*, XI, 8 (1065a 27), *De caelo*, II, 8 (290a 30) et II, 11 (291b 13 sq.). Cf. J. M. Ramírez, O. P., *De hominis beatitudine*, t. I (Matriti 1942), pp. 240-244.

[45] Incertum, sed forte Arist., *De gen. anim.*, II, 6. 742a 20 sqq. et 744b 18 sqq.

[46] elementi *cod.*

[47] Non potui invenire exemplum apud Aristotelem.

[48] motam *cod.*

[49] Spatium duorum circiter verborum relinquitur vacuum in codice a scriptore.

[50] Cf. Alb., *De animal.*, XX, tr. II, c. 4, n. 82; *De nat. et orig. an.*, tr. I, cc. 1 et 5 (ed. Colon., t. XII, pp. 3-4). De his tribus virtutibus, viz. caeleste ac elementale, virtute animae et virtute intelligentiae universaliter agentis, vide Albertum, *De animal.*, XVI, tr. I, c. 7, nn. 42-45.

[51] Vide notam 44 supra.

[52] op'his *cod.*

Tricesimum Quintum

Tricesimum quintum fuit an aliquid de substancia celi intret ad composicionem compositi ex quatuor elementis et maxime uiui et animati per effectum sue uirtutis. Ad hoc autem respondere non est difficile,[55] quia cum nichil intret in composicionem mixti nisi miscibile per minima ita ut minimum sui sit cum minimis cuiuslibet aliorum miscibilium, item cum nil intret in mixtum nisi ab excellenciis suarum qualitatum alterabile ad medium, et corpus celeste per substanciam suam nec diuisibile sit nec a qualitatibus suis alterabile, sequitur demonstratiua necessitate, que per causam essencialem et conuertibilem concludit, quod nulla substancia celi intret in corpus generabile et animatum. Uirtus tamen corporis celestis per (fol. 21rb) irradiacionem et duodecim circulis factam ad centrum concepti seminis intrat in corpus tale; et hoc Aristoteles uocat[56] celi 'calorem' sicut et 'lumen' celi; et in lumine uirtus intrat in elementa et format qualitates eorum ad tendendum in hanc uel illam formam figura tocius constellacionis figuratam. Cuius signum dicunt esse philosophi Perypatetici,[57] Porphirius et Theophrastus,[58] quod aliquando quamuis in semine uirtus generantis ad formam animati ad simile generanti moueat, et quamuis uirtus elementi dirigat, tamen figuram humanam <non> habebit propter figuraciones radiorum et stellarum in aliam figuram trahencium, sicut quod dicitur[59] quod conceptus luminaribus existentibus in Ariete versus capud Gorgonis, si Iupiter respectu Fornaci (?)[60] non adiuuet et Uenus non respiciat, natus et homo erit et figuram corporis humani non habebit. Et hoc ego tempore meo bis inueni stellis subtiliter equatis ad loca predicta et ad horam conceptus et natiuitatis duorum natorum de quibus dixi paulo ante. Sic igitur constat quod per uirtutem et elementales qualitates influxam et in uirtutem seminis uirtus corporis celestis est generatis. Et super hoc tota fundatur sciencia libri qui *Alarba* uel *Quadripartitum* dicitur, in quo agitur de qualitate natorum quam et stellarum scintillacionibus sorciuntur.

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[53] Arist., *De anima*, II, 2. 414a 10.

[54] Vide notam 42 supra.

[55] Cf. Arist., *De caelo*, I, 3. 270a 26; *Meteor.*, I, 6. 343b 34-35. Vide Albertum, *De animal.*, XX, tr. I, cc. 5-7.

[56] Arist., *De caelo*, II, 7. 289a 19-20. Vide Albertum, *De animal.*, XVI, tr. I, c. 3, nn. 22-23.

[57] Albertus ipse, *De animalibus*, XV, tr. II, c. 10, n. 133, similiter nominat "Peripateticos, Aristotelem videlicet et suos sequaces, Porfirium maxime et Theofrastum."

[58] Forte Porphyrius in suo *Introductione in Cl. Ptolemaei opus de effectibus astrorum*, Basileae 1554, et Theophrastus "qui librum *de Animalibus* composuit in quo etiam de virtutibus spermatis praedictam tradidit sententiam" (Alb., *De animal.*, XVI, tr. I, c. 4, n. 29).

[59] Videtur Albertum non alibi tradidisse talem conceptum luminaribus sic dispositis, nec etiam experientiam adnotatam de duobus natis monstrosis. Vide autem Ptolemaeum, *Tetrabiblos*, III, c. 3.

Tricesimum Sextum

Tricesimum sextum est fere idem isti quod habitum est. Querit enim an aliquid de substancia celi intret ad composicionem corporis naturaliter compositi ex quatuor elementis et maxime uiui et animati per effectum sue uirtutis. Dicendum est enim quod non intrat per substanciam propter causam que dicta est. In uiuum autem et animatum plus intrat de uirtute eius propter spiritus animales et uitales et naturales, qui in corporibus uiuorum mouentur deferentes undique uirtutes anime, sicut ad omnem partem mouentur lumina et radii stellarum in loco generacionis, uirtutes celestium corporum in locum generacionis[61] et in centrum nati deferentes. Propter quod bene dicit Moyses Egypcius[62] quod in tali radiacione spera stellarum fixarum proprium habet mouere terram; et ideo in exortis de terra figure sunt multe in plantis propter multas figuras ymaginum et stellarum et radiacionum que sunt in spera illa. Si<c> eciam spera Solis ap<p>ropriatum habet mouere ignem ut dirigat et congreget omogenea et separet etherogenea in loco generacionis. Spere autem Lune ap<p>ropriatur mouere aqua de profundo per ebulliciones inundantes in omnem partem loci generacionis. Speris autem quinque aliorum planetarum ap<p>ropriatur mouere speram aeris ad generacionis locum; et quia multiplices sunt motus quinque planetarum, ideo multi motus sunt in aere et multe alteraciones qualitatum. Patet igitur quod celum uirtute est in composicione talium corporum et non substancia.

Tricesimum Septimum

Tricesimum septimum est theologicum. Querit enim an corpora glorificata lucebunt plus quam sol, et an tunc post resurreccionem Luna luceat plus quam Sol [uel quantum Sol], et Sol in septuplum quam modo, et corpora sanctorum sepcies magis Sole. Ad hoc autem libencius audirem alium respondentem quam meipsum, quia seraphym (Ysaias, VI <2>) uelabant pedes sedentis super solium excelsum, significantes[63] occulta et uelata nobis esse ea que post iudicium futura sunt. Tamen illud quod in questione ponitur quidam doctores sentire uidentur[64] tractantes illud Ysaias XXX <26>, *erit lune lux sicut lux solis et lux solis erit septempliciter sicut lux septem dierum, in die qua alligaverit Dominus uulnus populi sui*, et adhibent et exposicionem et causam dicentes quod sicut orbis et lumina celi defluxerunt per peccatum, sic liberabuntur a seruitute corrupcionis (fol. 21va) illius per innouacionem glorie, quia aliter per congruenciam non responderet habitatori habitaculum, quod esset contra ordinem sapiencie diuine. Et ideo stabit in pleno lumine sicut Sol; nec minuetur, nec crescet, eo quod non circuibit accedens ad Solem et recedens sicut modo; et lux Solis redibit ad lumen illud quod in primis septem diebus habuit ante quam fieret peccatum. Et quia hoc non fuit proporcionatum nisi statui innocencie prime, et status glorie maior erit illo, ideo dicitur quod Sol tunc super lumen primum quod habuit in statu innocencie septempliciter lumen accipiet ut congruat glorioso statui beatorum resurgencium, et quod lumen ex natura per peccatum non fuscata in beatis fulgebat sicut Sol, tunc fulgebit in regno Patris eorum[65] (Matth. XIII <43>), et quod ex uirtutis merito super illud lumen septempliciter accipient augmentum; et hoc pium est credere et sanctis honorificum.

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[60] Forci *cod.*

[61] generandis *cod.*

[62] Maimonidis, *Dux neutrorum*, P. II, c. 10.

Tricesimum Octauum

Tricesimum octauum item est theologicum. Querit enim an angelos quos uidit Maria Magdalena circa sepulchrum[66] Domini lacrimali uoce consolati sint eam. Ad hoc autem respondere nullus homo sufficit nisi qui aut ystoriam aut<h>enticam hoc dicentem legit uel de hoc reuelacionem certam accepit et non fallacem. Quantum autem ex coniecturis Scripture elici potest, non uidetur esse probabile, quia expresse in omnibus Euangelistis legitur quod tristiciam a sanctis mulieribus repellentes dixerunt, 'Nolite timere, uos[67] flentes', eciam consolantes dixerunt, 'Mulier, quid ploras?', et quod exierunt[68] cum timore et gaudio magno hoc nunciantes. Habitus autem consolantis non est flere uel tristiciam exhibere, set ylari uultu[69] blandiri afflicto, ut dicit Gregorius super Job II.[70] Debet enim consolans eum quem consolatur ad se trahere in consolacionem; et sic non satis congruus esset habitus flentis ei qui a fletu consolandum debet remouere[71] et in gaudentis habitum transponere. Set hoc dicit C<h>risostomus super Iohannem,[72] quod in uultibus angelorum Magdalena cognouit post se stare aliquid magnum quia uidit quod species uultus angelorum mutabatur ad reuerenciam, et quod ad illum uisum conuersa est retrorsum, et uidit Jesum stantem et nesciebat quia Jesus est.[73] Set tamen tam magnum aliquid eum esse credidit, quod, angelis dimissis, ab ipso sollicite de eo quem querebat sciscitata est et instruccionem consolacionis accepit.

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[63] significancia *cod.*

[64] Cf. Alb., *De resurrectione*, tr. IV, q. 1, a. 13 ad 2 (ed. Colon. t. XXVI, p. 336. 20-22).

[65] "Tunc iusti fulgebunt sicut sol in regno Patris eorum." Vulg. *Matth.* xiii, 43.

[66] sepulcrhum *cod.*

[67] nos *cod.*

[68] obiciunt *cod.*

[69] uulti *cod.*

[70] Gregorii, *Moralium*, lib. III, c. 12 (PL 75, 609-610).

Tricesimum Nonum

Tricesimum nonum uult esse theologicum, set est uanum et curiosum, nil uel parum habens utilitatis. Fundatur enim super ypotesim impossibilem: querit enim an homo possit uidere oculo mentis omnia que aguntur hominis humana impressione in corpore exterius extra animam, si habebit uisum ita accutum sicut habuit diabolus; quia sicut peccatum habuit (quia dicit Dyonisius in libro *De diuinis nominibus*, capitulo IIIIº, quod 'data demonibus naturalia data nequaquam ea mutata esse dicimus, set sunt integra et splendidissima'[74]) et ideo ypotesis est impossibilis. Si tamen per impossibile ponatur, sequitur quod perspicaciter uidebit sicut dyabolus, set antiquitatis longi temporis experienciam non habebit sicut dyabolus; et per illam in coniecturalibus plus iuuatur ad demonstrandum signa talia quam nature uisus perspicacitate. Sapiencius enim coniecturantur experti quam perspicaces, ut dicit Philosophus[75] et Tullius.[76] Et ideo eciam si limpiditatem equam uisus accipiat homo ad dyabolum, non adhuc equaliter iudicabit de hiis que non cause set signa ualde communia sunt signatorum; et talia communia et fallacia sunt passiones anime impressionem facientis in corpore.

Quadragesimum

Quadragesimum est de astrologia. Querit enim an licet ascendendo Mars immediate sit supra Solem quantum ad situm, tamen in descendendo immediate sit supra Lunam quantum ad dominium (fol. 21vb) in prima hora Martis;[77]

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[71] remanere *cod.*

[72] Chrysostomi, *In Ioannem*, homil. LXXXVI (PG 59, 468-9).

[73] esset uel est *cod.*

[74] Dionysii, *De div. nom.*, c. 4 § 23: "Data ipsis angelica dona nequaquam ipsa mutata esse dicimus, sed sunt et integra et splendidissima."

[75] Arist., *Metaph.*, I, 1. 981a 22 sqq. et *Ethic.*, VI, 7. 1141b 13-18.

[76] Cf. Ciceronis, *De divinatione*, II, iv, 12.

[77] noctis *cod.* Vide elenchum quaestionum supra, q. 40, Kilwardby apud Chenu, *op. cit.*, q. 40, et S. Thomam, *Responsio ad Ioan. Vercel.*, a. 39.

que questio, ut puto, a quodam dicto Aristotelis in II° *De celo et mundo*[78] occasionem accepit. Dicit enim ibi Philosophus quod Luna uisa est eclipsare Martem in celo; et questio supponere uidetur quod eclipsans et eclipsatum sint immediate se consequencia in eadem dyametro descendente perpendiculariter. Dico autem quod hoc dictum est penitus ignorantis et nescientis quid dicat, quia si Mars ad Lunam descenderet, aut oporteret quod descenderet in deferente[79] circulo uel in epiciclo, quia quod in deferente[80] descendat impossibile est, quia deferens Martis undique super deferentem Solis et nunquam sub ipso, et per consequens semper inter deferentem Martis et deferentem Lune sunt spacia trium deferencium, Solis scilicet et Ueneris et Mercurii, cuius deferens non Lunam set conum umbre terre (qui ultra deferentem Lune est) uix attingit, ita quod nil sui in conum umbre terre immergitur, quia aliter, ut dicit Ptholomeus,[81] umbra terre sicut Luna eclipsaretur. Si autem descenderet in epiciclo, aliquando Mars sub Sole et Uenere et Mercurio[82] uideretur in magna corporis sui dyametro, et aliquando exaltatus super Iouem et Saturnum uideretur in parua dyametro, quia quantum in epyciclo descendit, tunc oportet quod super superiores ascendat. Que omnia improbata sunt in *Almagesto* Ptholomei.[83] Unde fatuus fuit qui hoc dixit. Si quis autem dicat quod descendens motu diurno et Luna ascendente Mars inferiorem superficiem Lune respicit, et sic uirtutem sibi infundit, hoc magis fatuum est quam primum, quia hoc omni die accidit in omnibus stellis, et tamen ex hoc nullus unquam astrologorum tabulas diurnas uel nocturnas composuit.

Quadragesimum Primum

Quadragesimum primum est theologicum. Querit enim an in inferno erit fletus corporalis quantum ad lacrimarum resolucionem. Ad quod quidem, nil temere diffiniens, dico quod lacrimarum resolucio prouenit ex tristicia cordis pelliculam in qua inuoluitur cerebrum constringente, quod cum restrictum fuerit, comprimitur et exprimitur humiditas ipsius et egreditur per oculos; et quia resolucionem a corde dicit lacrima, propter hoc non credo quod lacrimans fundat corporaliter <in inferno, quamuis?>[84] cordis tristicia habebit, et multo maiorem quam si ad litteram[85] lacrimas fundere[n]t, et est sicut illud Ysaias XXX <33,7>, *angeli pacis amare flebunt*. Si enim conceditur quod corpora dampnatorum resoluuntur in parte, non scirem[86] assignare racionem quare non in toto resoluerentur.

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[78] Arist., *De caelo*, II, 12. 292a 3-10.

[79] differente *cod.*

[80] differente *cod.*

[81] Ptolemaei, *Almagest*, VI, c. 6.

[82] Marte *cod.*

[83] Cf. Ptolemaei, *Almagest*, IX.

[84] Spatium trium circiter verborum relinquitur vacuum in codice a scriptore.

[85] aliteram *cod.*

Quadragesimum Secundum

Quadragesimum secundum est an in inferno sit uermis corporalis. Ad hoc autem sine preiudicio dico quod si esset ibi uermis corporalis, exureretur nisi potencia Dei conseruaretur ad ororem dampnatorum. Puto tamen quod nec erit, set remorsus consciencie uermis dicitur; et ideo non moritur, sicut nec consciencia; et multi remorsus et de multis multi erunt uermes, et ideo dicitur Ysaias IX <14,11>, *Subter te sternetur tinea, et oprimentum tuum uermes.*

Quadragesimum Tercium

Quadragesimum tercium est an possit sciri[87] distancia a superficie terre usque ad centrum eius. Ad quod dico breuiter quod hoc scitur non tantum probabiliter, set eciam demonstratiue, et est in *Almagesto*[88] demonstratiue probata quantitas dyametri terre, cuius medietas est quantitas a superficie terre usque ad centrum eiusdem; et est mensurata distancia centri eccentrici[89] Solis a centro, quod esse non posset nisi sciretur distancia centri terre a superficie ipsius per demonstracionem.

Hec igitur cecucientes pre senectute propter dileccionem Paternitatis Uestre et reuerenciam studiose questionibus Uestris respondimus, oracionibus magis de cetero cupientes intendere quam questionibus curiosis respondere. Ualeat in eternum Uestra Paternitas, et meas in Uobis preces Deus exaudiat ut ordinem nostrum[90] Uestra sollicitudo reducat ad primam consciencie et religionis puritatem.

[86] scient *cod.*

[87] scribi *cod.*

[88] Almagesty *cod.* Cf. Ptolemaei, *Almagest*, IV, c. 16.

[89] ex centrici *cod.*

[90] vestrum *cod.*

Mediaevalia

"DIES DOMINICA:" TWO HIBERNO-LATIN TEXTS

One of the most fantastic of the Christian apocrypha is the so called *Carta Dominica*, the Lord's Letter,[1] which Christ is supposed to have composed in letters of gold, even in His own Blood, and let fall at one of the principal shrines of Christendom, for example on the tomb of St. Peter in Rome or in the holy places at Bethlehem or Jerusalem. The theme of the letter, which by its form and content was intended to be accepted by the Christian world as a special revelation from heaven, is a strict command of Christ under penalty of divine punishment to observe and keep holy the Lord's Day by prayer and abstinence from worldly preoccupations.[2]

The importance of the letter in the history of the cultural development of Christian literature is attested by the vast number of different versions and recensions of it which are preserved not only in Greek and Latin but also in almost all the vernacular languages of both Orient and Occident.[3] The existence of this curious document can be traced as far back as the late sixth century, to a letter of Licinianus, bishop of Carthagena about 581, which he had directed to a certain Vincent, bishop of the island of Ebusus.[4] Unfortunately this letter of bishop Licinianus neither reproduces nor describes the contents of the *Carta Dominica*, as it was then known; nor does it throw any light on the identity of the author, the place of provenance or the time of composition.[5] The most probable place of origin is the West, probably Africa or Rome, since the association of the letter with Jerusalem and Bethlehem seems to represent a later tradition; and, it is less likely that the author, if he were Oriental, would conceive the letter as dropped by the Lord in Old Rome, the center of Occidental Christianity.[6]

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[1] The *Carta dominica* is also related to the apocryphal letter of Christ to Abgar which was also known to the Old Irish. Cf. J. Kenney, *Sources for the Early History of Ireland* I (New York, 1928) 713, 718, 719.

[2] The various versions of the Letter differ somewhat in form and content. Cf. H. Delehaye, "Note sur la legende de la lettre du Christ tombée du ciel," *Acad. Royale de Belgique, Bull. de la Classe des Lettres* (Brussels, 1899) 171-213.

[3] M. Bittner, "Der vom Himmel gefallene Brief in seinen morgendländischen Versionen und Rezensionen," *Denkschriften der K. Akad. der Wissenschaften zu Wien, Philos.-hist. Klasse* 51, 1 (Vienna, 1906) 1-240; E. Renoir, "Christ (Lettre du) tombée du ciel," *Dict. d'arch. chrét. et liturg.*, 3, 1 (Paris, 1913) 1534-1546.

[4] *Epist.* 3: *Ad Vincentium Epis. Ebositanae insulae* (*PL* 72, 699-700); H. Delehaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-175.

[5] The judgment of E. Renoir, *op. cit.*, p. 1535, on this matter though made forty-five years ago, is still sound: "Nous ne pouvons, en l'état actuel de nos connaissances, déterminer ni l'auteur, ni la date, ni le pays d'origine, ni le contenu primitif de la lettre du Christ."

[6] H. Delehaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-12. It is by no means certain that the *Carta dominica*

The first important evidence for the diffusion of the *Carta Dominica* in mediaeval Europe is found in the Acts of the Lateran Synod, held by Pope Zacharias on October 25, 745, to examine the charges against the Irish bishop, Clement, and the Frankish bishop, Aldebertus, who had both been denounced to the pope by St. Boniface.[7] At this Synod, the priest, Denehard, read to the assembled Fathers from "a letter, used by Aldebert, which he declared was from Jesus and had fallen from heaven."[8] The Acts of this Synod unfortunately cite only a small portion of Aldebert's copy of the Letter of Christ; and, on the basis of this meager evidence, it is impossible either to date it, establish its provenance or determine its exact relation to the universal tradition of the *Carta Dominica*.[9] Further evidence of the persistence of this apocryphal document in the West, even after its condemnation by Pope Zacharias at the Lateran Synod,[10] is the prohibition of letters fallen from heaven which is contained in the *Admonitio Generalis* issued by Charles the Great on March 23, 789.[11]

The *Carta Dominica*, under the name *Epistil Ísu*, was well known to Old Ireland. A version of it is preserved in the *Cáin Domnaig*,[12] a text which belongs to the Old Irish period and which can very probably be dated about 830 or somewhat earlier. The *Cáin Domnaig* in the broadest sense of the word contains three parts which are interdependent: (1) The *Epistil Ísu*[13] on the observance of Sunday; (2) three examples of supernatural punishment for the transgression of Sunday; (3) the *Cáin Domnaig*, in the narrow sense of the word, a highly technical law tract. It is with the *Epistil Ísu* or the first part of the *Cáin Domnaig* that this study is chiefly concerned.

The text of the *Epistil Ísu* tells that "the Law of Sunday was given to Conall MacCoelmaine, abbot of Inis-Coel towards the end of the sixth century, while he was on pilgrimage to Rome. He transcribed the Letter of Jesus with his own

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originated in the West. C. Schmidt, "Fragment einer Schrift des Märtyrer-Bischofs Petrus von Alexandrien," *Texte und Untersuchungen* 20 (Leipzig, 1920) 4-46, presents strong evidence for the Eastern origin of the Letter.

[7] J. Harduinus, *Acta Conciliorum* 3 (Paris, 1714) 1936-1938; A. Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands* 1 (Berlin, 1954) 515-517.

[8] J. Harduinus, *op. cit.*, 3, 1939; J. Hefele and H. Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles* 3, 2 (Paris, 1910) 878.

[9] On the basis of the evidence, it is impossible to construct any direct relationship between the Letter of Aldebert and the *Epistola Iesu*, published by S. Baluzius, *Capitularia regum Francorum* 2 (Paris, 1780) 1396-1399. Certain aspects of the latter document suggest Irish influence.

[10] After hearing the Letter of Aldebert read and before condemning it, Pope Zacharias sagely remarked: "Pro certo, fratres carissimi, iste Aldebertus in insaniam est conversus." Cf. J. Harduinus, *op. cit.*, 3, 1939C.

[11] W. Schmitz, "Tironische Miscellen 1: Vom Himmel gefallene Briefe," *Neues Archiv* 15 (1890) 602-603.

[12] The *Cáin Domnaig* is one of the four laws of Old Ireland. Cf. The Martyrology of Oengus the Culdee (*ed.*, W. Stokes, *Félire Oengusso*, *Henry Bradshaw Society* 29 [London, 1905] 210) and the Gloss on Colman's Hymn (*ed.*, W. Stokes and J. Strachan, *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus* 2 [Cambridge, 1903] 306).

[13] J. G. O'Keeffe, "Cáin Domnaig," *Eriu* 2 (1905) 189-214.

hand and brought it with him back to Ireland."[14] But it seems more probable that the Letter made its way into Ireland from the Frankish Kingdom about the year 811, at the time that the Céle Dé arrived in that island. This "time accords better with that from which, on grounds of probability, the vogue of the Letter in Ireland may be dated; and, the development of a stricter Sabbatarianism appears to coïncide with the institution of the Céli De."[15]

The *Cáin Domnaig*, though itself composed in Old Irish, undoubtedly rests upon a Latin tradition, at least as far as the *Epistil Ísu* is concerned. In three Latin manuscripts, Orleans 221 (193), BN. lat. 3182, both hitherto unpublished, and Vat. Reg. lat. 49, only incompletely published by the late Dom A. Wilmart,[16] I have found two Hiberno-Latin versions of the *Carta Dominica* which may represent the immediate source of the *Epistil Ísu* or, at least, examples of the Latin dissemination of this Old Irish version of the apocryphal *Carta Dominica*. Both texts, certainly products of Early Celtic religious culture which showed a marked inclination towards the apocrypha, are very probably of Irish origin.

The first text, printed below as Document I, rests on two manuscripts, Orleans 221 (193) and BN. lat. 3182. The former, written by a certain Iunobrus, is characterized by B. Bischoff[17] as a Breton manuscript which can be prudently dated about the year 800. It represents, therefore, a tradition of the *Epistil Ísu* which is somewhat earlier than that which is found in the *Cáin Domnaig*. In addition to various collections of canonical decrees, the codex also contains the canons of Adamnanus (fol. 212: *Incipiunt canones Adamnani : Marina animalia... non reditur pro eo*),[18] and an account of the creation of the world which depends on the Book of Enoch.[19] The selection, *Dies dominica*, is found on page 22 of the codex.

The second manuscript of Document I, BN. lat. 3182 (s. ix-x), also of Breton origin, was formerly preserved in the monastery of the Holy Trinity at Fécamp from which it passed at a later date into the possession of Jean Bigot. The codex contains some marginal and interlinear glosses in Old Breton and on p. 355 mentions in a partly effaced inscription the name of the scribe: "Discipulus Maeloc conscripsi hunc ego (?)..." Actually this manuscript, called the *Collectio canonum Fiscannensis*, is a *corpus iuris canonici* of a distinctly insular character. Among other legal items, it is made up of the *Canones Adamnani*, the *Sinodus Aquilonalis Britanniae* and the *Gildae Paenitentiale*.[20] The passage on the *Dies dominica* which appears on page 17, shows signs of direct, though remote, dependence on the tradition of the *Dies dominica* represented by the above mentioned Orleans codex.

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[14] *Cáin Domnaig* 1, 20, 21. *Ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 192, 193, 202, 203.

[15] J. Kenney, *op. cit.*, 1, 477.

[16] A. Wilmart, "Catéchèses celtiques," *Analecta Reginensia, Studi e testi* 59 (Rome, 1933) 29-112.

[17] B. Bischoff, "Wendepunkte in der Geschichte der lateinischen Exegese im Frühmittelalter," *Sacris erudiri* 6 (1954) 274.

[18] F. W. H. Wasserschleben, *Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche* (Graz, 1958) 120.

[19] The author's conception of creation, inspired by the Book of Enoch, is not reproduced here. It is found on pp. 21-22 of the Orleans manuscript and on pp. 17-18 of the Paris manuscript: "Die prima, id est dominica.... Discite a me, quia mitis sum."

[20] Cf. the *Catalogue géneral des manuscrits latins* 4, *Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris* (Paris, 1958) 302 ff. I am indebted to Rev. J. C. Wey, C. S. B., for bringing this manuscript to my notice.

The Vatican Codex, Reg. lat. 49, printed below as Document II, is the work of a scribe or author known as Guilhelmus, and can be dated as late ninth or early tenth century and is also Breton, perhaps Welsh. The script, a remarkable combination of Carolingian minuscule and insular abbreviations, seems to confirm the probability of Breton origin. The manuscript contains the only extant copy of the *Catechesis Celtica*, a collection of homilies, intended for liturgical use in a Celtic setting. Since the contents of this work are composite in nature, it is impossible to date it as a whole, though beyond doubt some of the component pieces of this collection are authentic specimens of Early Celtic piety and representative of the oldest and purest Celtic traditions.[21]

These two texts are resumés not only of the apocryphal but also of the Christian tradition of the wonders which *Heilsgeschichte* testifies were enacted by the Lord on Sunday. The proximate source of inspiration is undoubtedly the *Carta Dominica* whose spirit and content they clearly reflect. Together with the apocryphal account of the creation of the world which is built largely on the Book of Enoch and is found immediately after the *Dies dominica* in both Orleans 221 (193) and BN. lat. 3182, the description of the eight consistencies from which Adam was created, which is presented in Vat. Reg. lat. 49, offers a clear testimonial to the tradition of the apocrypha in the early ninth century.

In connection with the two documents presented below, I have noted certain relations between them and the *Epistil Ísu*, the Latin Fathers, Jerome and Isidore, the *Carta dominica* and the apocryphal gospels. These relations I regard partly as actual sources, partly as literary parallels, which reveal the compendious character of the documents and their dependence on tradition. The author's use of Scripture is normal and requires no special notice.

Though both documents clearly reflect the religious thinking of the early medieval Celtic lands, specifically the Irish, it is impossible on the basis of the evidence to determine the precise character of the relation of these documents to the literature of these lands of which the *Epistil Ísu* is a pertinent example. It is not at all clear whether they represent, especially Document I, the basic source material from which the compiler of the *Epistil Ísu* worked; or, whether they are nothing more than examples of the Latin transmission of the *Epistil Ísu* back to the continent in the course of the ninth century; or, whether they represent a branch of the common tradition from which both they and the *Epistil Ísu* ultimately stem.[22]

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[21] With due respect to the greatness of Dom Wilmart's scholarship, his edition of the *Catechesis Celtica* should be reworked with proper care for the source analysis and the reproduction of the complete text. A careful study of the whole work will yield remarkable conclusions on the spirituality of the Old Celts (Irish?). My edition of this work is nearing completion.

[22] R. Priebisch, "Quelle und Abfassungszeit der Sontagepistel in der irischen Cáin Domnaig," *Modern Language Review* 2 (1907) 138-154, has tried to illustrate some of the relations of the *Cáin Domnaig* (*terminus a quo* 830). He believes that it is related to Pehtred's Homily 44, §§ 215-26 and that both are in turn related to some common Latin ancestor such as the *Epistola de die sancto dominico*, found in Clm. 9550 (s. xi).

I

Incipiunt virtutes quas Dominus dominica die fecit.

Diem autem dominicam primam diem esse dubitari non potest, quia scriptum est VI diebus factum esse mundum et in septimo die requievise Dominum. Quem septimum diem sapatum appellavit.

Quomodo mater Domini inter omnes mulieres principatum tenet, ita et in ceteris diebus <haec> omnium dierum maior est.

Dominicum autem non octavum appellamus sed primum diem.

Dominica <dies> exordium omnium dierum continet, et resurrectionem renovat.

Die vero dominica Christus cum latrone paradisum reseravit.

Die dominica dixit Christus ad angelos: *Aperite portas iustitiae. Et ingresus in eas confitebor Domino.*

Die vero dominica sinagoga Iudeorum fugit.

Et in die dominica nata est eclesia.

Die vero dominica Dominus noster resurrexit a mortuis, tertia die.

Die vero dominica nativitas Domini.

Die vero dominica misit Dominus Spiritum sanctum apostolis.

Die dominica divisit Deus mare rubrum.

Die dominica fecit Deus mirabilia in Cannan Galileae.

1 The expression, *virtutes... fecit*, is from the Vulgate, e. "non fecit ibi virtutes multas" (Mt. 13:58).

2 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3 (*PL* 83, 761B). The first day of creation is obviously Sunday.

3-4 Isidore, *ibid.*; Exod. 20:11; 31:17.

4 Isidore, *Etym.* 6, 18, 17.

5-6 Jerome, *Epist.* 29, 2 (*PL* 30, 231C-233B). E. Dekkers, "Clavis Patrum," *Sacris erudiri* 3 (1951) 603, p. 106.

7 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 24, 1-2 (*PL* 83, 760C); *Etym.* 6, 18, 21. According to St. Isidore, Sunday is both the first and the eighth day.

8-9 Jerome, *Epist.* 29, 3-4 (*PL* 30, 232D); Isidore, *Etym.* 6, 18, 19-21.

10 Jerome, *ibid.*

11-12 Ps. 117:19, 27; Jerome, *Epist.* 29, 4 (*PL* 30, 232D); *Cáin Domnaig* 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 201).

13 Jerome, *Epist.* 22, 3 (*PL* 30, 218D); *Epist.* 29, 2 (*PL* 30, 231D).

14 Jerome, *Epist.* 22, 3 (*PL* 30, 218D).

15 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3 (*PL* 83, 761B); *Cáin Domnaig* 7.

16 *Cáin Domnaig* 15 (*ed.* J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 199); *The Assumption of the Virgin* 37 (*ed.*, M. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* [Oxford, 1953] p. 206).

17 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3; *Cáin Domnaig* 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 201).

18 *Cáin Domnaig* 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 199).

19 *Ibid.*

O: Orleans 221 (193) P: BN. lat. 3182 3 requievisse P 4 sabbatum P 5 ita *om.* O 6 maiorem *pro* maior O est *om.* O 8 exortum *pro* exordium O 10 domina O 11 et *om.* O ingressus P 13 vero *om.* O sinaggoga P 14 ecclesia O 15 vero *om.* O 16 vero *om.* O 17 vero *om.* O 19 Canan P

Die dominica de V panibus et duobus piscibus <Dominus V milia hominum satiavit.>

Die dominica, prima die, pluit manna de celo XL annos in heremo.

Dies vero dominica initium dierum esse omnium non dubium est.

II

(f. 53^{r}) De die dominico

Dies dominicus dies beatus, quia primus dies fuit.

<Dies> dominicus dies beatus, quia incessavit Deus <ab> operibus suis in ea.

Dies dominibus dies beatus, in qua die spiravit Deus animam in Adam.

De octo ponderae factus est <Adam>: Pondus limi, unde facta est caro. Pondus salis, unde salsae sunt lacrimae. Pondus ignis, unde rubicundus est sanguis. Pondus venti, unde est anhela. Pondus florum, unde est varietas oculorum. Pondus nubis, unde est instabilitas mentium. Pondus roris, unde est sudor. Haec sunt VIII pondera de quibus factus est Adam. Alius pondus, id est anima, de caelestibus facta est.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua die obtulit Abel munera manu sua Deo.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua vidit Noe lumen de arca post diluvium.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua exiit Israel per mare rubrum siccis pedibus.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua percussa est petra et fluxerunt X flumina ab ea et saturati sunt populi.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua pluit manna de caelo per XL dies <pro> populo Dei.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua exiit Iesu, filius Nun, successor Moisi, per flumen Iordanis siccis pedibus.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua venit Dominus ad domum Abrahe, quando fuerunt IIII mediae in uno die: et medio mundi et media etas Abrahe et media dies.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua ordinatus est primus episcopus, Aaron nomine.

20-21 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3 (*PL* 83, 761B); *Cáin Domnaig* 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 199).

22 *Ibid.*

23 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3 (*PL* 83, 761B). Compare line 2 with line 23. It is characteristically Irish that a literary piece terminate as it began.

2-4 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3 (*PL* 83, 761B).

6-11 *The Book of the Secrets of Enoch* 30, 8 (*ed.*, R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* 2 [Oxford, 1913] 14-15.

12 Gen. 4:4

13-14 *Cáin Domnaig* 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 199).

15-16 Exodus 17:5-6.

17-18 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3-4 (*PL* 83, 761BC).

21-23 *Carta dominica* (*ed.*, A. de Santos Otero, *Los evangelios apogrifos* [Madrid, 1956] p. 719).

24-25 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 2, 5, 2-4 (*PL* 83, 781AC).

20 die dominica *om.* P   22 annis P   23 die *pro* dies P   est *om.* P

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua benedixit Deus vinum in Canan Galilee.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua venit Christus in mundo.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua cepit Deus ieiunare ab initio <quadragesimae> usque ad <tempus> pasce.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua resurrexit Dominus a mortuis, quando liberatus est totus mundus de ore diaboli.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua discendit Spiritus sanctus super apostolos.

Dies dominicus dies beatus, in qua veniat Dominus deiudicare vivos ac mortuos.

Dominus dixit. Si constitueritis diem sanctam dominicam, aperiam catarectas caeli vobis et multiplicabo fructum vobis et benedictionem in domum vestrum <omnibus> diebus usque ad mortem, et post mortem dabo vobis regnum meum; et quid quaeritis, dabo vobis; et letabitur propter vos, et scietis quia ego sum Dominus. Iuro vobis per patientiam Dei, et per angelos meos, si non converseritis ad sanctam diem dominicam, inducam super vos vindictam magnam, et sustinentiam bonam vestram faciam, vos miseri. Comburet vos ignis caelestis.

Qui faciunt opera in die dominico, et qui tundunt caput in die dominico, et qui purgunt domum in die dominico, hi sunt qui ieciat Deus in tenebras exteriores. Et nos debemus praedicare ad omnes homines, ut vitam aeternam habeamus sine fine in secula saeculorum. Amen. Finit. Amen. Guilhelm scripsit hunc librum. Deo gratias.

Robert E. McNally, S.J.

26 *Cáin Domnaig* 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 199).

27 *The Assumption of the Virgin* 37 (*ed.*, M. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* [Oxford, 1953], p. 206); *Cáin Domnaig* 7, 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 199).

30-31 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3 (PL 83, 761B); *Cáin Domnaig* 7, 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, pp. 195, 201).

32 Isidore, *De eccl. off.*, 1, 25, 3 (*PL* 83, 761B); *Cáin Domnaig* 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 201).

33-34 *The Assumption of the Virgin* 37 (*ed.*, M. James, *op. cit.*, p. 206); *Cáin Domnaig* 7, 15 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, pp. 195, 201).

35-41 *Cáin Domnaig* 12, 17, 18, 33 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, pp. 197, 202-3, 211).

41 *Cáin Domnaig* 13 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, p. 197).

42-45 *Cáin Domnaig* 17-19 (*ed.*, J. G. O'Keeffe, pp. 201-3).

THE RELATION OF BOOKS I AND III OF MALORY'S "MORTE DARTHUR"

The unity of Malory's *Morte Darthur*, first questioned by Professor Eugène Vinaver in 1947,[1] may be successfully demonstrated by a number of means — by careful studies of Malory's overall chronology, characterization, and theme,

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[1] In his Introduction and Notes to *The Works of Sir Thomas Malory*, 3 vols. numbered consecutively (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947) hereafter cited as *Works*. References in the text of this article, however, are to the more accessible 1 volume edition edited by Vinaver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954). Vinaver's principal contention is that

among others — but also on a lesser scale by examinations of the manner in which Malory at times arranges the episodes of his long, apparently rambling narrative in parallel structure in order to link them into an organized thematic chain.

An important example of Malory's linking technique may be observed, I believe, in the arrangement of the adventures comprising Books I and III of the *Morte Darthur*. Book I, "The Tale of King Arthur,"[2] represents Malory's first attempt at the reworking of a French source[3] — in this case, the *Suite de Merlin* — and although he endeavors, as Vinaver says, "with varying degrees of success, but with remarkable consistency... to reduce the bulk of the stories and to alter their arrangement,"[4] he adds very few incidents to his French original and is content to make his principal thematic changes by the simplest possible means — by the insertion, deletion, and alteration of speeches and details of action.

Book III, "The Noble Tale of Sir Launcelot du Lake," on the other hand, though next in order of composition, presents an entirely different aspect of Malory's treatment of his source material. Here Malory selects from the vast OF Prose *Lancelot* two short, widely-separated adventures of Lancelot to which he adds a third adventure for which there is no clear source.[5] Although Vinaver states that Malory has here composed a skillful *roman d'aventures*,[6] he denies to Malory any intention of fitting these adventures into an overall scheme of composition and insists that Malory had "no ambition except that of telling a good story."[7]

Yet, it seems to me, one of Malory's main purposes in these early sections of the *Morte Darthur* is to establish at the very outset of his work his principal theme — the rise, flowering, and decay of an almost perfect civilization — as well as to prefigure the plot lines which unify the narrative framework of the book — the Lancelot-Guinevere intrigue, the Lot-Pellinor feud, the Grail quest — and hence unify as well the tragic themes which these narrative strands convey — the failures in love, loyalty, and piety. As part of this intent, there-

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Malory, far from attempting to construct a unified Arthurian narrative, "regarded each of his works as an independent 'tale' or 'book'..." (*Works*, xxxii). For articles refuting Vinaver's position consult the bibliography listed by R. M. Lumiansky in "Malory's Steadfast Bors," *Tulane Studies in English*, VIII (1958), 5, n. 2.

[2] I am using Vinaver's book divisions and titles not to indicate agreement with his theory of "separate romances," but because they are more descriptive and more convenient than Caxton's proliferation of chapters.

[3] Book I is the second of Malory's efforts at translation, though his first from a French source. Book II, that of Arthur's Roman Wars, the source of which is the English alliterative *Morte Arthure*, is his first composition.

[4] *Works*, lii.

[5] Among the episodes of this third adventure, the "Healing of Meliot" recalls a section of the *Perlesvaus* (cf. R. H. Wilson, "Malory and the *Perlesvaus*," *MP*, XXX (1932), 13-32), and Lancelot's encounter with Sir Pedivere is strongly reminiscent of a passage in the Prose *Lancelot* (cf. R. H. Wilson, "The Prose *Lancelot* in Malory," The University of Texas *Studies in English*, XXXII (1953), 1-13.

[6] *Works*, lvi.

[7] *Works*, p. 1402.

fore, Malory must have purposed in Book I to define — prologue-fashion — pre-Arthurian knighthood and to chronicle the emergence of the new chivalry.[8] It is my contention here that taken together Books I and III of the *Morte Darthur*, far from relating a "series of short and well-defined tales,"[9] do precisely that: Book III attempts to present by means of contrasting parallel episodes a commentary on the actions of Book I in order to contrast the new knighthood with the old.

Malory thus found it necessary to make comparatively few changes in the episodes related in Book I, all of which could be adapted to his purpose by means of alterations.[10] In Book III, on the other hand, he needed to recast and reorganize completely his source material in order to construct, insofar as he was able within the limitations imposed on him by his French book, a series of episodes parallel in structure to, though contrasting in theme with those he had already presented in Book I. These parallels could not, of course, be exact since Malory was adapting old materials and was obliged to conform to the familiar story patterns and since he could not contruct parallel episodes at the expense of obscuring the development of his major narrative lines. But there are clear signs that the startlingly original organization of Book III reflects Malory's attempt to present these first adventures of Lancelot, the finest exponent of Round Table chivalry, in marked contrast to the adventures of the older knights — Gawain, Marhalt, Pellinor, and the others — who typify an older and more brutal civilization.[11]

In general, Malory's presentation of the two sorts of chivalry he is contrasting centers on two issues: (1) the proper attitude of a knight toward women (and this would necessarily include the problems of courtly love and adultery) and (2) the attitude of victor to vanquished. These contrasting elements are not presented, of course, in anything resembling chronological sequence, but their contrasting natures are enforced and emphasized by Malory's own comments on the action (particularly in Book I) and by his additions to and arrangement of the action (particularly in Book III). A tabular arrangement will present these contrasts most clearly:

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[8] This same view of at least part of Book I, the "Torre and Pellinor" section, is put forth by Vida D. Scudder in *Le Morte Darthur of Sir Thomas Malory and Its Sources* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1921). Miss Scudder states, rightly I think, that the theme of these early adventures "is the theme of the failure of the knights for lack of a restraining code, the imperative need for a standard through which the confused instincts of nascent chivalry may be focused and preserved. At the end of the book [Caxton's Book III] this standard is to be established once and for all: the great Oath [Malory's addition on p. 91] is to be sworn" (p. 201).

[9] *Works*, lvii.

[10] All arguments regarding Malory's purposes in the *Morte Darthur* must necessarily be based on the alterations, particularly the additions, that Malory makes in his sources. However, since Malory whenever possible adapted and reduced rather than added to his sources, much of his intent can be induced from what he chose to retain as well as what he chose to delete or alter.

[11] It is interesting that T. H. White in *The Once and Future King* (London: Collins, 1958) sees Arthur's coming to the throne in similar terms. Arthur, in White's novel, is seen as trying to divert the warlike instincts of the nobility into socially useful channels; "... with his Round Table, he had tried to harness Tyranny in lesser forms, so that its power might be used for useful ends" (p. 666).

I. Attitude Toward Women

Book I	Book III
(Old Brutality and Immorality)	(New Chivalry)
1) Pellinor rapes Torre's wife (74-75). [Malory is responsible for Pellinor's use of force.]	1) Lancelot kills Perys de Foreste Savage, described *by Malory* [not his source] as a ravisher of women (194).
2) Gawain kills a damsel "by myssefortune" (79). [Malory adds the grief of the damsel's bereaved husband, and he strengthens the rebukes of Gaheris and the four knights.]	2) When Pedivere kills his own wife, Lancelot rebukes him fiercely (207-208). [Not in source.]
2a) Lanceor's damsel, Columbe, kills herself (52). [Malory increases the importance of the death of Columbe by making it the cause of the dolorous stroke.]	2a) Lancelot spares Phelot's wif though she has aided her husband i. his attempt to kill Lancelot (206). [Not in source.]
2b) Balin smites off the Lady of the Lake's head (49), thus breaking the law of safe-conduct.	
3) Upon his return to court, Gawain swears to be never again unchivalrous to ladies (81), but later tricks Ettard (124).	3) Pedivere is forced to do great penance for having killed his wife (208) and becomes a hermit. [Not in source.]
4) Abellius spurns damsel's request to spare her brother (84).	4) Lancelot cures Meliot at the request of his sister (200-204). [Not in source.]
4a) Pellinor spurns damsel's request to aid her wounded brother (86). He is later severely punished for this action (90-91).	4a) Lancelot assists Bagdemagus at the request of his daughter (184). [Not in source.]
5) Gawain and Yvain fight Marhalt who is described, wrongfully as it turns out, as a great woman hater (114).	
6) Accolon is Morgan's lover, though she is married (102).	6) Lancelot three times denies any unlawful association with Guinevere (184, 194-195, 204).
6a) Lot's anger at Arthur is caused by Arthur's affair with Morgause (58). [Malory increases the importance of Morgause's adultery since in his source, Lot is angered by Arthur's murder of the children born on May Day.]	

7) Gawain betrays Pelleas in order to seduce Ettard (120-126).	7) Lancelot disdains the advances of Morgan and the three queens (183-184).
7a) Garnish commits suicide because of his betrothed's infidelity (66).	

II. ATTITUDE OF VICTOR TO VANQUISHED

Book I	Book III
(Old Brutality)	(New Chivalry)
1) Gawain is willing to kill Ablamor because Ablamor has killed his hounds (79). [Gaheris and the four knights add Malory's own judgment of Gawain's action (79, 80).]	1) In Book III, Lancelot continually grants mercy to the knights that he overcomes, even to Pedivere whom he obviously despises (208). [Not in source.]
2) Pellinor refuses to help a wounded knight (86).	2) Lancelot helps a knight whom he has accidentally wounded (186), [In source, he kills him.]

In addition to constructing these thematic parallels between Book I and Book III in order to define the effects of Arthur's chivalry upon knightly behaviour in love and war, Malory arranges also for a number of parallel episodes which keep before the reader his unifying narrative threads – the Lancelot-Guinevere intrigue, the Lot-Pellinor feud, and the Grail quest.

The courtly love affair of Lancelot and Guinevere is, of course, suggested by the parallels listed above under "Attitude toward Women" (particularly by item 6) in which the older brutish treatment of woman, particularly by Pellinor, is contrasted with the courtesy of Lancelot.[12] However, in addition to these parallels, Malory adds at the beginning of Book III (180) references to Guinevere's growing regard for Lancelot and to Lancelot's later rescue of Guinevere from the stake. He also makes explicit the passage in Book I (71) in which Merlin warns Arthur of Guinevere's future infidelity, thereby reminding the reader of the tragedy to come. Malory also adds to Book III passages (198, 200, 208) in which Lancelot orders captured knights to report to Guinevere rather than to Arthur as was usual in Book I.

The Lot-Pellinor feud is suggested in Books I and III both by direct reference (Gawain's anger at being knighted after Torre [73-75]) and by a series of parallel episodes dealing with kinship. The tragic conclusion of the Balin-Balan story (68-69) and the various attempts of Morgan to kill her brother and her husband (102, 113, 109) contrast with the clannish devotion of Gawain and his brothers in Book I (75, 77, 114) and Lancelot and Lionel in Book III (181, 189). Malory would seem to be working with a double contrast here, pitting family loyalty against family disloyalty, but at the same time foreshadowing the feud between the families of Gawain and Lancelot.

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[12] We must remember also that at the time of Book III, Lancelot is still the youthful and innocent courtly lover and that he has not as yet entered into the adulterous relationship with the queen which is to lead to the destruction of the kingdom (cf. R. M. Lumiansky, "The Relationship of Lancelot and Guinevere in Malory's 'Tale of Lancelot'," *MLN*, LXVIII [1953], 86-91).

The Grail quest is, of course, prepared for in the Balin-Balan story of Book I and by Bagdemagus's finding of the "braunche of holy herbe" (98), but it is entirely possible that the oddly-conceived "Healing of Meliot" section of Book III also prefigures the Grail. This adventure of Lancelot, possibly derived from a section of the *Perlesvaus*, recounts Lancelot's journey to the Chapel Perilous in search of "a swerde and a blody cloth" (202) which will cure the wounded Meliot. Lancelot goes to the Chapel, encounters a number of wonders — thirty fierce knights who flee at his approach, "a corpus hylled with a clothe of sylke," an earthquake, the magic sword, a sorceress — and returns to cure Meliot. This episode, seemingly out of place among the more pedestrian adventures of Book III, may well represent another of Malory's parallels, devised by him to show Lancelot's success in a spiritual adventure of the kind in which Balin had so obviously failed. The "Healing of Meliot" thus stands in marked contrast to the Balin-Balan story of Book I and prefigures both the Grail quest and, more importantly, still another of Malory's additions, the "Healing of Sir Urry" in Book VII.

In general, then, Malory's purpose in Book III is to look both backward and forward, to contrast the courtly perfection of Lancelot with the barbarity of earlier knights and, at the same time, to foreshadow the forthcoming tragedy. Surely the demonstration of such an intent reveals a literary aim more ambitious than "that of telling a good story."

Charles MOORMAN.

SIGNIFICANCE OF A DAY IN "TROILUS AND CRISEYDE"

Almost exactly half of Book II in Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde* is devoted to the account of the day when Criseyde first heard of Troilus's love for her. Evidence of several different kinds points to Chaucer's having given a special attention to this first intimate view of Criseyde. For exemple, the final touches to the poem, minute revisions of word, phrase, and line, Professor Root found concentrated in three sections.[1] One of these sections starts at line 701 of Book

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[1] Where Chaucer started his more concentrated revisions is more significant than where he left off. Once started, the momentum of his interest would no doubt carry him through the limits he might originally have set himself. The revisions are concentrated in the following passages I, 1-500; II, 701-1113; III, 401 - IV, 1450. Of these passages all three end in mid-scene and two of them in mid-speech. In none of the three is there a major break in the action near-by. On the other hand, the first two start at important points, the first at the beginning of the work, the second immediately following the lines:

And what she thoughte somwhat shal I write,
As to myn auctour listeth for tendite. (II, 700)

The third starts three stanzas before the end of Pandarus's talk with Troilus after the lovers' first meeting alone; at this point the narrative section leading up to Pandarus's arrangements for the consummation scene is about to begin. I have intentionally accepted

II; at precisely this point Criseyde, having learned from Pandarus of Troilus's love and having seen her lover pass by the palace, starts turning over in her mind the problem of how she ought to respond to his affection.

A comparison of the first part of Book II with its source in *Il Filostrato* gives further evidence of the care Chaucer devoted to it. Not only does he considerably expand the account given in Boccaccio, but he adds important elements that change entirely the context of values in which the action takes place. Pandarus's "architectonics" (see I, 1065 ff) in laying the foundations for his revelation, his playing with the conventions of the social environment, the casual way in which he offers to leave without satisfying the curiosity he has aroused in Criseyde, his taunting of her until she is moved to break through her sophisticated poise —

"Now, my good em, for goddes love I preye,"
Quod she, "come of, and telle me what it is;
For bothe I am agast what ye wol seye,
And eke me longeth it to wite, ywys;
For whether it be wel or be amys,
Sey on; lat me nat in this feere dwelle." (II, 314)

— this long preamble serves more important purposes than the mere delineation of Pandarus's character.[2] It establishes Criseyde in her social environment; it gives us a sense of her competence and self-assurance, her happiness in her limited but cultivated world, before love comes to disturb her equanimity. The long section after Pandarus's departure has an even greater significance. For as Criseyde wrestles with her problem, "pliting" it "ful ofte in many folde" (697), we have first the sense that this is no mere convention for her, as it so patently is for her prototype in *Il Filostrato* (see especially stanza 70 of Part II), that love if it comes will be more than an episode, more than the permitted and expected behavior of a sophisticated woman in a courtly setting. At the same time we catch glimpses of her, surprised by the instinctive responses that are taking place beneath and in freedom from her rational control. "Who yaf me drynke?" she thinks as she watches Troilus ride by with eyes modestly lowered in the midst of the people's acclaim —

For of hire owen thought she wex al reed,
Remembryng hire right thus: "lo, this is he
Which that myn uncle swerith he moot be deed,
But I on hym have mercy and pitee." (II, 655)

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the limits of these passages as set forth in Root, Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde*, Princeton, 1945, pp. LXXII f. It is apparent from Professor Root's discussion of the matter that he arrives at these limits on purely textual grounds. Quotations throughout the article are from the Root edition.

[2] In Boccaccio Pandar gives his news to Criseida privately and with reasonable directness; hence we have no experience of Criseida in society. Furthermore she agrees to accept Troilo as lover before Pandar leaves, and later wavers first out of fear that Troilo's affection will wane after he has possessed her, then out of fear of their relationship becoming known to others. She makes no discoveries about herself and interests the reader primarily as a passionate woman, not as a gradually evolving and unfolding character.

And at the end of the day, when she goes to sleep, her dream of the eagle exchanging hearts with her reveals an inner life strangely at variance with the amenities of bower and garden that constitute her world. Her pleasure in the dream, in the violence of the eagle setting his long claws under her breast and rending out her heart, measures the extent to which her nature has quickened under the impact of Troilus's affection.

On this day, then, we watch Pandarus bring the news of Troilus's love to Criseyde, we watch her as she seeks to adjust to this disquieting change, and we become aware of her as a complex being living the life of blood, nerve, and instinct, as well as the more articulate life of society and intellect. It is right that the day should start with Pandarus and end with the dream. The structure of this section of the poem suggests the deepening significance of the action — suggests the conflicting forces of society, rational indecision, and emotional and instinctive response, and the extent to which the fate of the lovers will be determined by the quality of their whole being rather than by conscious decision. The pattern set here foreshadows and dispels the apparent contradiction between Criseyde's resistance to Pandarus as he urges her to see Troilus on the night of the consummation and her words as Troilus takes her in his arms:

"Ne hadde I or now, my swete herte deere,
Ben yolde, iwys, I were now nat here." (III, 1211)

It prepares us for the easy assurances of return that Criseyde can give Troilus before she faces the difficulties actually involved, and for the contrast between her determination,

"To Troie I wol, as for conclusioun" (V, 765)

and her entry into her father's tent the tenth night as the stars wheel relentlessly overhead and Troilus and Troy town start slipping knotlessly "thorughout hire herte." It explains the stunning self-ignorance of her words as she realizes too late that to be carried off by Troilus would be the happiest solution of her impasse:

"To late is now to speke of that matere;
Prudence, allas, oon of thyn eyen thre
Me lakked alwey, or that I com here." (V, 745)

The deepening experience of life that begins for Criseyde on the fateful day she listens to Pandarus ends in the distortion of her recognition of Troilus

"As for the gentileste, trewely,
That evere I say, to serven feythfully". (V, 1076)

Instead of this real appreciation we have the weak innuendoes of her final letter

"Ek grete effect men write in place lite,
Thentente is al..." (V, 1630)

as she seeks to justify and conceal the weakness that has betrayed her into the arms of "this sodeyn Diomede."

The connections of this opening section of Book II with the rest of the poem are not exhausted by the light thrown on Criseyde's nature.[3] Two stanzas, one at the beginning and the other at the close of the day, relate through a muted contrast to an even deeper significance of the action, to the nature of love as the poem explores and exposes its paradoxes. The first of these stanzas describes the swallow waking Pandarus with its chattering song:

> The swalowe, Proigne, with a sorwful lay,
> Whan morwen com, gan make hire waymentynge,
> Whi she forshapen was, and evere lay
> Pandare abedde, half in a slomberynge,
> Til she so neigh hym made hire cheterynge,
> How Tereux gan forth hire suster take,
> That with the noyse of hire he gan awake. (II, 70)

The second describes the nightingale singing as Criseyde thinks over the events of the day and falls asleep:

> A nyghtyngale, upon a cedre grene
> Under the chambre wal ther as she lay,
> Ful loude song ayein the moone shene,
> Paraunter, in his briddes wise, a lay
> Of love, that made hire herte fressh and gay.
> That herkened she so longe in good entente,
> Til at the laste the dede slepe hire hente. (II, 924)

These two stanzas, for which no hint appears in Boccaccio's *Il Filostrato*, with their parallel subject matter still further set off by their position at the beginning and the end of the day, present in one respect a significant contrast. The classical legend in which both swallow and nightingale figure dominates the first stanza, but is carefully excluded from the second. The psychological appropriateness of this contrast is apparent. For Pandarus, still suffering the throes of his unsuccessful suit, the swallow's song brings Procne and the fatal consequences of her husband's love for Philomel to mind. But for Criseyde, who has just heard Antigone sing of love's innocent bliss, who has herself been moved more deeply than she realizes by what the day has brought to her ears and her eyes, the nightingale has no such meaning. Her heart made fresh and gay by the song, she sinks into a deep sleep and her dream of the eagle.

Thus the legend with its ominous message does not intrude on the crescent love. As we approach the center of the poem and the triumphant paean to love in the third book, the knowledge implied by the legend of Philomel is muted. But though the nightingale singing a "lay of love" does not suggest Philomel to Criseyde, to the reader it can hardly fail to recall, however faintly, what was explicit so short a time before. The note of warning thus sounded as love starts taking root in Criseyde's heart foreshadows one of the oppositions basic in the poem's final meaning. Love at its most intense brings men as in the third book to a sense of the omnipotent, the eternal. It is an aspect of the power that forms and moves and rules all things. But human frailty cannot for long sustain that intensity. Love between human beings exposes their limitations, their weakness. Somehow love wanes or changes or is betrayed. Thus in the fifth book Chaucer can both pity Criseyde and point out to "yonge fresshe folkes" the only security men can have in the imperfect world —

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[3] The connection between the story Criseyde and her companions are reading and the interpretation of Troilus's dream by Cassandra in Book V is pointed out in Patch, *On Rereading Chaucer*, (Cambridge, 1948) pp. 70 f. For a discussion of further implications of Criseyde's dream of the eagle, see my note in *Explicator* IX (No. 4), 26.

> For he nyl falsen no wight, dar I seye. (V, 1845)

Both the triumph of love and its failure are experienced intensely in the poem; each is valid and each helps to define the other (see Pandarus's "Of two contraries is o lore" I, 645). This thematic tension is implicit in the contrast between the swallow-stanza and the nightingale-stanza, between the opening and the close of the day on which Criseyde learns of Troilus's love.

Charles A. Owen Jr.

THE RHYMES IN "GUILLAUME D'ANGLETERRE"

In the opening lines of *Guillaume d'Angleterre* the poet states his purpose in the following terms:

> Crestiiens se veut entremetre,
> Sans nient oster et sans nient metre,
> De conter un conte par rime,
> U consonant u lionime,
> Ausi com par ci le me taille;
> Mais que par le conte s'en aille,
> Ja autre conte ne prendra,
> La plus droite voie tenra
> Que il onques porra tenir,
> Si que tost puist a fin venir. (Lines 1-10)[1]

These lines seem to be peculiarly provocative for the following reasons: (1) they give the author's name, *Crestiiens;* (2) they indicate his resolution to tell his story; (3) they furnish technical names for the versification to be used in his "conte par rime"; (4) they suggest that he will not be deterred from his purpose, no matter what the difficulties might be.

The present study is concerned primarily with the third of these points. What exactly did *Crestiiens* mean by the terms "consonant" and "lionime" and why does he feel it necessary to call attention to his feat in this manner? Obviously, the answers proposed to these questions might have some bearing on the other points mentioned above, but our intention here is to study and classify the kinds of rhymes used in the poem.

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[1] Bibliography used in this study is as follows: the edition used for reference and quotations is that of Maurice Wilmotte, *CFMA*, Paris, Champion, 1927; E. Freymond, "Ueber den reichen Reim bei altfranzösischen Dichtern bis zum Anfang des XIV.Jahrhunderts," *Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie*, I (1882); Georges Lote: *Histoire du vers français*, Tome II, Première Partie, Paris, Boivin, 1951; A. Tobler: *Le vers français, ancien et moderne*, traduit par K. Bruel et L. Sudre, Paris, Viewveg, 1885; G. Cohen: *Chrétien de Troyes et son œuvres*, Paris, Boivin, 1931.

Specialized detail concerning rhyme could hardly have been of great interest to *Crestiiens'* audience and the poet's attempt to emphasize this technical information leads us to speculate, beyond the points suggested above, on the currency of such rhyming devices among his contemporaries on their use in Chrétien de Troyes' romances and on the identity of the *Crestiiens* of line 1. The answers to some of these questions can only be tentative until more knowledge comes to light, but suggestions may emanate from the present study.

The meaning of the term *léonine*, or "*lionime*" in *Guillaume*, has long been misunderstood and more fiction than fact has been written about its nature, origin, dates, use and popularity. There are, however, two studies in particular which have done much to clear away the accumulation of error and misconception and which have been constantly used in the present study. They are the article by E. Freymond and the more recent work of Georges Lote, both of which have been cited in the Bibliography. It is the latter which we have found most useful and Lote's classifications have been followed here for the sake of clarity.

In his discussion of rhyme in general, Lote says (p. 95-97): "La rime... exige l'identité non seulement de la voyelle tonique, mais encore de toutes les articulations subséquentes: *métier* et *forestier*, *fort* et *tort* sont des rimes... En langue vulgaire la rime apparaît pour la première fois dans une œuvre provençale, *La Chanson de Sainte Foy d'Agen*, écrite au milieu du xi^e^ siècle en laisses octosyllabiques, tandis que les textes contemporains ne connaissent encore que l'assonance. Celle-ci règne encore en maîtresse pendant toute la durée du xii^e^ siècle. A cette époque, il existe cependant quelques poèmes rimés: *le Voyage de Saint Brendan*, vers 1125, *Le Sermon rimé*; *le Comput* et *le Bestiaire* de Philippe de Thaon, qui sont sensiblement aussi anciens, puis entre 1150 et 1175, *le Roman de Troie*, qui a pour auteur Benoît de Sainte-More, *le Roman de Thèbes*, et *le Roman d'Énée*, ainsi que les deux ouvrages de Wace, *la Geste des Bretons*, et *la Geste des Normands*, à quoi il faut ajouter encore l'abondante production de Chrétien de Troyes, et à la fin du siècle, divers autres poèmes."

A great part of the confusion in the study of rhyme has arisen because the same terms were used for many centuries but the terms referred to different things. It should be remembered that the love for rhyme and its intricacy develops over a long period of time and varying definitions for the same word were almost inevitable. Much of the hesitation among present day scholars has resulted from taking the discussion of Machaut or Deschamps as applicable to the twelfth or thirteenth centuries.

Shift in the meaning of terms started almost at the beginning. The word *consonant* was used in Latin to designate a rhyme which existed between the caesura-syllable and the final-syllable.

"Les rimes suffisantes sont nommées en Latin *consonnantes* (Lote, p. 140) dans un texte cité par Thurot, reproduit par E. Freymond, et qui remonte peut-être au xi^e^ siècle: 'De Consonantibus Versibus: Consonantes dicuntur qui in principio tertii pedis et in fine ultima aliquam consonantiam tenent, ut est illud:

> Ethiopium terr*as* jam fervida torruit aest*as*.'

D'abord employée... pour désigner l'accord de la césure et de la rime, l'appellation est transférée à la finale du vers, lorsqu'il y règne une 'aliqua consonantia', c'est-à-dire, lorsque l'homophonie se borne à la tonique et aux consonnes dont elle est suivie."

I. Rime Pauvre

In general "rime pauvre," or "consonante" in *Guillaume*, or "suffisante," dominated all of the first half of the 12th century, in the Anglo-Norman territory, as well as in continental France. And it continued with full vigor into the 13th century. During these years it referred to the rhyme of the final syllables of succeeding lines, rather than following the Latin usage illustrated above. Since the term "rime pauvre" was applied only to the tonic syllable when final, such rhyme was, perforce, found only in masculine lines. Lote lists two types of "rimes pauvres":

1. *Assonant*: Ex. *-ént*: *-ént* (in the *Leys d'Amor* called "sonnant").
2. *Consonant*: Ex. *-mént*: *-mént* (in the *Leys d'Amor* called "consonnant").

From Lote's chart the following formula has been used to help clarify the categories:

1. *Assonant*: -V́(owel)C(onsonant): V C, or V́(owel):V́(owel)
2. *Consonant*: -C(onsonant) V́(owel)C(onsonant): C V́ C, or C(onsonant)V́(owel): C V́

The following is a list of the first ten examples of this category found in the *Guillaume d'Angleterre*:

Rimes pauvres (*suffisantes*) ("Consonantes" in *Guillaume*).

I. *Assonantes*; Ex. *-ént*: *-ént*; V́ C: V́ C, or V́:V́.

17:18	v*eut*: s*eut*	57:58	f*ist*: pr*ist*
19:20	r*oi*: l*oi*	61:62	gre*va*: al*a*
41:42	cr*ut*: d*ut*	67:68	grev*er*: al*er*
43:44	pl*ains*: m*ains*	69:70	command*a*: al*a*
51:52	p*ot*: bien *ot*	77:78	tress*aut*: h*aut*

Rimes pauvres (*suffisantes*) ("Consonantes" in *Guillaume*)

II. *Consonantes*. Ex. *-mént*: *-mént*; C V́ C: C V́ C, or C V́: C V.

(This group also includes those final syllables which begin with a semi-vowel or semi-consonant before the tonic vowel, since the distinguishing feature of this group seems to be that the rhyme begins with the element before the tonic vowel. Included in this group, also, is a certain number of rhyme pairs in which the first letter or letters of the final syllable do not correspond, l.333-334 c*roit*: d*roit*, while the whole syllable does not rhyme because of the initial letters of the consonant group, cr- dr-. Such groups have greater rhyming components than those found in the previous category, and must of necessity appear in this group). The first ten examples are listed.

45:46	*lui*: *lui*	111:112	*sien*: b*ien*
55:56	con*chut*: aper*cut* (cf. lines 65:66, and, particularly, 337:338, 603:604, for rhyme with *ch* and *c*.)	115:116	n*uit*: br*uit*
		123:124	moust*ier*: pro*ier*
		135:136	a*vient*: *vient*
63:64	le*voit*: a*voit*	143:144	mespris*iés*: proi*iés*
97:98	avés *droit*: oren*droit*	147:148	ar*gent*: povre *gent*

II. RIME LÉONINE

Léonine rhyme seems to have appeared in vernacular literature first in the *Saint Brendan*, where it is to be found in 161 of the 917 lines (Lote, p. 146). It is found also in Anglo-Norman literature of the 12th century. "Avant 1200 les poètes savants la recherchent. Hélinard, par exemple, en fait un usage répété. Au XIIIᵉ siècle, elle est encore rare dans les poèmes strophiques, mais elle l'est beaucoup moins ailleurs, surtout dans les poèmes didactiques, et de plus en plus elle acquiert une vogue qui ne cessera qu'avec la Renaissance" (Lote, 146).

Adolphe Tobler defines the terms as follows: "Les rimes où l'homophonie des terminaisons des mots commence avec la voyelle qui précède la tonique ont été appelées *léonines* — et aussi *superflues*, *doubles*, etc., comme ab*onder*: in*onder*; jouis*sance*: li*cence*; off*ensée*: p*ensée*" (page 150).

Lote says (page 145): "Il ne s'agit, en effet, chez tous les critiques que des voyelles: ce qui caractérise la rime léonine, c'est qu'elle en embrasse deux au lieu d'une, celle qui finit le mot, et celle dont la syllable finale est immédiatement précédée.... A prendre les chose en gros, on peut dire que l'accord de la consonne antécédente étant d'une manière générale toujours possible, mais non nécessaire, la rime suffisante se fait par la dernière syllable, à partir de la voyelle tonique, et la léonine par la dernière et par la pénultième à fois, à partir de la première voyelle, mais que le caractère léonin est indépendant de la place de l'accent, celui-ci pouvant tomber sur la première voyelle, si le mot est féminin, ou sur la seconde, s'il est masculin, pourvu que cet accent soit le même dans les deux mots accouplés."

Léonine rhyme may be found in both masculine and feminine lines, then, and consists of three types, i.e. *simple*, *parfait*, *plusqueparfait*.

Masculine	Feminine
1. *simple*: Ex. *-emént*: *-emént*	*-énte*: *-énte*
2. *parfait*: Ex. *-remént*: *-remént*	*-ménte*: *-ménte*
3. *plusqueparfait*: Ex. *-airemént*: *-airemént*	*-eménte*: *-eménte*

These types could be summed up in the following formulae:

Masculine	Feminine
1. *simple* V (C) V́ (C): V (C) V́ (C)	V́ (C) V: V́ (C) V
2. *parfait* C V (C) V́ (C): C V (C) V́ (C)	C V́ (C) V: C V́ (C) V
3. *plusqueparfait* V (C) V́ (C) V (C): V (C) V́ (C) V (C)	V (C) V́ (C) V: V (C) V́ (C) V

The first ten examples of each category are listed.

Rimes léonines

I. *Simple*. Masculine. Ex. *-emént*: *emént*; V C V́ (C): V C V́ (C), or V V́ (C): V V́ (C).

7: 8 pr*endra*: t*enra*
9: 10 *tenir*: *venir*
25: 26 il *eüst*: p*eüst*
27: 28 umil*ité*: car*ité*
39: 40 *signor*: *grignor*
65: 66 apr*ocier*: acouchier
71: 72 *voloit*: *soloit*
75: 76 *soner*: *touner*
91: 92 entent*ion*: avis*ion*
101:102 i *a tel*: *catel*

Rimes léonines

I. *Simple*. Feminine. Ex. *-énte*: *-énte*; V́ C V: V́ C V, or V́ V: V́ V

3: 4 *rime*: lion*ime*
5: 6 *taille*: s'en *aille*
11: 12 Engle*terre*: enq*uerre*
13: 14 *croire*: *voire*
21: 22 Egl*ise*: serv*ise*
29:30 roi*aume*: Guill*aume*
31:32 *sage*: lign*age*
47:48 ro*ïne*: mat*ine*
53:54 compaignie *orent*: *porent*
73:74 *eure*: dem*eure*

Rimes léonines

II. *Perfect*. Masculine. Ex. *-remént*: *-remént*: C V (C) V́ (C): C V (C) V́ (C)

15: 16 Sain*t* *Esmoing*: *tesmoing*
37: 38 *l'ama*: *clama*
95: 96 *savés*: vos *avés*
99:100 de*mander*: l'a*mander*
129:130 de*mandé*: a *mandé*
171:172 confe*ssion*: remi*ssion*
255:256 enpre*sissiés*: vo*sissiés*
257:258 *seü* avés *eü*
279:280 *parlé*: *par lé*
299:300 *venra*: *covenra*

Rimes léonines

II. *Perfect*. Feminine. Ex. *-ménte*: *-ménte*: C V́ (C) V: C V́ (C) V

1: 2 entre*metre*: nient *metre*
23: 24 pro*messe*: ne *messe*
33: 34 ra*conte*: el *conte*
59: 60 *ciere*: leg*iere*
85: 86 te *mande*: com*mande*
107:108 com*mande*: cort *mande*
125:126 *coutées*: es*coutées*
179-180 com*mande*: *mande*
185:186 de*livre*: et *livre*
205:206 que *sages*: mes*sages*

Rimes léonines

III. *Pluperfect*. Masculine. Ex. *-airemént*: *-airemént*; V (C) V (C) V́ (C): V (C) V (C) V́ (C)

49: 50 pros*perité*: *verité*
551:552 mang*eriiés*: *feriiés*
1087:1088 *i* *avoit*: li *avoit*
1115:1116 por *avoir*: signor *avoir*
1409:1410 *veïssiés*: *creïssiés*
1863:1864 des*lia*: donés *li a*
2339:2340 ap*arissant*: acl*arissant*
2911:2912 de*servi*: gré *servi*
3191:3192 de *cordé*: le *cor Dé*

Rimes léonines

III. *Pluperfect*. Feminine. Ex. *-eménte*: *-eménte*; V (C) V́ (C) V: V (C) V́ (C) V

35: 36 Grat*iiene*: crest*iiene*
127:128 *capele*: seul *apele*
167:168 ver*itable*: esper*itable*
173:174 *seüe*: *teüe*
239:240 *veüe*: aperc*eüe*
263:264 esb*ahie*: tr*aïe*
271:272 ceste p*artie*: dep*artie*
319:320 *porroie*: *morroie*
383:384 en *eüssent*: *seüssent*
519:520 m'*en chie*: est*anchie*

There is no way for us to know if Crestiiens was aware of the refinements of versifications and of the subdivisions within categories which we have listed in following Lote. One would suspect that he was aware of them and that he took pleasure in overcoming the obstacles and, as a sort of gesture of defiance at a difficulty conquered, even added a higher category, as if to prove that the task was not too difficult for him. Evidence for this suspicion can be gleaned from the last category only, where we see that twenty-seven pairs of rhymes out of the eighty-four pairs in the "pluperfect, feminine" category have an extra rhyming element — sometimes a single letter, sometimes a whole syllable is superfluous. Cf. lines 35:36, 167:168, 271:272, 639:640, 663:664, 671:672, 711:712, 1295:1296, 1357:1358, 1657:1658, 1727:1728, 1861:1862, 1895:1896, 1943:1944, 2151:2152, 2225:2226, 2277:2278, 2297:2298, 2523: 2524, 2633:2634, 2719:2720, 2875:2876, 2903:2904, 2963:2964, 3063-3064, 3109: 3110, 3155:3156. No evidence for this suspicion can be found in the lower categories, for an added element there simply moves the rhyming pair up into the next higher category. Since he mentions only the types "consonant, lionime," we can be content with the statement that he has, according to our count, 1180 lines of consonant rhyme and 2148 lines of leonine rhyme.

An examination of the romances of Chrestien de Troyes shows the same use of rhymes — consonant and leonine — and the present writer finds in the remainder of this study, which is to be published subsequently, that the proportions seem to be about the same as in the *Guillaume d'Angleterre.* This similarity of intricacy of rhyme at the early dates usually ascribed to Chrestien de Troyes and the *Guillaume d'Angleterre* would add further support to the theory that the two "Chrestiens" authors are the same person.

Lote and Freymond, along with other scholars, have pointed out the infrequency of this type of rhyme during Chrestiens de Troyes' day. According to them it was known but not widely used. Perhaps the novelty of the device would help to explain why the author of the *Guillaume* felt called on to point out and emphasize his use of it in the opening lines of the poem. And perhaps it was the pride of a young and unknown poet seeking his way in the world which made him point to his accomplishment. Certainly his achievement reveals a mastery of the difficulties of versification which few, if any, poets have been able to equal. As Gustave Cohen has said: "Il lui (au vers narratif) a prêté toute l'aisance et la fluidité de la prose, sans presque jamais arrêter sa phrase au couple de rimes, comme l'avaient fait la plupart de ses prédécesseurs. Il excelle à enjamber la rime et à donner à un vers qui n'a que huit syllabes les coupes les plus variées, et le plus souvent la rime, aussi riche que facile, loin d'être une entrave est la source, par association de sons, d'association d'idées qui engendrent de jolis images ou d'ingénieuses comparaisons. Des unes et des autres nous avons cité d'innombrables exemples à propos de chacun de ses romans où il nous était facile de les puiser, car, comme dit l'un de ses contemporains, Huon de Méon, dans son *Tournoiement Antéchrist,* Chrétien versait 'le bel françois trestot a plain'" (page 509).

William S. Woods.

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